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Abstract 
The thesis tests the hypothesis made elsewhere (Banks 1991, Kritkautsky 
1995) that, on regaining independence, Lithuania had the capacity to create 
an environmentally sustainable society based on historical connections 
with the land and mass support for environmental issues during the 
fight for independence from the Soviet Union. It is found that the priority 
given to environmental issues on the Lithuanian political agenda has 
declined since the restoration of independence. Regardless of the political 
leanings of those in power, these goals have been replaced by immediate 
economic and political concerns, hindering any possibility for the creation 
of an environmentally progressive society. 
The factors involved in the rise and fall of environmental issues and of 
the Green movement in Lithuania are discussed, together with the 
connection these have with secession from the USSR, and the pattern of 
economic and social development that has followed. It is found that, 
since the restoration of independence, environmental problems remain 
and initial hopes of integrating environmental and economic policy have 
failed. In looking at all the influences involved in resolving environmental 
problems, the future of environmental policy in Lithuania is assessed. 
Two case studies are provided which highlight the interrelationship 
between economics, ecological problems, political priorities, national 
identity, and social conditions. Water pollution, particularly in the Baltic 
Sea and the Nemunas River, is an environmental priority in Lithuania 
but there are several obstacles to its improvement and it cannot be resolved 
without international cooperation. Energy production has been one of 
the most controversial issues in Lithuania, with debate initiated even 
before secession. The continued operation of the Soviet-designed nuclear 
power plant at Ignalina and the proposed construction of the 
environmentally destructive and economically inefficient oil terminal at 
Butinge demonstrate the relatively low priority given to environmental 
issues and the primacy of economic and political considerations in an 
atmosphere of strong national sentiment. 
National identity and environmental concern had an influential role in 
the fight to restore independence and this is examined within the context 
of social movement theory. The theory of an increasing concern for 
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economic issues is tested by discussing the connections between the 
environment and economic systems (in theory and practice), the situation 
in the USSR, CEE, Lithuania, and the EU and the negative implications 
these have had for environmental policy in those countries. 
An analysis of both internationally and domestically derived financing of 
environmental projects is also presented which highlights the nuclear 
and waste water treatment priority of programmes, identifies problems in 
using fiscal measures, and questions the values of international donors. 
The hypothesis is further tested by reviewing political developments, the 
process of rebuilding democracy, and the various legal reforms necessary 
for facilitating an open, sustainable society in which environmental issues 
are a priority. It is found that while some positive developments have 
occurred, such as legislative reform and some improvements in water 
quality, the primacy of economic development will continue at the expense 
of environmental protection. 
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Figure 1 .1 The B al tic Region 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Lithuania is one of several republics formerly occupied by the Soviet Union 
that are currently undergoing dramatic change in all areas of society as they 
re-establish themselves as independent nations. The revolt against 
communism throughout the region was unique in itself and the process of 
change that has followed has had no working precedence. In many ways the 
events didn't resemble earlier twentieth-century revolutions, and not only 
because they were made against socialism rather than in the name of it. 
They were not led by organised revolutionary parties, were mostly peaceful, 
and state power, as it were, melted away rather than having to be directly 
overthrown (Giddens 1994:110). 
Reform in just one area of society would be difficult for any country. Even 
more challenging for Lithuania, and others in the former communist bloc, 
is that reform is simultaneously being undertaken in all spheres of society. 
The uncharted nature of the transition from communism to capitalism has 
complicated the process which has been further compounded by economic 
problems and by the rebuilding of society on top of, rather than in place of, 
the old (Mason 1992:69). Lithuania, therefore, acts as an interesting case 
study for the examination of changes in the environment and environmental 
policy, and their relationship with the economic and political changes that 
have taken place since the restoration of independence in 1990/91. Such 
relationships are more difficult to identify under a more stable system. The 
process of change is extremely complicated, involving many obstacles, in 
the face of which many Lithuanians will struggle to remain motivated. 
Referring to the transition in the region, it has been noted that: 
[c]leaning up Eastern Europe will be a long, costly and often dispiriting process, 
disrupting the lives of millions. It will require cooperation with neighbours 
and involve an overthrow of the values of the immediate past...But,...it 
will also involve questioning the values of the Western donors whose money 
will be critical to the success of the clean-up (Cave 1990:7) (see Chapter 6). 
In examining the environmental problems of Lithuania, this thesis is 
concerned with the processes of social, economic, and political reform that 
have influenced both environmental impact and policy development. In 
doing so, it demonstrates the complex relationship between various facets of 
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society and how these affect the environment in Lithuania. 
As Lithuania has begun to transform society one cannot help wonder what 
Lithuanian society would have been like had annexation to the USSR never 
occurred. Many refer to the successful agricultural sector, which provided a 
sound economic base for the country in the inter-war period, as evidence of 
Lithuania's potential for economic leadership in the region. It is, of course, 
difficult to imagine what events would have occurred in the country and 
what situation it would be in if circumstances were different. Certainly they 
would have had a stronger economic base and they may have been a member 
of the European Union. On the other hand, the Lithuanian people may 
have felt more protective of their sovereignty, economic system, and resources 
and, therefore, been more inclined to oppose membership as the Scandinavian 
countries have done in recent years. 
There would not be a RBMK (1) nuclear reactor (see Chapter 2) but there may 
have been another type of reactor creating similar concerns. There would 
not be the pollution problems stemming from Soviet military sites or from 
over-sized antiquated factories. But there would have been other factories 
producing for the European market with their own serious impacts on the 
environment. One can wonder whether the Lithuanian forests and lakes of 
today would still exist in their present quantities or whether the pressures of 
economic development would have led to more land clearance and 
construction in a small country (see 1.4). There are endless possibilities in 
hypothesising about what may have been. 
It is not the intention of this thesis to claim either possibility, but it is worth 
pointing out that there are serious environmental problems in Lithuania 
resulting not only from the policies of the Soviet Union, but from economic 
development in general which would have occurred to some extent under a 
sovereign government. There would still be environmental problems to 
discuss in Lithuania had they continued to develop independently after 
World War II and some of these problems may have been worse than those 
that Lithuania currently faces. Yet, Lithuania was forceably incorporated 
into the Soviet Union and this has had impacts on all sectors of society and 
it forms the context in which present problems are discussed. 
1 Reaktory Bolshoi Moshchnosti Kalalynye (High Powered Charmalised Reactor) 
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1.2 Aims and Objectives 
The primary aim of this thesis is to test the hypothesis made elsewhere 
(Banks 1991, Kritkausky 1995) that, following the restoration of independence 
in 1990/91, Lithuania would take a lead in developing an environmentally 
progressive society. Lithuania was seen as being in an opportune position 
to do so, even though contemporary environmental awareness had evolved 
over a much shorter period of time than in the West. Lithuania's pagan 
ancestry of venerating nature and its subsequent historical connection with 
the land strengthened the possibility of Lithuania creating an 
environmentally sustainable society; together with the fact that 
environmental issues had already played an influential role in the restoration 
of independence. Further, reforms were necessary in all spheres of society, 
thereby facilitating and mitigating the effects of any associated upheaval. 
An examination of the background to this hypothesis is made, including 
early Lithuanian perceptions of nature; the way in which these perceptions 
led to a respect for the land; and the development of cultural and national 
identity in general. Further, this thesis analyses the role environmental:, 
issues played during Lithuania's secession from the USSR, issues which 
were believed to be linked to early pagan perceptions of the environment 
and Lithuania's strong national identity. 
To ascertain whether there are prospects for the creation of an 
environmentally sustainable society in Lithuania, it is necessary to assess 
the amount of commitment the Government, and the people, expend towards 
these ends. This thesis, therefore, presents an analysis of economic systems 
and their impact on the environment in theory and practice. The impacts 
of both the Soviet system and the free market system of the European Union 
are used to gauge past and future impacts in Lithuania. It also includes an 
evaluation of community action on environmental issues during the 
secession and in the years following the restoration of independence, as well 
as the avenues being created to facilitate public participation. 
The commitment of Lithuania to environmental issues is evaluated by 
ascertaining government priorities and the financial support of the state for 
environmental rehabilitation and protection programmes. The role played 
by international assistance in environmental rehabilitation and protection, 
including the motives and priorities of donors, is also discussed. 
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Environmental decisions are made within the political climate of a particular 
country. Therefore, a discussion of the political situation in Lithuania and 
the priorities of the major parties is presented in order to establish political 
will. Democratic processes are a crucial aspect of an environmentally 
sustainable society, particularly the establishment of avenues for public 
participation in the decision-making process. Rebuilding democracy has 
been a major part of the reform process in Lithuania, so an analysis of its 
development and any problems faced is important in establishing the 
prospects for environmental sustainability in Lithuania. Another indication 
of commitment is the development of legal measures which protect 
environmental integrity and which provide mechanisms for participation, 
responsibility, and accountability. An overview of the relevant 
environmental legislation is also provided in this thesis, with the aim of 
ascertaining commitment to environmental rehabilitation and protection 
in Lithuania. 
In testing the hypothesis, the thesis demonstrates the complex situation in 
which post-communist countries have been placed. The increasingly obvious 
problems of pollution, high inflation, lack of services, energy short falls, 
poor technology, and crime are not easily resolved simultaneously. While 
looking in particular at the environmental issues in Lithuania, it becomes 
clear that so many issues are inseparable. The thesis highlights some of the 
factors involved in the rise and fall of environmental concern and the 
Green movement and the connection these have with both secession from 
the USSR and the pattern of economic and social development that followed. 
In doing so, the thesis aims to ascertain why environmental problems remain 
and why hopes of integrating environmental and economic policy (thereby 
creating an environmentally sustainable society) appear to have failed. By 
looking at all the influences involved in attempts to resolve environmental 
problems, the future of environmental policy in Lithuania is assessed. 
It is found that the aforementioned hypothesis has not proved correct. There 
are a number of reasons for this; primarily, economic adversity (which, in 
turn, leads to the pursuit of economic rationalist goals), strong national 
sentiment, an undeveloped political culture, and ineffective administrative 
structures. All of these have become a hindrance to the priority given to 
environmental issues, as is evident in the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE). Even if desires for environmental protection are given some 
measure of importance by future governments, there will still be barriers to 
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successful implementation of such policies. It is argued that it is only possible 
to avoid such a pessimistic prognosis if it is recognised that economic recovery 
is dependent on a healthy environment, ultimately requiring adequate 
environmental planning to mitigate against the effects of increased 
production. This can only be achieved by enacting environmentally sound 
policies with a long-term focus, followed up by effective implementation, 
and, ultimately, co mm itment to the notion of environmental protection in 
general. 
1.3 Method 
The thesis is written from an environmental perspective and, to that end, 
has the protection of the natural environment (which includes the health 
and well being of the human inhabitants) as its highest priority. A thesis 
with a different focus might have different conclusions but that is not to say 
that this thesis ignores other perspectives. Social, political, and economic 
issues are also considered from within the environmental perspective. A 
central tenent of Green political theory is the understanding that political, 
economic, and social problems are fundamentally caused by our intellectual 
relationship with the non-human world and the practices which stem frorri 
it. Thus, research which appreciates the interdependence of the human and 
non-human worlds, and the parts within them, is preferable to a reductionist 
approach in which things are studied in isolation (Dobson 1990:37). This 
multidisciplinary approach provides a clearer picture of the way in which 
environmental problems are interrelated with social (including religious), 
economic, and political problems and the degree of influence each has on 
daily life and future directions. The majority of articles about Lithuania are 
written from an economic perspective on the problems of reform. This 
narrow focus demonstrates how interrelationships can be ignored or lost 
(see Chapter 5). 
The thesis was prepared primarily in Tasmania, Australia between February 
1992 and March 1997 but involved three research trips to Lithuania, one of 6 
months in 1992, one of 10 weeks in 1994 (which coincided with two 
international conferences that I attended, where further comments, contacts, 
and information were collected making the second trip 4 months in duration), 
and a third of ten weeks in 1996 (which coincided with an invitation to 
present a paper at an international workshop in Vilnius). During these 
research trips, information was gathered by way of interviews with politicians, 
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ministry employees, consultants, green activists, academics, scientists, and 
students and through requests of such people to provide documents, articles, 
or reports. A small survey of 96 university students and 37 green activists 
was conducted in 1992 to gain an understanding of the level of environmental 
awareness. The questionnaire was administered to students at Vytautas 
Magnus and Vilnius Universities at the beginning of various classes and at 
an "English Club" meeting. There were 16 questions, primarily multiple 
choice but including open-ended questions relating to perceived 
environmental problems. Students were also asked about voting preferences. 
A copy of the questionnaire appears in the appendix and some results are 
referred to in Chapters 2, 3, and 4. It was originally hoped that the survey 
would be more extensive and could be repeated at a later date but for various 
logistical reasons it was not and, therefore, remains largely anecdotal. 
The time spent in Lithuania was invaluable in terms of understanding the 
social, economic, and environmental problems since a researcher cannot 
expect to grasp the specific tension between economics and the environment, 
for example, if they have never experienced life in that country. Such 
tensions are, of course, common to all societies, but the particular issues, 
problems, and priorities will differ in each country and are often contingent 
on specific cultural and political contexts. 
The economic hardship at the individual and family level was made patently 
clear during the first visit in 1992. At that time, inflation was extremely 
high(2) while wages failed to increase comparably. In addition, due to conflicts 
with the Russian government regarding debts on each side, Lithuania was 
expected to pay world market prices for oil, effectively resulting in an "oil 
embargo". The consequences of this was that central heating was provided 
late and only at 13 degrees Celsius while hot water was unavailable except to 
hospitals and on occasional days, despite outside temperatures of minus 
15°C. 
The severity of the environmental problems, in particular in energy, waste 
water treatment, abandoned Soviet military sites, and poor technology-related 
air pollution, also highlight the difference between problems in Lithuania 
and Western countries such as Australia. This is especially so when the 
aforementioned economic and infrastructure problems are linked with the 
2. Inflation was 380% in 1991 and 1160% in 1992 (Samonis 1996:145). 
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impacts on the morale of society. Case studies are used to illustrate the 
unique situation in Lithuania, while many of the issues are indicative of all 
post-communist countries (see Chapters 2 and 3). 
1.3.1 Limitations 
It was difficult to obtain relevant material in English and, on occasions, 
some articles were translated with much appreciated assistance from Darius 
Sabaliunas, Kristin Baird, Aloyzas Knabikas, Jadvyga Druskiene, and Algirdas 
Makarevicius. The language barrier caused further problems in interviewing. 
On some occasions, interviews were carried out with the assistance of an 
interpreter - most often not trained in such a position. Despite developing 
conversational skills in Lithuanian, it was never certain that everything 
was being repeated or that the questions were understood by the interpreter. 
When the interviewee spoke English it was much easier, however there 
were still problems with catching exact meanings on both sides and 
misunderstandings were a common phenomenon. Perhaps the most 
common misunderstanding was in regards to the research approach. It was 
not only a language barrier that left people confused about what discipline 
was the focus for the research. The concept of multidisciplinary work fell 
largely on deaf ears, although the approach is being attempted at the new 
Department of Environmental Studies at Vytautas Magnus University in 
Kaunas and the Environmental Studies Centre at the University of Vilnius 
and welcomed by the Institute of Sociology, Philosophy, and Law in Vilnius. 
There were also blatant attempts to withhold information even though it 
was available for public dissemination, the only apparent reason being 
disagreement with my general views and an unwillingness to assist foreign 
researchers "who know nothing about Lithuania" and "who want to make 
money out of the country". Such protective attitudes on providing 
information, which include attempts to maintain some sense of secrecy and 
authority over information, are reported to be a legacy of the "old school" of 
Soviet intelligentsia and certainly highlight the way in which information 
was controlled in the past as well as the lasting influence such approaches 
have made. There are also implications of such attitudes for the rebuilding 
of democracy (see 7.2.3). 
It was difficult to maintain communication whilst back in Australia and the 
expected advantage of having developed contacts during the first trip was 
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minimal. To be fair, however, some successful correspondence provided 
invaluable material. Due to these problems, a second research trip became 
necessary in order to obtain missing data (much more of which was available 
in English), providing an opportunity to compare observations from the 
previous trip two years earlier. The third, unexpected trip to attend the 
Production, Economy, and Environment: Theories and Applications 
International Workshop, allowed further information collection and 
comparison. 
1.3.2 Notes on Terminology and Abbreviations 
Since 'environmentally sustainable society' in Lithuania is the focus of critical 
evaluation in this thesis, an interpretation of the term will now be provided. 
The foundation of Green thinking is the fact that the earth's natural resources 
are finite, putting limits on economic growth which utilises those finite 
resources. In addition, economic growth is exponential in character as are 
the associated environmental and social problems. The interaction between 
the various problems is such that solving one does not necessarily lead to 
the resolution of all the problems and may in fact exacerbate some. Further, 
the general trend toward technical solutions to environmental problems 
will not lead to sustainable society (Dobson 1990:77). 
Environmentalists have put forward various models of society which are 
aimed at sustainability including; 'centralised authoritarianism', 
'authoritarian communal system', a 'new global order', and 'anarchical 
society' (Dobson 1990:81-83). Dobson (1990) has argued that only the latter 
has all the main facets of the Green political ideology of a sustainable society, 
particularly, egalitarian and participatory principles. However, there are 
concerns that such a society in which 'government is the people' has little 
practical relevance, especially on a large scale. For the purposes of this 
thesis, the principles of equality and open, pluralistic, participatory democracy 
are taken as essential for environmentally sustainable society along with: a 
focus on small business and clean technology; costing of resources utilised; 
strict fiscal and legal measures to protect the environment and to facilitate 
public participation; financial support for nature protection for its own sake; 
support for environmental education, health, and welfare; and a preparedness 
to take no action in order to maintain environmental integrity - all of which 
are not possible without some degree of state intervention. The following 
chapters seek to ascertain whether Lithuania has been undertaking changes 
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in the environmental, economic, and legal sectors which would indicate a 
move toward such a society. 
The term USSR (United Soviet Socialist Republics) is used when referring 
to policies, events, or decisions taken by that government. The term Former 
Soviet Union (FSU) is used when discussing issues relevant to the most or 
all of the republics that were once a part of the USSR. The Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS) refers only to those republics that became members 
of that coalition (3). When discussion relates to countries of the former 
communist bloc in general they are referred to as such unless it specifically 
relates to those outside the FSU such as Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania at which time the term Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) is used. The European Community (EC) formally became the 
European Union (EU) at the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 and the 
latter is used when referring to the community, regardless of whether the 
issue relates to events prior to the Maastricht Treaty. When citing documents 
published by the organisation, the name on the published document is used 
(EC or EU). 
1.4 Lithuanian Overview 
1.4.1 Geography 
Lithuania's borders encompass an area of 65 300 km', with forests covering 
around 30 per cent and agricultural land accounting for 60 per cent of the 
total area (Duzinskas and Gutkauskas 1994:79 and Lithuanian Department 
of Statistics 1996). It is situated in the middle of the European continent, 
bordering Latvia in the north, Poland in the south, Kaliningrad in the south 
west, Byelorussia to the East, and the Baltic Sea to the west (see Figure 1.1). 
Its area is twice the size of Belgium (30 315 km') but smaller than Ireland 
(70 283 km 2). The capital, Vilnius, was established in the 14th Century by 
the Grand Duke Gediminas. 
The country is relatively flat and is endowed with a large network of lakes, 
rivers, and streams. At the beginning of the 11th Century, the Lithuanian 
landscape consisted of 56 per cent forest, 24 per cent wetlands, and 20 per 
3 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, Georgia, Kyrgystart, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russian 
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time, the population has decreased by approximately 35 000 mainly due to 
re-emigration to other parts of the FSU but also due to a natural decrease. In 
1994, the number of deaths exceeded the number of births by 3 654 people. 
The largest cause of death is diseases of the circulatory system (44.2 per cent), 
followed by injury and poisoning (including alcoholism) (21.7 per cent), and 
cancers (16.7 per cent). Since 1989, deaths caused by alcoholic intoxication 
increased by 4.1 times, murders by 2.4 times, and suicides by 69 per cent. 
These deaths have mainly been young men. Approximately 83 per cent of 
deceased young men (15-29 years) and about 50 per cent of older men died 
from accidents. This mortality rate amongst men has shortened the average 
life expectancy to 63.59 years while women in Lithuania can expect to live 
for 75.19 years (1955) )(Lithuanian Department of Statistics 1996c, Lithuanian 
Department of Statistics et a/. 1996). 
Market reform, new businesses and structures, inflation, and low salaries, 
have affected the labour market in Lithuania. The unemployment rate had 
already reached 7.5 per cent in 1995 and has increased to 8.5 per cent at the 
start of 1997. Unemployment has added to social problems throughout the 
region as welfare payments remain low. The Lithuanian figure is relatively 
average with Estonia having 6 per cent unemployed and Latvia 7 per cent. 
The Czech Republic has managed to keep unemployment at 3 per cent while 
in Poland 12.5 per cent of the able population does not have employment 
(Lithuanian Department of Statistics 1996b, Lithuanian Department of 
Statistics et al. 1996 and EL TA, December 4 1996) (see also 5.4.3.1). 
1.4.3 History 
This thesis does not contain a comprehensive review or analysis of the 
history of Lithuania. It does contain discussion of the more recent events 
which led to the restoration of independence. That is not to say that history 
is unimportant. It is, in fact, a crucial element of the way in which Lithuanian 
society has developed and the nature of the existing environmental practices 
and associated problems. It also forms a backdrop for the way in which such 
problems are perceived and managed. The historical context is crucial to 
understanding present events in any country yet it is important to recognise 
its influence and significance without allowing it to achieve analytical 
dominance. It is, therefore, extremely important for this thesis yet the 
limitations of space require its detailing to be left to the historians. Excellent 
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Table 1.1 Significant Historical Events in Lithuania 
Date 	 Event  
1251 	 Mindaugas converts to Christianity 
1253 Mindaugas crowned King of Lithuania by Pope Innocent IV 
1263 	 King Mindaugas and his sons assassinated. Lithuania reverts to paganism  
1385 Lithuanian ruler, Jogaila, marries Polish Queen, Jadwyga, starting Jagellian 
dynasty which continued in Lithuania-Poland until 1572 
1387 Feb 1 	Bishopric of Vilnius established  
1410 	 Battle of Tannenberg. Teutonic knights are overwhelmingly defeated by 
Lithuanians and Poles 
1558 	 Ivan the Terrible invades Baltic provinces 
1569 Union of Lublin with Poland. Lithuania-Poland countered Tsar Ivan the Terrible 
in a 24 year war  
1795 	 Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth petitioned - most of Lithuania (except 
Klaipeda region) is taken over by Russia  
1795-1915 	Occupation of Lithuania by Tsarist Russia  
1830 1863 Polish-Lithuanian revolts against Russian rule  
1915-1918 	German occupation of Lithuania  
1917 Jan Woodrow Wilson's speech on self determination 
Lithuania renews resolution for independence 
Lenin acknowledges the right to self-determination 
1918 Feb 16 	Lithuania declares independence. Initially governed by a presidential 
triumvirate 
1918 Nov 11 	WWI ends. First government of independent Lithuania is officially formed  
1919-1921 Lithuanians, Poles, and Bolsheviks struggle for the Vilnius region. Poland claims 
Vilnius. Lithuania is governed from Kaunas  
1919 April 4 	Smetona becomes first president of Lithuania 
1920 	 Establishment of parliamentary government 
Lithuania signs Treaty of non-aggression with Russia 
1921 Sept 	Lithuania accepted at League of Nations 
1922 July US recognition of Lithuanian State. Democratic constitution introduced 
1923 	 Lithuania seizes Klaipeda from Germany 
1926 National Party takes over parliament by military force. Smetona resumes power 
1934 	 Co-operation Treaty between Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania  
1939 Aug 23 	Signing of Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, dividing Poland and the Baltic States 
between Germany and the USSR. Lithuania is seen as a German "sphere of 
influence" 
Sept 1 	Germany invades Poland. WWII begins 
Sept 17 USSR invades Poland 
Sept 18 	USSR occupies Vilnius 
Oct 10 Vilnius returned to Lithuania on signing mutual assistance pact with USSR. 
Soviet troops stationed in Lithuania 
1940 June 15 	Red Army occupies Lithuania. Smetona flees Lithuania 
June 17 Formation of People's Government in Lithuania as a result of puppet elections 
July 21 	Lithuania "applies" for admission to the USSR 
Aug 3 Lithuania annexed, major confiscation of property 
Oct 9 	Formation of Lithuanian Activist Front  
1941 Jan 10 Protocol of Molotov-Ribbentrop pact transfers Lithuania to Soviet influence in 
exchange for 7.5 million gold dollars 
June 14-22 	Deportations of over 30 000 Lithuanians to Siberia 
June 22 Germany invades USSR. Around 100 000 Lithuanians stage a revolt against 
Soviets 
June 23 	Formation of provisional government and declaration of independence (never 
recognised by Germany) 
Aug 5 	Provisional government declares itself involuntarily suspended and disbands  
1941-1944 About 170 000 Lithuanians and 200 000 Jews murdered by Nazis  
1943 Jan-Feb 	Germany defeated at Stalingrad 
June 6 Allied landings in Normandy 
July 	Red Army re-enters Lithuania. Approximately 60 000 refugees eventually reach 
Western Europe 
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Table 1.1 continued 
Date 	 Event 
Guerilla warfare in Lithuanian forests. Tens of thousands killed on both sides  
Soviet re-occupation completed with the fall of Klaipeda sea port 
Mass deportations. 250 000 Lithuanians deported 
United Democratic Resistance Movement formed 
First post-war collective farm established 
Collectivisation of agriculture effectively completed 
End of unified guerilla resistance 
Death of Stalin. Recovery of culture and literature 
First edition of the Catholic dissident newsletter, The Chronicle of the Catholic 
Church of Lithuania is published, detailing Soviet repression in Lithuania  
Death of Breshnev. Andropov begins attempts at reform from above 
Appointment of Mikhail Gorbachev as Secretary General of Soviet Communist 
Party. Introduction of glasnost and perestroika 
Explosion at Chernobyl nuclear power plant, giving impetus to environmental 
protests. Lithuanian Writers Union issues statement condemning ecological 
problems 
1944-1952 
1945 Jan 28 
1945-1949 









Foundation of Sajudis 
Founding of environmental group, Atgaja, indicating the beginning of a 
contemporary environment movement in Lithuania 
Mass rallies to mark anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Turning-point 
for Lithuanian independence 
Founding Congress of the Lithuanian Green Movement 
Algirdas Brazauskas returns Vilnius Cathedral to the Church 
Declaration of sovereignty 
Formation of the Lithuanian Green Party 
'Baltic Way' -2 million people form a chain of hands, from Vilnius to Tallinn, 
calling for independence 	 -- 
Declaration of full independence. Vytautas Landsbergis elected Chairman 
Moscow stops oil shipments to Lithuania 
Baltic Co-operation Treaty of 1934 is renewed. Baltic Council established 
Lithuania accepts, in principle, a moratorium on the declaration of • 
independence. Soviet economic blockade temporarily ends 
Soviet paratroopers seize the press centre in Vilnius 
Soviet troops seize television centre and tower in Vilnius - 13 people are shot or 
crushed by tanks 
Failed coup d'etat in Moscow 
Soviet State Council recognises Lithuanian independence 
Landsbergis initiated referendum to create a Presidential system is unsuccessful 
Russian oil embargo on Lithuania 
Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDDP), headed by Algirdas Brazauskas, 
win parliamentary elections. Referendum on presidential system is successful  
Brazauskas elected President of Lithuania 
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia form a Baltic Council of Ministers to present a 
united front on EU and NATO membership 
Lithuania signs free trade agreement with EU 
"Mafia" boss, Boris Dekanidze is executed as Lithuania attempts to eliminate 
corruption 
Offices of Lietuvos Rytas are bombed 
Lithuania formally submits application to EU 
US President Clinton re-affirms commitment to Baltic Republics 
Lithuanian Prime Minister, Slezevicius, dismissed from Parliament for abuse of 
powers 
Homeland Union, headed by Landsbergis, wins national elections 
New Lithuanian Government formed by Homeland Union and Christian 
democrats. Landsbergis becomes Chairman of Parliament and Vagnorius 
becomes Prime Minister 





1989 May 18 
May 
Aug 23 








1992 May 23 
Sept/Oct 
Oct 25 
1993 Feb 14 
1994 June 13 
July 18 




1996 Feb 8 
Oct 20 
Nov 13 
Sources: Lieven 1993, Srugoiene-Sruoga 1987, Suziedelis 1965 and Tuskenis 1986 
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1965, Silbajoris (ed.) 1983, Senn 1993, Hiden and Salmon 1994, and Rowell 
1994. An overview of important dates in the history of Lithuania is provided 
in Table 1.1. 
Norgaard and Pedersen (1994) have argued that environmental policies in 
the Baltics are shaped by three analytically separate historical forces: their 
post-communist systemic legacy as shared with other post-communist 
countries; the Baltic identity created through a prism of collective memory 
of the western-style programmes pursued in the independence years of the 
interwar period; and autonomous historical events which have led to 
individual national identity. Where relevant, reference is made to specific 
events or general circumstances which have influenced either the 
environmental situation or the way in which it is managed. The thesis 
mostly contains discussion of more recent history (1940 to 1996), although 
earlier events are considered. Chapters 4, 5, and 7 refer most to historical 
events and their implications for the environment in present day Lithuania. 
As a starting point, some general historical points ought to be made. 
Perhaps the most relevant aspect of Lithuanian history to this thesis is their 
record of resisting interference, with a view to protecting their territory and 
culture, from the many "outsiders" that have sought to control the small 
but geographically well-placed country. This tendency was influential in 
Lithuania becoming the last state in Europe to be Christianised in 1387. 
Resistance has essentially comprised two distinct forms; military struggle as 
used in the forests following the Soviet annexation, and cultural activities 
designed to maintain Lithuanian language and national identity in the face 
of 'Russification'. In terms of the latter, literature had 'an important capacity 
in supporting national identity' (Rubavicius 1994:45). 
Lithuania is a nation state which emerged from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania 
following various Unions with Poland and many years of occupation by 
Tsarist Russia (see Table 1.1). They have had relatively few years as an 
independent nation, but have consistently fought for independence on the 
basis of their national identity. Independence between 1918-1940 was short-
lived and, on June 15 1940, Lithuania was invaded by Soviet Russia (this 
period is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4). Drastic social and economic 
changes were carried out and a totalitarian military-based dictatorship was 
put in place, and annexation soon followed (Budreckis 1969:314). Resistance 
was essentially passive in 1940, using anti-Soviet literature to condemn the 
14 	 Chapter One 
occupation while the development of the Lithuanian Activist Front (LAF) 
led to more organised action (Budreckis 1969:316-19) (see also Chapter 4). 
Underground resistance swelled waiting for an opportunity to revolt. 
It seemed the hour of deliverance was upon Lithuania when Germany 
attacked Kaunas on June 22 1941 and the Red Army began to withdraw. It 
was at this point that the LAF announced a provisional independent 
Lithuanian Government and violent clashes between Lithuanian rebels and 
the Red Army began until, on the night of June 23, the Red Army was 
driven out of Kaunas. The little-known provisional Government, which 
operated for 6 weeks, demonstrates that the revolt was organised and had a 
specific purpose: independence. During the six week period, the Government 
also resisted German authorities who did not recognise the Government. 
Eventually Germany created the administrative region of Ostland (Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Byelorussia) on July 28, 1941. Resistance continued 
under German control, lasting until re-occupation by the Soviet Union in 
the summer of 1944 which saw the beginning of a partisan war that finally 
ended with the death of Stalin (Budreckis 1969:323-29 and 353). 
The restoration of independence began with a declaration in 1990 while 
universal acknowledgment of this status culminated with the failed coup 
d'etat against Gorbachev and the subsequent break up of the Soviet Union 
in August 1991 (see Chapter 4). Characterised by its peacefulness, the 
Lithuanian secession also involved violence, such as on January 13, 1991 
when 13 people were killed as citizens protected media outlets and the 
parliament from oncoming Soviet tanks employed to quash aims of 
independence (see Valstybinis Leidybos Centras 1991. and Taskunas (ed.) 1992). 
As this thesis shows, the tradition of resistance is also important in 
understanding the strong national sentiment in Lithuania which was crucial 
for cultural survival in the Soviet Union and ultimately for realising 
secession. National identity has also had implications for environmental 
policy. While the pagan perception of the environment set the scene for an 
environmentally aware society, a combination of other factors such as the 
more recent Catholic tradition, national sentiment fuelled by the history of 
control and resistance, and poor economic conditions in the years since the 
restoration of independence, have dominated the way in which 
environmental problems are perceived and managed. The pagan respect for 
nature and connection with the land has been seen as a basis for optimism 
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regarding the environmental situation in Lithuania (for example see Banks 
1991). However, it must be viewed as a factor of Lithuania's cultural history 
which, while certainly influential in the evolution of national identity, is 
not an indication of present perceptions and policies. While there has been 
a revival of pagan philosophy and folklore, it has not had a strong influence 
in the modern Lithuanian way of life (see 4.2.1 and 4.3.2). 
1.5 The Environmental Situation in Perspective 
The Soviet Union's environmental protection policy was based on the 
assumption that collective ownership and central planning would solve 
environmental protection issues. Slogans such as "all for the good of man" 
and "we cannot wait for favors from nature; our task is to take from her", 
reinforced a modernist and anthropocentric worldview that the USSR's 
boundless riches were ripe for exploitation. A preoccupation with industrial 
development arose with a philosophy that big was better, huge was best, and 
science solved all the problems (Peterson 1993:11). Economic activity was 
centrally controlled so as to maintain relative interdependence among 
republics (see 2.2.1 and 5.4.1.1). There has been a tendency for authors to 
accuse the Soviet regime of ecocide, implying widespread environmental 
destruction. While this is true for many areas, there are huge differences 
between various parts of Central and Eastern Europe (Hansen 1995:20). There 
have also been significant acute and chronic pollution problems in the West. 
In the communist system, the emphasis was on production quotas rather 
than quality so little attention was paid to environmental or social controls, 
yet sites for industrial development tended to be aggregated in specific areas. 
This left a mixed legacy for the future. On the one hand, industrial pollution 
is severe in these industrial areas, but on the other hand, most industrial 
areas are fairly distinct, and environmental damage is less widespread than 
it has been in western Europe. There is, therefore, much that remains to be 
protected (Fisher for EBRD 1994:xi) (see also 1.5). 
For example, it has been estimated that about two thirds of the natural 
environment in Lithuania has been severely damaged through sustained 
industrial, agricultural, and transport-related pollution yet the state of flora 
and fauna is, in comparison with Western Europe, relatively good. Some 
species are under threat with transboundary pollution from the CIS being a 
major contributor (Duzinskas and Gutkauskas 1994: 80&84). Air quality 
problems in general also do not appear to be very serious by western standards 
(Harrington 1993:5). As Chapter 3 demonstrates, water pollution is of greater 
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concern in Lithuania. 
The environmental problems under examination and their relationship to 
social values, economics, and politics are by no means unique to Lithuania. 
Concern is growing world-wide regarding the effect of past policies on the 
environment and a re-evaluation of priorities has been taking place. 
[T]he interaction between continued economic development and the complex 
and often fragile systems on which development depends has become a major 
international political issue (Hurrell & Kingsbury 1992:2). 
The international ascendancy of environmental issues, particularly during 
the 1980s, was a contributing factor in the political (and symbolic) significance 
of environmental degradation during the revolutions throughout Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) (Fisher 1992:4- 
5). Concern from the international community gave some legitimacy to the 
work of activists in the region, particularly given the desire to re-enter that 
community. The world-wide interest in environmental issues and their 
resolution has led to the provision of environmental aid (see 6.2) and an 
increase in international agreements on the environment which need to be 
implemented at the national level. Lithuania, after rejoining the 
international community in 1991, has signed several of such agreements. 
The impact of these agreements (and indeed national environmental policies) 
is yet to be seen as implementation faces several obstacles including 
underdeveloped political, legal, and administrative structures, economic 
pressures, and a mistrust of scientific and technical expertise (Fisher 1992:6-9) 
(see Chapters 5, 6, and 7). 
Due to the much advertised environmental destruction in the post-
communist region, some confusion has arisen regarding the extent of the 
problems and the likelihood of recovery both within the nations and from 
outside. Duncan Fisher (1992) has usefully documented five categories of 
pollution problems specific to the CEE region which apply equally well to 
Lithuania and the other Baltic countries. 
1. 'Pollution problems that could be resolved easily in the process of 
economic change': referring to such issues as emission levels that 
could be reduced through economic reform combined with stricter 
regulation, increased energy pricing, and industry modernisation; 
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2. 'Immediate problems that need specific solutions which are not hugely 
expensive': including saline pollution in rivers or reducing impacts 
of domestic heating provision; 
3. 'Serious and expensive problems that are likely to get worse': including 
soil contamination affecting ground water supplies and river pollution 
where no treatment facilities exist; 
4. 'Serious problems which are not getting worse, and can be tackled 
when economic conditions are more favourable': referring to some 
cases of soil and water pollution as well as some waste management 
sites. These problems can cause difficulties for western investors 'at 
a time when liability regulations are ill defined'; and 
5. 'New problems that are emerging in the current process of economic 
development': These include the changing structure of energy supply 
(including nuclear energy); the dumping of unclean and outdated 
technologies by western industries; the changing composition of 
household waste (an increase in plastics, for example); and an increased 
impact on natural and cultural resources in the face of an expanding 
tourist and trade industry. 
The two most debated issues, argues Fisher, are the likelihood of effective 
implementation of environmental legislation during the process of change 
(as expressed in point 1) given that the administrative structures are not 
often in a position to implement and enforce the well prepared policies and, 
secondly, the pattern of future development which focuses on the emerging 
problems (point 5) which are a consequence of the process itself but could, 
and ought to, be avoided (or at least minimised) by careful and thoughtful 
planning taking into consideration the historical, cultural, and political 
contexts. The early intentions of integrating environmental considerations 
into economic policy, creating a new system mindful of environmental 
protection which transcended the limitations of the models provided by 
East and West, have been thwarted by a combination of obstacles from the 
political, legal, and social spheres. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 analyse these factors 
and their connections in an attempt to understand why the environment 
has fallen from the political agenda in Lithuania, why it was there in the 
beginning, and why so many environmental problems remain in light of 
their significant role in the re-establishment of political independence. 
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Essentially, this thesis is about environmental politics and economics. It is 
about change and the way in which social organisations have interacted in 
the process of political and economic reform in Lithuania. As such, its focus 
is not environmental problems per se, however, a significant part of the 
thesis (Chapters 2 and 3) is dedicated to particular environmental problems 
in Lithuania which help to identify the interaction and connections between 
economics, politics, culture, and the environment by examining issues such 
as national sentiment, social movements, inflation, economic and 
environmental aid, the development of a democratic political culture, the 
restructuring of parliament and the legal system, and environmental 
sustainability. These are but two examples of a number of environmental 
issues needing resolution in Lithuania such as solid and/or hazardous waste 
disposal, air pollution, forestry, and species extinction. 
The decision to develop a free market system in the countries of CEE and 
FSU has landed them with the description, 'countries in transition'. Manser 
(1993) argues that a more accurate description would be, 'middle-income 
developing'. He points out that the countries of CEE and FSU have not 
been 'in transit from being relatively poor to being relatively rich, 
industrialized, and western; to suggest otherwise was a hoax' and the term 
'in transition' is merely a label for a 'group of countries which were and are 
likely to remain on the by-roads of the industrialized world' (Manser 1993:146). 
Part of the problem stems from the planting of ideal market models onto 
such countries without a full understanding of the cultural, historical, 
political, environmental, and economic context. While such poignant 
comments are relevant, the term 'in transition' will often be used in this 
thesis to describe those countries, like Lithuania, which have been in a 
process of political, economic, social, and environmental reform since the 
breakdown of the communist system. The Lithuanian governments have, 
themselves, used the term 'transition' to describe policy development. They 
have gone as far as setting December 31, 1999, as an end date for the 'transition' 
at which time they expect to be accepted as members of the European Union 
(Girnius 1995:58). 
1.6 Chapters in Review 
The issues of energy and water pollution are used as case studies to 
demonstrate the links between the processes discussed. The future of 
electricity generation and the oil industry are discussed as the most pressing 
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energy problems. The Baltic Sea and the Nemunas River are examined as 
examples of water pollution. They are presented in Chapters 2 and 3, so that 
the reader can become familiar with the particular problems in Lithuania 
before reading the discussion of the issues. It is intended that any further 
references to the examples will then be more clearly understood. The case 
studies have been chosen specifically for their representation of most or all 
of the issues being discussed. They had to be a major environmental concern 
for Lithuania, include the problem of balancing economic and ecological 
priorities, demonstrate the role of national sentiment, include reactions from 
the Green movement, or involve political decision-making. They also offer 
a fair representation of Fisher's five categories outlined above. 
The energy crisis in Lithuania following independence brought the reality 
of economic transition to the people. With basic energy requirements lacking, 
solving the problem of energy supply is the greatest challenge for 
environmentalists. The economic versus environmental priorities is put to 
a great test. Solutions are inevitably political since most supplies previously 
came from Russia. Fisher has argued that the Western nuclear industry's 
plans for expansion in the region have influenced the way in which the 
energy debate (including proposed solutions to the crises in most post-
communist countries) has developed. Attention has moved from demand-
side to supply-side solutions. So, in effect, 'The "energy production or energy 
conservation?" debate is being turned into the traditional supply-side "what 
kind of energy production?" debate' (Fisher 1992:2). 
In this thesis, the energy issue is broken into two examples. Firstly, an 
examination of the environment in Lithuania, and in particular energy, can 
not omit a discussion of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (NNP). Nuclear 
power is of world-wide concern and the technology used at this plant has 
come under much criticism from the anti-nuclear movement and the 
international nuclear industry alike. Secondly, the debate surrounding the 
proposed oil terminal at Butinge on the coast of Lithuania is discussed. This 
was chosen for its controversial nature (the most discussed environmental 
issue in 1992-4), the role of various Green groups, and the conflict between 
economic, political, and environmental priorities in the face of national 
sentiment. 
The Baltic Sea seems a natural place to begin a discussion on water pollution 
which is considered one of the most crucial problems in Lithuania. Following 
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from this, the problem of sewage treatment is discussed, particularly in 
Kaunas. The city has a population of around 500 000 people, has no sewage 
treatment facilities and is situated on the Nemunas river which flows into 
the Baltic Sea via the Kursiu Marios Lagoon (see Figure 1.2). 
The interaction between religion (paganism and Catholicism), nationalism, 
and the environment is examined in Chapter 4. Lithuania was the last 
country in Europe to be Christianised and some elements of the pagan past 
are still found in the cultural practices of today. Particularly interesting is 
the connection ancient Lithuanians had with the land. Several fairytales 
and beliefs reinforce this connection. Today, the Lithuanian identity seems 
to be an incongruous mixture of strong Catholic morality and an identification 
with the pre-Christian ancestors who, though surrounded by enemies, were 
never vanquished (Sinnig 1992). The national identity is, nevertheless, 
very strong and was the focal point for secession from the Soviet Union. 
Therefore, the issue of nationalism will also be discussed, particularly in 
terms of the development and future role of two mass movements (the 
reform movement and the Green movement) which emerged at the height 
of political dissent in Lithuania facilitated in part by glasnost (openness) and 
perestroika (restructuring). Furthermore, the chapter will deal with the 
consequences of national sentiment and the aforementioned social 
movements on the environment. 
An examination of Lithuania's environmental problems could not avoid 
the issue of economy. Indeed, any such study must include the universal 
problem of balancing economic and environmental needs. In Chapter 5, an 
overview of economic systems (in theory and practice) and their impact on 
the environment is used to demonstrate the relationship between economic 
and environmental priorities in past, present, and future systems employed 
in Lithuania. It will, therefore, analyse the tension between economic and 
environmental concerns which is particularly marked in a reforming 
economy. Again, such problems are not peculiar to Lithuania or even to 
the Central and Eastern Europe region. Unemployment, recession, pollution, 
and social inequity are now common throughout the world. It is particularly 
interesting in Lithuania given that economic change has been so dramatic 
and because the economy has become an engulfing concern for the population 
of independent Lithuania. It has become evident that the economic problems 
of transition have led to a downturn in production which has, in turn, led 
to a decrease in pollution. While some assume that an improvement in the 
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economy will allow more funds for environmental protection, it is first 
necessary to prevent the reverse of the aforementioned trend. Environmental 
policy must plan for the obvious increase in production that will accompany 
economic recovery in order to prevent a dramatic increase in pollution. 
Chapter 6 has a practical focus, examining the methods of financing 
environmental rehabilitation and protection; an important aspect in 
ascertaining commitment to environmental rehabilitation and protection. 
Finance has been derived from international assistance as well as the complex 
domestic system of pollution permits and charges. The priorities of 
Government and international donors are evidenced by their direction of 
financing. Therefore,the priority given to environmental issues can be shown 
and, therefore, the likelihood of developing an environmentally sustainable 
society. The domestic generation of funds has come primarily by fiscal 
means and has been hindered by ineffective monitoring and policing 
mechanisms. 
The future of all spheres of Lithuanian society is strongly influenced by the 
political situation of the country and the surrounding region. Political 
decisions in Lithuania often take precedence over economic decisions and it 
is, therefore, vital to include an analysis of political change and influence 
and, in particular, its significance for the environment - both in terms of 
policy and pollution. 
Chapter 7 will deal with these political processes and examine the changes 
in political influence. During the preparation of the thesis, there were two 
changes of government. The Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDDP) 
(formerly the Communist Party of Lithuania) was elected to government in 
November 1992 (second round) by a "landslide" victory over the Sajudis 
(Reform Movement) government which had been led by Vytautas 
Landsbergis. LDDP were not returned to office at the next national election 
held in October 1996 when the coalition of "post-Sajudis" conservative parties 
were elected to form government, led once again by Landsbergis. An 
examination of the priorities of these governments may give an insight into 
the future of the environment in Lithuania. Balancing these various 
priorities, whilst trying to retain power, involves continual trade-offs. In 
one country it might be considered political suicide to support nuclear power, 
for example, whilst in another such an allegiance might be beneficial. 
Governments must ascertain the power of certain interest groups such as 
22 	 Chapter One 
the Green movement, business, and foreign governments. The under-
developed political culture in Lithuania is such that interest groups have 
not attained a high level of influence particularly since politicians do not 
seem to yet appreciate the bargaining power of votes. 
Rebuilding democracy and the development of a new political culture which 
are important aspects of environmental sustainability are a focus of Chapter 
7. Legal reform is also an essential part of facilitating democratic behaviour 
and in protecting the environment. An overview of environmental 
legislation, including a national environment strategy, that has been enacted 
in independent Lithuania demonstrates a well developed policy framework, 
however, there are several obstacles to effective implementation, and in 
particular to the integration of environmental concerns in economic policy. 
A discussion of international cooperation is also discussed in Chapter 7, 
since it has been (and will continue to be) an important factor in the changes 
taking place. Lithuania has been accepted into the Council of Europe and a 
lot of effort is currently being directed into obtaining membership of the 
European Union. Many current and future decisions will be made with this 
in mind. The environmental impacts of this focus, and of later membership, 
are discussed and the environmental record of the European Union is 
examined. International environmental cooperation (reseaidt, joint 
ventures, education programmes, and international agreements) will be 
fundamental to improving the environmental situation in Lithuania. 
However, international pressure can also have negative implications and 
inclusion in the European Union may not resolve problems associated with 
the economy and the environment in Lithuania. 
Chapter 8 presents some conclusions about the interrelationship of the 
aforementioned issues, problems, and processes and the way in which they 
have influenced environmental decision making. Given the enormous 
problems, some a legacy of fifty years of Soviet rule, some incurred by the 
process of separation, and others caused by the inexperience of the new 
leaders, environmental policy is likely to continue to suffer. Despite the 
initial importance given to environmental issues at the time of independence, 
this has lessened for a number of reasons. The protection system developed 
at the University of Vilnius which comprises areas with varying degrees of 
protection and accounts for around 11 per cent of the total territory, is a 
promising sign for environmental protection in Lithuania. As is the 
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development of a national strategy on environmental protection. However, 
there has been criticism that the National Parks network does not adequately 
represent biodiversity and the National Environment Strategy has also been 
criticised for having little practical relevance. Regardless of any other 
criticisms, effective implementation remains the key. Also, it is not adequate 
to protect particular areas if political and economic decisions on other issues 
continue to counteract any success. Thus, commitment is fundamental to 
effective implementation. 
While Lithuania has begun to address environmental problems as part of 
overall reform in the country, expectations for an environmentally 
sustainable society in which environmental, economic, and social justice 
issues are integrated into all policies, are destined to remain theoretical due 
to a combination of factors such as economic priorities (particularly the pull 
of the EU system), national sentiment, underdeveloped legislation and 
political culture including avenues for public participation, and a general 
ambivalence toward the environment on the part of modern Lithuanian 
society. 
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Chapter 2: Politics and the Environment in Energy 
Planning 
2.1 Introduction 
The following two chapters use case studies of environmental decision-
making in Lithuania to highlight the interaction of political, economic, social, 
and environmental factors in Lithuanian policy-making. This chapter focuses 
on the two issues which have dominated the Lithuanian energy debate 
since the restoration of independence; the construction of an oil terminal 
on the Baltic Sea coast and the future role of nuclear power in electricity 
production. It illustrates that in both these cases, the protection of political 
and economic vested interests, a nationalist-based desire for energy security, 
particularly electricity, and a determination to be independent from Russia 
have been overriding factors in decision-making. These issues are put in 
context by first describing Lithuania's energy situation and energy system. 
2.2 Background: Lithuania's Energy Crisis 
The former reliance on the Soviet Union for energy supplies has left Lithuania 
in a difficult position with a legacy of 'energy-related pollution which must 
be tackled as the main priority for environmental policy' (Hughes 1992:75). 
Like other countries in the region, Lithuania is now in a historically unique 
situation in which it is experiencing simultaneously, 'falling energy demand 
and a process of wholesale economic restructuring' (Fisher 1992:2). The 
important question that this situation raises is whether the emphasis of 
Lithuanian energy planning should now be energy production or 
conservation. The latter holds considerable potential for environmental 
improvements and would be expected to be the energy strategy chosen if 
Lithuania was actively working toward an environmentally sustainable 
society. It has been suggested, however, that in most former communist 
countries, the emphasis of energy planning has been increasing production 
(with the debate focusing on what types of energy production should be 
used) rather than restraining growth in demand (Fisher 1992:2). 
As an energy-intensive economy with few natural fuel resources of its own, 
Lithuania is destined to be an importer of oil and gas. This fact seems 
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disturbing to the country's nationalists. The reason for this is that after 50 
years occupation, reliance on any one country (particularly Russia) is widely 
considered to be an unacceptable risk. It is a view that has influenced energy 
trade. Although Lithuania has potential to be the largest exporter of electricity 
in the region, the bulk of this would be generated by the Ignalina Nuclear 
Power Station (NNP) located at the town of Visaginas just north of Ignalina 
(see Figure 2.1). One of the arguments of this chapter, however, is that not 
only would such a strategy be incongruent with an environmentally sensitive 
energy policy but it cannot be justified on economic grounds. 
Figure 2.1 Location of Energy Centres in Lithuania 
Economic hardship associated with the transition to a market economy has 
been exacerbated by Russian economic blockades, particularly in energy supply. 
At the same time, environmental concern appeared to wane (see Chapter 4). 
This tension between economic and environmental concerns was already 




limited availability of hot water, heating, and gas during the cold winter of 
1992/3 made it one of the most memorable in the minds of most Lithuanians. 
Temperatures fell to minus 20° C while no hot water was provided and 
central heating was fixed at around 14°C Geziorski 1993a:B2). The impacts 
on well-being and morale and the political ramifications were considerable. 
People rapidly became disenchanted with a democratic market system so 
demonstrably incapable of creating a better life in Lithuania and expressed 
their disenchantment by voting for the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party 
(LDDP - formerly the Communist Party of Lithuania) at the Parliamentary 
elections in October 1992 (see 7.2.1.2). Under such severe economic conditions, 
the advantages of the new system in which only a few seemed to improve 
their standard of living were difficult to recognise. As Chapter 4 demonstrates, 
the economic conditions have also contributed to a decline in Green support 
and the political salience of environmental issues in Lithuanian society. 
Lithuanian energy policy also has important implications for political 
relations with neighbouring countries and vice versa. First, the break in 
relations with Russia impinged immediately on the supply of oil and gas 
since Russia was previously the sole supplier of those fuels. The subsequent 
shift to market prices, regardless of supplier, was strongly felt: 
The rise in the cost of Russian oil and gas has been one of the main factors 
which so far has frustrated the Baltic belief that freedom from Moscow's 
diktat would bring automatic efficiency and prosperity (Lieven 1993:333). 
Second, occupation-related fears have been fuelled by right wing Russian 
politicians, such as Prime Minister Vladimir Zhirinovski, who have openly 
declared their intention to reclaim the 'near abroad' (Rich 1992:12). This 
contributed to the cultivation of a strong national sentiment which has 
impacted on relations with other countries in the region, thereby creating a 
barrier to cooperation (see also Chapter 4). All of these impacts have had 
important implications for the state of the environment since they have 
affected the balance in energy policy and planning between environmental 
protection and other goals. 
2.2.1 Soviet Energy Policy 
In the USSR, preoccupation with industrial development arose with a 
philosophy that big was better, huge was best, and science solved all the 
problems (Peterson 1993:11). As a result, centrally planned economies were 
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skewed toward heavy industry. These industries, moreover, consumed large 
amounts of energy: 
This sectorial specialisation as well as resource-intensive production 
technologies and the extraordinary price distortions which encouraged 
wasteful consumption patterns, have resulted in economies which use 2-3 
times as much materials and energy per unit of economic output as market 
economies. (Helsinki Commission 1992, Ch. 4:5) 
The energy-intensive approach to Soviet production has had repercussions 
for the former republics and much of the blame and antagonism surrounding 
the energy crises is centred on Russia. As the sole supplier of oil and gas 
since independence was restored, Russia has had strong political bargaining 
power and the capacity to cause immense problems in Lithuania by blocking 
supply". This has been compounded by the fact that Russia has been in the 
throws of an energy crisis itself since the mid 1980s. Faced with diminishing, 
easily accessible resources, once thought unlimited, the Soviet Union (and 
later Russia) was forced to review its energy policy. The need to increase the 
efficiency of energy production and use became clear (ten years after the 
"crisis" in the West), as inefficiency threatened to cripple the economy 
(Feschbach and Friendly 1992:136). 
The Soviet Union at that time was richer in energy reserves than any other 
industrialised nation in the world, yet exploration and extraction was proving 
to be cost ineffective. Siberian oil, for example, used too much energy in 
extraction, even without including environmental costs. There were also 
technical problems with drilling and transport, and poor pipe maintenance 
which led to huge losses of oil even before processing. Thus, the use of oil 
decreased and gas increased. 'The paradox was one of poverty in the midst 
of plenty' (Feschbach and Friendly 1992:133-141). 
Although it is clear that the Soviet Union's energy-intensive economy has 
left a legacy of inefficient technology, and that the centrally planned system 
has left the former republics unable to support themselves independently, 
responsibility now lies with the independent governments. Decisions and 
events that have taken place since secession demonstrate the difficulties 
. Lithuania was able to use its electricity generation capacity to influence the removal of 
supply blockages by Russia. The government threatened to stop supplying electricity to 
Kaliningrad and Byelorussia if the supply block was not lifted which contributed to Russia's 
decision to resume supply (Salay et al. 1993:203). 
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these governments are having in keeping promises and balancing interests. 
The Soviet government's planned nuclear power station on the Latvian 
coast near Liepaja, for example, was abandoned on economic grounds prior 
to the Chernobyl explosion. Now nuclear power is, once again, gaining 
appeal as an energy alternative. Juris Ozolins, head of the international 
department of the Latvian Ministry of Energy and Industry, explains: 
"green" sentiments have declined after the energy shortages of the past 
winter. Two years ago, no one dared mention the possibility of a nuclear 
power station in Latvia. Now energy experts discuss it openly (Rich 1992:13). 
In a similar case, construction began on an oil terminal near Tallinn, Estonia, 
under Soviet rule but was cancelled due to environmental concerns. The 
terminal has since been completed as a joint venture with a Finnish company 
(Rich 1992:13). A hydro-electric accumulation station, which stores unused 
energy from Ignalina until required in peak periods, was also initiated under 
Soviet rule but later abandoned on environmental grounds. Construction 
later recommenced under the new government (Karalius 1989, Kaniauskiene 
1989 & Adomaitiene 1992a&b). The last of the above examples is interesting 
because it has further ramifications for nuclear policy and has become a 
pawn in the political manoeuvrings of the nuclear lobby in Lithuania (see 
2.4.5.1). 
2.2.2 Lithuanian Energy system 
The Lithuanian energy system, although lacking indigenous resources, has 
a capacity almost twice that required for domestic use. This excess capacity 
occurs in the two main energy industries - oil refining and electricity 
generation. Despite being an importer of crude oil, natural gas, and coal, 
Lithuania has been able to export substantial volumes of refined oil products 
and electricity. 
In 1990-1993, the total installed electrical generation capacity was 
approximately 5 680 MW (actual capacity is 5 200 MW since the nuclear 
plant was derated), producing, on average, 28 to 29 billion kilowatt hours of 
electrical energy per year (World Bank 1993:160). At the beginning of 1994, 
the maximum installed capacity was 5800 MW and the Ignalina NPP was 
the largest generator, representing 43 per cent of total generating capacity 
(Vilemas and Reichenbach 1995:528). The electricity transmission sector is 
extremely inefficient, with losses averaging 22 per cent. Part of the problem 
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is that the underground distribution network consists of oil/paper insulated 
lead-sheath cable, some of which is more than 50 years old. No modern 
polyethylene insulated cable has yet been installed (World Bank and IEA 
1993:19). The provision of central heating is also inefficient in Lithuania, 
requiring about twice the amount of fuel used in developed countries (Vainius 
and Piksrys 1994:2) 
2.2.2.1 Energy Balance in Lithuania 
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 summarise the supply and use of energy in Lithuania at 
the time independence was restored. This information itself does not indicate 
anything unusual about the Lithuanian energy system as per capita energy 
supply (primary energy) and use do not differ significantly from the range 
observed in Western Europe, North America and Australia. In Australia, 
for example, primary energy use was 228 GJ/person in 1990, almost 50 per 
cent greater than Lithuania, while the Australian residential/commercial 
sector had almost exactly the same energy use, at 28 GJ/person, (Australian 
data from Bush et al. 1993:92). Significant differences between the Lithuanian 
energy use patterns and those of Western countries emerge, however, when 
Table 2.1 Primary Energy Consumption in Lithuania (1990) 1 
Solid Fuels 	Oil 	Natural gas Hydro-electric 	Nuclear2 	Total 	Per capita 
44.4 PJ 	311.6 PJ 	172.6 PJ 	3.7 PJ 	45 PJ 	577.3 PJ 	156 GJ 
(8%) 	(54%) 	(30%) (1%) (8%) 
'Excluding all exports 
'The primary energy of nuclear energy has been taken as the thermal energy released in the reactor. It is assumed 
this is converted to electrical energy with an efficiency of 39%. Total primary nuclear energy used in 1990 was 
155.4PJ producing a total of 60.6PJ of electrical energy, 43.213J of electricity was exported from Lithuania. If all the 
exported electricity is attributed to nuclear energy, it can be argued that only 29% of the primary nuclear energy (i.e. 
45PJ) should be included in Lithuania's primary energy use.  
(Adapted from World Bank 1993:160) 
Table 2.2 End Use of Energy by Sector in Lithuania (1990) 
Residential / 
Commercial 
Industry Transport Agriculture Other Total 
Energy use PJ 101 171 85 42 28 427 
Per capita GJ 27.2 46.2 22.9 11.4 7.6 115 
Percent (100) 24% 40% 20% 10% 6% 
(Adapted from World Bank 1993:160) 
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economic indicators are included with the energy figures. Lithuania's primary 
energy use per million US dollars of GDP in 1990 was 78 TJ, whereas in 
Australia it was just 15 TJ. Even though Lithuania has a much lower industrial 
energy use than Australia on a per person basis (Australia 74 GJ/person 
compared to Lithuania's 46 GJ/person), Lithuania uses about five times as 
much energy as Australia for each dollar of GDP. This high proportion of 
energy compared with GDP is related to the low thermal efficiency energy 
production and consumption technologies and indicates the failure of the 
Lithuanian economy to provide value added products (World Bank and 
IEA 1993:2). 
2.3 The Oil Industry 
The Lithuanian oil industry, is a major component of the country's energy 
system. Refining capacity is about twice that required to meet domestic 
needs. In the past, Lithuania imported large amounts of crude oil and 
exported refined products from its Mazeikiai refinery (see Figure 2.1). In 
1990, Lithuania imported 402 PJ of crude oil and exported 133.5 PJ of refined 
oil products such as gasoline, diesel, and fuel oil (World Bank 1993:155 & 
160). The Soviet system of controlled prices of oil and its products has made 
Lithuanian re-entrance into the international market difficult. The use of 
controlled prices has continued in Lithuania as it is not feasible to abruptly 
shift to market prices. However, price reform will be essential, along with 
regulation and education, in order to ensure energy conservation. In 1992, 
Lithuanian industries paid only 3.4% of market prices for crude oil and 
around 15% of gasoline prices (World Bank 1993:162) (2) (see also 2.5.3.1). 
While negotiating over prices with Russia, Lithuania has sent a clear message 
that it intends to seek oil from other sources (including Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabie) by planning construction of a new oil terminal on the coast. As 
these new sources will require market prices for the oil, Lithuania will need 
2.The industry price for oil in January 1992 (converted from rubles) is recorded as USD 4.3 per 
ton while the average world market price is estimated at USD 128. The industry price for gas 
is recorded as USD 39.4 per ton while the average world market price is estimated at USD 
265 (World Bank 1993:162). 
3. Talks were held with the Kuwaiti interior minister on April 26 and 27, 1993 regarding oil 
supply and the possibility of Kuwaiti subsidies for the oil terminal and Mazeikiai refinery 
rehabilitation. Talks with a Saudi Arabian delegation were held in December 1994 at which 
time the Lithuanian Minister of Economics, Vasiliauskas, stated Lithuania was considering 
Saudi Arabia as an alternative supplier of oil since Russia's extraction rate had decreased by 
2.5 times (The Baltic Independent, 4(159), 5; May 1993 and 5(243), Bl; December 1994). 
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to gradually increase the price of energy. 
Lithuania has also been investigating the possibility of exploiting its own oil 
reserves and in 1993 nineteen small oil fields had been explored in western 
Lithuania but only two are operative. Early estimates of oil deposits of at 
least 50 million tonnes on land and 60 million tonnes in territorial waters 
(see for example The Economist of Lithuania, vol. 3, 55; 1990 and Respublika, 
September 25, 3; 1992) appear to have been over optimistic and more recent 
estimates suggest that Lithuanian oil deposits amount to around 15 million 
tonnes, only 5 million tonnes of which can be feasibly extracted. This is 
approximately equivalent to Lithuania's current annual requirement 
(Brazauskas 1993:B1). Yet other estimates have included 100 million tonnes 
in deposits and 15 million tonnes available for extraction at a rate of 0.5 
million tonnes per year (Karaliunas 1994:7). Some commentators have gone 
as far as to say that 'an oil drilling rig in the city of Vilnius is not improbable 
some time in the future' (Kemezys 1992:109). However, although indigenous 
oil has increased its share in Lithuania's energy balance ), it is generally 
acknowledged that it will never provide self-sufficiency and Lithuania will 
continue to rely on oil imports. Lithuanian energy decision-makers have 
therefore focused on the strategy of obtaining oil supply from countries 
other than Russia. 
2.3.1 An Oil Terminal for Independent Lithuania? 
Independent Lithuanian governments have worked on the premise that 
regaining economic independence is a prerequisite for retaining political 
independence and this has, therefore, strongly influenced decision-making 
in Lithuania. Thus, national sentiment has impacted on the economic, 
social, political and environmental decision-making. As Chapter 4 discusses, 
national identity once tied pagan Lithuanians to nature ) but now might 
become partly responsible for environmental pollution. The debate over 
the proposed oil terminal on the coast near Klaipeda is an example of how 
resistance to cooperation (whatever the reasoning) may have detrimental 
consequences for both the economy and the environment. It illustrates 
4 Oil production was 115 000 tonnes in 1995 (Energy for Sustainable Development Ltd (ESD) 
and Lithuanian Energy Institute (LEI) 1996:i). 
5 See Banks, A. J., 1991; Lithuania's Environmental Problems: Cultural and Political Aspects; 
TUULSS, Sandy Bay, ch. 1. 
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how the current push for economic development in the country may lead 
to further environmental impacts, despite the mitigating effects of some 
international treaties and financial support. 
There is currently an oil terminal at Klaipeda which acts as an import and 
export venue, but is not able to be supplied by tankers. When Lithuania was 
a republic of the Soviet Union, oil was transported by rail, refined at 
Mazeikiai(6) and then pumped to all three Baltic States and the Kaliningrad 
and St. Petersberg regions. Following Russia's "economic blockade" in 
response to Lithuania's declaration of independence in 1990, oil supplies 
have been inconsistent (Uzkalnis 1993). According to BNS reports, the present 
terminal has capacity to receive one tenth of the crude oil necessary to keep 
Mazeikiai refinery working and satisfy the country's demand (Staprans 1992). 
The proposal for a new terminal has become one of the largest environmental 
issues in Lithuania. Even among supporters, there is much disagreement 
about where such a terminal should be built. 
Developments in the oil terminal debate have been closely followed as part 
of the research for this thesis. In 1992, interviews were conducted with 
university lecturers, public officials, politicians, members of the Green 
Movement and Green Party, students, and others with strong opinions on 
the issue. There are several important questions for the analysis of the 
issue. What are the preferred sites? What would be the environmental, 
social, and economic impacts of building the terminal? Does Lithuania 
really need an oil terminal? Who should have an input into the decision-
making process? Who makes the final decision and on whose advice? Are 
there any alternative means for easing the energy crisis? 
2.3.1.1 Selecting a Site 
In 1992, when the interviews were conducted three options were under 
consideration: reconstruction of the present terminal at Klaipeda; construction 
of a new terminal at Butinge (further north near the Latvian border); and 
construction of a new terminal between Melnrage I and Melnrage II (old 
villages north of Klaipeda). A fourth option, a cooperative project with 
6  The refinery at Mazeilciai has a significant environmental impact itself which requires 
attention. See Banks, A. J., 1991; Lithuania's Environmental Problems: Cultural and Political 
Aspects; TUULSS; Sandy Bay; 56-61. 
Chapter Two 
	 33 
Latvia using the existing terminal at Ventspils was put forward by some 
Green groups but was generally disregarded by government. There was 
support for each option. The Butinge alternative was supported by various 
academics and the Klaipeda branch of the Green Party. The Melnrage site, 
which was agreed on in principle by the government while awaiting further 
research, was advocated by "Nafta" state oil company, the government, and 
the Vilnius Green Party. "Nafta" was prepared to accept the reconstruction 
of the Klaipeda terminal if Belgian and English specialists recommended it. 
Some members of the Green movement advocated working cooperatively 
with Latvia as an alternative to building a new oil terminal (see 2.3.1.2). 
To place the alternatives in perspective, it is necessary to outline the arguments 
for and against each, as seen by those interviewed and as understood by the 
author. The arguments in favour of Butinge, and consequently for opposing 
the Melnrage and Klaipeda options, were stated by the Klaipeda branch of 
the Green Party (here-after referred to as 'the Green Party') as follows. 
As Butinge is geographically closer to the Mazeikiai refinery than Melnrage 
expenditure on an oil pipeline would be reduced. The town, moreover, 
already has an industrial zone. They also noted that waste water treatment 
infrastructure was already in place at Butinge, further reducing capital outlay 
required if the terminal was constructed at Melnrage. The Green Party 
believes that Melnrage is the oldest village in Lithuania- older than Klaipeda-
and therefore, that the cultural heritage of the town should be preserved. It 
also feared that construction of a terminal at Melnrage would involve 
relocation of inhabitants to apartment housing as growth of the industrial 
area would result in the clearing of forests and would push locals out. 
While media reports claimed that 200 ha of forests would have to be cleared 
"Nafta" oil company insisted that only about half (120 ha) of that area of 
forest would need to be cleared. There was a commonly held view that the 
actual area cleared would be much greater than officially claimed. Paulius 
Kavaliauskasm (1992) pointed out that although the area of forest involved 
was not much in terms of Lithuania's total forest area, it was the only area 
of forest near Klaipeda and was therefore of ecological significance. It is also 
a Zoological-Botanical reserve called 'Giruliai'. The Green Party suggested 
7. A noted Lithuanian geographer who established the nature protection system used by the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection (see Chapter 7). 
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other areas near by which are less "valuable" scrub that could be used instead 
such as the ex-Soviet army grounds where trees were already cleared for 
training. The Butinge alternative would not involve the clearing of forests, 
there is a clear coast. 
The Green Party also had concerns about Klaipeda as a site. Its members 
suggested that the prevailing westerly winds in the area made it dangerous 
to build near the city of Klaipeda as any poisonous gases produced in an 
accident would be blown over the city. It would also require the fencing off 
of a large area which would prohibit community access to the sea. The 
Green Party also pointed out that this would eventually increase the tourism 
impact on areas such as Palanga in the Summer. 
The risk of oil spills was another major concern mentioned. In 1979/80 the 
Greek tanker Globe Assimi crashed as it was leaving the port and the 
subsequent release of oil affected areas down to Palanga, 25 km away. In 
1987 the Soviet tanker Antonio Gramsci leaked large amounts of oil near 
the Finnish coast and caused the worst damage to date. More recently, oil 
spilled from an Estonian ship in January 1993. Although only 40 tonnes of 
oil was involved, the Estonian Environment Minister commented that if 
all the fuel had spilt it would have been the biggest environmental disaster 
in Estonia's history (Tammerk 1993a). 
Other environmental concerns relating to the construction of an oil terminal 
at Klaipeda included the fact that it would be necessary to excavate a large 
channel and a long wall to allow the tankers to come in to port. This would 
impact on the local marine ecosystem and would visually pollute the coastal 
vista. The channel would need to be regularly dredged because of sand 
build up, preventing re-establishment of the aquatic fauna and flora. 
Also, the proposed storage tanks would be 60 m high and 30 m in diameter. 
Currently they are about 20 m by 15 m. General practice demands that a 
levee of equal capacity is required around the tanks to catch oil in the case of 
leakage. This would also be of economical benefit because the spilled oil can 
be recovered and enables fires to be contained. This would need to be 
considered in Lithuania. If the terminal was built to such standards the area 
required could be larger than estimated and may, therefore, affect surrounding 
forests or recreational access to the coast. The huge size of these tanks 
would also create visual pollution. 
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The oil terminal has also been questioned on economic grounds, with local 
and international experts questioning the logic of such large investment. 
Zablockis (1992:3) expressed distrust of the government estimates of the cost 
of construction, arguing that they would be at least 4 . times higher and 
warned of the ramifications for Lithuanians who would have to bear the 
burden through increased taxes. According to Belgian consultant, Dr Ralph 
Molenarr who was part of a team of experts investigating the financial aspects 
of the proposed rehabilitation of the Klaipeda terminal, plans to build a new 
terminal are not economically justified. Molenarr commented that since oil 
would still be supplied by Russia, to import oil from elsewhere 'would be 
stupid' (in Jeziorski 1993b:B3). 
2.3.1.2 Co-operation with Latvia? 
Views on the option of relying on the Ventspils oil terminal were sought 
from those interviewed. Many argued that the goal of Lithuanian economic 
independence required construction of a domestic oil terminal and that it 
was risky to cooperate with Latvia since no-one could predict future Latvian 
relations with Lithuania. Such sentiments appear to be at odds with the 
remarkable sense of unity and cooperation of the Baltic nations that was 
shown to the Western world in 1989/90. It is also at odds with the worldwide 
trend toward international trade and economic cocooperationoperation. But 
the fear of foreign occupation and the strong desire to remain independent 
are now obviously dominant features of Lithuanian decision-makers and, 
indeed, the general population. As understandable as this is, it appears to 
have led to some illogical consequences, such as building a second terminal 
within a very short distance of an existing one over the border. The decision, 
however, was not based purely on the desire for autonomy and many 
economic, political, social, and environmental issues also impacted on the 
decision. 
Some critics called the Ventspils option, "crazy Green thinking", yet openly 
suggested that Latvia could use the refinery at Mazeikiai which also worked 
below capacity. Of course, Latvia might also choose to build its own refinery 
which would lead to two terminals and two refineries within 200 km. Such 
a situation would lead to an increased actual and potential environmental 
impact despite the availability of a more reasonable cooperative solution. 
Ramunas Povilanskas (1993) outlined some of the issues. The possibility of 
Latvia building a refinery was aired but, due to the power needs of such a 
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refinery, it was suggested that construction of a nuclear power station was 
being considered. Whether or not this represented an accurate account of 
decision-making in Latvia, it clearly demonstrates the tendency of such 
development projects to snowball and result in a far greater environmental 
impact than first predicted, and much greater than would be caused through 
cooperation. 
The Ventspils terminal has had an immense environmental impact on the 
local area and thus, cooperation with Latvia would require significant 
redevelopment. Latvian environmentalists, along with residents of 
Ventspils, have expressed concerns over the impacts of the existing oil 
terminal to human health. They point to increased incidence of health 
problems such as bronchitis, asthma, dermatitis as well as more serious 
allegations of increased abnormalities in children. There have also been 
significant ecological impacts to the marine ecosystem (Jazukeviciute 1992:4). 
Simenas, a former Lithuanian Prime Minister, claims that cooperating with 
Ventspils would be more harmful for the environment than would 
constructing a modern terminal constructed to international ecological 
standards (Simenas 1993). The counter argument is that a joint venture 
with Latvia, with the money being used to re-develop the Ventspils terminal 
in order to make it more ecologically sound, could be a viable and 
environmentally acceptable option. Besides which, international 
conventions such as the Baltic Sea Declaration and the Helsinki Convention 
actually require countries in the region to cooperate in order to protect the 
Baltic Sea (Bergstrom 1992). 
Whilst such problems might constitute reasons not to use the Ventspils 
terminal, they also highlight the potential impacts of a second terminal 
within near vicinity which might be avoided through cooperation. Even if 
total investments to improve Ventspils are greater than the cost of a new 
terminal, the Lithuanian share might be less than it would spend on a new 
terminal. In addition to economic benefits, total environmental impacts are 
less from a cooperative approach. For example, the impact on migratory 
birds, especially those listed as globally vulnerable or threatened, would be 
increased by the construction of another terminal. Lithuania, as a signatory 
to the Ramsar and Bern Conventione ), has an obligation to protect such 
birds and their habitat. Fifteen seabirds listed in the Lithuanian red data 
8. See Table 7.1 on International Environmental Conventions binding on Lithuania. 
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book have been recorded near Butinge. Of particular concern is the impact 
on the population of globally threatened, Steller's Eider, Polysticta stelleri, 
which has a wintering site a few kilometres south of Butinge. The birds 
nesting in this area constitute around 5 per cent of the global population. It 
is expected that the proposed oil terminal at Butinge would have negative 
impact on the bottom dwelling molluscs, a major component of the Steller's 
Eider's diet. It is also possible that the birds would be forced to leave during 
the construction stage (Nafta Board of Directors and Institute of Ecology 
1995:104-108). The Klaipeda Green Party, in promoting the Butinge option, 
appear to ignore such environmental impacts. This seems to be because 
they accept that an oil terminal is an issue of state significance and are not 
confident of cooperation with Latvia. This highlights the nationalistic bent 
of the Party and somewhat of a "not in my backyard" attitude toward selecting 
a site for the terminal. 
What has been seen by the Government, "Nafta" representatives, some 
academics, and many of the general public as necessary for Lithuanian 
economic independence, is now being more seriously questioned. The so-
called "crazy Green thinking" has since been given support by energy experts 
from the G-24 group (the 24 economically most successful countries in the 
world) and other foreign specialists not normally described as 'Green'. The 
G-24 group met in Tallinn and advised the Baltics to cooperate more closely, 
making particular reference to the need for co-operative use of the Ventspils 
terminal and the Mazeikiai refinery (Tammerk 1993b). 
Co-operation with Latvia, therefore, appears to be the most practical and 
environmentally sound option for meeting Lithuania's oil needs. The 
question of alternative sources of energy which would reduce such needs, 
although investigated, will not be discussed in detail in this section. (More 
detailed discussion of renewable energy sources is provided in section 2.5.2). 
It seems more pertinent to discuss a proposal which almost reached the 
implementation stage, the status of which still remains unclear, and which 
became one of the most discussed economic and environmental issues in 
1992-4. 
2.3.1.3 The Government's Arguments 
Arguments from the government and "Nafta" are fewer but powerful in 
the eyes of many, and widely accepted by the general public. They claim that 
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Lithuania needs to have its own terminal as a major part of economic 
recovery. There seems to be a general consensus on this, even amongst 
some members of the Green Party. "Nafta" agree that the terminal should 
be as far away from Klaipeda as possible but insist that Butinge is not an 
economically viable alternative as new construction such as a lighthouse 
and emergency fire equipment would be necessary which would significantly 
add to economic expense. 
Paulius Kavaliauskas also regards a Lithuanian oil terminal as necessary. 
He suggests that on ecological grounds alone, the Ventspils option is most 
advantageous, but supports the Butinge option despite this, with the Ventspils 
option kept as a possible future alternative (pers. comm., September 1992). 
The Klaipeda Green Party shares his view. It seems that while the benefits 
of cooperation are recognised, economic independence remains an overriding 
priority. 
Basically, the major argument or rationalisation in favour of the development 
rests on the fact that Lithuania wants to have its own terminal for its economic 
independence and other arguments are mainly rebuffs of protests. This has 
been a powerful argument with the general population, well aware of the 
hardships caused by trading problems with Russia. The direct experience of 
the energy crisis, together with a strong nationalistic sentiment, has aided _ 
acceptance of the economic recovery argument. Claims that the oil terminal 
is necessary for independent Lithuania go unchallenged. Ironically, one of 
the major potential investors was the Russian company, L UKo il which has 
been actively lobbying for the construction of the terminal at Butinge. Their 
involvement was disapproved of by many, particularly the Landsbergis 
opposition in the parliament. Various discussions arose and the government 
stated that the Russian company would not have more than a 49 per cent 
share of investment. 
Since the arguments have been in response to an energy crisis, it is important 
to ask what the alternatives for solving Lithuania's economic, and therefore 
energy, problems are. While greater cooperation was recommended by both 
the G-24 energy experts and consultants from Belgium, with the latter seeing 
the re-emerging plans to build a new terminal economically unjustified 
(Jeziorski 1993b), this does not address the question of what the alternatives 
for Lithuania's energy supply are. These are discussed in section 2.5. 
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2.3.1.4 The Decision-Making Process 
The actual decision regarding Melnrage, which was agreed to in principle, 
came under some criticism by Paulius Kavaliauskas. The decision was based 
on a report signed by 19 prominent scientists stating that they approved of 
the Melnrage site. It was commissioned in May, 1991, to decide between 
Karkle and Melnrage. The Government argued that society must listen and 
heed the advice of those acclaimed scientists. According to Kavaliauskas 
(1992:2), this amounted to a falsification. 
In the aforementioned article, Kavaliauskas argued that the formulations of 
the first study were erratic and that social ecology, recreation, and economical-
geographical interests were excluded. This meant that the conclusions were 
not made on the basis of any accepted decision-making model but on 
haphazard reasoning. The Melnrage site was taken as the predetermined 
optimal site yet it is theoretically impossible to be the only possible alternative. 
Kavaliauskas (1992:2) argued that only two alternatives were put forward 
and the scientists simply chose the better of two evils. He considered the 
procedures of the second report listing Melnrage and Butinge as opposing 
alternatives, to be equally haphazard. He claimed there had been unethical 
manipulation of scientists' (Kavaliauskas 1992:2). 
Despite not having been actively pursued as a preferred site, the small town 
of Kopustai was chosen by the government on February 19, 1993. It was 
claimed that the terminal would be some distance from the coast line and 
that the oil pipeline would be laid through Melnrage I and II without damaging 
the Giruliai forest or other important environmental features (Europos 
Lietuvis March 4 1993). If this was the case then some of the concerns of the 
Green Party would be accommodated. 
Later, in May 1993, there were rumours that the government might back 
down on the construction of the oil terminal. Apparently this decision was 
made after receiving advice from various Western specialists which concurred 
with the arguments that the Green movement had been advancing for 2 
years. This climaxed at a meeting between Latvian and Lithuanian officials 
in April in Riga to discuss the possibility of a joint venture between Ventspils 
and Mazeikiai. Following the meeting, Prime Minister Slezevicius expressed 
his support for the Ventspils option. It appeared to be a victory for the 
Green movement, but opposition still remained. It was not certain whether 
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the government would accept the findings of the committees involved. 
The director of the fuel department, Vaclovas Greza, said that 'without a 
terminal of our own, we won't be able to guarantee the continuity of supplies, 
nor have flexible and cheap oil prices' (Vilkelyte 1993:1). Opponents seemed 
to ignore the fact that cooperation with Latvia was in itself a security measure, 
since when each country has an interest in the cooperative arrangements, 
some level of security is ensured. Further, by building the terminal, Lithuania 
will create a competitive market which could disadvantage both Lithuania 
and Latvia as companies such as L UKoil secure the best price. 
On June 16, 1993 (Resolution No. 435), the government decided to construct 
an oil terminal in the Baltic Sea that would accommodate imports and 
exports as well as the possibility of obtaining domestic supplies from drilling. 
The design involved reception buoys located approximately 7 kilometres 
from the shore where the water is deep enough to accommodate the 
manoeuvring of large tankers (80 000 tonnage) and at a distance of 3.3 
kilometres for the mooring of smaller tankers (Nafta Board of Directors and 
Institute of Ecology 1995:8-11). In spite of earlier arguments regarding 
additional capital costs involved in building at Butinge, it was .now the 
preferred site. The government argued that the site was chosen because it 
was considered safer in the case of an accident and no forests would need to 
be cut. Also, the required length of pipe necessary to reach Mazeikiai was 
around 22 kilometres less than from Melnrage (Weekly News from Lithuania, 
June 1-7, 1993). Prime Minister Slezevicius, who had openly supported 
cooperative options, subsequently announced on July 15, 1993, that 
construction on an oil terminal would begin at Butinge (The Baltic 
Independent, 4(171), B3; July 1993), but it is not clear whether this would be 
based on the platform-buoy design. At that stage, discussions were continuing 
with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
regarding the finance which was estimated at USD 60-70 million and USD 
100 million for the renovation of Mazeikiai refinery (The Baltic Independent, 
4(171), B3; July 1993). About three months later, on October 20, 1993, the 
Latvian and Lithuanian Prime Ministers met to discuss the oil terminal 
along with an ongoing sea border dispute. Prime Minister Slezevicius stated 
that the required pipeline to Ventspils would cost more than building a new 
terminal and reiterated that such a proposal did not resolve the issue of 
Lithuania's energy independence. His Latvian counterpart expressed concerns 
regarding the impact of an terminal malfunction at Butinge, such as an oil 
spill, on the Latvian environment (Uzkalnis and Ozols 1993:8). Another 
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three months later, on December 17, 1993, the two Prime Ministers signed a 
protocol of intentions on the joint construction of an oil terminal in the 
Latvian port of Liepaja with a pipeline to Mazeikiai refinery (Uzkalnis 
1994a:B2). Latvian concern regarding the environmental impacts of an oil 
terminal at Butinge on their coastline had been an influencing factor in the 
decision as had the reported difficulties involved in incorporating an oil 
terminal into a functioning port (Karaliunas 1994:11). 
The Liepaja project fell through, however, on the grounds that the port was 
too shallow to accommodate large oil tankers and, in April 1994, the 
government awarded a contract to the American company Flour Daniel for 
the design and management of a USD 180 million dollar terminal at Butinge. 
Geological tests were initiated near Butinge and construction was expected 
to begin in 1994 and to be completed by 1996. Instead of the oil import and 
export terminal at Liepaja, it was reported that Latvia and Lithuania would 
jointly construct a smaller terminal designed for the import and export of 
light products only. The first draft of the agreement relating to this terminal 
stipulated a 51 per cent share for Lithuania (Uzkalnis and Ozols 1993:B1, 
Lucas 1994:B1, Karaliunas 1994:11, and Vilkelyte 1994:B1). The decision process 
had been reversed once more. Apparent concern over environmental impacts 
from the terminals and a recognition of the importance of cooperation had 
eventually led to plans for construction two new oil terminals! On 
announcing Flour Daniel as the successful tender, the Lithuanian 
government stated that there would be no major impacts on the environment 
(only two houses would need to be removed) (Vilkelyte 1994:B1) despite the 
critical role environmental issues had played in the previous decision to 
abandon the plan in favour of the Liepaja proposal. 
Construction on the Butinge terminal, however, was halted after the Russian 
company, LUKoil, pulled out of the project on the basis that the proposal 
had not been properly financed. The company, potentially the terminal's 
most lucrative supplier, had been considered a core investor. Conservative 
Lithuanian parties had repeatedly warned of extensive Russian economic 
influence and welcomed the company's withdrawal. Others feared that 
without the financial input of LUKoil, the oil terminal would never be 
completed, particularly since its withdrawal might lessen the confidence of 
other investors (The Baltic Times, no. 37, 2; November-December 1996). 
Although construction of the terminal was to originally begin in 1990, at the 
time of writing (March 1997), the terminal remains incomplete. 
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It is evident that the decision about whether to build the terminal and, if so, 
where it should be built, has been a major controversy in Lithuania. The 
government appears to have vacillated and the preferred site has changed 
several times over the last 4 years (during which time there were two changes 
of government). Although information has been sketchy in the local press, 
let alone in English language papers, it seems that despite the advice of 
consultants, the G-24 energy committee, and other experts, the Lithuanian 
intention has been to persist with the option of building its own oil terminal. 
The view that a terminal will be necessary for political and economic 
independence appears to have been the critical factor. Following the 
withdrawal of LUKoil in November 1996, Deputy Energy Minister, Saulius 
Kutas, expressed confidence that the 'construction of the century' could still 
be realised in 1997. 
The process of Lithuanian decision-making in relation to construction of an 
oil terminal demonstrates the interaction between economics, environmental 
concerns, and national sentiment. It is likely to represent a precursor to 
many difficult decisions the Government of Lithuania will face during the 
transition from command to a market system and an opportunity to test the 
resolve of the Baltic States to work together' (Uzkalnis and Ozols 1993:B1), a 
test they appear to have failed. It indicates how the desires for autonomy 
can have negative impacts on both the environment and the economy. As 
noted by Danius Lygis, environmental adviser to the Lithuanian parliament, 
during the decision-making process; 'strategic decisions were not based on 
the economic standpoint' (in Vilkelyte 1993a:1). 
2.4 Electricity Generation 
The second decision examined in this chapter is that of the future role of 
nuclear power in Lithuania. As mentioned in section 2.2.2, Lithuania has 
installed electricity generation well above the level required to meet domestic 
requirements. Approximately half of this capacity is made up by the Ignalina 
Nuclear Power Plant. Opposition to the plant in 1988/9 was a focus of 
dissent, with the existence of the large nuclear reactors seeming to represent 
the large colonial power of Russia. As an independent government, it has 
been necessary for Lithuania to evaluate whether the continued operation 
of the plant is justified. The purpose of the following sections is to demonstrate 
that it is technically possible for Lithuania to meet domestic electricity 
requirements without the use of nuclear power by using alternative sources 
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of electricity generation, together with improved efficiency and conservation. 
Like the oil terminal case, debate surrounding the fate of Ignalina NPP has 
been driven by vested interests and has provided little space for public 
participation in decision-making. 
2.4.1 The Impact of the Chernobyl Accident on Soviet Energy Policy 
Prior to the Chernobyl accident in 1986, it was expected that nuclear fission 
would close the gap between energy demand and fossil fuel stocks (Feschbach 
and Friendly 1992:134). Official propaganda instilled a strong belief that the 
Soviet system, and therefore its nuclear programme, was infallible. In the 
words of Yevgenii Velikhov, a physicist and leading member of the Soviet 
Academy of Sciences, 'Before the Chernobyl explosion, many important 
specialists and political figures believed that a nuclear reactor could not 
explode' (cited in Peterson 1993:12). Even if such scenarios were considered, 
officials in Moscow admitted that the developers of the RBMK reactors did 
not perceive a need to include safety mechanisms to cope with failure caused 
by operator intervention as occurred in the Chernobyl case (see also 2.4.2.3). 
The events surrounding the Chernobyl accident, and the causes of the accident, 
have now been retold many times. At the time of the accident, the Chernobyl 
no. 4 reactor was undergoing tests at very low power to check on safety 
aspects of the reactor under those conditions. The resulting explosion was 
caused by a combination of operator errors and safety design faults. It was 
not a nuclear explosion but a steam explosion. The tragic outcome was a 
large release of radioactive material. Worley and Lewins (1988) have provided 
an interesting summary of the accident and Martinez-Val et al. (1990) have 
examined the physical causes of the accident and analysed the propagating 
mechanisms inside the reactor core. 
It could be argued that the lessons learnt from Chernobyl and the safety 
improvements being made at Ignalina make a repeat accident nearly 
impossible. The counter argument is that the extraordinary sequence of 
events leading to the Chernobyl explosion were unforeseen by those most 
closely linked to the operation of the reactor and so it is not possible to say 
with complete certainty that a similar accident (or some other accident based 
on a different chain of events) could not occur at Ignalina. 
While the accident at Chernobyl did not spell an end for nuclear power in 
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the region, it did lead to a down-scaling of Soviet aims to quadruple nuclear 
generation between 1980 and 2000 (Ramberg 1996:8). In the wake of the 
accident, operations were halted at nine nuclear energy stations, construction 
was stopped at sixteen sites, and plans for more than two dozen plants were 
abandoned (9) (Ramberg 1996:8). Many of these decisions were the direct 
result of protest action. Protesters later expanded their concern to other 
sources of power such as thermal and hydro-electric schemes. 
A joint energy development plan released soon after the accident by the 
Soviet ministries of energy and nuclear power canvassed three nuclear 
scenarios: generation of 30 million kilowatts of electricity per annum from 
nuclear sources; generation of 13 million kilowatts of electricity per annum 
from nuclear sources; or, 'if the negative attitude of the public and local 
authorities cannot be reversed', an end to construction of atomic energy 
stations (Feschbach and Friendly 1992:135). The plan needed to balance the 
economy's need for energy with the political and technical reality that energy 
production was increasingly high-priced and under attack from society on 
environmental grounds. The plan failed to comment on the lack of any 
serious attempt at improving energy efficiency although it was rapidly being 
recognised as the essential alternative both elsewhere and within the Soviet 
Union (Feschbach and Friendly 1992:135). 
Although the Chernobyl accident altered the nuclear orientation of energy 
in the region, many energy bureaucrats and nuclear protagonists argued for 
the continued use of nuclear power. One senior energy bureaucrat insisted 
that there was no alternative to atomic energy in industrial areas which 
lacked local stocks of fuel (Feschbach and Friendly 1992:134-5). Feschbach 
and Friendly (1992:135) refuted this and argued that although this might be 
true from an economic point of view, from a political standpoint, 'he was 
whistling in a graveyard'. Similar arguments have been put by Lithuanian 
energy specialists and bureaucrats in discussing the fate of Ignalina NPP (see 
2.4.3). 
Despite the much advertised devastation caused by the 1986 accident at 
Chernobyl the other less serious accidents throughout the FSU, many 
9 Feschbach and Friendly (1992:134) record that two plants were closed, construction was 
halted on 39 stations, and 11 were cancelled. Although there is some discrepancy in the 
accounts, the actual number of nuclear facilities affected is similar - around 52 plants. 
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governments plan to continue to rely on (and even expand) nuclear power. 
The reasons for doing so are simple: maintaining energy supply and jobs 
(Perera 1993:29). Many governments in the FSU and CEE are convinced that 
nuclear power is the cheapest way to satisfy their electricity requirements, 
particularly since many have invested large amounts of money into either 
existing plants or those under construction. Worldwatch Institute surveys, 
however, suggest that electricity generated from nuclear plants is more 
expensive than from gas-fired plants if the costs of environmental impact, 
decommissioning, safety maintenance, and waste management are included. 
For this reason, the nuclear industry is declining worldwide (Adelova-Calta 
1996a:12-14) (see also 2.4.4 and 2.5.1). 
Andrei Gagarinsky, from the Kurchatov Institute in Russia, has argued that 
'in conditions of economic crisis, nuclear energy becomes an island of stability 
in the power industry' (Perera 1993:31). The belief that nuclear power is 
indispensable also pervades the thinking of some Lithuanian energy decision-
makers. The Lithuanian Deputy Energy Minister, Saulius Kutas, for example, 
believes that Lithuania 'cannot survive without nuclear energy' and claims 
that Iclountries all around the world [have] arrived now at the conclusion 
that atomic power is one of the best ways of obtaining "weighty" energy' 
(Kutas 1993:9). He has therefore recommended that a new modern atomic 
power station be built in Lithuania. 
In November, 1992, energy ministers from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Byelorussia attended an energy summit. One topic of the discussions was 
the possibility of constructing a third reactor at Ignalina. The Estonian Deputy 
Energy Minister defended the plan as a necessity for the future of the Baltic 
region (Jeziorski & 011 1992: 6). This view ignored the allegation that two 
thermal power stations, with a combined capacity to supply around 50% of 
the Lithuania's needs, lay dormant (Jeziorski 1993a:B2) (see also 2.4.2). 
Although, the idea of constructing a new nuclear power plant has since 
been virtually abandoned in Lithuania, reliance on nuclear power is set to 
continue for some years to come as most nuclear protagonists aim to extend 
the design life of at least Unit 2 (see 2.4.3 and 2.4.3.1). 
A major concern of the nuclear industry is that early retirement of the 
nuclear plant would result in the loss of highly trained nuclear physicists 
and other technical experts involved in the running of the station who 
would leave the country to pursue their careers. Jan Nistad, head of the 
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Swedish Nuclear Inspectorate's co-operative programme with Lithuania, 
warned of the consequences of such emigration of nuclear specialists; 'If 
they leave, you have a reactor which is not the safest in the world, operated 
by inadequately trained people - that would be a horrific situation' (cited in 
Jeziorski & 011 1992:6). Ramberg (1996:24) noted that a similar problem 
exists in Russia and Ukraine where it arises from the difficulty of paying 
nuclear workers. Some plants have lost up to 20 per cent of their workforce, 
including supervisory personnel. In 1993, for example, around 150 personnel 
left the Chernobyl plant because wages were so far in arrears. In 1994, a 
further 13 personnel departed, including the plant manager. As a result, the 
station has been operated by a less experienced workforce, reliant upon on-
the-job training (Ramberg 1996:25). 
In the Lithuanian case, however, nuclear workers have not only been paid 
but have been given bonuses for working and living in a place of risk. The 
risk of a "brain drain" is therefore related only to the perceived effects of an 
announcement to close the plant. Far from being an appropriate reason for 
the continuance of nuclear power in Lithuania, the use of the "brain drain" 
arguments could be interpreted as industry scare tactics. The possibility of 
employees leaving in search of more challenging positions (though it seems 
unlikely for them to voluntarily return to Russia where living conditions 
are significantly worse than in Lithuania), could be reduced by a variety of 
strategies. Financial incentives to stay, such as a redundancy package available 
only after the final closure, could be offered. Or incentives in the form of 
new challenges could be created such as development of new methods for 
safe decommissioning of reactors. The two operating RBMK reactors are 
versions of the model used at Chernobyl and their design flaws have been 
constantly raised by environmental groups and the international nuclear 
community alike (see 2.4.2.1 below). 
2.4.2 Ignalina Nuclear Power Generating Station 
Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant is located in the east of the country in the 
town of Visaginas, close to the borders with Latvia and Byelorussia (see 
Figure 2.1). It is the largest of the 15 plants still operating in the FSU that 
use the Chernobyl-type RBMK reactors and is considered by some to represent 
the greatest environmental hazard in the Baltic Sea region (The Baltic 
Independent 4(190), 5; December 1993). Generating capacity at the plant is far 
greater than is required to meet Lithuania's own electricity needs, as it was 
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originally constructed under Soviet planning to service the whole north-west 
grid (Kaliningrad, Lithuania, Latvia, Byelorussia, and north-west Russia). 
The plan included the construction of four reactors at Ignalina and eight 
turbines at Kruonis Hydro-accumulation Station (see 2.4.5). Protest action 
halted the completion of the third reactor and plans for the fourth were 
abandoned. The plant now houses two reactors, the first of which was 
commissioned in 1983 and the second in 1986. The 1500 MW reactors are 
large by comparison with other reactor designs. For safety reasons, the plant 
is not run at full capacity and its designated total rated output has been 
derated to 2500 MW. The successful action to halt construction on the plant 
was part of a wave of environmental action at the time which was directed 
toward the Soviet Government. The plant has been regarded as a potential 
security risk owing to the mainly Russian work force as well as an intolerable 
environmental risk for Lithuania. Many interpreted the abandoned 
construction as a stepping stone to the eventual closure of the plant (Salay et 
al. 1993:203). However, following the restoration of independence, 'it became 
clear that there were strong interests within the government to maintain 
the electricity production at Ignalina' (Salay et al. 1993:203). 
Many documents relating to Lithuanian energy, particularly newspaper 
reports or articles not dedicated solely to energy issues, have lamented the 
decision to continue operation of Ignalina NPP but point to the many 
difficulties associated with its closure. The main difficulty expressed in such 
documents is that Ignalina produces a large proportion of Lithuanian 
electricity. The implication has been that Lithuania cannot meet its electricity 
requirements without reliance on nuclear power. This perception of a 
necessary reliance on nuclear power has been so often repeated that it seems 
to have become entrenched in Lithuanian energy literature and in Lithuanian 
society. 
While the World Bank (1993:155) figures indicate that Ignalina accounted 
for around 17 TWh, or about 60 per cent, of production in 1990, others have 
interpreted the figures differently and argue that Ignalina in fact produces 
much less than 60 per cent of Lithuania's electricity. Ruta Gajauskaite, a 
member of the Lithuanian Green Party, for example, claimed that Ignalina 
was producing less than 20 per cent of Lithuania's electricity (pers. comm., 
1993). This confusion arises over the failure to distinguish between production 
and consumption. In 1991, Lithuania exported 12.75 TWh of electricity, or 
44 per cent of the total amount generated, worth USD 660 million at world 
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market prices (World Bank 1993:155-6). If it is assumed, for arguments sake, 
that the electricity for export came only from Ignalina, then domestic electricity 
consumption from nuclear power was only 15-16 per cent of the total generated 
(including exports) (see Table 2.3) and just 8 per cent of the total primary 
energy use (see Table 2.1) or 4 per cent of actual energy use in Lithuania. 
Once exports are subtracted, the nuclear-generated electricity used in Lithuania 
amounts to only 26 per cent of the total electricity used in Lithuania (see 
Table 2.3). This would account for the figures used by Gajauskaite. In the 
debate over the fate of Ignalina NPP, the Greens have tended to use similar 
figures (local use) and this is likely to have been in order to demonstrate the 
feasibility of closing the Ignalina station. The Energy Ministry, on the other 
Table 2.3 The Contribution of Ignalina NP!' to Lithuania's Electricity Balance 
1990 	 1995 	% Change 
Total electricity generated in Lithuania 	29.0 TWh 	13.9 TWh 	-52% 
Electricity generated at Ignalina 	17.0 TVVh 	11.8 TIATh 	-31% 
Nuclear Power Station 
	
59%' 85%' 
Electricity generated by non-nuclear 	12.0 TWh 	2.1 TVVh 	-83% 
plant 41%' 15%' 
Electricity Exported 	 12.75 TWh 	8.0 TWh 	-37% 
% of electricity generated at 	75% 68% 
Ignalina 
%, of electricity generated in 	44% 	 58% 
Lithuania 
Imports 	 0.7 TWh 	5.0 TWh 	+86% 
Total electricity consumed in Lithuania2 16.95 TWh 	10.9 TWh 	-37% 
percentage of total electricity 	56% 78% 
generated in Lithuania 
Electricity generated in Lithuania and 	16.25 TWh 	5.9 TWh 	_64% 
used in Lithuania 
Electricity generated at Ignalina used in 	4.25 TWh 	3.8 TWh 	-11% 
Lithuania3 
as a proportion of total 	 15% 	 27% 
electricity generated in 
Lithuania 
% of electricity used in Lithuania 	 26% 	 35% 	+9% 
generated at Ignalina 
Percentage of total electricity generation in Lithuania for the corresponding year 
'Including transmission losses and energy sector use 
Assuming that all exported electricity was generated at Ignalina 
NB figures have been rounded 
Chapter Two 
	 49 
hand, has tended to use the figure of 60 per cent or more (total production) 
and this may have been done as part of an attempt to convince Lithuanians 
that the country could not survive without nuclear power. 
Events over recent years have dramatically altered the situation. Between 
1990 and 1995 energy consumption in Lithuania dropped significantly, as 
did exports, due to economic recession in both Lithuania and in the countries 
normally importing electricity from Lithuania (Byelorussia, Kaliningrad, 
Latvia). Lithuania was therefore left with excess generating capacity. As a 
result, generation at the thermal power station at Elektrenai virtually stopped, 
producing only 50 MW average from a capacity of 1800 MW. This decision 
was also influenced by the unreliable nature of oil and gas supplies required 
for its operation. Production from Ignalina also decreased. Despite its large 
excess generating capacity, Lithuania actually imported more electricity than 
it exported in 1994. In 1995, the exports were again greater than imports. 
Has the contribution of Ignalina changed during that time? What proportion 
of electricity consumed in Lithuania does it produce? 
The amount of electricity generated in Lithuania between 1990 and 1995 
decreased by more than 50 per cent (from 29 TWh to 13.9 TWh ), the 
contribution from Ignalina decreased by almost one third (from 17 TWh to 
11.8 TWh), and the amount generated by non-nuclear sources decreased by 
83 per cent (from 12 TWh to 2.1 TWh). The large decrease in the latter was 
due to the virtual closure of Elektrenai. As table 2.3 demonstrates, Ignalina 
accounted for about 85 per cent of total electricity generated in Lithuania in 
1995. While this proportion is greater than in 1990, the percentage of Ignalina-
generated electricity used in Lithuania remained quite low. Again, if it is 
assumed that all exported electricity has come from Ignalina, this would 
mean that 3.8 TWh of nuclear-generated electricity was used in Lithuania. 
This amounts to 27 per cent of total electricity generation and 35 per cent of 
the total electricity used in Lithuania (10.9 TWh including imports, energy 
sector use, and transformation losses). The small shortfall in production 
estimated in 1990 had Ignalina not operated could therefore feasibly be made 
up from renewable energy resources and improving energy efficiency (see 
2.5.2 and 2.5.3). While the amount of Ignalina-generated electricity used in 
Lithuania in 1995 could not all be replaced by renewable sources, the larger 
proportion of electricity used in the country that was produced at Ignalina 
that year was a consequence of the virtual closure of Elektrenai together 
with the reduction in exports. The 1990 provides a clearer picture in terms 
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of what is technically possible, given that the electricity system was operating 
to capacity at that time. 
There are two important points to be made regarding the situation in 1995. 
In response to the decrease in demand (both domestically and externally), 
the Lithuanian Government chose to virtually close the largest thermal 
power station (Elektrenai). Another option may have been to close one unit 
at Ignalina NPP. All areas of production and consumption have decreased 
but the contribution of the thermal power plants dropped the most, increasing 
the proportion of Ignalina-generated electricity used in Lithuania compared 
with 1990. There were, however, political and economic reasons for the 
choice to reduce thermal production. The point to be made here is that 
Ignalina_produces a small percentage of the electricity used in Lithuania, 
despite a myth to the contrary. Export revenue no longer seems to be an 
obvious advantage of nuclear power either. The possibility of improved 
electricity export levels in the future, which could be used as a justification 
for nuclear power, is limited by Russia's competitive edge in supplying 
Byelorussia and Kaliningrad with electricity. 
The main conclusion from a World Bank and IEA (1993:iii) report on supply 
options in Lithuania indicated that, based on various scenarios of high and 
low demand, fast and slow economic growth, and high and low nuclear 
options, little or no new capacity would be required, even in the high demand 
scenarios. Table 2.4 shows that the installed electrical generation capacity of 
non-nuclear sources in Lithuania was technically sufficient to meet 
Lithuania's requirements in 1995. Present consumption patterns indicate 
that the capacity is actually about 1.5 times the required level (see Table 2.4). 
Table 2.4 Non-nuclear Generating Capacity in Lithuania in 1995 
End use of electricity in Lithuania 	 6354 GWh 
Electricity generated including 22% transmission losses 	 8146 GWh 
Internal power plant electricity use' 	 2858 GWh 
Total electricity generated for Lithuanian use 	 11000 GWh 
Average capacity required to meet 11 000 GWh generation 	 1256 MW 
Total available non-nuclear installed capacity' 	 2627 MW 
Non-nuclear generating capacity (assuming 70% load) 	 1839 MW 
'Includes 1521 GVVh for operation of Ignalina and 537 GWh used for pumped storage 
'Excluding pumped hydro storage capacity (approximately 600 MW) 
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2.4.2.1 RBMK Reactors 
Whilst the sequence of events leading to the accident at Chernobyl could be 
described as unique, having been initiated by a series of safety violations and 
operator errors, ultimately 'the accident took place and reached catastrophic 
magnitudes due to the features of the RBMK reactor' (Martinez-Val 1990:371). 
RBMK reactors have a number of unique design features. They are graphite 
moderated (i.e. use carbon rods as one of the main control mechanisms for 
the rate of the nuclear reaction). They have no containment pressure vessel 
and therefore no 'second line of defence' against leakage of radiation in case 
of an accident. They use a direct cycle boiling water process for generating 
electricity which provides good efficiency and makes them safer than some 
other designs (Nero 1979). Under normal operating conditions the physical 
processes taking place in the reactor tend to slow the reactor if something 
goes wrong. The weakness of the RBMK reactor, however, is that under 
conditions of low power it is possible to get sudden 'excursions' (i.e. rapid 
power increases) which are difficult to control. Approximately 2 500 hollow 
vertical channels run through the 12m by 7m graphite moderator. Within 
1 700 of these channels are pressure tubes which house 30 000 reactor fuel 
rods in bundles of eighteen. Cooling water circulates through the tubes, 
some of which boils, creating steam to drive two 500 MW turbines. Control 
rods inserted into the 211 graphite channels manage the power level in the 
reactor (Ramberg 1996:14). Figure 2.2 illustrates the basic features of the 
RBMK reactor. 
There seems to be a general consensus that RBMK reactors are unsafe due to 
several design faults. Originally intended for military production with capacity 
to also produce electricity, the RBMK reactors were constructed with little 
attention to nuclear safety as it is understood in the West. Improving such 
reactors is not a feasible option. Yuri Vishnevsky, head of the Russian 
Government's commission on nuclear and radiation safety, is reported to 
have said that: 
no amount of modernisation and upgrading will bring [RBMK designs] up to 
the safety standards of today's Western reactors: they lack containment 
vessels that would hold radiation in if the reactor was breached, the 
instrumentation is inadequate and the pressure tubes carrying coolant are 
brittle. In short, they pose a potential threat to life (Perera 1993: 29-30). 
One of the major problems with the reactor type is the "positive reactivity 
feedback" or "positive void coefficient" which means that if the reactor runs 
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faster in low power areas, the heat leads to a faster reaction rather than the 
natural tendency to quench the reaction (in United States Senate Hearing 
1992:23). In the pressurised water reactors used in the West and in much of 
the FSU and CEE, there is a negative void coefficient whereby the formation 
Figure 2.2 A Schematic Sketch of an RBMK Reactor 
A - The reactor is driven by a lattice of fuel assemblies each consisting of rods of 
uranium dioxide fuel, control rods, and cooling water channels (the water is 
converted to high pressure steam through the heat given off in the nuclear decay 
of the uranium). 
B - The reactor core contains the lattice of fuel assemblies. It is graphite and is 
roughly 7 meters high and 12 metres diameter. 
C- The core is surrounded by a biological shield of concrete, sand, water and steel, 
which absorbs radiation escaping from the core. 
D - Above the reactor is the refuelling machine which can be operated remotely 
to replace individual fuel assemblies once the uranium dioxide is 'used up'. 
E - The high pressure steam from the reactor is separated from water which is 
carried out with the steam. The 'dry' steam passes through a high pressure 
turbine (F) and then a lower pressure turbine (G) before returning, via a condenser, 
to the steam separator. The turbines drive the electrical generator (H). Water 
from the steam separator is pumped, at high pressure, back into the reactor (I). 
of steam actually slows the energy generation (Ramberg 1996:15). According 
to Lord Marshall of Goring, Chairman of the Governing Board of the World 
Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), one correction to this problem 
was available prior to the accident and was installed in reactors in the Russian 
plant at Kursk following pressure from the plant management. He asserts 
that: 
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The tolerance of the large positive void coefficient and the omission of this 
extra protection system on all other reactors are the two basic blunders which 
led to the Chernobyl accident (in United States Senate Hearing 1992:9). 
This may now have been improved to the best of Soviet technology, but 
several other faults render the RBMKs unsafe and therefore the possibility 
of another serious nuclear accident remains. The design failure to separate 
the critical electrical and fluid systems means that, in the case of a fire, the 
"independent" backup systems would also be subject to the failure. They 
have inadequate fire protection systems and are plagued by small fire incidents 
that would never occur in Western reactors. And frequent breaks in the 
1600-1700 cooling pipes limit the effectiveness of the cooling system (in 
United States Senate Hearing 1992:24). 
Another serious flaw is lack of a containment vessel. There is a confinement 
system that could accommodate breaks in a small number of the pipes but 
which would not be sufficient if there was a massive failure of the core, as 
there was at Chernobyl in 1986 (in United States Senate Hearing 1992:24). 
Poor quality of construction, including the use of poor quality concrete and 
metal, compounds their weaknesses in design. Technical equipment is an 
additional problem: instruments and control systems are poor; electrical 
problems are common, including occasional overvoltage; poor cable 
insulation; and control rods subject to failure due to problematic drive systems 
(Ramberg 1996:15). After visiting the Ignalina plant in 1992, Swedish experts 
were appalled at the lack of safety standards. They estimated that the likelihood 
of an accident at the RBMK reactors was 'hundreds of times higher than in 
Western European nuclear plants' (cited in Hinrichsen 1993:36). Others 
have asserted that safety improvements cannot bring the RBMKs (and the 
older VVERs) up to Western safety standards (Boyle and Froggart 1993:3). 
Despite any improvements made to the reactors since the Chernobyl accident, 
the inherent design faults cannot be corrected without significant alterations 
and these would be more costly than a new reactor. Elizabeth Verville of 
the United States Department of State, in a testimony to the US Senate 
Energy and Resources Committee, concluded: 'we do not believe these plants 
can be practically upgraded to meet contemporary international safety 
standards; they should not be operated any longer than necessary' (in Ramberg 
1996:16). What constitutes 'necessary' has been a controversial issue and 
one in which political and economic vested interests have been dominant 
(see 2.4.3). The World Bank and TEA study (1993:12) points out that safety 
54 	 Chapter Two 
improvements made to Ignalina NP? 'are not intended to enable the units 
to operate beyond the medium term 410) . 
The RBMK design and construction weaknesses conceivably increase the 
risks of deliberate damage and there have also been some fears of sabotage 
following threats to the plant in October 1994. A threat was delivered to the 
German Ministry of Environment which seemed to be connected with the 
release of underground criminal, Boris Dekanidze. This sparked concerns 
that Ignalina was indeed a possible terrorist target. 
2.4.2.2 Environmental Impacts of Ignalina NNP 
For the purposes of this thesis and in consideration of the limitations in 
terms of space, environmental impacts associated with nuclear power are 
considered well documented and are generally taken as given. There are 
some specific problems associated with the Ignalina plant, most of which 
relate to the use of water from Lake Druksiai for the cooling of the reactors. 
From an environmental perspective, however, the risk of a nuclear accident 
from RBMK reactors is the most serious aspect to be mitigated or resolved. 
The most evident environmental impact is the thermal pollution of Lake 
Druksiai caused when the water is pumped back to the lake, with the 
temperature rising to 33° C in some parts. Many species of aquatic fauna do 
not survive such unnatural increases in temperature. The entire contents 
of the lake are used every week in cooling the reactors. Paskauskas and 
Sadauskas (1993) have described some of the scientific work being carried 
out in the vicinity of Ignalina which has revealed other ongoing problems 
associated with nuclear power in this area. 'Though the concentration of 
the investigated radionuclides in [Lake Druksiail sediments have not yet 
reached the maximum permissible levels, they are quite close' (Paskauskas 
and Sadauskas 1993: 3). This raises the question as to whether the maximum 
levels set are too high. There have also been repeated references to the 
possibility that the plant has been constructed on a geological fault, with 
concern over the apparent movement of one reactor (see Lithuanian World 
Community and LGM 1989, Banks 1991, Vainius and Piksrys 1994). 
w The medium term is defined as the year 2000, the long-term refers to 2010 and low nuclear 
scenarios are based on an early retirement date of 1995 (World Bank and IEA 1993:iv). 
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Major accidents are not the only risk associated with nuclear power plants. 
There is a small, but measurable, release of radiation under normal operating 
conditions and minor incidents occur with alarming frequency. Some of 
these involve increased radiation leakage. Reports in The Baltic Independent 
claim that there have been several accidents of varying causes at Ignalina in 
the last few years. There were at least three in both 1992 and also in 1993, 
ranging from small fires, broken cooling pipes, and a leak of radioactive gas. 
According to Genadij Lipunov, deputy head of VATESI (11), the incident on 15 
October 1992 involving a leak of radioactive gas could have caused a major 
accident had the plant not been shut down. It was closed for ten days 
(Jeziorski 1992:3). In 1996, Unit One was closed several times as a result of 
breaks in the cooling pipes and oil leakages, including a steam explosion in 
August similar to that at Chernobyl but which did not result in extensive 
radiation release. 
Another serious problem requiring resolution in the near future is that of 
waste storage. Previously, waste was transferred to Russia but since the 
restoration of independence it has been stored on site. Viktor Shevaldin, 
the General Director of the plant, has stated that around 98 per cent of the 
storage capacity has been filled (Hindahl 1995). Unless the plant closes very 
soon, it will therefore be necessary to use storage containers purchased from 
Germany. Where the containers will be located and what compensation 
will be paid to those living within a fifty kilometre radius remain controversial 
issues (Ciucelis, pers. comm., July 31, 1996). Shevaldin argues that such 
containers will provide a 50 year respite before permanent storage options 
need to be considered. It seems that, in his mind, this is a sufficiently long 
enough period to negate the need for present concern: 'It will be a problem 
to be solved by our children' (Hindahl 1995). Such statements are incongruent 
with the notion of environmental protection for future generations, a 
fundamental facet of environmentally sustainable society (see Tiberg 1992:24, 
Banks and Sainsbury 1997). 
2.4.2.3 The Deficit of a Safety Culture 
Problems caused by unsafe design features have been exacerbated by a further 
lack of what has been termed a 'safety culture'. Western analysts have 
expressed concern over the almost blasé fashion in which Ignalina employees 
11 The Lithuanian Nuclear Safety Inspectorate. 
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conduct their work, again a reflection of the entrenched faith in the infallibility 
of the Soviet system. This perception is demonstrated by the comment 
made by Saulius Kutas, then Energy Minister, that 'Ignalina power station is 
definitely safe' in spite of growing evidence to the contrary (quoted in Vilkelyte 
1993:3). 
As the previous sections have shown, even the international pro-nuclear 
lobby agrees that RBMK reactors have serious safety problems. The head of 
the Nuclear Energy Division of Siemens International (one of the world's 
largest constructors of nuclear plants) has stated that 'the only answer is to 
shut them [RBMK reactors] down as soon as possible' (Friends of the Earth 
1992:5). The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is certain that, despite some 
improvements in the system following the Chernobyl accident, the overall 
design is still seriously flawed (in United States Senate Hearing 1992:23). 
There appears little need for further argument that RBMK reactors have 
significant design faults which render them an unsafe means of generating 
electricity. 
Given the 'safety culture' deficit mentioned above, new equipment alone 
will not resolve the issue of safety at Ignalina NPP or other stations in the 
FSU. The failure has been in making energy production a priority over 
safety. As discussed in 2.2.1, the Soviet tendency to shroud potential problems 
by focusing on the "all powerfulness" of their technology led to misconstrued 
perceptions regarding the infallibility of nuclear power. In an official report 
released after the Chernobyl accident, the government acknowledged that: 
The developers of the reactor installation did not envisage the creation of 
protective safety systems capable of preventing an accident in the presence 
of premeditated diversions of technical protection facilities and violations 
of operating regulations which occurred, since they considered such a set of 
events impossible (cited in Ramberg 1996:22). 
Anecdotes from visiting technicians and academics confirm some of the 
concerns regarding this safety culture. Following their October 1994 visit, 
Banks and Todd (1995:29) commented that: 
To the non-expert eye at least, the flickering fluorescent lights, corrosion on 
pipe joints, and patched sections of concrete, together with a seemingly blasé 
attitude toward risks, contributed to a general sense of unease. We left with 
a deep sense of concern over the possible future of this huge reactor. 
Tony O'Donoghue, an engineer from Canada, recalls a similar experience. 
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Expressing his concerns regarding the quality control and maintenance of 
concrete strength he stated that 'structures in general looked sloppy and 
poorly built [which].. .gives one the very unsettling feeling about the actual 
work and development of the reactors themselves' (O'Donoghue 1991:5). 
Ivan Selin, as Chairman of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, found 
the deficit of a 'safety culture' evident in the littering of flammable rags on 
the floor during his visit to Chernobyl. He noted electrical and fire hazards 
everywhere (Ramberg 1996:23) at a facility where you would hope the 
implications of poor safety were best known. Ramberg (1996:23-24) also 
noted several examples whereby employees of nuclear power plants in the 
FSU have failed tests on safety procedures and a large proportion of safety 
relevant incidents which reflect personnel and procedural failure. 
2.4.3 Possible Options for Ignalina NPP 
A decision to cease using nuclear power, or to at least close down those 
reactors which have serious design faults, such as the RBMKs, is ultimately 
dependent on values. While it is often argued that the closing of plants 
such as Ignalina is not economically feasible, Banks and Todd (1994) have 
shown that, if there was a commitment to do so, it would be possible to end 
reliance on nuclear power in Lithuania. Tables 2.1, 2.3, and 2.4 demonstrate 
why it would be possible. A commitment to end nuclear power, although 
economic problems must be considered, requires a certain perspective 
regarding trade-offs. What the government, or the people who elect that 
government, view as most important in terms of the risks involved with 
generating power from RBMK reactors (or from nuclear power in general) 
will ultimately affect the course taken. Interviews with politicians, greens, 
academics, and other citizens revealed that while there existed a high level 
of concern regarding the continued operation of Ignalina, a general feeling 
of hopelessness prevailed. Most people seemed to be convinced by the 
arguments of the Ministry of Energy that Lithuania could ill afford to close 
down Ignalina. 
The time-frame for the inevitable closure of the existing reactors in Lithuania 
has been the topic of various reports. In 1993, a World Bank study was 
prepared in conjunction with the International Energy Agency (IEA) for the 
group of the seven richest nations (G-7). The report outlined ten scenarios 
based on various retirement dates together with fast or slow economic reform 
forecasts. In terms of the retirement of the reactors, early shut-down was set 
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at 1995, mid-term shut-down in the year 2000, and 2010 for the longer term 
(World Bank and IEA 1993:21-8). The report concluded that the most realistic 
option would be to retire the oldest unit at the beginning of 1995 and defer 
the decision regarding the second until the year 2000. It argued that this 
allowed some flexibility to retire the second unit early if demand made this 
feasible. The decrease in demand evident in Lithuania to date, however, 
has not been used as an opportunity to retire Ignalina. Another option 
suggested by the World Bank and TEA study was to derate both units to 1000 
MW each, if demand developed on a low to medium path (World Bank and 
IEA 1993:iv-v). 
In 1995 Ignalina was still running and the date for early retirement was 
postponed to 1996 or 1997 (see Banks and Todd 1995:41). The year 1997 was 
also suggested by Demarcq in 1993 who argued that immediate shutdown 
was not feasible whereas 1997 (as a low nuclear option) provided the time 
necessary for upgrading replacement facilities and developing alternative 
supplies (Demarcq 1993:7). At the time of writing (March 1997), Ignalina 
continues to operate and the date for possible early retirement has once 
again passed, with the mid-term shutdown date only three years away. 
The National Energy Strategy for Lithuania argues that since there is 
insufficient demand to justify both reactors at Ignalina, one reactor should 
be shut down. The report's authors suggested that the oldest unit be 
decommissioned in 1996 and not re-started unless long term export contracts 
were signed. They also recommended that the second reactor be upgraded 
while the first was still operating. The report considered the possibility of a 
new reactor if one or both of the RBMKs were decommissioned and suggested 
that the viability should be established in advance so that Lithuania would 
be in a good position to evaluate the option closer to the end of the RBMK 
reactors' life (IC Consult et al. 1993:100). While the Consultants who prepared 
the report and their advisors at the Lithuanian Energy Institute should be 
commended for recognising the need to close the oldest reactor and to upgrade 
the second, their failure to consider the 'no-nuclear' power option appears 
to have been a serious flaw in the strategy. 
A survey of 157 experts working in the fields of energy and environmental 
protection from government (parliament, Ministry of Energy, Ministry of 
Economics, Industry and Trade, Ministry of Environmental Protection, 
Ministry of Agriculture, and Ministry of Forestry), the Union of Farmers, 
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academia, other experts in planning and health protection, and employees 
from the plant was conducted by the Institute of Philosophy, Sociology, and 
Law in Lithuania. The survey revealed that most considered nuclear power 
to continue to have a major role in future electricity production. Despite 
airing strong concerns about environmental impacts and safety problems, 
the average estimate was that nuclear power will make up 48 per cent of 
electricity production in 2013, 44 per cent in 2033, 39 per cent in 2053, and 35 
per cent in 2010 (Morkunas et al. 1993:6). Among those experts and officials 
interviewed, there was uncritical acceptance that Lithuania must have nuclear 
power. Despite some research and pilot projects into alternative sources, it 
was assumed that Ignalina would continue to operate. When plans for a 
third reactor were discussed at a Baltic energy summit in November 1992, 
for example, the deputy Energy Minister, Saulius Kutas, stated boldly that; 'I 
think Lithuania must use nuclear energy' (Jeziorski and 011 1992:6). 
Given this widespread belief that Ignalina must continue to play a role in 
electricity production in Lithuania, the issue of safety must be considered. 
Operating the plant to the end of its planned life carries serious risks yet 
officials hope to extend the operating life of at least one unit. 
2.4.3.1 Replacing Channels 
The problem with running the reactors to the end of their planned 25 year 
life (2010) is that the reactor channels should be replaced between 15 and 20 
years after commissioning (2004 for unit 1, and 2007 for unit 2 at the very 
latest, with 2000 being more appropriate for unit 1) (Demarcq 1993:10). Other 
sources have given similar deadlines for absolute closing (see PROMENT 
LTD 1994)(12). The Government of Lithuania made a commitment to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) not to replace channels which 
would involve serious procedural risks and prolong retirement, thereby 
increasing safety risks (Arturas Klementavicius, Lithuanian Energy Institute 
pers. comm., November 1994). The agreement not to replace the existing 
channels leaves only 3 years (with a maximum of 7 - 2004) until the oldest 
unit must be shut-down. Whether to replace the channels is, therefore, a 
11 It has been estimated that decommissioning will be completed 5 years after closure 
(PROMENT LTD 1994:7). Other sources point out that decommissioning is not complete until 
after isolation with the final stage left until 100-135 years after shutdown. This is to ensure 
radiated equipment has time to "cool down" leaving less radioactive waste and exposing 
workers to lower levels of radiation during demolition (Motluk 1995:6). 
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decision limited by technical realities and cannot be a question of values. 
Given the almost nonchalant way in which experts referred to the idea of 
maintaining nuclear power with no definite answers to the issue of waste 
disposal nor clear estimates of the costs involved in either decommissioning 
the exisiting reactors or constructing a new reactor (if nuclear energy is 
actively pursued), it appears possible that the IAEA agreement will be broken. 
How could the Government be held to it? As Banks and Todd (1995:42) 
argued, if Lithuania has not prepared itself well for alternative sources of 
energy, when that ultimatum arrives, it is likely to be ignored with the 
excuse that Lithuania cannot abandon nuclear power because it has no other 
alternatives(13). Rather than running the risk of operating even more unsafe 
RBMK reactors, it is possible that the IAEA and governments of surrounding 
countries would then grant a reprieve so that the channels could be replaced. 
In this way, Lithuania could "bribe" concerned countries in the region, using 
similar tactics to Ukraine over the decision whether to continue operations 
at Chernobyl or to decommission the remaining reactors. In that case, the 
Ukraine government agreed to close the remaining three reactors at 
Chernobyl, only as long as the West agreed to provide the USD 3 billion cost 
of doing so (Mackenzie 1995:10). 
Interviews conducted in 1996 with energy researchers at the Energy Institute 
in Kaunas and a representative from VATESI, Rolandas Ciucelis, revealed 
that those involved in energy policy development do in fact intend to renege 
on the agreement with the IAEA. Several researchers claimed that the 
agreement should never had been made because the government officials 
involved were acting according to political motives and that the contracting 
parties [including the IAEA] were misguided in their information regarding 
the process of replacing the channels. The intimation from those interviewed, 
including the Director of the Energy Institute, Professor Vilemas, was that 
the decision-makers involved hoped that the agreement would not prohibit 
channel replacement when the time came to implement the procedure (pers. 
comm., July 10 1996). 
The result of such intentions has been a continued orientation of nuclear 
13 The continued construction of further units at the Kruonis Hydro-accumulation Station, 
which stores electricity from Ignalina at periods of low demand, also suggests a planned 
future for nuclear power since the station is far less efficient when used in conjunction with 
electricity generated by the thermal plants (see 2.4.5). 
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power in policy development. An example of how this has occurred is the 
misuse of funding provided by the EBRD for safety upgrading. The EBRD 
has provided 33 million ecu (USD 44 million) for 18 safety upgrading projects. 
A condition of the grant was that funding should be used only for safety 
improvements, with 'no larger investments seeking to prolong the working 
life beyond the planed life' (Kutas 1996:8). In other words, the grant was 
conditional on the terms of the IAEA agreement not to replace the channels. 
Part of the grant was assigned for a report(14) on least-cost options for the 
development of the energy sector. In view of the agreement on channel 
replacement, the working group was obliged to ignore such options. It 
found the most economic option to be late closure of both reactors. While 
this would not breach the terms of the contract, a senior expert on the team, 
Vaclovas Miskinis, admitted that simultaneous calculations were carried 
out on the option of extending the life of the plant (replacing the channels). 
When questioned on some of the issues raised in the report, he responded 
by saying: 'in this report, we were trying to keep Ignalina [commissioned] for 
as long as possible' (pers. comm., July 10, 1996). In light of such an approach, 
scenarios are pointless. The idea was to come up with the "right" answer. 
That answer would have been to replace the channels had the terms of the 
funding not prohibited its consideration (officially). Much of the work being 
conducted with the funds focused on establishing an argument for extending 
the life, even if it could not be referred to in that particular report. Miskinis 
added that the decision regarding when to close Ignalina was a ultimately a 
political one. The irony, in light of his previous statement, was apparently 
lost on him. This example highlights the focus of energy specialists and 
bureaucrats. 
If the channels are allowed to be replaced there will also be complications 
due to both the cost and implementation of the procedure. The cost of the 
replacement has been estimated to be USD 100 million per unit, further 
increasing the costs involved in retaining nuclear power (Demarcq 1993:10). 
This figure was also mentioned by the Public Relations Officer at Ignalina 
NPP (pers. comm., July 31, 1996). Vaclovas Miskinis, from the Energy Institute, 
claims that the actual amount required would be closer to USD 60 million 
per unit and this figure was used by he and his colleagues when estimating 
14 	• Lithuanian State Power System and Lithuanian Energy Institute, 1996;Republic of Lithuania: 
Least Cost Power Sector Development Programme - Final Report ; Kaunas. The report was 
funded by the EBRD under contract no. 31-1030.4.5 and also had assistance from the EU PHARE 
programme for its preparation. 
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the least-cost options referred to above (pers. comm., July 10, 1996). 
The procedure, which requires the unit to be shut down for several months, 
has been carried out only once before in Russia at Leningrad 1 (also known 
as Sosnovy Bor 1). The channels at Ignalina are different, owing to the 
higher power density of the 1500 MW reactor cores. In effect, therefore, a 
comparable procedure has not yet been performed (Demarcq 1993:10). Yet 
Rolandas Ciucelis, Senior Inspector with VATESI, appeared relatively 
disinterested in the issue when it was raised with him. He simply asserted 
that there would be no safety problem associated with changing the channels 
(pers. comm., July 31 1996). 
2.4.3.2 Energy Planning 
With the closure of Ignalina 3 to 7 years away (not a long period in terms of 
long-range energy planning) a decision must be made quickly regarding the 
development of future options, including the rehabilitation of the thermal 
power plant at Elektrenai, so that these can be put into place during that 
time. It has been seven years since Lithuania declared its independence 
from the Soviet Union, nine years since public protests were successful in 
halting construction of the third reactor at Ignalina, and more than ten years 
since the accident at Chernobyl. If a decision regarding the future of Ignalina 
is delayed, then risks will increase, less time will be available for securing 
alternatives, and more finances will be spent on improving safety. This 
money could well be better spent on the alternatives. Rolandas Ciucelis, 
pointed to the existence of a Fund established to accrue money necessary for 
either channel replacement or decommissioning. The Fund remains empty. 
This reason for this, according to Ciucelis, is that the Lithuanian State Power 
System owes money to Ignalina NNP (pers. comm., July 31, 1996). It also 
indicates serious inadequacies in the planning process. 
The EBRD grant for safety upgrades will culminate in a Safety Analysis 
Report (S AR), 'serving as a base for continued operation of Ignalina NPP' 
(Vilemas and Reichenbach 1995:531). The SAR will be prepared by the Ignalina 
NPP operator and reviewed by an independent consortium of technical safety 
organisations to nuclear safety authorities in the UK, Germany, Italy, France, 
Lithuania, and Russia. It will provide the basis for the licensing of Ignalina 
NPP by VATESI if unit one is to be operated beyond 1998 (Vilemas and 
Reichenbach 1995:531). This report has had various completion dates (15) but 
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will not be completed until late 1997 or early 1998. If it is decided that unit 
one should be decommissioned and unit two should continue operating, 
the latter would only have approximately 9 years of its planned life remaining. 
The sections above clearly demonstrate that those in control of the decision-
making process are working on the premise that nuclear power will continue 
for a long time to come in Lithuania - replacing the channels will extend the 
potential life of each unit by 20 years. Many energy planning reports assume 
continued reliance on nuclear power (16) . Vilemas and Reichenbach (1995:532) 
refer to a Lithuanian Power Sector Development Programme which would 
include definition of the scenarios developed by the LEI as a condition of the 
EBRD grant. In doing so, they point to a time-frame of 25 years (with a focus 
on the next 5-10 years) but do not mention either channel replacement or 
the construction of a new reactor, indicating that they expect Ignalina to 
continue operating beyond its planned life (17) Even if the reactors are operated 
until the end of their planned life but after channels should be replaced 
(2008 and 2011), the time frame is significantly less than that assumed by 
Vilemas and Reichenbach. Vilemas (1995:721) stresses that nuclear power is 
one of the most promising options for Lithuanian electricity production in 
the future, arguing for the construction of 'safer and more reliable reactors'. 
2.4.3.3 A New Nuclear Reactor? 
The National Energy Strategy (IC Consult et al. 1993) canvassed the idea of 
constructing a new nuclear reactor for Lithuania in 1993. Former energy 
minister, Saulius Kutas, has been the most vocal proponent of this option. 
Kutas met with representatives from the USA company, Westinghouse 
Electric Corporation in July 1993 where the company promoted a new 600 MW 
reactor it was designing (Vainius and Piksrys 1994:10). The main argument 
in favour of such a proposal is the rational use of existing nuclear 
infrastructure and the mitigation of social and economic problems expected 
in the region from possible closure of Ignalina (World Bank and TEA 1993:42). 
15. Vilemas and Reichenbach (1995:531) noted mid-1996 as the expected completion date of 
the SAR. In July 1996, Vilemas said the report would be completed at the end of 1996 while 
Miskinis expected it in the first half of 1997 (pers. comm., July 1996). 
16 See, for example, Lithuanian Energy Ministry et al. 1993 and IC Consult et al. 1993. 
17. This time frame is longer than end of the reactors' planned life, even if the later dates 
offered by Vilemas and Reichenbach are considered. They claim the design life of the reactors 
will end in 2010 and 2015, giving them a life of 27 and 29 years respectively. 
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Construction of a new nuclear reactor after the retirement of the existing 
reactors, however, is itself complicated by economic and environmental 
issues. Although Karaliunas (1992:12) claims that a new nuclear power 
reactor is the most economical option for Lithuania, nuclear power requires 
large capital investment which is unlikely to be available within Lithuania. 
Traditional sources of capital outside Lithuania might also prove difficult to 
obtain. According to Inesis Kiskis, Regional Environmental Specialist with 
the World Bank in Lithuania, grants and loans are not made available from 
his organisation for building nuclear reactors (pers. comm., December 1994). 
Even if such loans could be acquired, it would mean further indebtedness 
for the Lithuanian Government with the benefits of the credits remaining 
in foreign hands. In addition, in order to meet such liabilities, governments 
often need to cut other funding, usually in the social (education, health, 
welfare) or environmental spheres (Fink et al. 1993:9). A report by the LEI 
submitted to the Ministry of Energy in 1992 suggested that a new reactor 
could be funded by electricity exports (Salay et al. 1993:203). The ability of 
Lithuania to retain export markets (at least those using existing network 
grids), however, is in question. Since independence was restored, exports 
have been reduced significantly by a decrease in demand within the Main 
countries importing electricity from Lithuania (Kaliningrad, Latvia, and 
Byelorussia) (see Table 2.3). Thus, substantial export revenue is no longer 
available and the development of new markets would require even further 
infrastructure costs. 
The idea of constructing a new nuclear power plant appears to have been 
largely abandoned amongst energy experts in Lithuania in favour of the 
plan to extend the life of the existing reactors. However, even in 1996, Kutas 
was still pushing for a new nuclear plant, arguing that Lithuania has limited 
indigenous resources and that the nuclear infrastructure is already developed 
(Kutas 1996:8). 
2.4.3.4 Social and Economic Implications of Closure 
Any plan to close Ignalina confronts the social problems associated with the 
possible retrenchment of 5000 or so workers and the impact on their families 
and the town of Visaginas (formerly Snieckus) which was built to service 
the plant. There are an estimated 32 000 people dependent on the plant 
(World Bank and TEA 1993:vi). While this is a major issue that would need 
to be addressed, the aforementioned survey indicated that 65% of respondents 
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believed that it was possible to develop light industry in the town, while 
53% pointed to the micro-electronics industry and 48% suggested the 
development of reserves and forests (Morkunas et a/. 1993:11). 
The resolution to such problems is not discussed in detail in this case study. 
The main intention is to demonstrate the technical feasibility of Lithuania 
meeting domestic electricity requirements without the use of Ignalina and, 
in doing so, to highlight the political motivations behind plans for continued 
nuclear generation. 
2.4.4 Western Involvement in Energy Options for FSU and CEE 
Western involvement in the Soviet nuclear programme increased after the 
Chernobyl accident in 1986 and increased further after the breakdown of 
communism in the region in 1990/1. Funding has naturally focused on 
upgrading safety and improving training and management. However, a 
report by Friends of the Earth found that twice as much government money 
was spent on completing nuclear plants than on increasing safety, and three 
times as much if private investment was also included (Jenkins 1992:3). 
One major reason for this is the desire of governments to ensure that they 
are not held liable for any future accidents and it is believed that new nuclear 
plants create less risk than the existing Soviet models (Mackenzie 1995:12). 
The problem of liability is reduced by the newly independent countries 
becoming a party to international conventions assigning and limiting liability 
(such as the Vienna Convention on Third Party Liability) as well as becoming 
a member of the IAEA. Lithuania became a member on November 18, 1993 
(Vilemas and Reichenbach 1995:531). In general, Western involvement has 
tended to prolong the use of nuclear power in the region both by upgrading 
safety (a necessary process in the short term), and by signing long-term contracts 
which give incentives to continue running unsafe reactors in return for 
much needed hard currency (Jenkins 1992:15). 
Meanwhile, the IAEA has been accused of assisting the Soviet Union in 
covering up the consequences of the Chernobyl accident (Fink et a/. 1993:9). 
According to its statute, the main objective of the IAEA is to promote the 
use of nuclear energy throughout the world (Fink et al. 1993:6) and restrictions 
on the use of nuclear power following the accident would have been 
inconsistent with such an objective. The opening up of EEC and FSU has 
actually provided the nuclear industry with an opportunity to reverse the 
66 	 Chapter Two 
declining trend in its world market (Jenkins 1992:5). The post-communist 
region is an ideal place for the nuclear industry to obtain new contracts since 
there is experience with the use of nuclear energy with government aversion 
and public protest less likely. There are many vested interests within the 
countries which officials seek to retain. For the public, a new Western 
reactor appears attractive in comparison with existing antiquated unsafe 
designs. Western nuclear vendors have therefore been actively promoting 
the construction of new reactors (Adelvo-Calta 1996b:15). Thus, concern 
over the risks of nuclear accidents involving Soviet designed reactors in the 
region stems not only from altruistic concern regarding the serious risks to 
people and the environment but also from a concern over the impacts such 
an accident would have on the continuation of the industry. Comments 
made by the chairperson of the Hearing before the Committee on Energy 
and Natural resources in the United States Senate on the 'Safety of Soviet 
Designed Nuclear Powerplants', J. Bennett Johnston, tend to support such a 
perspective. The hearing was held in June, 1992 in Washington DC. In 
concluding the discussion, J. Bennett Johnston stated: 
the threat is not only to the people of the Soviet Union or Ukraine or wherever 
in Eastern Europe or otherwise that these reactors are located, but to the 
whole of Europe which receives the plume and also to the countries which 
have an extensive nuclear industry such as the United States, France, and 
Japan... [where] nuclear energy might be terminated as an effective option if 
you have another Chernobyl....Even though these reactors are totally 
different from those in the West and certainly in the United States, in effect, 
we have at risk a multi-hundred billion dollar industry in this country (in 
United States Senate Hearing 1992:69). 
Despite numerous reports outlining the serious design faults inherent in 
the RBMK reactors as well as documented problems with the quality of 
Soviet materials and construction, the direct action required to reduce the 
risks to millions of people in the region are yet to be taken. In promoting 
the expansion of the nuclear industry and delaying, indirectly, the 
decommissioning of unsafe reactors, nuclear organisations and their 
supporters condemn countries such as Lithuania to risks they would not be 
prepared to accept in their own countries. 
Much aid directed toward safety improvements at Ignalina has been bilateral. 
The Swedish Government, for example, provided USD 1.6 million per year 
for three years for research and safety upgrades (Jenkins 1992:17) and, following 
inspections from SKI and news of a minor accident during a visit from the 
King and Queen in 1992, pledged a further 40 million kronor for safety 
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improvements. It was rumoured that the accident may have been exaggerated 
as a tactic to encourage greater financial support from the Swedish 
Government. This is inconsistent, however, with the usual air of secrecy 
surrounding other accidents. Denmark, concerned over the impacts on its 
own country of an accident, provided DKK 2.8 million for safety systems 
between 1990 and 1993. Then, in 1994, a one year project 'Co-operation and 
Technical Assistance in the Field of Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection' 
was initiated by the Danish Ministry of the Interior. The aim was to increase 
preparedness for an accident by installing monitoring stations for early 
detection of an emergency situation. The German government has also 
provided assistance toward improving the control of processes in the reactors. 
Not all such assistance has been from concerned neighbouring countries. 
Japan is funding training programmes in the areas of nuclear safety, accident 
prevention, and re-processing of nuclear waste. (Hindahl 1995, MEP 1994:18; 
The Baltic Independent 4(190), 5; December 1995, The Baltic Independent, 
4(158), 7; 1993 and The Baltic Independent 3(133), 3; October 1992). 
There have also been commitments and/or provisions of multi-lateral 
funding from the G-7 and G-24 groups, the EC Commission (USD 1.3 billion), 
and the International Nuclear Safety Fund which was established by Sweden, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, UK, and Canada. The grant of 33 million 
ecus (USD 44 million) mentioned in section 2.4.3.1 was provided from the 
Fund in March 1994 to the power plant particularly for safety analysis and 
improvements. The project was prepared in close cooperation with the 
EBRD, the Lithuanian Government, and Ignalina management. The EU 
PHARE programme which funds environmental projects in East and Central 
Europe and the Former Soviet Union began a similar project in 1994 with a 
budget of 50 000 ecus (USD 66 419) (MEP 1994:18, The Baltic Independent 
5(208), B3; April 1994, and Rosendahl 1993:7). 
While this is by no means an exhaustive account of money invested in 
safety improvements of Ignalina, it shows that a very substantial amount 
has been spent so far on improving the plant. Had Ignalina been shut down 
before now, much of this investment could have been directed toward 
developing alternative energy sources. Boyle and Froggart (1993) asserted 
that the investments have been a waste of resources given that the World 
Bank/International Energy Agency report indicated that the least-cost option 
was to a low nuclear scenario. They claimed that the Chernobyl accident 
cost around USD 300 billion plus 40 000 lives (to say nothing of other 
68 	 Chapter Two 
environmental impacts) and the cost of phasing out RBMKs and developing 
alternatives amount to a further USD 1-3 per capita, a cost which Boyle and 
Froggart (1993:2) described as 'cheap insurance'. Of all the Baltic States, 
Lithuania receives the most international support for environmental projects. 
If international assistance provided specifically for improving safety at 
Ignalina is excluded, however, it has received the least funding (Swedish 
EPA 1995). This suggests that other important environmental projects have 
missed out on support (see Chapter 6). 
Western nuclear groups have also been involved in monitoring and 
reviewing practices at Ignalina. The Swedish nuclear authority is involved 
in a joint Swedish-Lithuanian programme designed to raise nuclear safety 
standards (Jeziorski 1992:3). Scandinavian nuclear experts who inspected 
Ignalina in 1992, were 'horrified by the low level of safety and called for 
urgent improvements' (The Baltic Independent 3(127), 11; September 1992). 
Various nuclear organisations - such as Siemens International, the World 
Association for Nuclear Operators (WANO), the United States Department 
of Energy, the IAEA, International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and 
the EBRD - have examined the issue of nuclear power in the Former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe. While recognising that RBMKs as well as VVER 
440/230s (pressurised water nuclear reactors) have several design problems 
that render them unsafe, with some recommending the closure of the most 
dangerous reactors, their conclusions have tended toward the short-term 
solutions of training and technological improvements. They have recognised 
the difficult economic situation in countries like Lithuania and therefore 
have focused on improving operational safety of the reactors on the 
assumption that dismantling these reactors is not feasible in the near future. 
Financial assistance programmes could also aid the construction of new 
Western standard nuclear plants (United States Senate Hearing 1993). So 
despite recognising that several international experts, including their own 
organisations, have recommended the immediate closure of RBMK reactors, 
none have prepared an outline or time frame for closure. 
Friends of the Earth (FOE) has been highly critical of the solutions given by 
these organisations, arguing that they are mainly short-term and not in the 
interests of the citizens of the countries concerned. They point out that the 
in 1992, the G-7 Group aimed to spend around USD 800 million on improving 
existing reactors rather than on phasing them out. According to FOE, the 
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G-7's approach is based on four main objectives: to reduce the risks of nuclear 
accidents; to decrease air pollution by replacing old lignite and coal power 
plants; to create projects for Western companies specialising in nuclear power, 
given that they face a lack of contracts in the West; and to prevent a further 
loss of public support for the nuclear industry in both Eastern and Western 
countries (FOE 1992:2-3). Friends of the Earth supports the first objective but 
advocates a different approach to achieving that objective - the closure of all 
nuclear power reactors in the Eastern Bloc, beginning with the most dangerous 
and rapidly phasing out the remainder. According to FOE, the second objective 
should be achieved not through increasing nuclear power but rather, 
decreasing the energy intensity of the countries. The final two objectives are 
not supported by Friends of the Earth. 
2.4.5 Kruonis Hydro-Accumulation Station 
The Kruonis (formerly called Kaisiadorys) hydro-accumulation station (HAS) 
is located approximately 85 kilometres from Vilnius and 25 kilometres from 
Kaunas on the right bank of the Nemunas river near the settlement of 
Kruonis (see Figure 2.1). The station was designed to store electricity from 
the Ignalina NPP base load during off-peak periods. It was planned for the 
whole North West region of the USSR (as was the nuclear power station) 
under the belief that only nuclear and hydro-electric systems were efficient 
sources of power (Spudulis and Vasilyev 1993:33, World Bank and IAEA 
1993:16). 
The initial plan included nuclear plants together with pumped storage in 
Latvia (on the coast), Ignalina, and Byelorussia. Construction at Minsk was 
abandoned following the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. Construction on the 
Ignalina and Kruonis combination, the largest of the three combined nuclear-
hydro systems planned, began in 1977 (World Bank and IEA 1993:16) and 
was the only one to have been constructed. A total of eight units (turbines), 
each with 200 MW generating capacity, was planned for the Kruonis HAS, 
but this was reduced around the same time that the third and fourth reactors 
at Ignalina were abandoned after strong reactions from the green movement. 
It was decided to halve the capacity and the agreement that was reached 
required constant monitoring and public information programmes. 
Eventually, only two of the original eight units were completed. When, 
under an independent government, construction was recommenced, it 
contributed to public frustration and, ultimately, to the decline in 
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environmental activism in Lithuania (see Chapter 4). According to the 
World Bank and IEA (1993:16), 'the environmental impact of the facility 
appears to be relatively benign'. However, serious concerns regarding the 
environmental impact of the project have been raised and these, along with 
other objections, are presented below. The information has been derived 
primarily from a series of interviews with energy and environment experts 
in Vilnius and Kaunas. 
2.4.5.1 Arguments Against Construction 
The primary argument against the construction of the Kruonis HAS was 
that the capacity of the planned system exceeded actual requirements by a 
very large margin. Such Soviet-style over-planning appears to have survived 
within the independent Lithuanian governments and is displayed most 
clearly in the area of energy planning, and energy planning associated with 
nuclear power in particular. Even the upper storage dam has been constructed 
in such a way so as to allow a doubling of the reservoir volume by extending 
the walls of the dam an additional 6 metres (World Bank and IEA 1993:16). 
A second concern related to the concentration of pollutants upstream from 
the proposed dam. It was found that these pollutants (including fertilisers, 
waste from chemical factories, and heavy metals) would accumulate in 
sediments on the bottom of the storage facility. It was felt that these sediments, 
and the act of damming the river, would have serious detrimental effects 
on the river's ecosystem. There was also some concern about the impacts of 
turbulence caused by high peak flow regimes. The fluctuations in water 
level, estimated to be between 0.6 m to 1 metre, would have several predictable 
consequences, including erosion of the river banks and damage to the breeding 
grounds of the fish species which deposit their eggs in the shallows. To the 
local residents, who do not have the numerous lakes on offer for residents 
of Vilnius and other cities, the Kaunas lagoon (the natural, lower storage 
area) is also a popular recreational area. The changes in daily storage would 
mean that the area of sandy beaches would be reduced, thereby decreasing 
recreational opportunities. There also concerns that the concrete was of 
such poor quality that the dam and the pipes were likely to fracture. 
This debate occurred when the influence of the Green movement was strong, 
having been heightened by successful protests in 1988/89 against an oil 
drilling platform off the coast at Nida, a hydro-electric dam on the Daugavils 
River (Latvia), and of course, the construction of a third reactor at Ignalina. 
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Protest concluded after the government eventually capitulated and reduced 
the capacity by half - to four turbines and construction on the third was 
eventually also stopped in 1989. At the time, the Director of LSPS publicly 
stated that the existing turbines should not be operated. Under the pressure 
of economic change, a decrease in the importance of environmental issues, 
and an increase in concern over security of energy supply, the independent 
government of 1991/2 recommenced construction of the third and fourth 
turbines. 
An argument for this recommencement was that the third generator had 
already been ordered under the old USSR pricing system. The cost of the 
fourth unit, however, was significantly higher. One of the decision-makers 
was Zigmuntas Vaisvila, previously a strong opponent of the project and 
leader of the Kaunas Green movement. This change in stance was to impact 
significantly on the future popularity and respect of the Green movement. 
The example highlights how much easier it is to obtain public opposition to 
environmental degradation when it is perpetrated by an enemy or foreign 
government rather than a democratically elected independent government 
with a virtual mandate from the people. By 1991/2, the Greens were unable 
to generate the same level of public support that it had been able to in 
1988-90. Its ability to attract public support was further eroded by the actions 
of some of its members, such as Vaisvila. It raised the question whether 
economic and political concerns of transition necessarily had to take 
precedence over environmental concerns, or whether the initially high level 
of Green support was merely an avenue for political dissent. These issues 
are discussed in Chapter 4. 
The debate over the hydro-electric pumped storage scheme also had another 
interesting element of relevance to this discussion. Installation of four 
turbines married with the intentions of ardent supporters of continued 
reliance on nuclear power. Energy experts have since pointed out that four 
turbines amount to overcapacity, even if a new reactor is built. The use of 
pumped storage systems in conjunction with thermal power is less efficient 
than when combined with nuclear (since supply is easily more easily regulated 
in a thermal power plant), and more expensive than the cost of installing 
and operating new capacity (World Bank and IEA 1993:17). This raises the 
question of what the intended purpose of completing the four turbines has 
been. The answer, it seems is that once the all four units are completed, it 
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will provide another lever for proponents of a continued nuclear programme. 
Banks and Todd (1995:37) predicted that once the large investment in the 
Kruonis HAS had been expended, it was highly likely that the government 
would argue that it would be then rational to continue relying on nuclear 
power. Leading energy advisers have since also used such an argument. 
Yet there are still costs involved in using Kruonis in the future. If Ignalina 
is operated beyond 2000, construction of the planned high voltage 
transmission line between Ignalina and Kruonis would become necessary in 
order for Ignalina to operate as a base load, evening out the demand peak. 
The total cost of equipment and installation would be about USD 48 million 
(World Bank and IEA 1993:43). 
2.5 Energy Options for the Future 
This thesis argues that nuclear power, particularly generated from RBMK 
reactors, is not compatible with an environmentally sustainable society. The 
thesis strongly promotes the decommissioning of Ignalina NPP and the 
rethinking of the necessity of a new oil terminal. Possible options for:meeting 
Lithuania's energy requirements in the future, therefore, are presented below. 
They include increased use of renewable energy, realistic pricing of energy 
inputs and outputs, improved efficiency of energy production and supply, 
and energy conservation. 
2.5.1 Life Without Nuclear Power 
As Tables 2.3 and 2.4 demonstrate, nuclear power is not technically necessary 
in Lithuania. Although Ignalina produces large amounts of electricity 
significant proportions have been exported. Even when the energy balance 
changed, with Ignalina producing an even greater percentage of total 
production, this was strongly influenced by the virtual retirement of the 
thermal power station at Elektrenai. Although the energy balance has altered, 
available installed capacity in Lithuania remains the same (5 127 MW), with 
non-nuclear sources having an available capacity of 2 627 MW (excluding 
600 MW capacity at Kruonis pump storage station). Lithuania's electricity 
consumption in 1995 required 11 000 GWh of electricity generation, allowing 
for transmision losses and electricity used within the energy sector (see Table 
2.4). This could be easily supplied by existing non-nuclear sources (assuming 
secure fossil fuel supplies), particularly if energy efficiency measures are also 
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implemented. The large amount of generation required is influenced by the 
large proportion of electricity used in operating Ignalina NPP which would 
not be required in a non-nuclear system. Electricity would be required in 
electricity production from non-nuclear sources but this is signifcantly less 
than that used at Ignalina NPP. So, in effect, Lithuania could meet her 
energy requirements without the use of nuclear power. Such assertions, 
made by Banks and Todd in 1994 at an international conference in Prague, 
were met with the contention; 'you are wrong!' by Juozas Burneikis from 
the Lithuanian Energy Institute. Other energy experts also did not want to 
acknowledge this possibility. In 1996, the Director of the same institute, 
Jurgis Vilemas, admitted that Lithuania currently has sufficient energy sources 
to meet its electricity requirements without relying on nuclear power (pers. 
comm., July 10, 1996). To adopt such a strategy, he argued, would result in a 
doubling of the consumer price of electricity. Again the argument rests on 
economics. 
In a statement released after a string of relatively minor accidents at Ignalina 
in August/September 1996, the Lithuanian Green Movement stressed that 
although the "cheap power" argument is popular amongst energy officials, 
the Greens believe that not all costs are included in the pricing. The amount 
spent on safety upgrades, for example, does not appear to have been included. 
An analysis of production costs at Ignalina NPP prepared by PROMENT LTD 
(1994) found that the 1994 Ignalina budget had not included all cost elements, 
significantly underestimating the cost of maintenance, fuel, overheads, 
insurance, and decommissioning. The estimations assume decommissioning 
in 2004 and 2010 to avoid channel replacement. When full costs of production 
were included, the cost per kWh almost doubled (18) (PROMENT LTD 1994:1, 
13-18). In view of this, assertions that the cost of electricity production 
would double if generated at thermal power plants, may be misplaced or 
exaggerated. Worldwatch Institute studies have also shown the relative 
expense of nuclear power once all environmental and management costs 
are included. They estimate a nuclear power production cost in the United 
States of US 12 cents per kWh compared with US 6-8 cents per kWh for 
electricity generated from gas (Adelvo-Calta 1996a:14). 
1 a The report by PROMENT LTD (1994:13-18) provides three revised budgets based on three 
different estimates of decommissioning costs, US 100, 200, and 300 million. The total production 
cost would rise from US 157.32 million to 287.7, 298.61, and 309.52 million respectively if all 
costs are concluded. The production cost per kWh would rise from US 1.1 cents to 2, 2.08, and 
2.16 cents respectively if all costs are concluded. 
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Some safety costs are included in the calculations made by the LEI as part of 
the least-cost options report to the EBRD and PHARE Programme mentioned 
above. They tend to be focused on short term amounts necessary to keep 
Ignalina technically operational, rather than including all monies spent so 
far, all of which have been necessary for safe operation (see Lithuanian 
Energy Institute 1996). They certainly have not included a proposed 43 
million Litas (USD 10.75 million) for civil security measures in the vicinity 
of the plant. The measures would include infrastructure to be used in the 
case of an accident such as evacuation points, improvements to roads and 
the communication network in the area, iodine and other medicinal 
provisions, and training exercises for those living in the area (Baltakis 1996:2). 
There are of course other issues involved such as security of oil and gas 
supply and economic issues involved in decommissioning and in the price 
of electricity produced. The price of nuclear-generated electricity is increasing, 
as a result of price increases of nuclear fuel and spare parts supplied by 
Russia, thereby increasing the cost of producing electricity from Ignalina. As 
the value of the ruble plummeted in 1992/3, Russia demanded higher prices 
(in USD) for nuclear fuel supplied to Ignalina. The import price wa's raised 
to USD 60 000 per assembly and a later trade protocol called for USD 73 000. 
Ignalina requires 1 630 assemblies to operate for one year (World Bank and 
TEA 1993:12). This has affected export potential because prices for fuel and 
electricity produced have been kept low within Russia (Vilemas and 
Reichenbach 1995:531, Salay et al. 1993:202). 
The independent governments in Lithuania have argued for an oil terminal 
on the premise that Lithuania should not be reliant on Russia for supplies 
(see 2.3.1.3 Yet this argument seems absent from the nuclear debate. The 
report by the World Bank and TEA (1993:12) referred to the Lithuanian 
Government's intention to seek other suppliers of nuclear fuel but it doubted 
that Western companies would supply the unique form of fuel for a price 
that could compete with that offered by Russia. The only way to avoid 
reliance on Russia is to build a new reactor which uses technology from 
outside Russia. But, as demonstrated above, this possibility has little practical 
relevance to the debate. The nuclear lobby continues to argue for a continuance 
of nuclear power in Lithuania, primarily through the replacement of channels, 
despite the fact that this would require reliance on Russian fuel rods and 
equipment. 
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Ultimately the decision is political, but the Lithuanian Government and 
pro-nuclear energy specialists have tended to disguise this in technical and 
economic terms. As noted by Gorz (1980:100), when such an approach is 
used, it is easier to disregard public opposition as uninformed. This has 
implications for the working of democracy in the country (see also 7.2.1). 
2.5.2 Renewable Energy 
The centralised, energy-intensive, heavily subsidised Soviet system placed 
little emphasis on the need to conserve energy, or indeed to canvas the 
possibility for renewable energy sources. Not surprisingly, in 1990, renewable 
energy accounted for only a small part of energy consumption in Lithuania 
(around 4 per cent). The World Bank suggested that increasing the share of 
renewable energy to 10 per cent over the next ten years would be attainable 
(IC Consult et al. 1993:54). Later, in 1996, it was estimated that renewables 
could make up 15 per cent of Lithuania's energy requirements. This increased 
estimate is partly because of a decrease in total demand but also from an 
increase in their use (Lahmeyer International 1996, A-1:16). To be able to 
use indigenous sources or be able to produce the energy in Lithuania will 
have economic and environmental advantages in the future. Although 
unlikely to provide a major percentage of consumption, renewable energy 
could assist by accommodating lost supply in the case of Ignalina's retirement 
and reducing the impact of other energy use, leading to a more 
environmentally sustainable society than possible under the Soviet system. 
2.5.2.1 Biogas 
Biogas from animal manure, food processing waste, and sewage provides a 
use for a waste product that would otherwise have disposal problems. The 
waste that is left after the gas has been extracted can be used as a fertiliser for 
agriculture, or alternatively, forestry. This in turn would reduce costs 
normally used on fertilisers (the production of which requires a large amount 
of energy and causes significant air pollution) and aid the growth of plantations 
which could be used as firewood - thus providing another indigenous 
renewable energy source. Most of the potential heat or electricity generated 
from biogas would be derived from the agricultural sector, with 3 per cent 
from sewage and 1 per cent from the food processing industry (Lahmeyer 
International and CowiConsult 1994, 3:5). 
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Some pilot biogas plants have begun in Lithuania including one at a large 
piggery where the manure from 500 pigs was used to generate biogas. There 
are also several family size and community-scale units in operation. Biogas 
can be used for heating greenhouses or homes and drying crops or timber. It 
will be most useful from large farms where the heat or electricity generated 
can be used by the wider community. There is also potential to use chicken 
manure in a direct combustion process, generating electricity for local use. 
The largest chicken farms have an estimated 50 000 chickens producing 
large quantities of manure (IC Consult et al. 1993:60). It should be noted that 
conditions involved with large-scale animal husbandry are in opposition to 
concern for animal rights and well being, which have become more widely 
acknowledged around the world, and are generally incompatible with the 
notion of an environmentally sustainable society. 
Biogas from sewage sludge also has some potential and using it to generate 
electricity would offset the environmental impacts the large quantities of 
biogas have on the greenhouse effect. The Lithuanian Energy Institute 
estimate that around 10 million m3 of biogas is emitted into the atmosphere 
each year from existing sewage treatment plants. The amount currently 
biologically treated and therefore having biogas potential is small and could 
only be a viable energy source once sewerage systems are improved and 
become more widespread in Lithuania (IC Consult et al. 1993:60). Since 
most municipal and industry sewage is integrated in Lithuania, there could 
be problems generating gas from the sludge if it contains heavy metals and 
other chemicals. It would also be inappropriate to use for fertiliser. Municipal 
waste could also be burned. There is currently a Danish funded feasibility 
study in progress to ascertain the potential of a 40 MW power plant in 
Klaipeda. The cost of waste incineration could be offset against land fill 
costs (IC Consult et al. 1993:61). 
2.5.2.2 Hydro-electric 
There are several other possible sources of renewable energy in Lithuania 
which could decrease the share of nuclear, oil, and coal in energy production. 
There is potential for increasing the share of hydro in electricity generation 
since only 11 per cent of the installed capacity is used (ESD and LEI 1996). 
Upgrading the existing 12 hydro power plants (and 65 small hydro systems), 
for example, is a feasible option, though new large scale plants are restricted 
by geography, financial costs of technology, and environmental concerns. 
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Only two rivers, the Nemunas and the Neris, would be capable of sustaining 
100 MW of generation (Lahmeyer International and CowiConsult 1994, 3:6). 
These could be supplemented with new micro plants, creating a potential 
capacity of 17 MW or 0.31 PJ per year (IC Consult et al. 1993:54). Gas turbine 
power plants have also been recommended as an inexpensive nuclear 
replacement for the post-communist region (Hinrichsen 1992:38) 
2.5.2.3 Biomass 
The current use of wood as a fuel source is minimal in Lithuania. There is 
one commercial size wood fuel boiler in operation and small amounts are 
used in rural areas. The forest industry in Lithuania produces between 1.4 - 
4.0 million rn3 and waste reportedly accounts for about 30 per cent of this 
total. Wood fuel could also be obtained from wood based industries. Sweden 
has been involved in the development of a plan for wood fuel use in Lithuania 
but restricted resources have hindered the promotion of wood fuels. Small 
plantations have since been developed in Lithuania specifically for energy 
production and the Forestry Ministry recommends such forests be planted 
in exhausted peat bogs (IC Consult et al. 1993:59-60 and ESD and LEI 1996). 
The Danish Energy Agency has provided funding for a feasibility study and 
implementation of a plan to convert an existing oil fired district heating 
plant of 4.5 MW to utilise wood chips and, if necessary, peat. It was intended 
to be completed by winter 1993 (IC Consult et al. 1993:60). 
The use of wood burning boiler is restricted by capital costs which are about 
2-3 times larger than a gas burner and there would additional costs of emissions 
control. According to the National Strategy, conversion of oil and coal fired 
boilers is both desirable and feasible especially as fuel prices rise (IC Consult 
et al. 1993:59-60). However, the use of wood and peat could have serious 
environmental ramifications. Some peat bogs are already exhausted and 
wetland areas have been substantially eroded and decreased (see Chapter 3). 
The concept of using waste to generate energy is an important aspect of 
environmental sustainability, thus, in using wood and peat consideration 
would have to be given to the degrading effects on the natural environment. 
2.5.2.4 Solar 
According to Paulius Kavaliauskas, solar energy is "Pie in the Sky" for 
Lithuania (pers. comm., September 1992). One reason is that the use of 
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active and passive solar regimes in Lithuania is restricted by the poor 
insulation of buildings. Therefore, passive solar will only be useful for new 
buildings and its contribution will depend on the rate of construction of 
new buildings which is dependant on the general state of the economy. The 
high cost of active solar is an immediate restriction. Also, since around 70 
per cent of buildings in larger towns and 55 per cent of buildings in the 
country overall are supplied with heating and hot water from a centralised 
system, active solar will only be economically viable in rural areas not already 
connected to the district heating system. It could, however, play a role in 
agriculture by heating greenhouses, drying crops, and milking, for small 
household hot water systems and for swimming pools at health resorts and 
the like (IC Consult et al. 1993, ESD and LEI 1996). 
2.5.2.5 Wind 
Danius Lygis (environmental advisor to the Seimas [parliament]), stated 
that a small wind farm was being developed for the North West (Danius 
Lygis pers. comm., July 28 1992) but would supply only about 1 per cent of 
the region's electricity demand (Paulius Kavaliauskas pers. comm., September 
1992). The National Energy Strategy recognises wind is an effective energy 
source since large wind turbines of >1 MW on the Baltic coast could generate 
up to 8.4 PJ per year - the equivalent of one 300 MW unit at the thermal 
plant at Elektrenai and accounting for 2 per cent of total primary energy 
consumption. However, there are some environmental problems such as 
noise and visual pollution and large land use, all in an important recreational 
area of Lithuania. Analysis, based on 1991 electricity and fuel prices, has 
shown that wind power costs 8 cents per kWh while electricity from 
conventional sources costs around 6 cents per kWh. Wind may have a 
future in Lithuania, nevertheless, if market prices for electricity are achieved 
and expected decreases in the cost of wind turbines is realised (IC Consult et 
al. 1993:58-9). 
2.5.2.6 Geothermal 
Geothermal energy seems to be a likely contributor to the Lithuanian energy 
system and is being seriously considered as an option since there are places 
with underground water temperatures of 70°C. There is currently a Denmark-
supported pilot project of 3.5 MW under development near Klaipeda. So 
far, the project has met with expectations and the warm water will be used 
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for heating greenhouses in the area. Further funding will be required to 
implement plans of another project at Palanga. Although currently restricted 
by the high capital investment required to get geothermal energy underway, 
research indicates that it could be a major contributor in Lithuania by the 
year 2000 (IC Consult et al. 1993:59). 
Such projects in renewable energy are only in the early development stages 
and confidence in these options as long term solutions is low. However, if 
alternative energy was seriously considered, it would be wise for planners 
and government departments to learn from the experience of the oil terminal 
proposal. Any alternatives would need to be developed thoroughly before 
decisions regarding the future use of Ignalina were made. Accusations of 
'Soviet-style thinking' and xenophobic attitudes have been levelled at 
decision-makers and the oil terminal serves as an important case study in 
highlighting such approaches to decision-making. It demonstrates the 
interaction between nationalism, interest groups, government, and the 
process of Sovietisation, in planning a potentially profitable, yet polluting, 
enterprise. 
2.5.3 Conservation and Efficiency 
Previous sections have highlighted the inefficiencies in the Lithuanian energy 
system, a legacy of Soviet energy planning. Improving efficiency and 
conserving energy offers the best prospects for meeting Lithuania's energy 
(particularly electricity) requirements. Scott et al. (1995:716) found that in 
the FSU region, particularly when based on low growth scenarios, 
conservation and energy efficiency would enable the closing of all the RBMKs 
and some VVERs with a fairly minimal investment. Conserving energy, 
improving efficiency in energy production and consumption, and reducing 
negative impacts of energy production on the environment are all referred 
to in the Lithuanian Law on Energy (Article 3) as aims of energy policy 
(Supreme Council of Lithuania 1995). The adoption of a Lithuanian National 
Energy Conservation Programme in 1992, indicating recognition of a problem 
with energy efficiency, was an important step. It was estimated that the 
programme could save around 20-25 per cent of various fuels if fully 
implemented. 
Conserving energy and improving efficiency is particularly important in 
terms of providing alternatives to nuclear generation in Lithuania, as 
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decommissioning Ignalina requires much of the country's domestic 
requirements to be met from air polluting thermal power plants using crude 
oil and gas. Rather than constantly improving safety at Ignalina, directing 
finance into improved energy efficiency could have positive implications 
for both the economy and the environment. Californian physicist, Arthur 
Rosenfeld, has strongly supported such a direction for CEE and FSU, insisting 
that: 
We applaud the West's growing concern about the nuclear crisis in Central 
and Eastern Europe, but proposals to spend billions on supply-side fixes are 
misguided. A less costly approach is to direct investment toward improved 
energy efficiency, concentrating initially on production and mass distribution 
of compact fluorescent lamps and other simple technological improvements 
(cited in Hinrichsen 1992:38) 
In order to affect energy use levels in a country, several approaches could be 
taken. A government could put strict regulations in place, such as compulsory 
insulation or building requirements or use prices as a mechanism to encourage 
efficient use or rely on conservation programmes aimed at developing an 
"efficiency culture". Australian Government policy has been to improve 
the efficiency of energy use in order to both conserve resources and improve 
environmental impacts. The approach to energy conservation in Australia 
over the past 15 years has been non-regulatory. All energy consumers have 
been encouraged, rather than forced, to adopt cost-effective conservation 
measures. This encouragement has taken several forms. Energy infor•ation 
centres have been established across the country in larger cities, often linked 
to government owned electricity or gas utilities (i.e. the centres are largely 
government funded). They supply energy conservation advice to residential, 
commercial and industrial consumers. Public education campaigns, urging 
energy efficiency, have also been funded by government. There have been 
many such campaigns across the country throughout the 15 year period. 
Energy efficiency has been taught in schools with some teaching materials 
prepared and distributed by government. Industries have been encouraged 
to undergo energy audits through tax concessions and schemes where the 
government pays for the audit. 
Another approach has been to encourage innovation in energy conservation 
through research and demonstration funding. Many hundreds of research 
grants to industry, universities, and research organisations were offered and 
were successful in establishing a diverse and enthusiastic energy research 
culture in the country. In 1991, the research emphasis changed from a very 
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broad mix of pure and applied research to a more applied approach, with the 
expectation that research would be jointly funded by government and 
industry. Concurrently, small grants were made available to local community 
groups to promote energy efficiency at a local level. 
How successful has this non-regulatory approach been? Primary energy use 
per person in Australia has continued to grow over this 15 year period, 197 
Gj/person in 1975, 211 in 1983, and 228 in 1990. But energy efficiency, measured 
as a function of GDP, has improved: 23 TJ per million US dollars of GDP in 
1975, 17 in 1983 and 15 in 1990. This might be judged as a modest success. 
Economic output has increased at a greater rate than energy use. But an 
improvement in per capita energy use should be the goal of any serious 
energy conservation campaign, suggesting that some regulatory control might 
also be desirable. This is more so in the Lithuanian situation where energy 
prices are well below international market prices which is a disincentive for 
people and industries to improve energy efficiency. 
In general, Lithuania has tended to use regulatory policy instruments. This 
is evident in the direction of a third of available monies from the 
Environmental Protection Fund toward environmental education and 
research whereas in Estonia the approach has been to more direct regulation 
and taxation, relying less on encouragement through education (Eckerberg 
and Pedersen 1997). There have also been, however, practical attempts to 
improve efficiency of consumption in the urban sector. Some efforts, such 
as a pilot project involving constructing of energy efficient apartments in 
Kaunas, initially suffered from a lack of financial support but have since 
secured more assistance from Denmark and the World Bank (Dragunevicius 
1994). Investment in such measures will have greater economic and 
environmental returns for Lithuania in the long-term. 
2.5.3.1 Price Reform 
The average cost of energy to consumers in Lithuania, and indeed the rest of 
the eastern and central European countries, has been traditionally well below 
Western Europe. (Hughes 1992:64) Under the Soviet system, there was no 
guide for market prices and the price of a commodity was rarely related to its 
actual production cost. For example, the state sold oil to its industries for 
about nine rubles a barrel - less than the price of a liter of vodka' (Peterson 
1993:16). This was also the case for water, forests, and other resources, leaving 
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no incentives to use them wisely. The transition to a market economy 
should help environmental quality by improving the incentives through 
the elimination of explicit or implicit subsidies for the consumption of energy 
and other natural resources, thus encouraging energy conservation and the 
more careful utilization of other resource-based products (Hughes 1992:67). 
Such changes would take time but would go far toward improving air quality. 
A gradual increase in energy prices up to the prevailing prices in Western 
Europe could reduce the energy intensity of the Central European economies 
by 30 to 50 per cent by 1995-2000. It will also require stricter environmental 
controls and the replacement of old technology before substantial 
improvements in ambient air quality (Hughes 1992:67-71). Hughes points 
out that it is important that governments do not replace old problems with 
new ones by establishing new subsidies for energy conservation. He believes 
that in the end it is energy prices that should govern the actions of industries 
and other consumers, 'not a panoply of subsides and other conservation 
policies' (Hughes 1992:73) However, it could be argued that an increase in 
price, while certainly an incentive to use less (particularly in a struggling 
economy), may only ensure just that. A reduction in energy use has overall 
benefits to the economy but not to quality of life - if it is still used in an 
inefficient way. Therefore, education will be a key factor so that consumers , 
can efficiently use less energy. Consumers that use less energy but wastefully 
are not getting the full benefit from what they pay for and perhaps will 
suffer as a result. It is also environmentally better if full benefit is received 
from extracted resources. Therefore it is essential that energy conservation 
measures are not restricted to incentives to use less but include education to 
ensure efficient use. 
Electricity prices in Lithuania and other parts of the former Soviet Union 
have been set well below the cost of generating the power. Thus, there has 
been a lack of adequate financial resources available for maintenance, 
improvements, and safety enhancement as well as no incentive for 
conservation. Price reforms will not only improve conservation but also 
provide funding for improvements to the nuclear power system and 
establishing alternatives (in United States Senate Hearing 1992:28&30). The 
price of electricity in Lithuania increased by 167 times between January 1992 
(US 0.03 cents) and July 1995 (US 5 cents) (19) . Whilst this has caused serious 
19 This is partly due to the relative value of the ruble to the US dollar (120 rubles per USD in 
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problems for some domestic users, it has been a necessary step toward 
improving energy efficiency. Improving the efficiency of buildings must 
also be carried out in order to avoid consumers paying more for electricity 
they do not need. Further, improving the efficiency in transmission would 
decrease supply costs, thereby reducing the need to increase consumer prices. 
2.5.3.2 Pollution Taxes 
An effective structure of environmental incentives and regulations will be 
needed to ensure that economic recovery coincides with environmental 
improvements (Hughes 1992:75). Hughes argues that the fines are often too 
low to act as a serious deterrent while enforcement has been ad hoc. Chapter 
6 demonstrates that the pollution charges and fines in Lithuania are not 
effective as a pollution abatement instrument. While it is desirable that the 
revenue from such charges are directed to a Environmental Protection Fund, 
the charges themselves should be directed by the level of damage caused - 
current or projected (Hughes 1992:74). Such fiscal approaches need to be 
backed up with regulatory instruments and incentives to conserve energy 
and reduce pollution rather than providing a license to pollute. 
2.5.4 Regional Co-operation 
Since regaining independence, Lithuania has been thrust back into the 
regional and indeed international community. For Lithuania to recover 
economically, socially, and environmentally, cooperation with the 
neighbouring countries will be vital. The Baltic Sea Region is a unique area 
with a variety of cultures and forms of government. It is generally expected 
that regional cooperation should follow the ending of the Cold War and the 
emergence of the Baltic States from the forced division of communism (see 
Fitzmaurice, J., 1992). The problem is, however, that cooperation clashes 
with the desire for independence that has been deeply instilled by 50 years 
occupation. The fight for independence has left fear in control of many 
policy decisions and the idea of forgoing any sovereignty is considered unwise 
in regaining economic independence. Although some believe that it will 
take some time before the Baltic States will integrate and cooperate with 
each other and, to improve the situation, cooperation in the whole region 
should be encouraged (Gricius 1992:192). 
January 1992) and the introduction of the Litas which has been pegged to the US dollar (4:1). 
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One area that obviously will require cooperation is energy. With few 
indigenous resources, Lithuania must negotiate with the neighbours. Co-
operation is desirable for both economic and environmental reasons. There 
were some signs of hope when in November 1993, the energy ministers 
from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia agreed to form a working group to 
examine energy issues with an emphasis on co-ordinated policies (The Baltic 
Independent 4(185), B1; November 1993). However, the apparent breakdown 
in cooperation (illustrated by the abandoned cooperative oil terminal options 
at Ventspils or Liepaja), indicates the impact of national sentiment on 
international relations. The legacy of the Soviet approach to energy planning 
should be appreciated, in order to understand the problems Lithuania faces 
in improving energy policy. 
2.6 Conclusion 
Energy production and use in Lithuania is clearly a cause of significant 
environmental damage. Major improvements in the efficiency of energy 
use are required if these environmental impacts are to be reduced. While 
the presence of a 'Chernobyl design' nuclear reactor is a constant, high 
environmental risk that the environmental movement would like to see 
removed, the environmental impacts of any nuclear power, RBMK or not, 
make it an inappropriate energy source from an environmental perspective. 
Concern over the safety of the Ignalina nuclear power station may act as a 
catalyst for international support to improve the energy system and develop 
renewable energy sources. Already there are a number of nearby countries 
which are supporting such initiatives. Some energy commentators would 
argue that the nuclear power plant should be replaced by a new, safer design. 
An environmental perspective, however suggests that, instead, the nuclear 
power industry in Lithuania should shut down all together and the large 
investment that would be required to rebuild the nuclear reactor directed 
into alternative energy sources and energy conservation. 
Nuclear power, excluding exports, accounts for only 8% of total domestic 
primary energy requirements - an amount that could, feasibly, be made up 
by an increase in indigenous renewable energy. In terms of electricity 
production, the available generation capacity of non-nuclear sources is well 
about that required to meet domestic requirements. Technically it is, therefore, 
possible for Ignalina to cease operation. But, if desired economic and industrial 
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growth is to be achieved, the energy system as a whole would have to 
expand or, alternatively, significant improvements in energy efficiency would 
have to be realised. Increasing the efficiency of energy production and use is 
the preferred environmental option. Education programmes, encouragement 
of local energy research and development initiatives, and public information 
on conservation options would help to establish a culture of energy efficiency. 
However, it seems likely that regulation in the form of more stringent 
energy standards for new residential and commercial buildings, compulsory 
retrofitting or upgrading of existing buildings, and minimum energy targets 
for new and existing industries would be required if the existing energy 
system in Lithuania is to cope with any growth and improvement in the 
standard of living. Regulation should accelerate the process to increase 
energy efficiency and reduce the environmental impacts of its supply yet 
may prove difficult to implement because of an entrenched scepticism of 
central control by the Lithuanian people in the transition to a market economy. 
Therefore, a gradual increase in energy prices will also be required to encourage 
efficiency as well as compensate the loss of nuclear-generated electricity exports 
This chapter has shown the highly political nature of decisions relating to 
environmental degradation or protection. Decisions regarding the 
continuance of nuclear power and the construction of the oil terminal were 
made on the basis of economic arguments - namely that Lithuania cannot 
be economically independent without them. However, it is clear that these 
decisions had other important implications for vested interest groups. The 
Lithuanian governments have not pursued energy policy in the way that 
would be expected if they were moving toward a society based on 
environmentally sustainable society. The politicising of decision-making in 
this sphere has hindered any efforts to do so. 
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Chapter 3: Water Pollution 
3.1 Introduction 
Lithuania has abundant water resources and water has always been a part of 
Lithuanian culture. There are several myths or legends which involve 
water such as the story of the Princess Jurate which tells of the origins of 
amber found in the Baltic Sea. Jurate lived under the sea in a huge castle 
made from amber. The god of thunder, Perkunas, was in love with her but 
Jurate's affections lay with a mortal fisherman. In his anger, Perkunas 
destroyed the castle into millions of pieces and these can now be found on 
the shores of the Baltic Sea. The cultural identification with water, and 
particularly the Baltic Sea, helps explain the importance of water pollution 
in Lithuanian society and the way in which people rallied to protect the 
Baltic Sea (these connections are further discussed in Chapter 4). 
A survey conducted in 1992, as part of the research for this thesis, highlighted 
the importance placed on water pollution in Lithuania, indicating that 74 
per cent of Lithuanian students and 62 per cent of Greens regarded water 
pollution as one of the three major environmental problems in their 
country.w Concern about the quality of water in their own country obviciusly 
influenced perceptions of world problems. Of the student respondents, 39.5 
per cent noted water pollution as one of the three major environmental 
problems in the world, while 40.5 per cent of Greens interviewed also 
mentioned water pollution. Water protection is also a government priority 
with a large proportion of the domestic and international assistance 
environmental allocations being directed toward waste water treatment (see 
6.2.3.2). It is also identified as a major priority in the National Environment 
Strategy (see 7.4.2). 
Such perceptions have not, however, led to a society conscious of water use. 
As with energy, Lithuanians use almost double the water per capita than 
people in other European countries. Water use varies in Lithuania but 
averages at about 272 litres per capita per day. In contrast, Sweden uses 
1.49% of students and 43% of Greens stated air pollution as one of the three major environmental 
problems and 43% and 35% respectively included Ignalina nuclear power station or other nuclear 
activity as a third major problem. See appendix for survey questions and comments. 
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approximately 195, Denmark 175, Norway 167, Finland 150, Spain 131, and 
Belgium 116 litres per capita per day (Houston and Tunnicliffe 1994:38). 
Besides the lack of effective meters and tariffs for water use during the 
Soviet period, there are other reasons for such high use. Industry has been 
inefficient and has consumed a lot of water in its processes. Also, the plumbing 
systems in the large apartment buildings encourage high level water use not 
only due to leaking pipes but also because water can take up to 10 minutes to 
become hot in some apartments. 
There are more than 700 rivers (2) and rivulets in Lithuania and 2830 lakes 
have an area greater than 0.5 ha. Rivers, lakes, streams, and canals have a 
total length of 64 000 kilometres. The majority (97 per cent) of the rivers are 
less than 10 kilometres, while nine rivers are over 200 kilometres long. The 
Nemunas, Lithuania's longest river (937 km), is a tributary of Lithuania's 
largest inland water source, Kursiu Lagoon (Environmental Protection 
Department of Lithuania 1992:65 and Duzinskas and Gutkauskas 1994:79). 
Around 4.6 billion rri3 of water from various water sources are used annually 
(1993) in Lithuania of which, around 3 billion is used for cooling the Ignalina 
NPP (see 2.4.2.2). Of the remainder, approximately 50 per cent is consumed 
for municipal or domestic purposes, 25 per cent for industry, 25 percent for 
fish farming, and 2 per cent in agriculture. The total water use has decreased 
to around half the quantity used in 1989 which has been attributed to economic 
decline. Along with the decrease in water usage, there was also a reduction 
in water pollution. In 1989 there was an estimated 500 million m 3 of polluted 
water which had decreased to 360 million by 1993 (MEP 1995a:37). 
Water use and protection in Lithuania have been regulated by the Water 
Code of 1972. The Law on Taxes on State Natural Resources of 1991 includes 
charges for extracting groundwater or using surface water. The Water Code 
emphasises protecting all water bodies from pollution and aridification 
(Zilgalvis et al. 1993:47-50). It has been criticised by Applegren (1994:20) 
because of its inconsistencies with the new economic and institutional system. 
Despite such legal statements as found in the Code, all sources of water have 
been affected in Lithuania. For example, intensive land reclamation for 
agriculture and peat extraction has led to the draining of around 80 per cent 
of the country's wetlands (Duzinskas and Gutkauskas 1994:79). Wetlands 
2.  According to Applegren (1994:5), there are 29 000 rivers in Lithuania, suggesting a somewhat 
larger grouping that would include streams and creeks. 
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provide important habitat for an array of wildlife and play an important role 
as nutrient sinks in the landscape, acting as a buffer to pollution before it 
reaches the Baltic Sea, for example. They can also be used for nutrient 
reduction in waste water. The most seriously threatened wetlands are the 
natural peat bogs. Although peat extraction has lessened during the recessive 
economic climate, the Government plans to increase extraction from 150 000 
to 2 million tons, including the exploitation of 73 previously undisturbed 
bogs (Lithuanian Fund for Nature 1995:1-2). The management of coastal 
lagoons and wetlands is a component of the Baltic Sea Joint Action Programme 
(Kindler and Lintner 1993:13). 
Groundwater, the primary source of drinking water in Lithuania, has also 
been affected by agricultural activity including run-off from large cattle farms 
and piggeries and poor storage of fertilisers and pesticides, leaving 51 per 
cent of shaft wells below hygienic requirements (Environmental Protection 
Department of Lithuania 1992:67, Juodkazis 1994:65). Old landfills, industrial 
contaminated sites, oil storage tanks, mining areas, and former Soviet military 
sites also pose serious threats to groundwater quality (US EPA 1995:3, Juodkazis 
1994:65). The shallow groundwater contains 'large amounts of organic 
substances, oil products, nitrates, nitrites, ammonia, pesticides, detergents, 
and other pollutants' (Environmental Protection Department of Lithuania 
1992:67). The concentration of nitrates in the ground water of about one 
third of the country is above the Maximum Allowable Concentration (MEP 
1995a:52). 
High iron and fluorine content is also a problem with around 60-70 per cent 
of wells supplying water with an iron content 3-4 times higher than the 
maximum concentration established by World Health Organisation (WHO). 
In rural areas, the iron content is removed from only 2.5 per cent of reservoirs. 
This is significant in light of the fact that around 700 000 people obtain water 
from the 14 000 wells located in Lithuania (Duzinskas and Gutkauskas 1994:80). 
Effects of heavy metals in the ground water are not significant but are generally 
higher at local pollution sources. Increased concentrations of cadmium and 
aluminium are evident as a result of acid rain (MEP 1995a:53). 
Surface water is also polluted. Organic substances in 70 per cent of rivers 
accounts for 2.0-4.0 mg0 2 /L while the amount in 20 per cent accounts for 
4.0-6.0 mg0 2/L. (BOD) According to preliminary calculations, surface water 
receives 40 per cent of the total pollutants from non-point sources 
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(Environmental Protection Department of Lithuania 1992:68-71). The 
discharge of waste water from households and industry is a significant 
contributor to surface water pollution. One strategy planned to reduce the 
input from households and industries is a water tax which should encourage 
people to use less water. A shortage of water meters remains a problem 
(Environmental Protection Department of Lithuania, 1992:71 & 128). As 
section 3.4 discusses, sewage treatment is a priority of the Lithuanian 
government. In rural areas, only one in nine settlements have sewage 
treatment facilities, most of which require substantial reconstruction, repair, 
or modification. Given that around 60 per cent of groundwater sources are 
hydraulically connected to rivers, the discharged waste water into rivers 
ultimately infects those groundwater sources (Duzinskas and Gutkauskas 
1994:80-1). Since the groundwater is essentially unconfined, contamination 
in one area can spread to another area (Juodkazis and Klimas 1997:36). 
The issue of water treatment in Lithuania is not only about waste water. 
Due to the above mentioned problems in the quality of groundwater, there 
is now an overdue need for pre-treatment facilities to reduce harmful 
pollutants (such as iron, manganese, and organic compounds), thereby 
significantly increasing the costs of water supply and treatment. Providing 
high quality drinking water to the rural population, for example, has an 
estimated cost of USD 500 million (Juodkazis and Klimas 1997:37). Beside 
the need to provide clean water to satisfy Lithuanians requirements, it is 
also an input in the food industry and necessary for the development of 
Western tourism both of which have economic benefits for the country 
(Juodkazis 1994:70). 
The US Environmental Protection Agency (1995:3-4) recommends that, by 
the end of 1997, Lithuania has in place an effective monitoring system which 
will be essential for priority setting. This requires modern sampling and 
analysis equipment and the harmonisation of collection and analytical 
protocols in line with international monitoring standards. It will also require 
new computer hardware and software, adequate training, and a reliable supply 
replacement parts. There are, of course, economic obstacles to the purchasing 
of such expensive equipment as well as issues affecting implementation 
such as corruption, inadequate infrastructure, and a lag in legal reform (see 
Chapter 7). In 1992, the goal of the Environmental Protection Department 
(1992:129) was to 'successfully establish the water quality and sewage water 
discharge standards of the EEC.' However, the Department recognised that 
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the implementation of such standards would be determined by the economic 
situation and the possibility of obtaining environmentally sound technology 
(see also 5.4.4). International assistance, particularly in technology transfer 
of equipment, will be an important aspect of improving water quality in 
Lithuania (see 6.2.4.2). 
3.2 The Baltic Sea 
Of major concern to Lithuania, and indeed the rest of the Baltic region, is 
the condition of the Baltic Sea. Interestingly, 21 per cent of student respondents 
and 11 per cent of Greens in the survey specifically mentioned the Baltic Sea 
as one of the three major problems in Lithuania. The Baltic Sea is a unique 
ecosystem which has been degraded by the increased industrialisation on its 
shores in the last 80 years. But as late as 1960, the Baltic Sea was still regarded 
as "healthy", characterised by high water transparency (Kindler and Lintner 
1993:7 and Zmudzinski 1989:47). 
Scientific knowledge has grown significantly during the last few decades as 
concerted cooperative efforts have been made to prevent further 
environmental deterioration in the Sea (Dybern 1989:89). As a result, it is 
now among the most well known salt water bodies in the world (Zmudzinski 
1989:46) yet pollution has continued to threaten its environmental integrity. 
As is demonstrated below, the unusual features of the sea have compounded 
pollution since it has not been able to cope with increasing loads. 
The Baltic coast has a length of 7000 kilometres (Ferm 1991:533) and includes 
Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Denmark, Germany, Poland, 
and Russia (Kaliningrad and St. Petersberg districts), with Norway, 
Byelorussia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Ukraine within the catchment 
area (see Figure 1.1). Transboundary pollution in the Baltic Sea, irrespective 
of its source, will need cooperation between the countries in the area. Each 
has a different impact on the environment and, due to the varying economic 
conditions, each has an individual capacity to implement measures to 
improve environmental conditions. This includes the priority given to 
environmental issues by each country. 
With the secession of the Baltic republics from the former USSR, more 
emphasis could be placed on interaction in the Baltic region. Relations 
between the USSR and communist Poland on the one hand and other Baltic 
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countries (such as Finland, Denmark, and Sweden) on the other, were not 
amenable to cooperation on issues such as Baltic Sea pollution, particularly 
since the impact of the communist countries was probably greatest. For 
Eastern Europe, the cleaning up is costly and requires sophisticated 
technologies which are not available (Fitzmaurice, M. 1992:xxvi). There has 
been some funding from the Western countries in the region since an 
investment in the cleanup of Lithuanian rivers, for example, will also bring 
beneficial returns to their coastal waters (see 6.2 and 6.2.2.1). 
3.2.1 History of Relations in the Baltic Sea 
Few attempts have been made to produce a comprehensive history of the 
Baltic region as historians have tended to write along nationalistic lines as 
well as generally focusing on land-based history (Runblom et al. 1992:5). 
The people living around the Baltic Sea have depended on its waters for 
transport and food since populations first settled in the area (Andreasson-Gren 
et al. 1992:4). The Hanseatic League was a medieval trading organisation 
with headquarters in German cities. The Baltic states' capitals also traded 
with these cities and later offices were opened in Riga and Kaunas. Danzig 
(Gdansk), the best known Hansa city, imported timber and raw materials 
from Lithuania. These were inexpensive and the middlemen (3) made large 
profits. The forests along the Nemunas river were heavily exploited because 
of their easy transportation from site. Trade with Danzig continued into the 
mid sixteenth century and the timber exports were massive (Lietuvu 
Enciklopedija 1956, vol.8:129-30). 
The Baltic Sea has been the focus of several wars in the region. The period 
between 1560 and 1720 was characterised by shifting coalitions in the rivalry 
for the Baltic commercial cities. What were once analysed as struggles against 
various threats - protecting one's territory sometimes required offensive 
action - are now generally seen as a power game 'to gain control over the 
Baltic Sea, its trade routes, its inlets and outlets, and the narrow passages' 
(Runblom et al. 1992:24). The Baltic Sea, straddling East and West, still has 
strategic relevance and armed forces have been deployed accordingly (Westing 
1989a:4). 
'The New Hansa' is a label that has developed to describe the supposed new 
3. Gender bias intended. 
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cooperation across the Baltic. However, some believe it is inappropriate 
since the Hanseatic League was an unequal partnership with the northern 
Baltic coastline countries more dependent on the German cities (Runblom 
et al. 1992:5-6). It is also clear that despite established trade, cooperation did 
not really exist and relations centred around a power struggle right into the 
twentieth century. 
Although the long history of trade had an impact on the environment (e.g. 
Lithuanian forests), the use of the Baltic Sea did not have a significant negative 
impact until the twentieth century. Populations of societies on its shores 
have grown and technologies have changed dramatically and put a strain on 
the sea. Since 1950, the nitrogen load has doubled and the amount of 
phosphorous entering the Sea has increased by four times (Ferm 1991:536). 
In addition, there has been chemical, oil, and heavy metal pollution. This 
burden has been buttressed by the lack any costs for its use and for any 
negative impact that activities have had on the sea. Economically, a zero 
price is justified only if there is a surplus of the services (Andreasson-Gren 
et al. 1992:4). That is to say, no resource or service should be free unless 
supply far out weighs its use. In the case of the Baltic sea, it is now apparent 
that the sea has a limited capacity to supply the countries with the services 
they make use of, therefore, the impact is not environmentally or 
economically justified. Finance for its clean-up, and protection (perhaps in 
the form of a 'polluter pays' tax) will need to come from all the countries on 
its shores. Problems arise with this due to its unequal use and unequal 
impact. 
3.2.2 Ecological Situation in the Baltic Sea 
The Baltic Sea, a remnant of a region that emerged during the Ice Age about 
10 000 years ago, is the largest body of brackish water in the world (around 
400 000 km 2). It is a non-tidal, epicontinental (4) sea, a distinction it shares 
with the Persian Gulf, the North Sea, and Hudson Bay. Epicontinental seas 
are all shallow; around 100 m deep as compared to seas between continents 
which are usually about 2000 m deep (Hakanson 1992:5). Although a relatively 
young sea, a unique ecosystem has developed due to its shallow and brackish 
waters (Fitzmaurice 1992:1), including an unusual combination of fish 
"Epicontinental" means that the sea is situated on the continent rather than between 
continents thus accounting for its shallow waters (Hakanson 1991:5). 
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species (5) . Brackish waters are unusual and few species have adapted to their 
conditions, particularly at low temperatures which allows only a short 
reproductive season. Since only a small number of species are able to cope 
with these conditions, food chains are extra sensitive to disturbance 
(HAkanson, 1992:5 and Lothigius 1991a:3). 
The few species living in the Baltic Sea have a good food supply and therefore 
populations are generally healthy. However, it is heavily polluted and is 
particularly sensitive because of the cold climate and the restricted water 
exchange with the ocean (Hakanson 1992:5). The northern part is covered 
with ice for up to five months of the year and the cold, stagnant areas act as 
traps for organic matter (Ferm 1991:533). The main source of oxygen 
replenishment is the opening to the North Sea. This is very narrow and 
only 18 metres deep, thus salt water inflows need to be strong in order to 
penetrate and renew the deeper waters of the Baltic Sea Proper where 
permanent stratification hampers the exchange of oxygen (Helsinki 
Commission 1993b, Ch.2:1 and Kindler and Lintner 1993:8). In other words, 
pollution is also aggravated by the difference between the density of the 
surface water and the saltier deep water, preventing adequate mixing and 
leading to an irregular exchange of oxygen (Fitzmaurice, M. 1992:3). 
It takes between 25 and 50 years for all the water in this semi-enclosed 
system to be renewed which enables stable compounds to persist and actually 
increase their concentration, as dilution is very slow (Lothigius, 1991a:4). 
The resulting stagnation is currently the worst on record in the Eastern 
Gotland Basin (Helsinki Commission Secretariat 1992, Ch. 2:4). The overall 
low salinity level of the Baltic See ) also adds to the species' sensitivity to 
pollution because the pollutants interfere with an ecosystem that is already 
under stress due to its adaption to the lower salinity. The continuously 
decreasing salt concentrations, or the salt gradient, is the main reason for the 
lack of life forms as compared to other marine systems (Kautsky 1992:6, 32). 
The sea can be divided into four 'functional' zones which are affected in 
different ways as described by Hakanson (1992). 
5 Cod and Herring cohabit with freshwater Pike and Perch (Fitzmaurice, M. 1992:4). 
6 The salinity level in the Baltic Sea Proper is 5 per mule and 4 per mule in the Bothnian 
Bay. It varies greatly in the Kattegat area; between 15 and 30 per mule. Oceans generally 
have a stable salt content of about 35 per mile (Kautsky 1991:6). 
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1. The drainage or catchment area is over 1 700 000 km 2 which is 
more than four times the total water area. It is densely populated 
[about 16 million people on the coast and 80 million in the catchment 
(Helsinki Commission 1992, Ch. 2:1)] and heavily industrialised. 
Rainfall in this area enters the sea via the network of streams and 
rivers bringing with it various pollutants. 
2. The coastal zone picks up pollutants from land-based activities. It 
becomes a "purification plant" for open waters. 'The natural processes 
(water transport, flux of material, and energy and bioproduction) in 
this zone are of utmost importance for the entire sea.' (Halcanson 
1992:8) 
3. The transition zone is located between the coast and deeper waters. 
There has been comparatively little studied about this zone but its 
condition is probably of paramount importance for the ecological status 
of the Baltic Sea. 
4. The deep water zone is the area beneath the wave base. It is the 
end point for many pollutants and therefore the areas where anaerobic 
conditions are likely to occur (Hakanson 1992:7-8). Some areas of the 
bottom of the Baltic Sea Proper and the Gulf of Finland are actually 
devoid of life (Fitzmaurice, M. 1992:4) due to oxygen deficiency and 
the subsequent presence of hydrogen sulphide (Sukyte et al. 1994:137). 
The Baltic region represents a unique example of an eco-geographical unit. 
Pessimistic forecasts predict a disaster in the sea by the end of this century, 
while more optimistic accounts suggest it might be after thirty years 
(Fitzmaurice, M. 1992:33). Current trends indicate increasing salinity, nutrient 
levels and concentrations of toxic substances in conjunction with decreasing 
oxygen levels (Zmudzinski 1989:48-50). If environmental conditions are to 
be improved in the Baltic Sea, it must be done in a coordinated manner 
with the inclusion of all countries in the catchment area (Hakanson 1992:5). 
3.2.2.1 Kursiu Lagoon 
The Nemunas river, which flows right through the territory of Lithuania, is 
a tributary of the Kursiu Lagoon. Part of the lagoon area is under the control 
of Russian Federation while Lithuania's territory covers 413 km 2 . The lagoon 
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has an area of 1 584 km' yet water from a river basin of over 100 000 km 2 
flows into it. The river has both economic and recreational significance, 
particularly as a major fishing resource. The lagoon is separated from the 
Baltic sea by a sand dune spit, leaving only a narrow opening, however, the 
combined effect of its shallow depth and the strong influence of wind and 
waves creates relatively effective mixing of its water mass. Despite high 
BOD concentrations, this mixing usually prevents anaerobic conditions during 
most of the year (MEP 1995a:46 and K-Konsult and Kruger Consult 1992:55). 
The lagoon is usually iced over in January (MEP 1996:1). 
Approximately 85 per cent of Lithuania's Kursiu Lagoon is now considered 
to be heavily polluted with mercury, phenols, DDT, nitrogen, and 
phosphorous. Swimming in the lagoon is considered a health risk and has, 
therefore, been prohibited. Pollution has been caused by various activities 
in Lithuania, Kaliningrad, and Byelorussia primarily being transported by 
rivers but also the settling of air pollutants. Much of the pollution is carried 
by the Nemunas which gathers water from an area of 98 200 km 2 
(Environmental Protection Department of Lithuania 1992:65-70, MEP 1995a:46, 
and Antanyniene et al. 1994:73). In 1992, rivers carried around 26 000 tons 
of nitrogen and 1 500 tons of phosphorous into the lagoon which was much 
less than the average amounts of the 1985-1992 period: 46 500 tons of nitrogen 
and 2 700 tons of phosphorous (MEP 1995a:48). The southern part of the 
lagoon is most affected. Here, oligochaete worms predominate which are 
typical indicators of organic enrichment and heavily polluted conditions. 
Crustacea, mussels, and snails (important components of fish diets) are now 
virtually absent from the southern parts (K-Konsult and Kruger Consult 
1992:56). 
The Kursiu Lagoon was once a leading fish resource not only for Lithuania 
but the whole USSR. There are around 50 species of fish living permanently 
in the lagoon and 20 of these are caught in commercial fishing. Sturgeon 
and Salmon have disappeared while numbers of pike-perch, which favour 
eutrophic conditions, have increased (K-Konsult and Kruger Consult 1992:56- 
7). Oxygen deficiency in the deeper parts of the lagoon at certain times 
(especially in summer) has led to the deaths of large numbers of fish. Blue-
green algae predominate in summer and autumn, making up between 58 
and 98 per cent of the total amount of phytoplankton (MEP 1995a:48-9, K-
Konsult and Kruger Consult 1992:55). 
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Siltation in the lagoon has led to an increased delta where vegetation has 
subsequently encroached into fish spawning and feeding grounds. The 
siltation also impinges on the habitat of other aquatic fauna such as molluscs. 
Mussel shells used to line the bottom of the lagoon but are now replaced by 
sand and mud. While there is little information regarding the heavy metal 
content of sediment, there is an increasing trend for mercury contamination 
(a waste product of the pulp and paper industry) (MEP 1995a:48-9, K-Konsult 
and Kruger Consult 1992:55, and Ferm 1991:534). The amount of bacterial 
flora, used as an indicator of pollution, has been found to be 250 times 
greater in such sediments than in the water. The concentration of bacterial 
flora has also been used to highlight the polluted zones of industrial and 
municipal waste water outlets (Antanyniene et a/. 1994:80). 
The Kursiu Lagoon is the end point for the waste water of around 5 million 
people living within the catchment as well as the various industries (MEP 
1995a:47). The quality of this water is dependent on the effectiveness of 
treatment plants. There are a number of major centres with inadequate 
treatment facilities, in particular the city of Kaunas which is situated on the 
Nemunas (see 3.4). As well as the aforementioned organic pollution which 
stems from domestic waste water, it has been found that industrial waste 
water discharged into the Nemunas and Kursiu Lagoon has led to 
abnormalities in the liver tissue of roach and bream including cancerous 
tumours in carp (Bukelskis and Serelyte 1994:103). 
The decreased use of fertilisers (see 3.2.2.2) has led to some improvements in 
the water quality of the lagoon, however, the pollution load through the 
Klaipeda straits has not lessened despite the closure of major pollution sources 
such as the pulp and paper mill in Klaipeda (MEP 1995a:50). 
There are internationally funded programmes on monitoring and improving 
water quality in the Kursiu Lagoon which include cooperative projects 
between scientists from Lithuania and Kaliningrad. Such cooperation is 
crucial but, like all forms of international relations, is fraught with difficulties 
(see 3.2.3.6 and 7.3.2). 
3.2.2.2 Causes and Effects of Pollution in the Baltic 
The Baltic Sea can be divided into 11 areas which are affected by the land-based 
activities of the countries in those particular areas. Land-based pollution is 
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the most significant source of environmental problems in the Baltic Sea and 
urban areas contribute around 25 percent of those land based sources of 
nutrient inputs (Fitzmaurice, M. 1992:32 and Ferm 1991:533). For the purposes 
of this thesis, the focus is on the region affected most by the activities of 
Lithuania. The Eastern Gotland Basin, which includes the Gdansk Basin, 
extends from the Nemunas river basin in the east to the Vistula river basin 
in the west. It is the most international part of the sea catchment with 
seven countries impacting on its quality. About 90 per cent of this region 
are drainage areas of the Nemunas (98 200 km 2) and the Vistula (194 700 
k m2) (Helsinki Commission 1992, Ch. 3:11). 
Three cities, Vilnius, Kaunas, and Klaipeda, discharge 80 per cent of the total 
municipal waste in Lithuania. Both Vilnius and Klaipeda have mechanical 
sewage treatment only, while Kaunas has no treatment facilities despite 
having a population of around 500 000 and being situated on the Nemunas 
river (see 3.4). Industrial waste is also discharged into this municipal system 
leading to high contamination with heavy metals.m Some of this is disposed 
of in landfills but this impacts on the groundwater system (Helsinki 
Commission 1992, Ch. 3:12). Amongst recreational areas, concentrations of 
nitrates and phosphates were highest near the sewage outfall of Butinge 
(MEP 1996:13, 17). There are several industries located on the Nemunas 
which discharge effluent into the river. There are food processing plants, 
textile and tannery industries, oil refineries, chemical plants, and pulp and 
paper mills (the two largest being in the Kaliningrad part of the catchment 
area). A high load of nutrients from these industries are discharged but 
initiatives to reduce these have so far been missing (Helsinki Commission 
1992, Ch. 3:13). Since many of these industries are old, the possibilities for 
reducing pollution by internal measures are quite limited (Helsinki 
Commission 1992, Ch. 3:13). A pre-feasibility study of the Nemunas River 
basin for the Kaunas waste water treatment plant was funded by Danish and 
Swedish organisations under the Baltic Sea Environment Program (see 3.4.1.1). 
Due to such impacts from Lithuania, as well as similar impacts from other 
countries in the region, there is continuing concern about eutrophication (8), 
7. Heavy metals are listed in Annex II of the Helsinki Convention under 'Noxious Substances 
and Materials'. The Contracting Parties are required to 'endeavour to use best practicable 
means to prevent harmful substances and materials from being introduced..into the Baltic 
Sea.' (Helsinki Convention, Annex II in Fitzmaurice, M. 1992:244). 
8 Eutrophication occurs when there is an over-enrichment of nutrients due to large increases of 
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and discharges of long living organic pollutants, mainly chlorinated 
compounds. Therefore, agriculture, the pulp and paper industries, and 
municipal sewage works have been identified as the major causes of Baltic 
Sea pollution and should be subject to more specific restrictions (Arby 
1990a:10). The first-world countries in the region have significantly reduced 
municipal and industrial pollution loads on the Sea in the last decade while 
legislation has reduced the use of hazardous compounds. Impacts have, 
rather, come from the discharged waste of the pulp and paper industry (9) and 
intensive agricultural practices. But in the former communist states the 
impacts have come primarily from inadequately treated domestic and 
industrial effluent (Kindler and Lintner 1993:8-9). The increase in nutrients 
since the war has left one third of the sea-bed lifeless (Arby 1990b:12). 
Inadequately treated municipal sewage not only adds to problems of 
eutrophication but high levels of faecal coliforms pose serious threats to 
human health as well as impacting on the economy through lost tourism. 
Around the town of Jurmala in the Gulf of Riga, for example, high levels of 
human faecal bacteria and pharmaceutical waste from the city of Olaine 
have led to annual warnings to people wishing to bathe in the Baltic Sea 
(Morris 1992:6). 
Other industries have made contributions to the load of chlorinated 
compounds. One surprising source is the chlorination of drinking water, a 
public health policy, leading to inputs of chloroform and trihalomethanes 
(Ennell et al. 1991:13). The Korsnas pulp mill in Sweden stopped using 
chlorine gas in its bleaching process in 1991 at a cost of 2 billion Kronor 
(approx. USD 400 million) (Granvik 1991:16), a price out of reach for the old 
Sulphite mills of Eastern Europe. Dioxins" ) have been found in sediment 
samples wherever taken in the Baltic Sea. Pulp and paper mills are one 
identifiable source but in 1985, waste incineration was identified as the largest 
source of dioxins in Sweden. With the introduction of flue gas cleaning 
equipment, emissions now approach the target reduction of x25 in Sweden 
(Lothigius 1991c:21). Mining and metal (steel, iron, copper, zinc, and silver) 
nitrogen and phosphorous. This results in oxygen depletion affecting the survival of many 
species. 
9 The countries in the drainage basin produce about 25 per cent of the world production of 
pulp, paper, and cardboard (Ferm 1991:534). Most of the plants (93 per cent) are located in 
Sweden (PHARE and FENVIRON 1994:11). 
Dioxin is a collective name for 75 different polychlorinated dibenzo-p-dioxins and 135 




manufacturing, primarily in Sweden, Finland, and Poland has also impacted 
on the Baltic Sea (Ferm 1991:534). 
Agriculture has been a major non-point source of pollution in the Nemunas 
and therefore the Baltic. Mineral fertilisers and pesticides have been used, 
on a per hectare basis, in comparable quantities to Denmark (excepting 
Phosphorous which is much higher) but the area on which they are applied 
is much larger (K-Konsult and Kruger Consult 1992:36-8). The most serious 
problem related to fertilisers and pesticides in Lithuania is inadequate storage, 
with average losses at 25-30 per cent of active substances. In addition, the 
machines are inefficient and consequently, fertiliser is spread unevenly and 
leaching (of nitrogen) is high. There is also leakage from liquid manure 
storage (Helsinki Commission 1992, Ch. 3:14-15). Around 90 per cent of the 
phophorous loads entering the Baltic Sea is derived from land-based activity 
such as agriculture (PHARE and FENVIRON 1994:11). 
The fertiliser plant near Kaunas is also a major contributor to atmospheric 
pollution which impacts on the Nemunas and the Baltic Sea in the form of 
acid rain. The economic conditions in Lithuania have led to a decrease in 
the consumption of fertiliser and pesticides. Since 1991, there has been a 
tenfold increase in the price of fertilisers and a sixfold increase in pesticide 
prices and farmers can no longer afford to use large amounts. However, 
once prices adjust, consumption is likely to increase again (World Bank 
1993a:268) (see also 5.4.3 and 7.4.1.4). 
Oil pollution continues to be a problem in the Baltic Sea as a result of spills 
from tankers, such as Globe Ass imi in 1980, as well as usual leakage from 
transport, and unloading and refuelling with oil products. There is also a 
contribution from urban run-off and contamination from former military 
sites which finds it way into the Sea via the network of rivers in the catchment. 
As Ferm (1991:536) notes, a further threat to the marine environment may 
be posed by proposed off shore extraction. As noted in Chapter 2, the recent 
construction of several oil terminals on the Baltic coast, often undertaken 
without EIAs, significantly increases the risk of further oil-related pollution. 
The victims of the unhealthy environment in the Baltic Sea are numerous. 
The Grey Seal population of the Baltic Sea has suffered greatly, particularly 
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due to the presence of PCBs (polychlorinated biphenyls). (11) These were found 
to be present in fish and seabirds throughout Sweden in 1966 by chemist, 
Soren Jensen. This discovery was to be a watershed for perceptions of 
pollution. Although PCBs were never intended to be used in the 
environment, at the time of the discovery of their impact, they were a firm 
part of technology throughout the world. The PCB poisoning of Baltic seals 
was clear twenty years ago, but only now have scientists begun to understand 
which individual PCBs are the problem (Lothigius 1991a:3). The persistent 
PCBs have had a greater effect on the seals than the fish. 
The high levels of PCBs in the Baltic Sea fish result in even higher 
concentrations in the fish-eating seals...and this is the main explanation for 
the wretched state of the seals health. (Lothigius 1991b:6) 
The otter, another victim, has already become extinct in the Baltic. Despite 
some promising work by scientists regarding the Grey Seals, after twenty 
years of suspicion of PCBs as the main threat to them, it is too early to 
assume that things are changing for the better (Mats Olsson, Swedish scientist 
in Lothigius 1991b:7). The PCB issue demonstrates how long it can take to 
overcome problems even when the cause has been identified. To protect 
the seals from the fate of the otters it is necessary to understand the mechanisms 
of PCBs in order to stop their spread and to be able to deal with any new 
toxic pollutant threats that emerge (Lothigius 1991b:7). There has been a lot 
of attention on PCBs, dioxins, and DDT and their environmental effects. Yet 
there are about ten million described organic substances and between 50 000 
and 100 000 different chemical compounds in general use around the world, 
most of which are organic substances. There are then a great many substances 
in use, the effects of which are not yet known; new substances are discovered 
in the environment more quickly than proven hazardous ones can be 
removed (Ferm 1991:537). 
3.2.3 Cooperation in Managing and Protecting the Baltic Sea 
Aims for regional cooperation are set out in the 'Law of the Sea Act 1982' 
(LOS), but in order to fulfil these, the assertion of national interests has to be 
overcome and a regional spirit for the benefit of the common should be 
PCBs are listed in Annex I of the Helsinki Convention under 'Hazardous Substances'. The 
Convention requires that protection from these substances can involve the use of appropriate 
technical means, prohibitions, and the regulation of trade, handling, and application of 
products containing such substances (Helsinki Convention, Annex I, in Fitzmaurice, M. 1992:244). 
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promoted (Fitzmaurice, M. 1992:xxix). Article 123 of the LOS convention, 
refers to legal obligations of countries bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed 
seas to co-operate and what the scope of this cooperation should be. There 
have been different interpretations of this Article, however Malgosia 
Fitzmaurice seems to support the opinion of Symonides who points to a 
duty to co-operate. Fitzmaurice poses the question; 'What is the scope of 
this principle of cooperation?' Firstly, states have to co-operate in good 
faith, i.e. with the intention to reach an agreement. He goes on to say that 
'all activities detrimental to other states should be banned' (Fitzmaurice, M. 
1992:13-4). 
This demonstrates the interdependence between coastal states which is 
particularly important in enclosed or semi-enclosed seas. Environmentally 
unsound activities in one country can influence the state of the environment 
in other countries. Cooperation, particularly that generated through the 
Helsinki Commission has led to some improvements. It was announced at 
a HELCOM meeting in October, 1995 that some aspects of the Baltic Sea 
environment were improving but that it was still too early to be conclusive 
(EL TA October 21, 1995). Improvements had been noted earlier in 1990 such 
as decreased DDT levels in fish and birds, decreased oil pollution, and heavy 
metal concentrations. However, decreases in PCB levels have only been 
noticed in a few localities (Zmudzinski 1990:51). Environmental cooperation 
in the region has the further advantage of improving trust amongst the 
countries in the catchment which has significant implications for political 
security (Broms 1989:69) (see also 6.2.4.3). 
3.2.3.1 Tragedy of the Commons 
First accounts of the poor condition of the sea appeared 30 years ago and the 
quality of its waters has deteriorated since (Andreasson-Gren et al. 1992:4). 
One reason why the situation has been made worse rather than improved 
since its condition became known has to do with "tragedy of the commons" 
(a term first coined by Garret Hardin). The Baltic Sea is the common property 
of those on its shores in a legal sense and of the world in a moral sense. 
Andreasson-Gren et al. (1992) provide an example. Economists point out 
that an environmental good that is considered to be common property, is 
not allocated by the free market in an efficient way. If no action is taken, this 
leads to over-exploitation because no economic incentives to take action 
exist. If an individual fisher, for example, takes action to protect fish stocks, 
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resulting in temporary profit loss, in order to preserve future profits, several 
other fishers would benefit from the action thereby reducing the economic 
benefit to the first fisher. If, however, they all co-operated, sharing both 
costs and benefits, they could continue to fish the area with a profit. The 
authors conclude that a free market will never lead to improvement in the 
sea which will only be obtained through co-operative management by Baltic 
countries (Andreasson-Gren et al. 1992:4) (see also 5.1, 5.4.2 and 7.3.2). 
Fishers would not be the only beneficiaries of improvements in 
environmental conditions in the Baltic Sea. Firstly, there is the flora and 
fauna that lives in the sea or relies on the sea such as coastal birds. There 
would also be great benefits to those people and their descendents who live 
in bordering countries by preserving the sea for future recreation. Also, 
since land-based pursuits, such as agriculture and other industries, are the 
principal source of pollution (in the form of nutrients) in the Baltic Sea 
(Helsinki Commission 1992:24), these activities may be restricted as a measure 
to protect the sea, thus further protecting soil, vegetation, and air in the 
region. The implementation of such restrictions is perhaps the most 
important step in the process (see also Chapter 7). 
The Law on Environmental Protection of the Republic of Lithuania (Ch. VIII, 
Articles 35.1 & 36.1) states that Lithuania, 
shall conclude international agreements on issues concerning environmental 
protection, and shall participate in the activities of international 
environmental protection organizations....The laws of the Republic of 
Lithuania must comply with international agreements, ratified by Lithuania, 
on issues concerning environmental protection and universally recognised norms 
of environmental protection (Supreme Council of Lithuania 1992). 
An overview of the important international agreements pertaining to the 
Baltic Sea to which Lithuania is a signatory would be useful in assessing 
Lithuania's role in protection of the sea. 
3.2.3.2 The Helsinki Convention 
The Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic 
Sea Area (the Helsinki or Baltic Convention) was ratified in Helsinki, 1974. (12) 
12. The Convention was signed by Denmark, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Federal 
Republic of Germany, Poland, Sweden, and the Soviet Union (Bergstrom 1992:21) 
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Although not the first convention, it was important because it was regional 
and included several types of pollution. It mainly concerned land-based 
pollution, dumping, clean-up and assessment of the environment. The 
collaboration between East and West was unusual at the time (Bergstrom 
1992:21). 
The Convention officially went into force in May, 1980 under the steering of 
the Baltic Marine Environment Commission - the Helsinki Commission 
(HELCOM). The Commission is inter-governmental and representatives 
(appointed by the governments) are usually drawn from environmental 
departments or agencies. There is a Secretariat (consisting of branch, 
environment, and Task Force secretaries) as well as other committees for 
specific problems (Bergstrom 1992:21). 
Fundamental to the Convention is international cooperation. It states that 
protection of the Sea cannot take place by national efforts alone but that 
'close regional cooperation and other appropriate international measures 
aiming at fulfilling these tasks are urgently needed' (in Broms 1989:63). A 
revision of the agreement was initiated in April, 1992. The new Convention 
covers all the water in the Baltic Sea, including internal waters. Russia, 
Lithuania, and Estonia became new signatories. (13) The revised version is 
more strict in that it requires that: 
best-available technology shall be used, and that the Contracting Parties 
shall apply the precautionary principle, i.e. to take preventive measures 
when there is reason to assume that substances or energy introduced, directly 
or indirectly, into the marine environment may create hazards to human 
health, harm living resources and marine ecosystems, damage amenities or 
interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea even when there is no conclusive 
evidence of a causal relationship between inputs and their alleged effects 
(Bergstrom 1992:23) (see also 7.3.2.1). 
It also requires the Contracting Parties to apply the 'polluter pays' principle 
and strict requirements regarding monitoring for ascertaining the 
implementation of the Convention. According to Andreasson-Gren (1992:6), 
one failing of the Helsinki Convention is its insufficient regulation of land-
based sources of pollution. For example, the agricultural sector, recognised 
as a major polluter, is not regulated at all. However, one might argue that 
13. At the time of publication of the information at hand, Latvia had not signed but was 
expected to do so in the near future. Byelorussia, Ukraine, and Czech and Slovak Republics, 
although situated in the drainage area, were not preparing to sign. 
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the April 1992 revision, although not specifying agriculture in particular, 
could be used to regulate the introduction of pollutants via agricultural 
practices. Despite improvements to the Convention, the most important 
task is to co-ordinate with all the countries in the catchment area (see also 
7.3.2.1). 
3.2.3.3 The Gdansk Convention 
The Gdansk convention was ratified in 1973 and set up the Baltic Sea Fisheries 
Commission. While the Helsinki Convention covers all waters, including 
internal waters, the Gdansk Convention is concerned only with the actual 
Sea. It aims to ensure conservation and the optimum utilisation of living 
resources (Fitzmaurice, M. 1992:21). In such a way, the Convention aims to 
protect the economic interests of using the sea by maintaining habitat 
conditions for fish. The Commission provides a permanent system of 
surveillance for those resources but it does not have the power to impose 
sanctions thus limiting its effectiveness. Protection relies, perhaps too heavily, 
on the close cooperation of the contracting parties (Broms 1989:63). 
3.2.3.4 The Baltic Sea Declaration 
The Baltic Sea Declaration was adopted by Prime Ministers and political 
representatives at the Ronneby Conference, Sweden, 1990. Representatives 
from the Baltic Sea States, Norway, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and 
the Commission of the European Community signed the declaration. The 
representatives declared, in nineteen paragraphs, their determination to 
assure the restoration of the Baltic Sea, enabling self-restoration and the 
preservation of its ecological balance (Bergstrom 1992:23). 
The major requirements set out in the Declaration were: the reduction of 
harmful emissions by 50 per cent by 1995; usage of best available technology 
in building sewage treatment plants; the reduction of air emissions from 
cars, ships, and industry; the intensification of cooperation; the application 
of the precautionary principle; the development a nature conservation 
programme; cooperation in improving legal instruments and technical 
regulations; the preparation of a joint initiative to gain world-wide support 
for new restrictions on tankers to reduce oil spills; the intensification of 
cooperation regarding airborne surveillance; and the encouragement of 
further multi and bilateral commercial and financial cooperation (Bergstrom 
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1992:23). 
Cooperation, then, plays a pivotal role in implementing such decisions and 
ensuring that each country takes responsibility for the restoration of the 
Baltic Sea. The Declaration: 
Welcome[s] the new climate of understanding and cooperation between the 
States in the Baltic sea area, which will make resources available for the 
protection of the Baltic Sea environment, inter alia, through the reduced 
need for armaments expenditures (Baltic Sea Declaration, Annex IV, 
Fitzmaurice 1992:269). 
3.2.3.5 The Baltic Sea Environmental Action Programme 
As required by the Baltic Sea Declaration, a high level Task Force of HELCOM 
prepared an environmental action programme 'for decisive reduction of 
emissions in order to restore the Baltic sea to a sound ecological balance'. 
(Quoted in Helsinki Commission 1992:5-2). The Task Force consists of 
representatives from the Contracting Parties to the Helsinki Convention, 
the Commission of the European Communities, and four financial 
institutions. 
The Baltic Sea Environmental Action Programme is based on a set of key 
principles which act as a framework for specific action. The first principle is 
that a long-term perspective is required in restoring the ecological balance of 
the Baltic Sea. Preventative and curative actions are fundamental to a long 
term approach and preparatory work for the Programme concluded that 
these would be necessary while addressing existing problems. Controlling 
pollution at the source, then, was an important principle of the Programme 
(Kindler and Lintner 1993:11). The minimal success achieved thus far by the 
Nordic countries and West Germany has taken thirty years while any 
reduction in the former centrally planned economies is likely to increase 
once economic activity improves. However, improved economic conditions 
may well bring increased pollution loads (see also 5.1 and 5.4.3.3). Secondly, 
the programme acknowledges the importance of the role of natural factors 
and the necessity to understand conditions in the sea. It also aims to harmonise 
economic and environmental objectives, as well as national development 
with regional environmental goals. Due to financial burdens, the 
establishment of conditions for private sector participation is promoted. 
Finally, in recognising the administrative and managerial constraints to 
effective environmental management, the strengthening of local capacities 
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in the field of human resources and policy reform, is recommended (Helsinki 
Commission 1992, Ch. 5:2-4). 
The Task Force identified 132 "hot spots" in countries in the catchment area. 
Sixteen of those are in Lithuania. Although the majority of these are situated 
in the East European countries, there are several problem spots in Sweden. 
The cost of meeting the recommendations of the Task Force are enormous. 
The funding needs of the "hot spots" are large and diverse and therefore 
require individual solutions (Helsinki Commission 1992:6-8). The 
implications for financing the programme are grave. The countries to the 
north and southwest of the Baltic Sea have among the highest standards of 
living, productivity, and wage levels in the world while the former centrally 
planned countries are undergoing massive changes, resulting in poor 
economic conditions. The latter countries also have a poor credit rating. 
Under such economic conditions, it is likely that: 
[t]he acute demands for basic items such as energy, food and medicine will 
undoubtedly impede the financing of the Programme over the medium term. 
In addition, some of the potential donor countries are suffering a protracted 
recession (Bergstrom 1992:26) (see also 6.2). 
Some finance arrangements will come from the Nordic Investment Bank, 
the European Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, the World Bank, and the Nordic Environmental Finance 
Corporation (Helsinki Commission 1992, Ch. 6:5-8). Domestic funding in 
Lithuania will come from a combination of permit charges, pollution taxes 
and fines, and state allocations (see Chapter 6). 
Expected benefits of the Programme include: improved water quality for the 
health and well being of those living in the region; improved status of 
aquatic flora and fauna, migratory birds, and others relying on the Sea; better 
conditions for tourism and recreation; positive impacts for the fishing 
industry; as well as capacity and institutional building for the former Soviet 
countries. Although improvements have already begun, major positive 
impacts are not expected before 20 years (Kindler and Lintner 1993:30-1). 
3.2.3.6 Implementation of Environmental Policy 
Cooperation at this level is all very well but the success of the programme 
rests on the implementation of complementary environmental programmes 
at the national level. International cooperation cannot work unless it is 
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supported by grass roots action (see also 7.3.2). There are some groups which 
may act as watchdogs such as 'Coalition Clean Baltic' which is a network of 
Green NGOs from the Baltic region. The Lithuanian Green Movement and 
Klaipeda's Green club are members. Anders Wirdheim published a booklet, 
"Vad Hander Med Ostersjon", in 1990 about the Baltic Sea environment 
which was translated and reprinted into Lithuanian by the Lithuanian 
Greens. (14) This was the first book about the state of the Baltic Sea to appear 
in Lithuania and was released in 1992. International NGOs such as these are 
seen as critical to hopes of co-operative action in saving the Baltic Sea (Arby 
1990b:13). 
Decision-making in Lithuania does not seem to prescribe to any particular 
model as participants try to shake the soviet-style process that cannot be 
reconciled with western values and thinking. As stated earlier, no matter 
which model one prescribes to, a problem must be defined before action can 
be considered. In the case of the Baltic Sea, a problem does exist and as 
concern has grown throughout the region, scientific evidence has mounted 
to support the claims. The formulation of international agreements, such as 
'The Baltic Convention and 'The Helsinki Convention', together with 
environmental policy on the national and local levels in the Baltic countries 
has been a necessary step toward protection of the Baltic Sea. However, 
perhaps more vital is the implementation process at all levels of government. 
The problems associated with implementing both international and national 
environmental protection programmes are discussed in Chapter 7 (see for 
example 7.4.3 and 7.4.3.1). 
3.3 Summary of the Baltic Sea Environment 
The Baltic Sea has a high level of pollution due to several sources (point 
and non-point) located in all the countries bordering the sea. Since all 
countries contribute to this problem, improving the situation will require 
cooperation. Lithuania must demonstrate a commitment to reducing its 
impact on the sea in the interest of the Commons. Signing various 
international conventions is the first step but commitment will involve 
giving environmental issues a higher priority on the political agenda. 
Organisations and structures are in place to facilitate environmental 
14 The Lithuanian version is listed in the reference list of this thesis as Kas Vyksta Baltijos 
juroje (What is Happening in the Baltic Sea). 
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cooperation in the Baltic Sea area, however the success of these is hampered 
by desires for autonomy, adverse economic conditions, and the complicated 
process of domestic legal reform (see Chapter 7). The task is difficult enough 
for the more affluent countries, let alone Lithuania which is involved in a 
complex process of transition. With so many changes, it will be difficult for 
decision-makers (and the people of Lithuania) to keep sight of environmental 
issues in the face of economic hardship. However, as stated by the Helsinki 
Commission, these problems are not insurmountable. Cooperation is vital 
for the future state of the Baltic Sea on which all the countries depend. 
Fundamental to successful rehabilitation of the Sea is applying the 
"precautionary principle", thereby reducing pollution at the source. The 
remaining Chapters will discuss the problems and prospects for Lithuania in 
honouring such commitments and whether there is evidence of practical 
and financial support for their implementation. This would be the minimum 
expected if one was to demonstrate that measures toward an environmentally 
sustainable society were being taken. 
3.4 Waste Water Treatment 
Antanyniene et al. (1994:81) recommended that waste water treatment 
facilities, along with improving production technologies be introduced 
without delay in order to reduce the eutrophication in the Nemunas river 
and Kursiu Lagoon. Such improvements to river water quality through the 
construction and upgrading of treatment plants have been the major priority 
of environmental programmes in Lithuania in line with HELCOM 
requirements to reduce pollution loads on the Baltic Sea. Fulfilment of 
these standards (BOD:15mg/L, total-N:12mg/L, and total-P:1.5mg/L) requires 
a corresponding reduction of 86 per cent, 65 per cent, and 80 per cent respectively 
(K-Konsult and Kruger Consult 1992:3). Waste water treatment has also 
been a primary focus of both international and domestic funding (see 6.2.3.2). 
In 1988, only 30 per cent of the Soviet Union's waste water was adequately 
treated (French 1990:17). In Lithuania, the problem is nation wide, however 
it is particularly problematic in the major cities. Several small towns and 
industries are equipped with waste water treatment plants, whereas some 
larger cities have no facilities. There are five municipalities larger than 
200 000 person equivalents (p.e.), yet the discharges from three cities alone; 
Vilnius, Kaunas, and Klaipeda, account for almost 80 per cent of the total 
municipal discharges for the country (Helsinki Commission 1993b, Ch. 3:9). 
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Discharges are a combination of municipal and industrial waste. The 
industrial effluent includes tannery, metal finishing, petrochemical, 
pharmaceutical, and electrical equipment waste (US EPA 1995:3). 
There are 14 waste water treatment plants under construction in Lithuania. 
The "hot spots" identified are in the main cities of Kaunas, Klaipeda, Vilnius, • 
Siauliai, and Palanga (see Figure 3.1). The daily discharge of registered waste 
water in Lithuania is 925 000 rri 3 . Approximately 24 per cent of this is treated, 
22 per cent is untreated, and about 54 per cent is inadequately treated". 
Figure 3.1 Location of Wastewater Treatment Hotspots 
15 There is an apparent disparity in figures on the treated/untreated proportions. The report 
by K-Konsult and Kriiger Consult (1992:22) states that 35% is biologically treated, 40% is 
mechanically treated, and 25% is untreated. This may be partly due to the categories used 
but even considering such differences the level of treated water provided by K-Konsult is 
higher than the estimate of Houston and Tunnicliffe. Nevertheless, the expected increase to 





Ninety per cent of the untreated water is discharged from Kaunas, situated 
on the confluence of the Neris and Nemunas rivers which flow into the 
Baltic Sea. Upon completion of treatment facilities, 81 per cent of waste 
water will be treated to HELCOM standards, 18 per cent will be inadequately 
treated, and 1 per cent will remain untreated (K-Konsult and Kruger Consult 
1992:2 and US EPA 1995:2). Following the construction of the waste water 
treatment plant at Kaunas and Klaipeda and the reconstruction of the existing 
plant at Vilnius, BOD will be reduced to 10 000 tonnes per year (70 per cent 
reduction), total phosphorous to 9 500 tonnes per year (20 percent reduction) 
and total phosphorous to 2 500 tonnes per year (15 per cent reduction). With 
the added benefits from the other improved treatment facilities, Lithuania 
should be able to meet the required 86 per cent reduction in BOD, but other 
measures to reduce nitrogen and phosphorous leaching into rivers will need 
to be taken if they are to meet the required reductions of 65 and 80 percent 
respectively (K-Konsult and Kruger Consult 1992:3,6) (see also 3.4.4). 
The major sources of information on the waste water treatment in the 
Nemunas Basin area are the Environmental Protection Department Report 
to UNCED, 1992 (Environmental Protection Department 1992) and the Pre-
feasibility Study of the Lithuanian Coast and the Nemunas River Basin - 
Technical and Synthesis reports (K-Konsult and Kruger Consult 1992). The 
latter was set up under the Baltic Sea Environment Programme with aims 
of reducing pollution of the Baltic Sea and the Nemunas River Basin in line 
with the Baltic Sea Declaration. A subsequent study by UK consultants, 
Houston and Tunnicliffe (1994) was prepared to ascertain priority areas for 
allocation of 2 million ecu (USD 2.65 m) to be provided by PHARE which 
also provides relevant data. 
3.4.1 The Environmental Impacts of Waste Water on the Nemunas 
The Nemunas, Lithuania's longest river, is 937 km in length. The first 
inhabitants to the basin came 12 000 years ago, and it became particularly 
important to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in 11-18th centuries. Now, all 
major industrial centres (excluding Siauliai and several Soviet towns) are 
located in the Nemunas River basin. The average population density in the 
basin area is 55 inhabitants per km 2 with 100 inhabitants per km 2 in Kaunas 
(K-Konsult and Kruger Consult 1992:9). A number of sources in Byelorussia, 
Lithuania, and Kaliningrad impact on the Nemunas. Much of the pollution 
begins in Byelorussia where there are treatment plants discharging up to 
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110 000 m 3 per day with a BOD content of up to an incredible 316 mg/L 
(compared with the HELCOM target of 15mg/L). The Sovetsk plant in 
Kaliningrad discharges 16 000 rn 3 per day but with a BOD content of 525 
mg/L. Sovetsk is also home to an old sulphite pulp and paper mill which 
creates additional pollution problems including chlororganic substances and 
ammonium nitrogen (K-Konsult and Kruger Consult 1992:26-32). 
There are 3.1 million p.e. connected to the sewerage system discharging into 
the Lithuanian part of the Nemunas. The total number of inhabitants is 2.2 
million in 69 sewered areas with around 65 per cent of those connected to 
the sewers. The discharge of major industries is estimated at 1.7 million p.e. 
(K-Konsult and Kruger Consult 1992:2-3). As a result of such loads, together 
with the pollution from Byelorussian sources, the Nemunas river is expected 
to become dead if measures against pollution are not taken (Environmental 
Protection Department, 1992:68). Adamkus, a Lithuanian American working 
for the US Environmental Protection Authority, Great Lakes District, and 
well known for his work in Lithuania, told authorities in 1990 that it would 
be too late for the Nemunas in three years time if the treatment facilities 
were not constructed (see also 3.4.1.1). 
The concentration of industry in the basin has had a significant impact on 
pollution levels in the river. There is a large variety of industries located in 
the catchment including, food processors, textile and tannery companies, oil 
refineries, chemical plants, and pulp and paper mills (the two largest are in 
the Kaliningrad region). (Helsinki Commission 1993, Ch. 3:9). The combined 
system of industrial waste and municipal waste creates further problems for 
the development and implementation of effective waste water management 
techniques (Helsinki Commission 1993, Ch. 5:13). Thus, measures need to 
be enforced at the source, reducing the load on the treatment plants and 
improving overall water quality. Treatment facilities at factories can also 
provide economic savings by allowing recycling of resources (including water) 
and improving energy efficiency. 
One of the largest problems associated with the treatment of sewage and 
industrial effluent in Lithuania is the treatment and storage of sludge (K-
Konsult and Kruger Consult 1992:27). Municipal sludge is seriously 
contaminated by heavy metals due to the connection with industrial sewage. 
This is often disposed of in gravel pits or other landfills but this has serious 
impacts for the quality of the groundwater (Helsinki Commission 1993, Ch. 
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3:9). Some industries use sludge drying beds but these often become sludge 
lagoons since drainage is poor (K-Konsult and Kruger Consult 1992:3). This 
sludge causes hygiene problems and threatens trees in nearby forests due to 
heavy metal contamination. It also has negative effects on the quality of 
groundwater. One such lagoon in Siauliai increases in size by around 10 
hectares per year (Houston and Tunnicliffe 1994:25 and K-Konsult and Kruger 
Consult 1992:27). 
3.4.1.1 Kaunas 
Kaunas is the second largest city in Lithuania with a population of around 
500 000 people and accommodating several large industries, yet no treatment 
facilities exist. It is one of the largest contributors of pollution in the country 
accounting for 90 percent of Lithuania's untreated sewage. While this figure 
indicates the seriousness of the city's environmental impact, it also highlights 
the possibility for large improvements in overall water quality if waste water 
treatment is addressed. About 69 per cent of domestic consumers are connected 
to the sewerage system while almost all industrial and commercial users are 
connected. The total length of the sewer is 500 kilometres. The volume of 
waste water discharged from the city in 1992 totalled 64.7 million m 3 (reduced 
from 75.9 million in 1989) with industrial, commercial, and domestic 
accounting for 30 percent, 13 per cent, and 57 per cent respectively: All this 
waste water is discharged, at nine large outfalls, into the Nemunas and 
Neris rivers. The BOD concentration is increased from 3 to 5 mg/L (when 
measured either side of the city) and ammoniacal nitrogen from 0.18 to 0.30 
mgN/L in the Nemunas near Kaunas (K-Konsult and Kruger Consult 1992:53 
and Houston and Tunnicliffe 1994:10). 
The process of site selection for the sewage treatment plant was rather 
protracted and, in such a way, has similarities to the oil terminal process 
discussed in Chapter 2. However, on this occasion, Greens were protesting 
about it not being built. The site was selected in 1991 (although discussions 
had begun in 1987) and is located close to the city which has economic 
benefits in terms of pumping costs. The long delay in beginning construction 
was a frustration to local environmentalists (see 4.3.4.1) despite rumours 
that it was their concerns that were holding up the decision about where to 
build the plant. Several Kaunas Greens went as far as conducting a hunger 
strike in front of the Kaunas municipal offices in 1989 in protest of the 
continued procrastination (Zemulis 1992a:2). Following that protest the 
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decision to construct the plant near lake Ezerelis was announced in front of 
the strikers' tents. The decision was later reversed as the project was thought 
to be uneconomical and other groups protested, such as a nearby collective 
farm and the Agricultural Academy (Zemulis 1992a:2). 
Debate surrounding the plant seemed to quieten, with officials concerning 
themselves with other matters as an election drew close. Even a proposal 
from Valdas Adamkus was allegedly ignored. The election of Greens leader, 
Saulius Gricius, to the position of Deputy Mayor, saw a renewed debate 
regarding construction of waste water treatment facilities. A choice was to 
be made between three sites; Ezerelis, Pypliai, and Marvele. Eventually the 
Marvele site, proposed by Swedish firm K-Konsult, was chosen as a 'lesser of 
three evils' (Zemulis 1992a:2). There was some opposition to the Marvele 
site from local residents and architects on aesthetic grounds. Sites further 
from the city would have involved increased piping and pumping costs 
(pers. comm. Linas Vainius, February 1997). 
The total cost of construction of the plant is estimated at around USD 50 
million with associated works in the longer term requiring a further USD 
120 million (Houston and Tunnicliffe 1994:11). The original design capacity 
was well above required capacity, once again due to a reduction in water use 
in both domestic and industrial sectors associated with economic decline. 
The plant was down-sized from a capacity of 420 000 to 260 000 m 3 per day. 
The average flow rate in 1992 was around 177 000 in 3 per day, leaving room 
for growth in all sectors (Houston and Tunnicliffe 1994:10-12). The over 
capacity was based on unreasonable forecasts of population and industrial 
growth, a legacy of Soviet-style planning. The down-sizing involved altered 
technical requirements and some construction was abandoned and some 
rebuilding was necessary, all of which increased construction costs. It will, 
however, be more efficient operating at a smaller scale. The industrial load 
requiring processing at the plant might be reduced by employing waste 
minimisation strategies at the Jonava fertiliser plant and Kaunas artificial 
fibre factory initiated by the World Environment Centre (PHARE and 
FENVIRON 1994:46). 
The Swedish firm, K-Konsult and Danish firm, Kruger Consult have been 
involved in preparations for the construction of treatment works in Kaunas 
funded by the Nordic Investment Bank. Finland and the EBRD have also 
contributed to financing arrangements (see also 6.2.4.5). Although Kaunas 
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was in a more difficult starting position than the other towns since there 
was no treatment plant in existence, Houston and Tunnicliffe (1994:15) argue 
that the project 'is ambitious in both engineering and financial terms ... 
[and] the affordability of what is proposed has not been addressed as carefully 
as it should be'. Given the economic situation in Lithuania, particularly as 
it is often used by governments an excuse for failure to act on environmental 
concerns, more careful use of funds in environmental projects should be 
expected. 
3.4.1.2 Vilnius 
The existing mechanical (primary) waste water treatment plant in the capital 
city serves a population of around 600 000 with the commercial and industrial 
sectors increasing the total load to around 700 000 p.e.. The average flow rate 
in 1992 was 220 000 rre per day with an associated pollution load of 43 tons of 
BOD and 71 tons of suspended solids per day. The plant discharges into the 
Neris river which forms part of the Nemunas catchment. The average BOD 
concentration increases from 3.5 to 5.7 mg/L and the concentration of 
ammoniacal nitrogen increases from 0.34 to 0.49 mg/L as if flows through 
Vilnius. The Soviet equipment used at the plant is in disrepair, is energy 
inefficient, and unreliable. Whilst there was no biological (secondary) 
treatment at the plant, construction of an aeration system was completed in 
1992. The arrangements for sludge disposal are inadequate, especially in the 
medium to long term and there is also a need to upgrade the sludge treatment 
process (Houston and Tunnicliffe 1994:6 and K-Konsult and Kruger Consult 
1992:52). 
In 1992, it was decided that the primary treatment facilities should be 
significantly upgraded and the secondary works under construction should 
be brought into full operation so as to meet the requirements of the HELCOM 
agreement. It was recommended by Danish consultants that the focus be on 
improving the existing mechanical treatment plant which would then 
improve the performance and reliability of the biological process. It would 
also improve the quality of the effluent entering, and therefore leaving, the 
secondary phase. However, Houston and Tunnicliffe (1994:7-8) found no 
evidence that such recommendations were being implemented, despite 
agreement from municipality and Enterprise representatives that updating 
the existing plant would have a greater positive impact for the same amount 
of expenditure. Local funding (about 40 per cent of the state's allocation to 
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waste water treatment and 60 per cent of that required to complete the 
secondary works) seemed to focus on the construction of secondary treatment 
facilities which were completed in October 1996. It is the only plant of the 
five largest proposed to have been completed (as at the time of writing, 
February 1997). 
3.4.3 Other Waste Water "Hot Spots" Impacting on the Baltic Sea 
3.4.3.1 Klaipeda 
The coastal town of Klaipeda is Lithuania's third largest city with a population 
of around 200 000. It has a diversity of industries, mainly metallic and food 
based, a ship building dock, a fishing harbour, and is Lithuania's only 
commercial port (World Bank 1994:6). Unlike other towns, around 90 per 
cent of waste water is actually collected and treated at the existing mechanical 
treatment plant. Sewage discharges have also decreased in Klaipeda from 
100 000 m 3 per day in 1989 to around 79 000 per day in 1992. The existing 
plant has been operating for about 16 years so its efficiency is poor and the 
plant has been plagued by stoppages and accidents such as the discharge of 
raw sewage into the Kursiu Lagoon (Houston and Tunnicliffe 1994:17). The 
sewerage pipes are also in poor condition with about 60 per cent of the 
network being more than 25 years old. Other than age, the acidic effluent of 
the pulp and paper mill has caused the most damage to pipes. There are 6 
pump stations some of which only achieve 45 per cent efficiency, electrical 
and mechanical equipment are malfunctioning or irreparable, and concrete 
buildings are in disrepair all of which adds to energy costs (Rust VA Projekt 
et al. 1994:xvii, 56, 53 and Zemulis 1992a:2). 
The existing plant was owned by the Klaipeda Paper Mill which no longer 
operates due to bankruptcy. A decision in 1986 was made to upgrade the 
plant to be used by the mill only, with a new plant being constructed for 
municipal sewage. The upgrading went ahead but with little progress on 
the sludge treatment component. Construction of the new treatment plant 
began in 1988, however work stopped due to a lack of funding in 1991, 
leaving a debt of around USD 7 million to the Polish company which had 
undertaken the work. The new independent government was not in a 
position to continue construction and work focused on purely maintaining 
the site. The design capacity of the proposed new treatment plant was based 
on Soviet optimistic estimates of growth in the region able to cope with 
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more than double the current effluent load. The design was subsequently 
down-sized to cope with 100 000 m3 per day (Houston and Tunnicliffe 1994: 
17-19). 
The Commission on Swedish Support to Waste Water Treatment in Baltic 
Countries funded the preparation of a new pre-feasibility study in 1994. The 
main physical component of the project was identified as the waste water 
treatment plant although nine other components were outlined. The removal 
of phosphorous was indicated as the main priority of waste water treatment 
in Klaipeda given that it can contribute up to 35 per cent of the phosphate 
load in the Klaipeda Strait (Rust VA Projekt et al. 1994:xxix). The proposed 
upgrades, which include rehabilitation of water supply and waste water 
collection facilities and sludge treatment processes, will cost an estimate 
USD 23 million and will require international assistance provided by Sweden, 
Finland, EU (PHARE), WWF, the World Bank, with local funding of USD 7 
million and an IBRD loan of USD 7 million. The latter is a "soft" loan to be 
paid back over 20 years with 5 years grace (World Bank 1994:14-15) (see also 
6.2.4.5). To complete the plant, a further USD 6 million is required as estimates 
fell short in the face of inflation. In January 1997, World Bank representatives 
met with the new Minister for the Environment, Imantas Lazdinis, as well 
as representatives from Sweden and Finland, about financing arrangements 
for the completion of the Klaipeda plant (ELTA, January 19, 1997). The new 
plant will reduce the pollution in the Kursiu Lagoon and the Baltic Sea by 
significantly reducing BOD, suspended solids, nitrogen, and phosphorous. It 
will also reduce the number of coliform bacteria in the sewage, heavy metal 
content (60 per cent) (Rust VA Projekt et a/. 1994:137, 233). 
3.4.3.2 Palanga 
Palanga, also situated on the coast, is a popular tourist destination. It is one 
of five hot spots discharging waste directly into the Baltic Sea with its outlet 
18 kilometres down the coast from the town centre. A decision to construct 
waste water treatment facilities was made in 1983 but construction only 
began in 1991 and a mechanical plant was operational from early 1993. 
Secondary treatment was expected to be completed by the end of 1995, however, 
as at February 1997, the facility was still incomplete primarily ue to financial 
limitations. The installation of the plant has led to considerable improvement 
in the water quality in the Sea near Palanga, yet beach closures have occurred 
at times due to the discharge of untreated or poorly treated sewage (Houston 
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and Tunnicliffe 1994:22 and Zemulis 1992a:2). Construction mostly used 
Russian equipment but German technology is being used where possible in 
the upgrades to biological treatment. The primary reason being the energy 
efficiency of the German equipment is superior to that supplied by Russia. 
The energy costs of the plant in 1993 were more than 20 per cent of total 
operating costs with the more recent increases in energy prices adding to this 
burden. The use of wind generators was proposed to reduce energy costs. 
The design capacity of the Palanga plant also required revision and was 
consequently reduced to reflect more realistic load expectations (Houston 
and Tunnicliffe 1994:22-3). 
3.4.3.3 Siauliai 
Siauliai, situated in the north of Lithuania, is a major polluter of the low-flow 
Kulpe and Musa rivers in the Lielupe catchment which flow north through 
Latvia, discharging into the Gulf of Riga in the Baltic Sea. The daily waste 
water load and the pollution content have also decreased in Siauliai due to a 
decline in the total production of surrounding enterprises. The industrial 
effluent comes from food processing, tanneries, and machine and electronic 
factories. The quantity of effluent is expected to increase once industry revives 
although to what extent is uncertain (Houston and Tunnicliffe 1993:25). 
There is an existing treatment plant which uses both mechanical and biological 
processes achieving 60-70 per cent reduction in pollution. However, not all 
users are connected while the treated effluent is discharged into the Kulpe 
river, the most polluted in Lithuania. The river has a very low flow rate 
and, at times, consists almost entirely of treated effluent. The most serious 
problem is the growing 100 hectare sludge lagoon, located 8 kilometres from 
the city (Houston and Tunnicliffe 1994:25 and Zemulis 1992a:2). 
The decision to build a new treatment plant was made during the Soviet era 
and construction began in 1990 on a new site near the sludge lagoon. The 
discharge is planned to be emitted into the Kulpe but further downstream 
than the existing outlet. Construction has been funded almost solely from 
state funds which have been inadequate and irregular, thus extending the 
required time and funds required. The Soviet design included low er quality 
Russian technology, most of which has already been purchased. The original 
plan to operate both plants each with a capacity of 60 000 m3 per day, may 
have to be reconsidered as the future industrial demand for effluent treatment 
services is uncertain (Houston and Tunnicliffe 1994:26). The plant has been 
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funded primarily from the domestic budget with support from the World 
Bank. Like the Klaipeda project, the budget for Siauliai proved to be too 
small and the plant is still incomplete (ELTA, January 19, 1997). 
3.4.4 Benefits of Improved Waste Water Treatment 
As required by the Baltic Sea Declaration, the Environmental Action 
Programme aims to control and reduce pollution in the Baltic Sea. This 
entails reducing pollution in the rivers that flow into the Baltic Sea. Separate 
reports were prepared for various areas. The reduction of waste water is a 
key objective of the Lithuanian Basin Programme and will necessarily involve 
a number of complementary actions. The Programme aims to support any 
actions that would address the specific problems of combined municipal and 
industrial sewerage systems. 
The proposed Action Programme for the Nemunas River Basin (the 
Programme) would have a number of benefits for the environment, human 
health, and the economy. If treatment levels in Klaipeda, Vilnius and Kaunas 
were implemented according to HELCOM standards, the BOD discharge could 
be reduced by 75 per cent and if all plants were improved, the reduction 
would be around 86 per cent. Nitrogen and Phosphorous would be reduced 
by 65 per cent and 80 per cent respectively. These proposed reductions of 
pollution would improve the quality of the water and, therefore, natural 
ecosystems. The most significant impact in the Nemunas River would be 
the reduction of BOD (K-Konsult and Kruger Consult 1992:3 & 88-90). 
However, only the expected reduction in BOD comes close to the 50 per cent 
reduction agreed on in the HELCOM agreement. Consultants suggest that, 
irrespective of the method for reduction, the discharges of Nitrogen and 
Phosphorous will not meet HELCOM standards (12mg/L and 1.5mg/L 
respectively). Therefore, action needs to be taken to reduce the non-point 
source pollution, caused primarily by agriculture, before the goals of the 
Baltic Sea Declaration would be met. However, the authors note that 
substantial benefits would be felt from the significant reduction in BOD and 
smaller reductions of other pollutants (K-Konsult and Kruger Consult 
1992:25&96). The impact of non-point sources such as agricultural run-off 
has led some to argue for the notion of hot spots to be de-emphasised since 
eutrophication problems are derived from a large number of sources (GOte 
Svenson, cited in Zylicz 1993:187). Controlling the use of fertilisers and 
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pesticides (i.e. maintaining the economic-related reduction in use) would 
contribute toward improving water quality by end-of-pipe solutions such as 
waste water treatment (see also 7.4.1.4). 
There are also benefits to human health from improved waste water 
treatment. An improved hygienic standard of the water quality in the water 
wells will decrease the occurrence of communicable diseases such as Hepatitis 
A and Shigellosis. Improved water quality for drinking will also be beneficial 
for human health. A decrease in the use of mineral fertilisers will reduce 
the health risks associated with nitrate concentrations in water, which is 
especially hazardous to infants. Further, a decrease in the use of pesticides 
and an improvement in the quality of municipal sludge used as fertiliser 
will improve the quality of food produce. Air pollution, a continuing source 
of acid rain impacting on Lithuanian rivers, should reduce the occurrence of 
respiratory diseases in industrialised areas (K-Konsult and Kruger Consult 
1992:96-7). 
Although the cost of fulfilling the suggestions of the Programme are high, 
there are also several economic benefits pointed out by consultants who 
undertook a pre-feasibility study. For instance, income could be generated 
by converting processes that produce chemical waste so that the waste is 
marketable. For example, it is suggested that copper wash units at ammonia 
fertiliser factories that create pollution detrimental to fish could be replaced 
by methanol producing units. This change would remove a pollution problem 
and still create a valuable product. Income could be further generated if 
energy and environmental audits were undertaken by the government 
thereby reducing operating costs. Improved water quality will eventually 
enhance the fishing industry through larger catches of a better quality, and 
through better conditions for aquaculture (K-Konsult and Kruger Consult 
1992:97). 
Tourism also might improve due to the cleaner environment on offer which 
would, in turn, generate more foreign exchange. However, the benefits of 
increased tourism must not be over estimated since its presence, particularly 
on the coast, is also a source of pollution (K-Konsult and Kruger Consult 
1992:97). The population of Palanga, for example, increases from 20 000 to 
an estimated 60-80 000 in the summer. Previously, tourist numbers were 
twice as high but a combination of economic recession locally and in Russia, 
hard currency and visa problems for visiting Russians, and a lack of attractions 
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for Western tourists has had adverse effects on tourist numbers. The reduction 
in tourism, together with the installation of the mechanical treatment plant, 
has resulted in a 65 per cent reduction in BOD and suspended solids and a 10 
per cent reduction in Nitrogen and Phosphorous (Houston and Tunnicliffe 
1994:22). With adequate equipment, including a capacity for biological 
treatment and sludge treatment processes, an improvement in the tourist 
trade could be accommodated. 
3.4.5 Associated Problems 
There are some common problems related to most, if not all, of the current 
waste water treatment projects in Lithuania. Firstly, the per capita water use 
is very high - almost twice the typical amount used in a north European 
country. Although leakage is reportedly low, there is considerable leakage as 
a result of wasteful practices, particularly in the household sector. Meters 
have begun to be installed in all new premises and, where possible, old 
houses and apartment buildings, which should, along with increased tariffs 
and public education in water efficiency, lead to a reduction in water use. 
The decline in industrial water use (associated with economic decline) and 
the subsequent decrease in pollution loads from industry have had a positive 
impact on water quality in Lithuanian rivers. However, the economic 
uncertainties make it difficult to predict industrial water demand which has 
implications for estimating the required capacity of proposed treatment plants. 
As a result of the history of high water use in both the domestic and industrial 
sectors, together with a Soviet legacy of over planning based on optimistic 
economic forecasts, many of the treatment plants have been designed with a 
higher capacity than necessary. As the economic situation improves, emerging 
industries are still likely to use less water by employing more efficient Western 
technology. Thus, many of the proposed treatment plants are likely to be 
more expensive than necessary (Houston and Tunnicliffe 1994:4). 
Another problem is that the overall approach focuses heavily on technical 
engineering solutions to treatment. Although they have been crucial, they 
are all end-of-pipe solutions and it is clear that they have not at least been 
economically efficient. Alternative methods such as recycling for use in 
greenhouses, forestry, agriculture, or aquaculture have not been seriously 
considered. Also, the problem of sludge storage or treatment needs to be 
more adequately addressed. In Siauliai it was proposed, as part of the redesign 
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of sludge treatment processes, that biogas generation from sludge could reduce 
the plant's energy costs by up to 50 per cent (Houston and Tunnicliffe 1994:28). 
Other measures at the source which reduce the contamination in water 
discharged are just as important as the end-of-pipe treatment facilities. Such 
measures not only reduce the pollution load on rivers, they also improve 
the efficiency of the treatment plant and reduce the corrosive impact of 
substances (such as those with a high acid or alkaline content) on plant 
machinery and the sewer lines. The installation of grease traps at some food 
factories limits the fat concentration of effluent which can otherwise lead to 
blocking in the pipes (Rust VA Projekt et al. 1994:109). 
The financing of the plants has also been problematic. Houston and 
Tunnicliffe (1994:5) point out that although the Lithuanian Government 
has provided significant funds for the construction and upgrading of plants, 
these have been allocated across different projects on a year by year basis 
leading to uncertainties regarding its availability and thereby planning for 
completion. The government was also slow in initially committing funds. 
According to Houston and Tunnicliffe, this has raised overall costs of the 
projects. Bad debts have also been a problem for the water authorities. 
Some treatment services were owed sums equivalent to up to 4 months' 
income from tariffs. People pay for all their utilities (water, hot water, 
electricity, telephone, gas) at the local agencies which then transfer the money 
to the Municipality which then sends it to the water authority. During these 
transfers, up to 50 per cent "disappears" into other municipal priorities 
(Houston and Tunnicliffe 1994:8-9). It will take some time before 
infrastructures are in place to allow a direct payment to the authority. It is 
not only the issues of funding and poor supply of equipment that have held 
up the projects. Zemulis (1992a:2) points out that the old structures of 
management have crumbled but the new structures are inadequate and 
inefficient while decision-makers still fail to consider the long-term 
environmental consequences of their actions (see also 7.4.3.1). 
3.5 Summary of Waste Water Treatment in Lithuania 
The treatment of waste water has become the highest priority of 
environmental rehabilitation and protection in Lithuania. The government's 
aim has been to meet the commitment to reduce pollution of the Baltic Sea 
by 50 percent as agreed in the Convention on the Baltic Sea Environment 
Also, to reduce BOD, nitrogen, and phosphorous loads according to HELCOM 
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standards as set out in the Baltic Sea Joint Environmental Action Programme. 
Lithuanian rivers have suffered from an overload of pollutants from a variety 
of sources including agricultural run-off, acid rain, and municipal and 
industrial effluent. The latter has contained high levels of nitrogen, 
phosphorous, heavy metals, chlororganics, petrochemicals, detergents, and 
ammonia. If the planned construction and upgrading of treatment plants is 
completed at least the BOD requirements could be met. However, reducing 
the nitrogen and phosphorous contents to HELCOM standards will prove 
more difficult. Whilst the Lithuanian Government has continued to provide 
finance for treatment plants, there have been a number of problems associated 
with their design and construction. Funds have been wasted and projects 
have dragged on. Funding for such capital-intensive works has necessarily 
required international assistance and loans. The processes involved in such 
assistance and an evaluation of its direction is presented in Chapter 6. There 
are also administrative obstacles to the effective operation of treatment 
services which would need to be overcome if they are to be efficient in the 
future. Some of these are discussed in Chapter 7. 
There have already been some reductions in pollution loads which have 
had a positive impact on river water quality and the completion of the 
treatment plants should improve this further. It is important that financial 
and technical support is also provided for reducing the pollution load at its 
source (such as environmentally sound technology in industry and incentives 
for farmers to use biological methods of fertilising) since this will improve 
the quality of the water entering, and therefore leaving, the treatment plant. 
Such preventative measures form a guiding principle of the Baltic Sea Joint 
Environmental Action Programme. The focus away from end-of-pipe 
solutions (by reducing the load on them and the need for further extensive 
treatment of sludge, for example) will improve the efficiency of the plants 
and, in turn, overall water quality. 
Financing of waste water treatment projects has involved international 
assistance from bilateral and multi-lateral donors, together with the major 
proportion of the state government's environment allocation. Thus, together 
with nuclear safety, the issue of waste water treatment has detracted funds 
from other important environmental problems (see 6.2.3). A willingness to 
continue to provide such a proportion of state funds for environmental 
concerns once the projects are completed would be an indication of a 
commitment to environmental protection (see Chapter 6). 
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3.6 Conclusions on Water Pollution in Lithuania 
Enormous economic barriers must be overcome for Lithuania to improve 
and protect the environment. It is estimated that the construction and/or 
upgrading of the planned sewage treatment plants in 4 major cities (Vilnius, 
Kaunas, Klaipeda, and Siauliai) will cost 177 million ecus and a further 15 
million each year for maintenance (K-Konsult and Kruger Consult 1992:98-9). 
Thus, there must be an improvement in the economy in order to be able to 
meet the enormous costs for implementing environmental policy. But the 
economy cannot be improved and maintained if environmental effects are 
not reduced and economic growth will most certainly bring with it added 
environmental problems. 
The challenge of restoring the environment by breaking with ineffective past 
systems should constitute one of the cornerstones of the overall reform process. 
Continued disregard of the environment will not only affect the quality of 
life of the population, but also ultimately reduce economic productivity and 
increase production costs. Thus, environmental improvements must proceed 
hand in hand with economic structural reforms....The difficulties of 
successfully matching these objectives are of course enormous, yet they can be 
surmounted. (Helsinki Commission 1992, Ch. 4:3&6) (see Chapter 5 for further 
discussion on the links between economics and environmental policy). 
There are, however, other problems which are perhaps more serious than 
the economic difficulties faced by Lithuanian governments. These include 
ineffectual methods and administrative structures, corruption, secrecy, and 
lack of legal avenues for participation and appeal of decisions, all of which 
have been inherited from the Soviet system. Both case studies have hinted 
at such practices, leading to delays which have consequences for the 
environment (see Chapter 7). 
Concern regarding water pollution, especially in the Baltic Sea, has led to 
action from the Lithuanian Government. They have provided significant 
amounts for the environmental sector (albeit much less than industry and 
banking allocations), which have gone some way to turning the water 
pollution situation around. This decision has been strongly influenced by 
the role of the international community. Firstly, Lithuania signed the Baltic 
Sea Joint Environmental Action Programme which set reduction targets at 
50 per cent and outlined maximum allowable discharge levels of BOD, 
nitrogen, and phosphorous. The pollution affects several nations, including 
wealthier Western nations that are members of the EU with which Lithuania 
would want to maintain good relations. Lithuania is, therefore, more inclined 
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to act on issues affecting not only their domestic environment but that of 
those EU members. Those nations, in turn, are placing pressure on Lithuania 
to act and have the advantage of available funding to encourage the 
development of waste water treatment. They have also used this self-interest 
to fund nuclear safety. The international community are less likely to assist 
with environmental problems which do not pose a transboundary threat. 
Thus, improvements in water quality, like decisions surrounding the energy 
sector, also have a political motivations at their core (see also Chapters 6-7). 
Whilst these measures taken to construct or upgrade treatment facilities are 
clearly necessary, they are focused on end-of-pipe solutions and, in such a 
way, will always be limited in their capacity to reduce pollution. They are an 
important starting point, but measures which reduce the pollution load on 
the treatment facilities are crucial to environmental protection. Continued 
financial support for the environmental sector upon completing the waste 
water treatment plants will indicate whether the comparatively high annual 
allocations (1993-1995) are really an indication of government commitment 
or whether they represent an immediate (short-term) response to a critical 
situation under pressure from the international community. As-Chapter 6 
demonstrates, a decline in government spending on the environment is 
evident in the 1996 allocation, indicating that "commitment" was only short-
term in nature. The reductions in water pollution achieved so far (and 
particularly on the completion of all projects) will not be maintained if 




Chapter 4: National Identity, the Environment, and 
Social Change 
4.1 Introduction 
The significance of the preceding case studies must be viewed in terms of 
the social, economic, and political situation in Lithuania. All of these are 
interrelated; processes and events in the social sphere cannot be analysed in 
isolation from economic, political, and environmental events while political 
decisions are influenced by events in the other spheres. This chapter focuses 
on some social aspects of the situation in Lithuania. It would be beyond the 
realm of this thesis to discuss all social processes and issues, many of which 
could be argued as significant in terms of overall environmental policy. It 
includes a discussion on some specific issues such as nationalism which 
have direct consequences for the way in which social and environmental 
policies are developed. The examination of nationalism aims to ascertain 
its impact on political, economic, and environmental decisions and its effects 
on the creation of an environmentally sustainable society in Lithuania. 
Nationalism could have positive implications for such a society, however, 
in the main, it generates attitudes and aspirations which have a distinctly 
negative impact on the way in which environmental policy is developed 
and on attitudes toward the environment in general. Nationalism, as a 
specific form of politics, was once argued to be largely finished (Breuilly 
1993:340). However, developments in Central and East Europe (CEE) and 
the republics of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) have shown that nationalism 
is not finished in world politics. 
This chapter also examines social movements in Lithuania with particular 
attention to Sajudis (the Reform Movement) and the Green Movement. 
These two groups, with overlapping membership, played significant roles in 
the restoration of independence in 1990/1 and have, therefore, been influential 
in shaping the emergent political sphere. Both groups were strong advocates 
of environmental issues and, in addition, embraced nationalism as a form 
of dissent. This chapter explores their development, their impact on society, 
and their future. 
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4.2 Development of National Identity 
In the struggle to achieve Baltic independence and Baltic national identities, 
memory, and memory reworked as myth, have always been as important as 
economics or diplomacy, let alone tanks or guns (Lieven 1993:54). 
Perceptions of the past are important not only in discussing the recent 
restoration of independence but also in relation to future directions in 
Lithuania. Only by reconstructing the past and modelling contemporary 
reality can future prospects be developed (Samalavicius 1994:67). 
4.2.1 Perceptions of Nature in Lithuania: A Short History 
The pagan faith of ancient Lithuania was environmentally benign with people 
seen as an integral part of an equal, although venerated, natural world. The 
belief in the reincarnation of the spirit into other living things such as 
flowers, trees, and birds, together with the perception of nature as part of 
people and people of it, strongly influenced their perception of the 
environment. They had an image of nature as sacred and alive which 
provided reasons not to act exploitatively toward it. 
There was particular affection toward trees which were often planted to 
celebrate a new born child and were said to then grow imbued with the 
same life forces as its human counterpart (Gimbutas 1963:191). They were 
seen as "mute brothers" and it was believed that if the tree was cut down, 
then the person would die (Kazokas 1992). Trees were thus sacred for two 
reasons; their connections with individuals and their role as an abode for 
the siela (spirit). Whole forests were also seen as sacred and to cut down a 
tree from one of these sacred groves was punishable by death (Kazokas 1992). 
Such beliefs helped retain the large percentage of old growth forest left standing 
up to the sixteenth century (Banks 1991:15-6). Areas of soil, rocks, and rivers 
were also seen as sacred, with sacred hills being a common place for celebrations 
and other rituals. The sacred rivers were honoured and respected and 'no 
one dared soil their life-giving water, which had purifying, healing, and 
fertilizing properties' (Gimbutas 1963:193). The attitudes toward soil and 
water were particularly important to agriculture which has been the primary 
occupation of Lithuanians for centuries. Thus, most customs and traditions 
are not only linked to agriculture but were also influenced by it. The important 
gods were those that affected the crops and livestock on which Lithuanians 
depended (Brazyte-Bindokiene 1989:48). Although pagan Lithuanians had 
128 	 Chapter Four 
many gods, Earth was the Great Mother goddess (Zemyna) who was the 
life-giving force and 'all manifestations of [her] fecundity were lovingly cared 
for and protected' (Gimbutas 1963:196). 
The agrarian culture, then, added to this background to form a culture of 
respect for the land and what it could provide. It is such traditions which 
led to hopes for a revival of an environmentally sustainable way of life 
since environmental issues had been a prominent feature of the dissent 
which brought about independence (see also 4.3.1.1). Despite a return to 
pagan lifestyles among some sectors of society (see 4.3.2), later changes have 
proved more stoic in their influence such as the centuries of catholicism, 
Tsarist and Soviet domination, and the more recent pull of the economic 
rationalist Western world (see 5.4.2). 
When the Lithuanian Grand Duke, Jogaila, converted to Christianity in the 
fourteenth century, his first action was to cut down the sacred trees (Lieven 
1993:41). Conversion was met with considerable resistance and it was several 
centuries before it took hold. The Bishopric of Vilnius was established on 
February 1, 1387, and all pagan practices were forbidden. However, paganism 
clandestinely continued into the twentieth century (Sruogiene-Sruoga 
1987:25) and many aspects were absorbed into Lithuanian culture. So, despite 
610 years of Christianity, many of Lithuania's current customs have their 
roots in paganism. However, they now do not hold the same importance 
and have become more an aspect of recreation, particularly in the holiday 
season (Brazyte-Bindokiene 1989:48). Lithuania's existing religious tolerance, 
which stemmed from the separation of policy from religious ideology, was 
instrumental in preventing the complete permeation of Catholic attitudes 
into Lithuanian culture, particularly between 1550 and 1580 (Kavolis 
1989:10,14). Early travel chronicles point to a tolerant society which never 
persecuted foreigners for their beliefs. Yet, if an attempt was made to impose 
other values on them or ridicule their way of life, the pagan Lithuanians 
were very stubborn and remained steadfast in their convictions (Brazyte-
Bindokiene 1989:50). Today, the Catholic Church is one of the largest 
institutions in the country, with around 85 percent declaring themselves as 
Catholic. 
Christianity, contra paganism, established a dualism of humans and nature, 
ordaining humans with the power to exploit nature not only for their needs 
but also their wants. It advocated a homo-centric perception of nature with 
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humans situated at the top of the pyramid of life. Only God was superior to 
humans. Given that Christianity does not include the notion of animism, it 
was 'possible to exploit nature in a mood of indifference to the feelings of 
natural objects' (White 1971:10-11). Animism, which is still evident in Baltic 
literature was replaced by 'the cult of the saints' who were seen in the 
likeness of humans and their abode was not within trees but in heaven 
(White 1971:11, 14 and Lieven 1993:114). Thus, in the Christian perception, 
humans are not nature's equal but, rather, nature's master. While such a 
perception does not necessarily dictate exploitative behaviour, it offers no 
resistance (McLaughlin 1985:300) and eventually the desire to develop and 
dominate becomes paramount. This transition took place over much of the 
Western world, morally justifying "events" such as the industrial revolution. 
For example, the liberal philosophies of writers such as John Locke focus 
heavily on the rights and duties of humans to God, the creator. In Locke's 
perception, the lower ranks of creation 'were placed in the world by God so 
that they may be instruments of human preservation' (Parry 1978:41). With 
nature seen as instrumental to human needs and wants, it does not matter 
if forests are destroyed or fertilisers are over-used. Chapter 5 examines how 
such perceptions (at the root of capitalist society) influence the economic 
system that a society employs and the consequences of these systems on the 
quality of the environment. 
Perceptions of nature in Lithuania underwent a further change with its 
annexation to the Soviet Union in 1940. Any environmental problems that 
existed in Lithuania prior to annexation were compounded by the pro-
industrialist soviet policies and by the policy of 'internationalism' which 
included the processes of 'indoctrination' and 'Russification'. Attempts were 
made to suffocate the Catholic faith which had become an integral part of 
the cultural identity. This, together with the Marxist perception of nature as 
the 'tool house' of humans and the political and economic focus on 
production, led to not only grave environmental damage but also 'cultural, 
political, and ethnic genocide' (Silbajoris 1983:9). 
Although such perceptions were, at least initially, only at an official level, 
they influenced the daily practices of those growing up in the system. The 
image of nature created by the Soviet ideology was superordinate to any 
other perceptions held by the Lithuanian people. That image viewed nature 
as inferior to humans and its only value was as a source for improved 
productivity (Kalensnik and Pavlenko 1976:128 cited in Thomas 1987:3-4). 
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Those with different perceptions were unable to express their concerns 
publicly, eliminating any limiting or controlling influence of interest groups 
such as in the West. Thus, there were no boundaries for exploitation and 
manipulation (McLaughlin 1985:300). So while the Christian tradition 
tolerates and accepts development which degrades the environment, the 
Soviet perception of nature imposed on Lithuania in 1940 sanctioned and 
indeed dictated environmentally unsustainable development. 
The Gorbachev reforms in the late 1980s facilitated a measure of public 
opposition to environmental destruction and, ultimately, the development 
of organisations such as the Green Movement. They established a political 
environment more accommodating of pressure groups and environmental 
activism began to surface which was based on other perceptions (see 4.3.1). 
Environmental issues were a major focus of pro-independence rallies and 
quickly accrued popular support, not least of all because of the perception 
amongst the central authorities that such issues were essentially apolitical. 
The previous restrictions on such behaviour prevented the establishment of 
a Green Movement any earlier than 1988 and limited its capacity to reach 
the depth found in Western Green movements which developed over several 
decades (see 4.3.1.1 and 4.3.4.1). The apparent widespread support for 
environmentalism was influenced by a growing awareness in the West of 
the finite capacity of the earth to support the needs and wants of the modern 
world and of the environmental problems associated with such limited 
capacity. 
Factions of the Green movement around the world have begun to look back 
to pagan perceptions of nature as an alternative to the economic rationalist 
global system and its environmentally destructive consequences. Likewise, 
parts of the Lithuanian Green Movement have turned to the beliefs and 
practices of their ancestors. Lithuanian pagan beliefs certainly have a role in 
a notion of environmentally benign society and it is true that many of the 
pagan symbols and practices were incorporated into Lithuanian Catholicism 
or into every day cultural traditionsP For example, traditional crosses (the 
making of which is a specialised skill passed on through generations) have 
pagan origins, primarily focusing on the sun goddess or symbols of fertility 
such as the snake. All Souls Day, a regular event on the Christian calendar 
when people remember the dead, actually stems from pagan times when 
1 This is also the case in general - many Christian festivals have pagan roots. 
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there existed a period of ten days in early November known as 'the days of 
longing' (Jomantiene 1994:11). The 'Man of Sorrows', Rupintojelis, is a 
common figure, typically carved from wood and depicted with his head 
against one hand and wearing a wreath-type crown. Reflected in many 
ancient hymns and folk songs and found in most homes, cemeteries, and at 
sites of historical significance, he is pagan in origin but has, for centuries, 
been depicted as Christ (Lieven 1993:28). Early Lithuanian immigrants stunned 
their Australian counterparts by bringing food to church for blessing, clearly 
remnant from pagan practices of offerings to the gods in order for a good 
harvest (Genovaite Kazokas, pers. comm.). These neo-pagan elements found 
in contemporary Lithuanian culture, having been thoroughly mixed with 
Christian traditions, are not only different from the original paganism but 
also quite distinct from neo-paganism in modern Western Europe (Lieven 
1993:114). 
Lithuania's history of resistance, such as fighting against the Teutonic Order, 
is also important in the development of cultural identity, particularly in 
terms of a culture of independence. At the time, Lithuania was a powerful 
force and such resistance, which prevented the total expansion of the Order 
(Gimbutas 1963:172), has become an integral part of their identity. This 
history of resistance continued with the partisan movement in Lithuania 
following annexation to the Soviet Union. The partisans lived in the forests, 
often growing their hair which linked them to medieval ancestors. Up to 20 
thousand Soviets and 13 thousand collaborators were killed by partisans in 
Lithuanian forests while a similar number of Lithuanians were lost (Lieven 
1993:90). The forest was not only a practical hiding place. The guerilla war 
has been depicted as a conflict between 'city' and 'forest', with the partisans 
fighting to protect the traditional way of life (Lieven 1993:89). 
Historical influences, while important in the unique expression of identity, 
do not translate directly to present practices. That is to say, historical 
connections with the land are not tantamount to modern environmentalism. 
The pursuit of economic rationalism since the restoration of independence 
in the race to join Europe indicates other, perhaps more influential, forces at 
play (see 5.4.3.1 and 5.4.4). These forces (as outlined in the following chapter) 
have proven to be more powerful than the pagan connection. As the sections 
below will demonstrate, environmentalism in Lithuania was really closer to 
anti-colonialism - a platform for change - than a direct association with 
pagan ancestry. That is not to say that it did not have some historical roots 
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in paganism, only that those connections cannot be extrapolated directly to 
present actions. Regardless of any pagan influence, the Lithuanian identity 
has become strong in character and has, at times, been expressed as nationalism 
which should be investigated for its potential as both a hindrance and/or a 
buttress to the development of an environmentally sustainable society. 
4.2.2 Nationalism 
In the previous chapters, national sentiment was mentioned as a possible 
hindrance to international environmental co-operation and, therefore, 
protection. This chapter looks at nationalism, and its role in shaping the 
country's future, in more detail and demonstrate how it is one of several 
factors influencing the current situation in Lithuania. The term nationalism 
can have either positive or negative connotations depending on the 
circumstances in which it is used. This may be dependent on cultural 
perceptions of nationalism (which is strongly dependent on the generally 
perceived definition) or on the political climate at the time. 'Some people 
see it as a modern form of patriotism that stimulates people to work for the 
good of their nation, whereas others demonize it as backward, irrational, 
and intolerant' (Karklins 1994:3). 
What does nationalism mean? Is it possible to have different types or levels 
of nationalism? If so, what kind (or kinds) of nationalism are distinguishable 
in Lithuania and what affect do they have on the environment? 
It is not the task of this thesis to analyse nationalism as a phenomenon, to 
explain its existence, or add to the plethora of writings on the topic. Several 
authors have provided a variety of explanations for the existence of 
nationalism and its recent resurgence. However, in order to assess the nature 
of nationalism in Lithuania and its impact on society, some brief discussion 
of its origins and types of nationalism presented in theory (2) seems in order. 
Bakunin argues that 'nationality has no right to be concerned with itself 
until that right is denied' (cited in Bookchin 1994:32). The Lithuanian example 
demonstrates how, even after reclaiming that right, concern for nationality 
among decision-makers and the people at large has persisted. 
Several writers, termed 'contextualists' (similar to Karklins"situationalists'), 
2.  The main texts used are Kellas 1991, Breuilly 1993, and Karklins 1994 
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see nationalism as dependent on the relationship between politics, economics, 
and culture at a given time in history. They argue that there was a 'pre-
nationalist' period in which those relationships were not conducive to the 
development of nationalism. This argument was put forward by Gellner 
who stressed the necessity of industrialisation as a precondition for widespread 
nationalist sentiment. Some writers have stressed the primacy of culture as 
a causal element in the development of nationalism while others have 
tended to emphasise politics or ethnicity (Kellas 1991). Breuilly asserts that 
nationalism arises in opposition to the modern state but in the case of the 
USSR he argues that nationalist movements were a rational response, rather 
than a catalyst, to the breakdown of the communist system (Breuilly 1993:350). 
In his view, 'to focus upon culture, ideology, identity, class or modernisation 
is to neglect the fundamental point that nationalism is, above all, about 
politics and that politics is about power' (Breuilly 1993:1). 
His discussion, therefore, stresses the necessity to understand nationalism in 
terms of the political context in which it has developed (Breuilly 1993). 
Breuilly must certainly be seen as a contextualist, or what Karklins defines 
as an 'instrumentalist', in that by seeing the essence of nationalism as power 
which, 'in the modern world, is principally about control of the state' (Breuilly 
1993:1), nationalism becomes purely a tool for political goals. In this thesis, 
while it is recognised that nationalism is a form of political activity designed 
to achieve certain goals (usually economic, political, or cultural rights), its 
existence is taken to be dependent on the history of the nation's development. 
With nationalist political activity being commonplace all around the world, 
Kellas' contention that nationalism must be discussed in the context of politics, 
economy, and culture, seems most appropriate. The relationship is dynamic 
and interdependent with each of these factors affecting the others. Thus the 
state, and the way in which it developed, affects the culture and economy of 
a society, which may or may not be expressed in nationalist terms, and this, 
in turn, has an impact on politics, economy, culture and, subsequently, the 
environment. 
4.2.2.1 Defining Nationalism 
Writers on nationalism admit to the difficulties involved in defining their 
field of interest. For example, Karklins, whose focus is on ethnopolitics as 
distinct from nationalism, argues that the concept of nationalism is complex. 
Such complexity is evident in Breuilly's analysis where fifteen pages are 
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used in defining the term. A general definition is found in the Collins 
Concise Dictionary which defines nationalism in three ways: a sentiment 
based on common cultural characteristics that binds a population and often 
produces a policy of national independence; loyalty to one's country; 
patriotism; or exaggerated or fanatical devotion to a national community. 
The first is a general definition while the others could be seen as forms or 
levels of nationalism. The second is usually seen as acceptable and the third 
tends to carry the negative connotation mentioned above and savours of 
potential violence. It could be argued that all three exist in Lithuania, although 
the "fight" for independence, aside from 13 years of guerilla resistance ) in 
the earlier years of occupation, has focused on peaceful protests which never 
resulted in the level of violence recently witnessed in the Former Yugoslavia. 
Perhaps it never had to reach such a level, for Lithuania has not had to fight 
for territory in the same way as various displaced ethnic groups in Former 
Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, or the Soviet Union, since the borders of the 
Baltic countries were almost the same at the time of regaining independence 
as at the time of Soviet occupation.(4) At what point nationalism becomes 
exaggerated or fanatical is subjective but a problem exists when nationalistic 
behaviour becomes an end in itself, without regard for the needs and well 
being of the citizens, or for the environment in which they live. 
David Miller (1992:87) suggests that a common national identity has more to 
do with shared beliefs than with objective characteristics. In particular a 
belief that: 
each belongs together with the rest; that this association is neither transitory 
nor merely instrumental, but stems from a long history of living together 
which (it is hoped and expected) will continue into the future; that the 
community is marked off from other communities by its members distinctive 
characteristics; that each member recognizes a loyalty to the community, 
expressed in a willingness to sacrifice personal goals to advance its interests; 
and that the community should enjoy a measure of political autonomy, 
normally (but not I think necessarily) in the form of a sovereign state. 
Miller notes that his definition assumes little; it does not assume common 
race or language (although these may be part of the perceived 'distinctive 
characteristics') nor does it assume anything regarding behaviour. All 
3.The last partisans gave up the struggle after Stalin's death in 1953 (Lieven 1993:89). 
4.However, it must be noted that an ongoing border dispute exists between Estonia and Russia 
as well as a sea border between Lithuania and Russia and between Latvia and Lithuania. 
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particularist loyalties, says Miller, have at least a potential for intolerant 
behaviour toward non-members yet not to commit ourselves to such 
groupings is to ignore their value (Miller, D. 1992:89). 
In Kellas' definition, three major categories of nationalism are defined; 
ethnic, social, and official nationalism. These forms of nationalism may be 
found, not only among different nations, or ethnic groups denied the right 
to call themselves a nation, but also within a nation. Ethnic nationalism is 
found among groups which 'define their nation in exclusive terms, mainly 
on the basis of common descent' (Kellas 1991:51). Kellas argues that the 
nationalistic behaviour of such groups tends to be based on a primordial 
sense of community, referring to the instinctive behaviour of early societies. 
However, unlike other theorists of nationalism, he suggests that this 
instinctive behaviour is not bound by time but, rather, it is dynamic. In 
such a way, it changes within the context of politics, the economy, and 
culture (Kellas 1991:35, 51-3). The 'primordialists' (Karklins"essentialists') 
explain ethnic conflict as not only natural, but a necessary outcome of ancient 
and irreconcilable differences. 
Although ethnicity can be at the heart of nationalistic behaviour, ethnic 
politics, as Karklins points out, is not the same as nationalism. Likewise, 
nationality is not the same as nationalism. 'Nationality gives people the 
common identity that makes it possible for them to conceive of shaping 
their world together' while 'citizenship gives them the practical means of 
doing so' (Miller, D. 1991:94). According to Miller, the notion of nationality 
does not contain rules about how nations should behave towards one another 
above the idea that one owes special loyalty to one's compatriots (Miller, D. 
1992:88). Thus national identity itself does not really explain nationalistic 
activity. 
Social nationalism, based on social ties and culture rather than ethnicity, is 
also contextually expressed. However, while this might be a basis for 
membership of the nation, probably expressed in citizenship, it does not 
necessarily mean that nationalistic behaviour will result. The identification 
of commonality, whether ethnic, cultural, or social, is not a cause, or even 
an explanation, of nationalism. It is a combination of such factors within 
the context of politics and economy. 
Official nationalism is described as 'the nationalism of the state, encompassing 
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all those legally entitled to be citizens, irrespective of their ethnicity, national 
identity and culture' (Kellas 1991:52). Official nationalism is likened to 
patriotism or loyalty to the state. This form is found in the United Kingdom, 
United States of America, and Australia. This does not deny the existence of 
social and ethnic nationalists within these states but the official nationalism 
of the state is linked with the national culture and is not necessarily dependent 
on a change in political power. While the countries referred to have official 
nationalism, they are, in part, ethnic and social nations. 'Thus patriotism 
and cultural homogeneity go hand in hand' (Kellas 1991:52). Ethnic 
nationalism, depending on the cultural homogeneity or political situation, 
can also be official nationalism as in Latvia where ethnic Latvians make up 
50 per cent of the population but, because Latvian parties control the 
government, their nationalism is the same as that of the state. 
Approaches such as this are presented as theoretical frameworks for analysing 
nationalism. While Karklins and Kellas highlight the limitations of the 
'primordialist' view in describing and explaining nationalism, it could be 
argued that it is possible for such a view to be held by 'the people'. Thus, in 
situations such as Israel or Bosnia-Herzegovina, where ethnic differences 
are seen to be absolute and irreconcilable, compromise and change seem 
unattainable; only possible if that concept of absoluteness were to change. If 
the view, or perception, of ethnicity and the conflict were to change, this 
would demonstrate the fluidity of identity, supporting the assertions of 
authors like Karklins and Kellas. Karklins argues for a synthesis of essentialist-
primordial and situationalist (contextualist) approaches since, although 
usually based on concrete norms such as language, 'identity is perception'. 
So, 'the perception of the salience of identity - and how it should be expressed 
- changes according to context' (Karklins 1994:7). Breuilly also argues that 
nationalism must be seen in terms of context since it is primarily a form of 
politics used by political movements seeking or exercising state power. This 
'instrumental' approach assumes that the notion of ethnic identity is imagined 
since nationalism becomes a tool for achieving political aims (Breuilly 1993:2). 
While Breuilly agrees with Kellas regarding the need to analyse nationalism 
'contextually', his discussion focuses primarily on the political context, thereby 
failing to adequately acknowledge cultural and economic contexts. 
Karklins (1994) suggests the existence of 'enlightened nationalism' whereby 
the good of the nation is interrelated with the good of other nations. She 
maintains that 'nationalism can be a great unifier within nations' since it 
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transcends class and other divisions in society, binding people in a larger 
community. It can locate the individual within a 'people', forming a basis 
for collective solidarity. The notion of 'the people' is closely tied to the 
emergence of democracy, so the 'struggle for national and political 
emancipation often go hand in hand'. For Karklins, this was the case in the 
FSU, particularly in the Baltic region (Karklins 1994:3-4). 
4.2.2.2 Lithuanian Nationalism 
Lithuanians, along with Estonians and Latvians, are directly descended from 
tribes which settled on the coast of the Baltic Sea around 4000 years ago. The 
Lithuanians and Latvians are descendents of the Indo-European races while 
Estonians belong to the Finno-Ugric group. Another group, the Livs, are 
closely related to the Estonians and a few thousand are still found in northern 
Latvia. They 'have had to share their lands with other races, some of whom 
dominated them for centuries' which is important for understanding 'the 
way in which national identities were forged and preserved even under the 
rule of others' (Hiden and Salmon 1991:2 & 9). 
According to Sabaliunas, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was secular and the 
Lithuanian nation did not develop until early 19th century, growing in 
intensity toward the 20th century and coming to fruition in 1918 when 
independence was established creating a degree of social cohesion. He 
concludes that the Lithuanian identity, although drawing on medieval times, 
is actually quite young (Sabaliunas 1990:1-9). Perhaps the Lithuanian nation, 
and therefore nationalism, is relatively young, however, ethnic and cultural 
identity preceded the development of the nation-state. Although they were 
subjected to war and conquest for centuries, they have lived in the area 
longer than any of their rulers (Germans, Swedes, Russians): 'The kernel of 
the historical awareness of the Baltic people is the fact that they are directly 
descended from the original inhabitants of their countries' (Pristohlkors 
1990, quoted in Hiden and Salmon 1991:9). 
It could be said that nationalism in Lithuania is generally ethnic in origin 
with Lithuanians having a strong sense of continuity with their ancestors 
even though the Lithuanian nation itself is relatively new. Anderson, in 
explaining the emotional power of nationalism, points to nationalists' faith 
in an everlasting life through membership of a continuing nation' (Kellas 
1991:46), particularly in secular societies. However, religion can coexist with 
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nationalism and, in some cases, reinforce it. In cases of supranational religions 
such as Roman Catholicism or Islam, there may be a conflict of loyalty 
between the state and the Church. Yet, even supranational churches can 
'underpin nationalist movements against oppressive states which deny 
nationalism its free expression' (Kellas 1991:48). However, whilst the Church 
has had an important role in the formulation of Lithuanian national identity, 
it has not always acted to support democracy (see 4.2.2.4). 
The modern notion of nationalism has its roots in the emancipation of the 
serfs throughout Europe in the nineteenth century. The nation became the 
focus for identity which aided Monarchs to create states by breaking the 
control of the feudal nobles which later helped nations to break from 
multinational empires such as Tsarist Russia (Mason 1992:131). Land reform 
began in Lithuania in 1861 (later than in Estonia and Latvia) and eventually 
led to the development of a variety of political parties by the early 1900s and 
a strong resistance to Russification. Society was less diversified than the 
Baltic provinces because underdevelopment left only a small middle-class 
on which nationalism could build. Poor literacy levels (32.6 percent were 
illiterate in 1923) added to this, causing problems for the recruitment of an 
ethnic administration and giving nationalism a slow start (Hiden and Salmon 
1991:18-9 and Hope 1994:54). Literacy gradually improved (the number of 
students increased seven-fold by the 1930s) and, by the time the national 
movement re-emerged in the 1980s, high literacy levels actually strengthened 
the campaigns (Lieven 1993:64). An important event for Lithuanian 
nationalism occurred in 1904 when the battle was won to have books published 
in the Latin alphabet instead of cyrillic as imposed by the Tsars. (Sabaliunas 
1990:1-9). The fight had begun in the 1880s and included the illegal publishing 
of a Lithuanian newspaper, Ausra (Dawn), first appearing in 1833.. The 
editor, Basanavicius, explained the objectives of the paper as 
to propagate the idea of Lithuanian nationality; to foster a love for the 
Lithuanian country and its language; to acquaint the readers with Lithuania's 
history and to demand Lithuanian schools (White 1994:25). 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, 'nationalism was being expressed 
in increasingly subversive terms' and was 'perceived by the Tsarist regime 
as more dangerous than the traditional particularist claims of the German 
ascendancy' (Hiden and Salmon 1991:18-9). Tsarist repression was greater in 
Lithuania than some other republics and nationalist activity had to be carried 
out underground. At this time, nationalists did not aim for the creation of 
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an independent Lithuanian state but tended to opt for a loose federation of 
Lithuania, Poland, and other countries. For nationalists, the large population 
of Jews and Poles living in Lithuania 'presented problems for any ethnically 
based definition of Lithuanian nationality' (Hiden and Salmon 1991:20). 
Although initially arguing for more autonomy under the Tsars, Lithuanian 
nationalists tried to secure more than this, which culminating in the 
declaration of independence on February 16, 1918 and excluding Germany as 
a protectorate (as had been the case in the past) (Hiden and Salmon 1991:28-9). 
The ethnic complexity of the Baltics meant that the new leaders faced 'tribalism 
and ruin, or alternatively, racial tolerance and prosperity' (Hiden 1987 in 
Hiden and Salmon 1991:46). At the turn of the century, 2.7 million inhabited 
the area known as Lithuania, of whom 58.3 per cent were Lithuanians 
(Sabaliunas 1990:1-9). In 1934, with a population just over 2 million this 
percentage had increased to 84 per cent and in 1945 decreased to 80 per cent 
where it has remained stable (Hiden and Salmon 1991:46 & 206). In Lithuania, 
minority rights were enshrined in the constitution of 1920-2. This gave 
minorities virtually the same rights as those held in the Estonian constitution 
which has been hailed as a model of its kind. Lithuania had been the first 
nation, in 1905, to demand autonomy from Russia and this has influenced 
the creation of the radical, egalitarian constitution (Hope 1994:49). Yet, it has 
been argued that, 
in reality, Poles and Jews in particular were subject to discrimination from 
an early date. The early collapse of democracy in Lithuania in 1926 ensured 
that there was little time for tolerance of minorities to take root (Hiden 
and Salmon 1991:47-8). 
Lithuania faced difficult economic and political restructuring in the 1920-30s. 
However, they did have the advantage of developed links with capitalist 
Europe and many administrators, politicians, and business people had 
experience with of such a system. (In 1991, these markets had to be redeveloped 
from scratch) (Lieven 1993:61). However, all three Baltic states, under the 
pressure of economic crisis, abandoned participatory democracy in favour of 
authoritarian regimes. Yet, land reform during the early 1920s which led to 
the development of small-scale farms was 'of great political significance 
because it sanctioned parliamentary republicanism; even during the so-called 
authoritarian period in Lithuania after 1926', the smallholdings also 
'strengthened widespread aversion to communism' (Hope 1994:47). 
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Antanas Smetona came to power in 1926 (5) as a result of a military coup. 
The extreme right nationalist turned parliamentarianism into a presidential 
dictatorship and a new constitution was concluded in 1928. He merged 
nationalist groups into a single patriotic front and, in 1933, reorganised his 
own Nationalist Party along Nazi lines (Hiden and Salmon 1991:49-54). 
Despite his strong nationalism, Smetona shunned racial ideology, remained 
a practising Catholic, and did not hold a revolutionary or violent streak, 
thereby differing from his fascist contemporaries such as Hitler and Mussolini. 
He also averted at least thirteen coup attempts by the more fascist Voldemaras 
and his followers (Lieven 1993:66-8). Some might argue that Landsbergis, as 
Chairman of the Lithuanian Council 1990-1992, was also heading toward an 
authoritarian approach as he was often blamed for ignoring advice and 
avoiding delegation, though this could be attributed to a general fear about 
who was trustworthy, as allegations of KGB collaboration throughout 
parliament dominated the press. Landsbergis' right-hand-man, Cepaitis, for 
example, in whom he confided totally, was eventually discredited by 
revelations that he had been a KGB informer (Lieven 1993:225). The two 
leaders (Smetona and Landsbergis) have been likened to one another (see 
Lieven 1993:68) and in such a way, similarities can be drawn from the two 
periods of national uprising. 
Official nationalism also exists in Lithuania. Today, the state has a more 
liberal citizenship policy than Latvia, and nationalities other than Lithuanian 
have obtained Lithuanian citizenship. With only 20 percent of the population 
made up of non-Lithuanians, the issue of ethnic nationalism within the 
state has not been, indeed it has not needed to have been, problematic as in 
Latvia. Ethnic conflicts have been most acute in the capital, Vilnius, where 
Lithuanians only constitute around 50 per cent of the population (Senn 
1990:98). The threat to Lithuanian identity is not seen to be as great as the 
comparable situation in Latvia. 
Between 1987 and 1993, the term 'nationalism' tended to have a particularly 
derogatory connotation in Lithuania, despite the existence of conservative 
parties such as the Homeland Union, primarily made up of members from 
5 Smetona was instated as the first President of Lithuania on April 4, 1919 and held office 
until June 20, 1920 when parliamentary government was established. Two parliaments followed 
1992 and 1923. Smetona and two other nationalists were elected to the parliament in 1926 and 
the Nationalists and Christian Democrats later (December 17) took control of the parliament 
with the help of the army (Encyclopedia Lituanica, vol. 5:233-234). 
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the once popular Sajudis group, headed by Vytautas Landsbergis, and the 
Lithuanian Nationalists Party. This perception developed due to several 
reasons. First, the general political climate in Europe, where the results of 
extreme nationalism evident in Bosnia and the violence surrounding neo-
fascist groups in Germany, have had an impact. Thus, there was a general 
perception that nationalism can lead to intolerance, violence, and war. No-one 
wanted to be labelled a nationalist. There were also memories of the nationalist 
Nazi regime that was responsible for the near annihilation of the Lithuanian 
Jewish population as well as other Lithuanians, another reason not to be 
identified as a nationalist. Nationalism is also losing favour in Europe, at 
least officially, due to the current enlargement of the European Union, of 
which Lithuania hopes to become a member, although, there is some 
uneasiness with the so-called internationalism of the new Europe (see also 
7.3.1.1). So, while the popularity of nationalistic policies in Europe at the 
time influenced its acceptance in Lithuania in the late 1920s and 1930s 
(Mussolini and Pilsudki had seized power and Hitler was gaining favour), 
the negative perception of it in Europe at the time of restoration of 
independence influenced its shunning. 
Perhaps the most influential factor in this negative perception of nationalism 
is the memory of the Smetona regime and the constant condemnation that 
followed from the Soviet propaganda machine. Although Adolfas Sapoka's 
famous History of Lithuania, published in 1936 and which later became the 
embodiment of discontent, praised the authoritarian rule of Smetona (Senn 
1990:25), even Lithuanian nationalists recognise the problems with those 
years. That period of history was described by Soviet historians as "bourgeois, 
nationalist Lithuania" a definition that went unchallenged publicly until 
1988. During its beginnings, Sajudis and perhaps more so, the Lithuanian 
Freedom League (LFL) faced constant criticism from the government for 
nationalist and anti-Soviet activity, a charge which the former sought to 
defend (Senn 1990). The need to defend such allegations may be seen as a 
political tactic of a group that required some official recognition in order to 
remain in existence. Sajudis sought to shed the 'nationalist' label and often 
distanced itself from the more 'extreme' Freedom League (a tactic that was 
to be censured by the emigre community). For example, Vytautas Petkevicius, 
a writer and prominent Sajudis member, thought it necessary to put this 
disclaimer to the crowd present at a rally on July 9, 1988: 'We distance ourselves 
from any extremist or chauvinist or nationalist hotheads and we have nothing 
in common with them' (Senn 1990:89). The impact of the Soviet propaganda 
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must also be an influence on the perception of nationalism in Lithuania: 
Trained over the years to consider "bourgeois nationalism" something bad, 
the Lithuanians insisted that the feelings they were expressing should not 
be thrown into the negative semantic circle of "nationalism", and they also 
objected to the use of the word nationalist by foreign observers (Senn 1990:98). 
Nationalism has since lost some of the negative connotations and, with the 
formation of the Lithuanian Nationalists Party as well as the right wing 
conservative party, the Homeland Union in opposition to the Democratic 
Socialist Party, many openly declare their nationalism. 
4.2.2.3 Nationalism, the Economy, and the State 
The recent upsurge of nationalist movements in Lithuania and other parts 
of the FSU might be seen as incompatible with communist ideology and 
practice in which nationalism is meant to be superseded by internationalism. 
The Marxist predication that national identities would disintegrate along 
with the state to be replaced by global solidarity failed to acknowledge the 
potency of nationalism. Many Western political scientists argued that 
communist governments had solved, or at least harnessed, the 'Nationality 
Problem' (Kellas 1991:106-8). But at the same time, 'Soviet-style economic 
growth wrought profound demographic, social, and environmental damage 
in Baltic Society' (Hiden and Salmon 1991:3). 
How were nationalist movements developed and maintained in the FSU? 
The communist ideology imposed the principle of "socialist internationalism" 
on the republics of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe whereby national 
interests were subordinate to international ones (the principle behind the 
1968 Brezhnev Doctrine which justified Soviet intervention in 
Czechoslovakia). 'So although there may have been ethnic and national 
tensions in the region, they were largely hidden and repressed' (Mason 
1993:132). The advantage of the Soviet system (for nationalist movements) 
was that the republics (in particular the Baltics) tended to be divided along 
national lines and were provided a formal government structure on which 
to build. This proved invaluable for nationalism under Gorbachev's more 
open system in the mid to late 1980s. An important condition in the 
development of nationalism is regime change which is particularly significant 
for explaining its sudden rise in the FSU and Former Yugoslavia. The 
political and economic changes of Gorbachev, although designed to increase 
economic efficiency, facilitated expression of political views and tolerated a 
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level of nationalistic behaviour previously repressed (Kellas 1991:107-9). 
Another advantage for the Lithuanian reformers was the fact that, by the 
late 1980s, 91.5 per cent of administrative or managerial posts were held by 
Lithuanians (79.6 per cent of the population) (Smith 1994:123). This was 
particularly useful in facilitating the transition from social movement to 
political force (see 4.3). 
So for Kellas (1993), glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) 
provided the necessary condition for national identities to find political 
expression. Smith (1994:121) agrees, placing the beginnings of the Baltic 
Popular Fronts in Gorbachev's reform agenda. Breuilly, on the other hand, 
contends that national movements were a logical response to the breakdown 
of the USSR, refuting the notion that nationalism was waiting to be expressed 
when political controls were relaxed (Breuilly 1993:344). He also objects to 
the image of the USSR as a 'deep freeze' in which national identities were 
suppressed only able to thaw out after the freezer had broken down. He 
argues it is 'a modern construct and that it acquires political significance 
only under certain conditions' (Breuilly 1993:343). Breuilly suggests that 
nationalism was a post-breakdown phenomenon and that, rather than 
emerging from cultural identity, nationalism creates identity. Yet his 
discussion of how it developed points to factors which could be construed as 
national identity. For example, when discussing nationalism in the Baltics, 
he writes: 
The Baltic Republics were especially advanced in relation to the rest of the 
USSR. They had their own very recent memories of independence; well 
developed literary languages in a highly literate and well educated 
population; and were very open to the west....Everything - cultural identity, 
aspirations to greater political freedom, and economic self-interest - meant 
that the effect of the Gorbachev reforms was the rapid growth of demands 
for national independence, demands which came under the control of 
nationalist rather than local communist leadership (Breuilly 1993:347). 
Although cultural identity and the existence of cultural systems such as 
language are not synonymous with nationalism, they do show that an identity 
existed prior to the nationalist uprising. Also, the fact that Breuilly can 
point to a nationalist leadership before the actual breakdown of the USSR, 
demonstrates the fluidity or dynamics of the relationship. The national 
movements of 1988-1991 could draw upon a rich variety of pre-Soviet national 
symbols derived from cultural heritage as well as more recent memories of 
statehood (Smith 1994:121). So, it could be argued that a cultural identity 
existed and this was expressed when the regime change provided the political 
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opportunity). As Kellas points out, 'it is the changes in political, economic 
and cultural relationships that give rise to nationalism' (Kellas 1991:65 - his 
emphasis). 
The political, economic, and cultural consequences of the changes have, in 
turn, influenced the notion of national identity in Lithuania. The seeds of 
nationalism were there and the development of national movements was 
aided by the political changes but it can not be ignored that those national 
movements, especially in the Baltics, had implications for the future of the 
USSR. The national movements in the Baltics had gained Western support 
and although Gorbachev may have envisaged Western kudos for his more 
liberal reforms he most certainly did not expect the nationalist uprising 
which led to several declarations of independence, including, in the end, 
from Russia. It is debatable whether the Centre resigned itself to losing the 
Baltics, especially given the effective economic and military reaction to 
Lithuania's declaration of independence (Breuilly 1993:349), but the increase 
in Western attention is significant. Western knowledge, interest, and 
understanding of the situation was strongly linked to the resolve of the 
national movements who made their cause known throughout the- :world (6) . 
Kellas attempts to explain why national sentiment was waiting to be expressed 
when given the opportunity. While Breuilly focuses on politics (though 
not ignoring economics), Kellas looks at the economic and cultural 
connections with national movements. According to Kellas, 'Nationalism 
feeds on economic discontent, and channels it into a nationalist perspective' 
(Kellas 1991:114). This is especially true where there is 'uneven economic 
development' regionally such as was the case in the FSU and FYR (Kellas 
1991:114). The regional disparity in wealth distribution often has a cultural 
basis and, therefore, economic deprivation can be perceived to be connected 
with ethnicity. Thus, regions or republics might demand economic changes 
along national lines (see also 4.3). 
Marxists take a reductionist view by linking the emergence of nationalism 
to a stage of economic development - the rise of the modern industrial or 
capitalist state. Kellas is less resolved to the primacy of economy, but 
nevertheless recognises the close connection between nationalism and 
6 The West does not deserve much credit , however, given their slow response to recognition 
of the independence declarations and their apparent disinterest in the military invasion in 
Lithuania in January 1991 where 13 people were killed. 
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economic or material interests. A rise in nationalism can be related to the 
economic consequences of colonialism or 'internal colonialism' where the 
colonised have a nationalist reaction (Kellas 1991:61). This may have been a 
factor in Lithuania where control of the economic system was prevented by 
the internal colonialism of the FSU. It was believed by Lithuanian reformers 
that independence from the integrated communist economic system was in 
the interests of the Lithuanian nation, including its economy and 
environment (see 4.3-4.4). 
The revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989 intensified nationalism in the 
Soviet Union, leading to declarations of independence in five republics, 
including Lithuania, by March 1990 (Mason 1992:133). Nationalism has 
continued to affect political and economic decisions in Lithuania since 
independence regardless of the political affiliations of those in government. 
The new catch-cry, and thus rationale, for many decisions of the first 
independent government (Sajudis) was, 'this is for the economic 
independence of Lithuania'. This argument has been used to rationalise 
several decisions in order to obtain popular support. It appears that 
nationalism was behind the government's goals of retaining political 
independence and regaining economic independence but this could have 
adverse effects in terms of both economic recovery and environmental 
protection. Similar arguments were taken on board by the Democratic Labour 
Party (formerly the Communist Party) which won office in 1992 (see 7.2.1.2). 
Lithuania has already shown signs of avoiding co-operation with other 
countries (particularly ex-Soviet republics regardless of whether they are CIS 
members or not, such as Latvia and Estonia) which will be to the detriment 
of the economy and the environment. For example, the argument espoused 
by government in favour of the proposed Oil Terminal, discussed in Chapter 
2, was that it was needed in order to re-build the Lithuanian nation. 
Economic reconstruction is an important part of Lithuania's recovery and 
the success of the government's predecessors in the 1930s could provide 
some basis to counter claims that the Baltic republics cannot survive on 
their own (Hiden and Salmon 1991:78). However, what must also be 
considered is what was sacrificed in the name of economic progress. Hiden 
and Salmon (1991:56) noted that all three nationalist dictators successfully 
drove their economies down the road of modernisation but only at the 
expense of their respective minorities. There is other information which 
suggests that, while acknowledging the authoritarian nature of the regimes 
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and the problems associated with them, support for minority education 
continued. The minority government under Prime Minister Slezevicius, 
had introduced egalitarian, tolerant policies on the basis of the 1922 
constitution including further expansion of Polish schools (Hope 1994:62). 
This was one aspect of the increasingly secular and non-Lithuanianness of 
the constitution which eventually led to the authoritarian take-over. One 
reason for the nationalists' dissatisfaction with the egalitarian approach was 
that Poland was closing Lithuanian schools in Vilnius ("belonging" to Poland 
at the time) and to accommodate the Poles in Lithuania therefore amounted 
to treason (Lieven 1993:66). The somewhat less tolerant approach of the 
Smetona government, designed to emulate the growing economic and 
cultural power of Germany, led to the closure of several Polish schools 
(Hope 1994:62-4). Whilst those years could be seen as politically and socially 
unsound, minority language instruction remained partly or entirely 
subsidised by Smetona and his government actively supported the influential 
Jewish community (Hope 1994:64). Yet, according to Adam Michnik, founder 
of the Polish Workers' Defence Committee: 
nationalism always leads to egoism and self-deception. To egoism because 
it allows one to ignore the injuries suffered by other nations and disregard 
other peoples' values and ways of seeing. To self-deception, because by 
focusing on one's own injuries, nursing the memory of those injuries, nationalism 
allows one to ignore the injuries one has also inflicted (quoted in Mason 
1992:132). 
It is important that the nationalism that had the positive effect of regaining 
independence does not turn in other directions as in most of Eastern Europe 
where it has become divisive and destructive. The Lithuanian Nationalists, 
headed by Rimantas Smetona, proposed a referendum in 1994 to terminate 
the government of the Democratic Labour Party, demonstrating the possibility 
of a revival of nationalist principles. However, together with their only 
supporters, the Democrats, they held just six seats in the 1992-1996 parliament 
(Baltrusaitis 1994). At the 1996 elections, the Lithuanian National Union 
and Young Lithuania Nationalists gained one seat each (see 7.2.1.4). 
In post-industrial societies, emphasis is shifting away from class or materialist 
issues toward post-materialist values of quality of life such as the 
environment, civil rights, and culture. Such a shift is facilitated by the 
economic and physical security of post-industrial countries (Kellas 1991:66). 
Perhaps a feature of these societies is not just industrialisation but a well 
developed democratic political system that delivers a large measure of 
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individual safety and protection of rights. When citizens no longer feel 
economically or physically secure and are not adequately protected by the 
state, nationalism within a state can also develop as groups seek their own 
protection. This nationalism is more likely to be violent if people are not 
protected by the state and participative institutions are weak or few. Such a 
situation is evident in FYR where fear of one ethnic group gaining more 
than another has led to a domino effect in violent action (Ignatieff 1994:16 
and Kellas 1991:112). Areas with a history of self determination, such as the 
Baltic Republics, are more likely to use constitutional action. They have 
used methods such as mass demonstrations, 'illegal' declarations of 
independence, and economic sanctions much of which have avoided violence 
(Kellas 1991:112). 
Class or economic divisions in Lithuania are beginning to become evident 
since the restoration of independence, with the cleavage between rich and 
poor increasingly obvious. There is some antagonism toward those who 
have succeeded in the new market economy since the number that have 
done so is small. Nationalism in Lithuania tends to transcend these economic 
divisions, although successful business people are usually perceived to be 
associated with Russian Mafia. Economic problems are still blamed on the 
Soviet system or, more precisely, Russia. Although Lithuania has not yet 
developed a high degree of economic security and Mafia crime seems to defy 
legal structures, the history of self rule is a basis for developing these areas 
and continuity with their ancestors aids cultural homogeneity. 
4.2.2.4 Nationalism and Culture 
'Primordialists' have argued that nationalism is based on a 'natural' instinct 
while others, like Kellas, have suggested that 'nationality and culture are 
almost synonymous'; that many of culture's attributes are national' (Kellas 
1991:67). Yet it is problematic to see them as the same. Indeed, culture is an 
integral part of national movements but cultural identity need not be expressed 
as nationalism. Nevertheless, it would be inappropriate not to discuss the 
role of culture in the development of nationalism. 
Culture, often stemming from ethnicity, is thus an important feature of 
nationalism. Culture is often a crucial part of national identity which produces 
a sense of commonality that members might seek to preserve. According to 
Kellas (1991:70): 
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Any nation whose identity is based on language, religion, education or the 
Arts, and which is faced with threats to its culture, is likely to react with 
nationalism. 
Lithuania could be seen as one such nation. Lithuanian is an ancient language 
- the closest living language to Sanskrit - related only to Old Prussian (no 
longer spoken) and Latvian. It is, therefore, an important language for 
linguists. The printing of books in the Lithuanian language was prohibited 
by the Tsars and, under the Soviets, it lost its official language status to 
Russian. Its uniqueness has meant that the Lithuanian language has become 
an extremely important part of national and cultural identity. The right to 
give national languages official status was generally granted to the Republics 
in 1989, although Russian was expected to have equal status. During the 
Soviet period, 'national flags and anthems were banned, until Gorbachev, 
but education in the native languages was never eliminated' (Kellas 1991:110). 
Religion is a major part of cultural identity and the official or state religion 
is often subject to politically-driven change. As the last country in Europe to 
be Christianised in 1383, pagan practices clandestinely persisted for around 
four hundred years with groups still existing today. Lithuanian Paganism 
was organised and 'confronted the social, political and spiritual challenge of 
the Christian churches with considerable success' (Hiden and Salmon 1991:12) 
(see 4.2.1 and 4.3.2). Catholicism was to eventually become integral to the 
modern Lithuanian identity. During the early stages of Lithuanian 
nationalism in 1863, 'religion and nationalism formed a symbiotic 
relationship', with the Catholic Church leading the campaign against 
russification (Hiden and Salmon 1991:19). Later, in the early 1900s, 'the 
catholic clergy continued to take a lead in cultivating the Lithuanian language 
and coordinating resistance to Russian policy' (Hiden and Salmon 1991:20). 
During the independence years, the Catholic Church had a mixed relationship 
with nationalism and Lithuanian politics. There was some conflict between 
the Vatican and Lithuanian Church leaders when the church recognised the 
State in 1922 but did not create a Lithuanian church province. In Lithuania, 
the clergy regarded political pluralism valid as long as chosen parties were 
behind the church. The interaction between the church and politics led to a 
'polarisation of party-politics around religious and ideological issues' (Hope 
1994:50). The Vatican was also hostile towards the minority government of 
Populists and Social Democrats because it excluded the Christian Democrats 
and had begun to introduce policies based on an egalitarian and secular 
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constitution (Hope 1994:50). The tension between the secular and religious 
spheres of society influenced the eventual dissolution of parliament that led 
to the formation of a Presidential system (Hope 1994:62). So, the Catholic 
church has not supported Lithuanian nationalism at all times, but when it 
has (such as the changes in 1926) it has done so at the expense of the 
development of democratic pluralism which has become the cornerstone of 
free societies. Nevertheless, religion remained a focus for cultural and 
national identity, particularly during the era of Soviet occupation and 
secession from it. 
In 1960, when nationalism was beginning to fade in politics, Emersen noted 
the interrelationship between the state and religion: 
Within the state the independent church, or the presence of several churches, 
acted in the Western world as a safeguard against oppression. Now...religions 
everywhere have been so strongly absorbed into the nation that religious 
leaders bless its arms and pray for the destruction of its enemies (Emersen 
1960:169). 
Catholic identity certainly played an important role in the late 1980s in the 
fight for cultural, political, and economic independence. This could not be 
demonstrated more clearly than by the presence of the national flag in the 
Vilnius cathedral after it was returned to the Catholic Church in February 
1989 (Forest 1990:116). Earlier, the Church had also combined the national 
symbol with a religious ceremony at a mass to celebrate the "return of the 
flag" when the national flag was raised above the remaining tower of 
Gediminas' castle in October 1988. A flag was also hung from the window of 
the Dawn Gate - an entrance to ancient Vilnius and a sacred place for Orthodox 
and Catholics (Senn 1990:201 & Forest 1990:115). Another example of such 
mixed symbolism is found in the placement of a statue of the Madonna 
outside parliament in Vilnius to commemorate the fight to retain power in 
January 1991 when Lithuanian citizens protected the parliament and media 
outlets from oncoming Soviet tanks and which led to the deaths of thirteen 
people. The Madonna remained there (together with other commemorative 
pieces such as a tribute to Iceland the first nation to formally recognise 
Lithuania's independence) until December 12, 1992 when the acting President 
at the time, Algirdas Brazauskas, ordered its removal (The Baltic Independent 
1992, 3(141):1). 
7 Above the gateway is a small chapel housing an icon of Mary the Madonna which is 
crowned in gold and is believed to have cried the day Soviet troops entered Lithuania in 1940. 
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The link between the Catholic Church and the Lithuanian Freedom League 
(also translated as Lithuanian League for Liberation) was strong with the 
fight for religion seemingly synonymous with the fight for independence. 
The LFL was seen by authorities and some members of Sajudis as 'extremist' 
and 'nationalist'. The League tried to identify itself with the Church while 
the same could not be said of Sajudis (see 4.3.3.3). LFL's link with the 
Church was symbolised by the positioning of the hunger strike of several 
weeks outside the cathedral in Vilnius. Also, one of the leaders in the 
League, Nijole Sadunaite, tended to be seen as a Catholic rather than a 
political dissenter. She had been one of the key people behind the Chronicle 
of the Catholic of Lithuania which functioned as an underground newspaper 
during the Soviet period. The Church, however, was cautious about 
connecting itself with any political movement once the government began 
to show a willingness to deal directly with Church officials (Senn 1990:69-70). 
At the same time, many of the general population of believers had 
seen the Roman Catholic Church's struggle for survival in the land as a part 
of their own national consciousness; the church had provided an institutional 
alternative to the Soviet order' (Senn 1990:8). 
The Church has continued to align itself with authoritarian-tinged 
rationalism which stems from Church conservatism in general, particularly 
since it was insulated in the Soviet Union from reforms in the Vatican 
(Lieven 1993:366). 
Today, the Lithuanian identity appears to be an incongruous mixture of 
strong Catholic faith - a bastion against East and West - and an identification 
with the pagan ancestors who, though surrounded by enemies, were never 
vanquished. In both perceptions, Lithuania is seen as a fortress against the 
outside world, a perception which has obvious roots in Lithuanian history 
and which has led to an extreme sense of defensiveness (Sinnig 1992). 
Interestingly, the oppression of Catholicism under soviet occupation led to a 
renewed interest in "folk culture" which was tolerated as a potential counter 
force to "bourgeois" culture. The cultural folk groups thus became an 
alternative to practising religion and were used by their leaders to maintain 
the national consciousness of the Lithuanian people (Samalavicius 1994:73). 
This focus on "folk culture" gave a sense of national identity and later, 
paradoxically, became clearly linked to the Christian religion, with the same 
people welcoming back the Church into their lives as a uniting force against 
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communism. The Catholic Church stood firm against the atheism of the 
Soviet Union as well as the secularist West. Speaking at the famous rally on 
August 23, 1988 in Vingis Park (the 49th anniversary of the Molotov-
Ribbentrop pact), a Catholic priest called on those present to 'join him in 
decrying the sins of the modern world' (Senn 1990:126). 
An example of the mixing of Catholic and medieval pagan heritage is found 
in the inauguration ceremony of Algirdis Brazauskas as President in 1993. 
The two hour rite of passage played heavily on Lithuania's medieval history 
and the heroes of that time such as Grand Duke, Vytautas under whose rule 
the Grand Duchy of Lithuania stretched from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. 
A Presidential flag was introduced and installed on Gediminas hill, the site 
of an ancient pagan altar. The procession and service took place in the 
Cathedral of Vilnius and was presented by three priests and a representative 
of the archbishop (Sinnig 1993:8). Such events are also indicative of the role 
pagan ancestry has played in Lithuania's obsession with symbolism and 
ceremony. This kind of 'ritualisation' of politics is part of a 
'retraditionalisation' of life, although partly influenced by Soviet culture 
which was highly ritualised and aggrandised (Lieven 1994:25, 28). 
The era of pagan dukes and the era of the Catholic Church are a part of 
Lithuanian heritage and both were part of the movement which secured 
independence in 1990/1 and are behind the strong desire never to be conquered 
again, particularly by atheist Russia. The "fortress mentality" tends to portray 
the country as a 'classic picture of the notorious narrow-minded arrogance 
of the small nations of Central and Eastern Europe' (Sinnig 1992). Yet 
Lithuanian heritage is rich and complicated. Time and outside influence 
has begun to dismantle that fortress, challenging the archaic culture (Sinnig 
1992). 
Hundreds of years of occupation (particularly by Tsarist Russia, 1795-1914 
and later the Soviet Union, 1940-1990) actually strengthened this identity 
since the people struggled to hang on to the culture that made them different 
as the Soviet system attempted to make them the same. 
The regime's pressures for atheistic education, combined with its policies 
encouraging assimilation, gave the church a special mission as a repository 
of Lithuanian national feeling under Soviet rule (Senn 1990:66). 
Catholicism thus became a symbol of what the Soviet Union denied the 
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Lithuanian people while faith in God gave people the strength to continue. 
So 'when Gorbachev opened up the Soviet system to nationalist demands, 
language and religion became a focus for nationalism in the politics of the 
Republics' (Kellas 1991:111). 
If Catholicism has symbolised Lithuanian national culture, the re-emergence 
of secularisation in Lithuania (particularly amongst youth) could signify the 
diffusion of nationalist feeling and a more pluralist notion of the Lithuanian 
state. The rising numbers in sects such as 'Krishna Consciousness' and 
'Word of Faith' as well as the growing interest in paganism (see 4.3.2) has 
concerned traditionalists. The Lithuanian constitution of 1992, under clause 
43, gives support to religions which have been active in the country for over 
400 years - Catholic, Lutheran, Old Believers, Reformed, and Orthodox 
churches. Others are tolerated if their activities fall within the law (The 
Baltic Independent 1994, 4(199):2). Some would argue that this hardly 
constitutes 'freedom of religion', however, the growing membership of 
denominations outside the traditional churches (especially the Catholic 
church), along with those now professing atheism or agnosticism (from 
choice rather than force), demonstrates its ailing power in society and perhaps 
the beginning of a diminishing role in national identity. 
Cultural or social nationalism appears to be on the rise around the world. 
This indicates the increased importance of culture in the 'economy + politics 
+ culture = nationalism' equation. Kellas argues that this is due to the 
pursuit of 'psychic income' (quality rather than materialism) in post-material 
societies. Thus issues of environmental protection and human rights become 
the focus of political conflict. Also, the development of the media and mass 
publications have aided the spread of cultural nationalism (Kellas 1991:67-70). 
Is this the situation in Lithuania? While it seems certain that cultural 
nationalism was a significant factor in the national movement in Lithuania, 
events since independence present a slightly different view. The 
environment, culture, and human rights were at the pinnacle of the political 
agenda in 1990 at the first free elections since the declaration of independence. 
However, as Chapter 5 discusses, materialist issues have now come to the 
fore. It could be argued that Lithuania is not a 'post-materialist' state and 
that the shift discussed by Kellas is only relevant for nationalism in advanced 
'post-materialist' societies (see also 4.3). Cultural and national identities are 
constantly being reaffirmed in Lithuania through the media, however, 
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economics and materialist aspirations have become the primary focus of 
political conflict. Media was particularly important for promotion of national 
identity during the early formations of the nationalist movement. They 
provided a republic-based focus on issues and events which was significant 
in providing a national context for concerns and debate (Smith 1994:128). 
It is not easy, or indeed beneficial, to make generalisations about nationalism 
in the Former Soviet Union because of the cultural differences between the 
nations. The Soviet Union consisted of many minority nations. 'Each of 
the country's 15 constituent republics represented a different nationality, 
and the Russian republic alone contained over 100 nationalities' (Mason 
1992:133). Many minority nations feel that their culture is threatened by the 
state which usually represents the majority nation or a constructed state 
culture. This fear can culminate in a sense of 'relative deprivation' which 
can be political, economic, or cultural and is important in explaining 
nationalist behaviour (Kellas 1991:69). Republics with a strong cultural 
identity such as Lithuania felt this deprivation on all levels under the Soviet 
system. Economic and political deprivation under the command economy 
were noted in the previous section. Cultural suppression is equally, if not 
more, significant. Part of this suppression came in the form of migration of 
non-nationals (particularly Russians) into the republics for work in Soviet 
enterprises. This was an element of the 'Sovietisation' process which aimed 
to replace national identities with the international Soviet identity. This 
tended to happen more in the better-off Baltic Republics. But as discussed 
earlier, the Baltics are not innocent of ethnic intolerance. The ethnic balance 
in Lithuania has meant ethnic tensions are now relatively few, however, 
would it be the same if the balance had shifted greatly during the occupation 
years? 
As Kellas points out, migration can upset the ethnic balance, as it has in 
Latvia where Latvians constitute only half of the total population (Kellas 
1991:113). While Kellas points to the shift toward ethnic and cultural 
nationalism away from cosmopolitanism or official nationalism, Karklins 
(1994) proposes pluralism as the only political structure able to resolve ethnic 
tensions. Pluralism is also advocated as crucial for environmentally 
sustainable society, even if it means risking the democratic election of parties 
who are against environmental protection (see 7.2.2). 
The methods used by separatist republics to achieve independence have 
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varied. Kellas (1991:110) notes that some Republics, 'such as Lithuania, 
appeared impatient, while others, such as Latvia and Estonia, seemed prepared 
to compromise on independence in the short-term'. 
Senn offers the opposite view and asserts that Lithuanians tended to be slow 
to act, at least at first, compared with Estonia. Western observers, he notes, 
spoke of their cautiousness and determination not to step over the bounds 
of official toleration (Senn 1990:56). Hiden and Salmon argue that although 
Estonia and Latvia were more modern and more sophisticated in their 
approaches, Lithuania mounted a more direct challenge; that Lithuania was 
portrayed by the West as headstrong while the other two Baltic states took a 
less confrontational path to independence (Hiden and Salmon 1991:127 & 
163). There were cultural differences in the nations, which led to different 
nationalist movements, and also 'between their relationships with the USSR' 
(Kellas 1991:110). 
4.2.2.5 Nationalism and the Environment 
Environmental issues were brought abruptly onto the Soviet political agenda 
following the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in April 1986. 
The accident had serious repercussions for the Soviet political system firstly 
by bringing ecological issues onto the Soviet agenda and secondly by triggering 
the process of democracy through public discontent over the secrecy 
surrounding the accident. It also dramatically alerted the international 
community to the state of the environment in the region (Norgaard and 
Pedersen 1994:98-99). As Chapter 2 demonstrates, the issue of nuclear power 
production has continued to be a focal point for environmental groups in 
Lithuania. The eventual collapse of the Soviet Union brought the 
environment onto a much higher platform. Environmental issues were 
handled within new administrative structures and were, necessarily, in 
competition with other priority issues such as state building and ensuring 
the economic viability of the country (Nergaard and Pedersen 1994:98-99). 
Concern over the latter issues has dominated the political agenda since 
independence. 
What affect has Lithuanian nationalism had on the environment? 
Nationalism can have positive effects for environmental protection. The 
desire to protect the nation's territory can be strong. In the early years of 
independence in Lithuania, it was common to hear comments such as 'look 
Chapter Four 
	 155 
at our nature' and 'see how beautiful our nature is' from those who were 
not particularly involved in nature conservation (pers. obs. July-Dec. 1992). 
Prior to glasnost, overt expressions of nationalism were rare, and complaints 
against environmental degradation were generally voiced on behalf of 
biosphere protection or economic efficiency, rather than on behalf of "our 
republic" or "our people" (Pryde 1991:256). 
At the time of secession, the perception was that environmental problems 
were caused by the policies of the central planners and that an independent 
nation could, and would, utilise their resources more efficiently and protect 
their nature more adequately. It is rather like the notion that one looks after 
one's own home with more care than a rented home or that of one's neighbour. 
This tended to be one of the influences of Green support in the late 1980s 
(see the following sections). Thus, much of the environmental debate in 
the FSU was conceptualised in terms of "us" verses "them", 'engendering a 
"not in my backyard" mentality that became reinforced by sentiments for 
political autonomy and economic autarky' (Peterson 1993:222). In such a 
way, environmental issues became a focus for political and economic 
independence. In this period, oppositional politics tended to be mobilised 
against certain developments and was always linked to a national concerns. 
Thus, protests tended to be issue-specific, focusing especially on those projects 
with environmental implications (Smith 1994:129). So, while protests 
appeared environmental in nature (such as opposition to phosphate mining 
in Estonia, and the expansion of the chemical industry in Lithuania), they 
often had other nationalistic motivations such as opposition to associated 
issues such as immigration of Russian workers (Lieven 1993:220). As Peterson 
(1993:215) points out, 'environmentalism often was couched in a broader 
anti-Russian feeling'. 
In July 1988, a protest involving cycling around the republic (a method that 
was to become popular in the Green Movement) promoted an environmental 
message through a national slogan - 'Lithuania My Home' (Senn 1990:94). 
In effect, environmental deterioration 'fanned the embers of ethnic 
nationalism' (Pryde 1991:254). Later, in September, Lithuanians participated 
in forming a human ring around the Baltic, extending from Scandinavia, 
through Poland and the Baltics. The ring was a sign of concern over pollution 
in the Baltic Sea. Participants waved the national flag and sang traditional 
folk songs. 'Once again concerns about ecological problems evoked feelings 
of national solidarity' (Senn 1990:139). As discussed above, national sentiment 
is also at the root of environmental concern, indicating that a somewhat of 
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an interdependence. 
It is important to note that environmental issues can bind nationalities. 
Often problems are local and citizens of all nationalities may come together 
in protest. However, nationalistic protests are more likely to occur in cases 
of transboundary issues (Pryde 1991:259). Environmental protests in Lithuania 
were not only about transboundary pollution (coming from other republics) 
but also local problems were, in effect, transboundary in that they originated 
from decisions made outside the republic. Transboundary issues, such as 
pollution of the Baltic Sea have, at times, been a focus for international 
co-operation (see Chapter 3). The famous protest in 1988 when people from 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania gathered on the coast to protest against 
pollution, for example, demonstrates how a transboundary problem can unite 
affected nations. Yet this protest was directed against a common enemy - the 
Soviet Union. Another protest (the fiftieth anniversary of the Molotov-
Ribbentrop pact) involved a human chain (linked by hands) extending from 
Lithuania to Estonia - again directed at Moscow. The co-operation shown at 
such combined Baltic environmental protests impressed Western observers, 
yet such cooperation seems unlikely to be repeated now the Baltic republics 
have regained independence. Environmental co-operation in the Baltic Sea 
area has involved several other nations but, as discussed in Chapter Three, 
national sentiment can be a hindrance to such co-operation. So while 
nationalism can be a positive force in environmental protection, it can also 
limit co-operative arrangements. As Fisher has noted: 
the association of environmental and national concerns had both a benefit 
and a cost. It enhanced the importance of the environmental issue at the 
time; on the other hand, as soon as national questions could be articulated 
elsewhere, attention was quickly diverted away from the environmental 
issue (Fisher 1992:7) (see 4.3.4.1). 
Environmental concerns were fuelled in 1988 when the Soviet press (Ties a) 
announced plans to expand the industrial complex in the Lithuanian cities 
of Kedainiai, Jonova, and Mazeikiai. This raised environmental and national 
concerns. Such development would mean increased air and water pollution 
as well as the likelihood of renewed Russian immigration of 'technical 
experts'. The large percentage of Russians working in many polluting 
industries was thus a contributing factor in opposition to their establishment 
or continued operation. 'Ignalina' and 'Snieckus' (now Visaginas - see Chapter 
2), for example, became code words for the nationality problem (Senn 1990:58 
& 64). In addition, such enterprises were designed to produce for large areas 
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of the Soviet Union and were, therefore, not in the economic interests of 
Lithuania (see also 5.4.1 and 5.4.1.1). 
It is yet to be proven that an independent nation protects its nature any 
better than a foreign government. To be sure, evidence of colonial activities 
around the world demonstrates that such a political structure is not often 
favourable for the colonised. Lithuania has developed a comprehensive 
system of nature protection (such as National Parks, strict reserves, and 
Historical Parks) accounting for approximately 10 per cent of its total area 
(see 7.4.1.1 and 7.4.1.2). This is a promising start but implementation of the 
system will be the key. In addition, such measures are only really beneficial 
if other policies do not counteract benefits or utilise all available funds (see 
Chapters 5 and 6). As discussed in the oil terminal case (see section 2.3), 
environmental protection is claimed to be limited by economic problems, 
yet political decisions (influenced by national sentiments) are sometimes 
made at the expense of both the environment and the economy (see also 
7.2.1). 
National sentiment, whether based on nostalgia or a sense of cultural identity, 
has been the impetus for large-scale political, economic, environmental, and 
social reform in Lithuania. It mobilised large sections of society throughout 
the region to effect change from below. There were also several changes 
from above which facilitated the success of these social movements. Their 
success, particularly in relation to environmental issues, demands 
examination in order to establish the role of "people power" in effecting 
change and to ascertain the future directions of the movements post-
independence. This is important in uncovering whether an environmental 
sustainable society will emerge. In particular, such an examination should . 
indicate whether environmental issues have retained their position of 
importance on the political agenda and whether the Green Movement has 
retained both its attraction to mass society and its ability to influence political 
developments. 
4.3 Social Movements 
Social movements become possible when: 
there is a revision in the manner in which a substantial group of people look 
at some misfortune, seeing it no longer as a misfortune warranting charitable 
consideration but as an injustice which is intolerable in society (Turner 1969 
quoted in Wilson 1973:90). 
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Large scale social movements which challenge the institutional establishment 
are relatively rare events. Such mass social movements 'always involve 
networks or 'bundles' of movements rather than a single-issue or concern-
specific group' (Pakulski 1991:xi). They constitute systematic efforts to effect 
change in thought, behaviour, and social relationships (Mason 1992:107). 
Pakulski (1991) has sought to set limits for the definition of a social movement 
which has, at times, included all forms of social action. He thus defines a 
social movement as 'a recurrent pattern of partially institutionalised collective 
activities which is anti-systemic in its value orientation, form and symbolism' 
(1991:32) Mass social movements are those that achieve a high level of 
support. The Lithuanian reform movement (incorporating the Green 
Movement) can be seen to fit well with this 'middle-range' definition. 
The reform movement in Lithuania, at first glance, appears to have functioned 
in the name of a single issue; independence, but associated with this were a 
number of issues relating to political, economic, and cultural freedoms. 
Support, while coalescing around the aim of independence, was based on a 
vast array of concerns, including environmental degradation. The extent to 
which mass support was obtained is related to this 'fusing' of social 
movements that essentially had a single aim (independence) and a single 
enemy (the Soviet Union) whilst holding alliances to various other objectives. 
This fusing not only explains mass support but it also explains why the 
reform movement tended to dissipate on achieving independence (see 4:3.4 
and 4.3.4.1). Regardless of the fate of movements like Sajudis, they will 
always 'leave the social landscape changed' (Pakulski 1991:xi). 
There have been a number of approaches, incorporating various assumptions, 
in social movement theory. These include 'collective behaviour', 'mass 
society', 'resource mobilisation', 'revolutionary', 'post-materialist', and 'new 
social movement' approaches. They are adequately reviewed by Pakulski 
(1991). The number of approaches is not surprising given the array of public 
activity seeking change which might be considered a social movement. 
Generally, these have not been applied to the communist region which, 
argues Mason (1992:106-7), has left a large gap in knowledge and understanding 
about the development of social movements in these systems. The theories 
go some way toward explaining the development of social movements in 
Lithuania and other post-communist countries and are, therefore, useful in 
understanding the importance of their role and the factors involved in their 
success and failures. The Lithuanian Reform Movement (incorporating the 
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Green Movement) has displayed elements of several of these theories, 
indicating that they are not all-inclusive approaches. 
For example, they have displayed elements of the 'collective behaviour' 
theory (see Smelser 1962) whereby social movements develop as rational 
responses to abnormal conditions or structural strain, ultimately leading to 
social dysfunction (Pakulski 1991:5). Mason (1992:107) points out that collective 
behaviour is not equivalent to a social movement, stressing that 'if collective 
behaviour is to achieve social change, it must transform itself into a social 
movement'. 
Other social movement theorists (Durkheim, Fromm, Arendt, Kornhauser) 
have taken a 'mass society' approach which views social movements as 
non-rational and non-institutional responses to social malfunctions or 
pathologies (Pakulski 1991:8). The mass society approach has come - under 
increasing criticism for its sharp distinction between rational, conventional 
politics on the one hand and emotive, unconventional behaviour on the 
other, particularly since such distinctions are not so definite (Pakulski 1991:9). 
There are also problems in defining rational or irrational behaviour. Some 
aspects of the theory can be extrapolated and applied to the Lithuanian case. 
For example, certain aspects of the reform agenda in Lithuania, such as 
nationalistic tendencies and mass rallies of 'unconventional' behaviour, 
might be construed as non-rational and non-institutional but, in general, 
the fight for secession involved rational goals and was based, at least partly, 
on institutional means (using existing government structures and election 
processes). 
'Resource mobilisation' theorists have taken a more general approach to 
social movements, seeing them as an extension of the so-called conventional 
and rational forms of institutionalised politics. They are seen to use both 
conventional and unconventional means of action and rather than being a 
response to strain or deprivation, they are seen as innovative groups which 
create and utilise new political resources and opportunities. Grievances are 
only secondary. Thus, they are not symptomatic of dysfunction but of 
democratic openness and vitality (Pakulski 1991:12-3 and Mason 1992:108). 
On its own, such an approach is not appropriate for understanding the 
development of the reform movement in Lithuania. It is more useful for 
understanding movements which have developed from within modern 
liberal democracies. However, its emphasis on the way in which movements 
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can seize an opportunity to express desire for change can be extrapolated to 
highlight the way in which leaders (of Sajudis and the Greens) took advantage 
of the Gorbachev reforms in a calculated and purposeful manner (even if 
their ultimate achievements were not the focus of their original aims) (see 
4.3.3). 
Reform in Lithuania and the rest of the region has often been referred to as 
a wave of relatively peaceful revolutions. From a sociological point of view, 
revolutions break under conditions of mass deprivation. From the 
'revolutionary' approach, social movements are seen, to varying degrees, as 
forms of revolution. The difference lying in scope and intensity of the 
response. The key events in this approach are mass activity such as riots 
and protests as well as possible violence or unrest which occurs as a response 
to tension or strain in society. Discontent is seen to accumulate within 
society until such time that large sections of the population are mobilised 
and discontent is expressed in violent political action (Pakulski 1991:11). 
Lithuania might be said, from this perspective, to have undergone a peaceful 
revolution. Indeed this term has been used by Mason (1992) and Peterson 
(1992) to describe the process of transition in the former communist bloc. 
Mason (1992:111-2) has argued that the relative acceptance,. amongst 
communist leaders throughout the region, of defeat as inevitable was a 
major reason for their non-violent success. However, such an approach is 
inadequate in that it cannot account for all the intricate processes which 
were occurring as part of the change. 
More recent theories have focused on the post-modern world in which 
'new values' have come to the forefront of political and social life. The new 
values represent an emerging 'alternative paradigm' which can be seen as 
the Green agenda, incorporating other recognised movements such as peace, 
feminism, anti-nuclear, equality, and indigenous rights. Inglehart points to 
the political and economic stability of the post war era (1945 onwards) which 
enabled people to embrace 'post-materialist' or 'soft' values which were not 
associated with basic needs but, rather, with creativity and self-realisation. It 
is argued that these values have, in turn, led to the development of social 
movements which aim to secure change in those areas of social, economic, 
and political life. A fundamental criticism of Inglehart's approach is that 
these values are not actually new and that there has merely been an awareness 




This approach seems irrelevant to the Lithuanian case, given that Soviet 
society was closed and shielded from developments in the first world where 
the opportunity arose to express concern for 'post-materialist' values. 
However, the fact that such perceptions were changing in the West, where a 
higher value was generally placed on social justice, freedom of expression 
and association, democracy, environmental protection, and self-
determination, was an important factor in secession and reform. 
Communication with Western counterparts in the early days of reform 
provided information, incentive, and support to the social movements of 
the communist region. Baltic environmentalists in particular strengthened 
contacts in the West through participation in regional conferences such as 
those regarding the clean up of the Baltic Sea. There was also an active 
emigre community supporting the aims of the movements. The more open 
media in the region was a particularly important resource for social 
movements (Mason 1992:110 and Peterson 1993:223). Yet, the basic tenet of 
the value paradigm sought by Lithuanian reformers was not new. While it 
included notions of environmental degradation, this had more of an 
instrumental than a moral value. The committed and most active Greens, 
however, pursued issues of peace based on anti-nuclear and anti-military 
principles, demanding the dismantling of Soviet bases (Balbierius 1992:3). 
While materialist values tended to overshadow 'post-materialist' concerns 
such as environmental degradation in the years following the restoration of 
independence, there are reasons other than the insecurity of basic 
requirements which have led to a decline in environmental concern and 
activism (see also 4.3.4.1, 7.2.2.3 and 7.2.3). 
New interpretations of mass activity have been labelled the 'new social 
movement' approach and are discussed in terms of 'new politics'. These 
new movements are typically anti-statist and are sceptical of ideological blue-
prints. The approach is a combination of earlier interpretations, incorporating 
aspects of the 'collective behaviour' approach such as locating causes in the 
structural conflicts of society. Causes are found in the sociocultural sphere 
not in class conflict (Pakulski 1991:25-7). Unlike 'collective behaviour' 
accounts, the new social movement approach sees mass social action as 
rational, as forming new identities, reviving and expanding civic society. 
The historical roots of the movements are also emphasised. 'In this sense, 
they constitute 'healthy' responses to 'pathological' situations' (Pakulski 
1991:28). In this regard, the Lithuanian reform movement (like Solidarity) 
could be interpreted according to such an approach since it was a response to 
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a structural problem pursued, to some extent, through rational means. Yet 
the approach has been criticised for ignoring traditional methods of social 
movements such as lobbying and petitioning (Pakulski 1991:29). Lithuanians 
utilised conventional methods of dissent as well as methods usually 
considered radical such as anti-state protest rallies. 
Like Solidarity, Sajudis and the Greens developed under conditions of 'relative 
deprivation' while modernisation had led to the creation of a more complex 
social, political, and economic environment in which there was more 
opportunity for action. The groups seized such opportunities and utilised 
available resources, including the existing institutional arrangements. It can 
be seen that the theories of social movements can be applied to the communist 
region and offer some assistance in understanding their emergence and 
subsequent activities. Relative deprivation was an important factor in the 
emergence but resources were required to enable them to acquire the 
momentum necessary for change. 
For the Green movement (in the West) there has been tension between the 
radical change that the movement seeks and its reliance on conservative 
means of bringing it about. In Lithuania, it could be said that radical change 
was met with radical means alongside some other more conservative means 
such as gradually increasing influence in the parliament. Sajudis and the 
Greens were successful in their primary goal of independence by use of such 
means but are faced with a more difficult task post-independence (see 4.3.4.1). 
Radical action has decreased along with the downturn in participation (Dobson 
1990:25) (see also Chapter 7). 
Whatever approach is taken, it can be said that social movements arise in 
opposition to something or someone and, in such a way, have an identified 
enemy as the focus of their discontent. 'The basis of movement unity ... 
rests on what participants are against, rather than what they are for' (Pakulski 
1991:38). They have a vision of a common enemy (Mason 1992:113) but they 
also act in a positive way, presenting programmes and suggesting solutions 
(Pakulski 1991:45). Thus, social movements can be dynamic, changing and 
adjusting to suit certain situations as they work toward achieving their goals. 
Few, however, enjoy the feeling of having completed their aims and 




The development of the Lithuanian reform movement, based on national 
sentiment, can be divided into three main stages; a period of reawakening - 
(1986-8), the emergence of nationalist movements as Popular Fronts (1988-90), 
and formal institutional support for territorial secession (Smith 1994:128). 
Sajudis initially declared itself a 'movement, a wave, which will disappear 
when its mission is accomplished' (Senn 1990:78). At that stage, its "mission" 
was to make the Communist Party of Lithuania act on the idea of perestroika, 
thereby bring more political and economic autonomy to the republic, along 
with cultural freedom. Solidarity also constituted this kind of 'self-limiting' 
revolution as it too initially sought to reform, rather than overthrow, the 
communist regime (Mason 1992:110). Events were to change both the mission 
and the future of the movement as the reality of independence came into 
view. 
In accordance with the theory of revolution discussed above, Sajudis 
developed a formal organisational structure and was eventually successful 
in achieving its later aim of political independence from the Soviet Union 
(see 4.3.3, 4.3.3.1 and 7.2). By the 1992 elections (at which they were defeated) 
the group had become known as Sajudis III. It could be argued that the 
formal organisation of Sajudis, while important in terms of achieving those 
goals, ultimately undermined the nature of the movement. Pakulski (1991:42) 
points out that this is the tendency when a social movement becomes 
revolutionary. As the organisational structure develops and more concrete 
goals are established, the social movement becomes more heterogeneous, 
facilitating its dissolution as supporters become less interested (Mason 
1992:113) (see 4.3.4.1). Sajudis became a political structure rather than a 
social movement. 
The restoration of independence, however, its not only a result of the efforts 
of social movements. While they certainly had a primary role in de-
legitimising and de-stabilising authority, important factors leading to the 
achievements came from events in Moscow where Gorbachev's authority 
was being tested. The movements also needed to obtain some measure of 
support from key personnel within the political elite. Mason (1992:111) 
contends that in all the Eastern European countries, there were reformists 
within the communist parties who supported, to a greater or lesser extent, 
the abandonment of single-party rule. In addition, institutionalised methods 
and organisations, including actions of the existing Communist Party of 
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Lithuania, and a more open electoral process which allowed other parties 
and groups to seek representation in the Supreme Soviet, contributed to the 
final outcome. Since these achievements, a dissolution can be observed 
and, in order to maintain itself as an organisation, the focus of the group 
had to change again. The relatively peaceful acceptance of the movements' 
aims by Central authorities also reduced any perceived need for violence ) . 
The peaceful protest action trend spread throughout the region (with the 
help of media) and 'each successive nonviolent victory added to the store of 
experience' (Mason 1992:113). 
However, Sajudis has not disbanded altogether. Although several groups 
and political parties have arisen from its ranks, Sajudis still exists in Lithuania 
as an umbrella organisation. There was still a role for the Reform Movement 
in Lithuanian politics, particularly when the Lithuanian Democratic Labour 
Party was in power, pursuing a different vision of Lithuania than Sajudis 
had prognosed. The vision of a better world held by the Reform Movement 
mainly focused on ridding Lithuania of 'communist influence' and in that 
way, the goals were not significantly different within the post-Sajudis camp. 
Many members would have felt frustration in seeing their hard work for 
independence "end" in the election of former Communist Party chief, Algirdas 
Brazauskas as President in 1993, yet a second chance for the Sajudis-derived 
party, the Homeland Union, was provided at the 1996 national elections at 
which time they attained 70 seats in the 141 seat parliament (see 7.2.1.4). f 
The following sections will look more closely at the emergence and 
development of the Green Movement and Sajudis in Lithuania to ascertain 
their significance for reform which was fundamental for any further changes 
in society such as the establishment of ecologically sustainable society. The 
Green Movement, in particular, is analysed so as to evaluate its likely influence 
in promoting, establishing, and maintaining such a society. 
4.3.1 The Green Movement in Lithuania 
The environmental crisis is bound up with the issues of human rights, 
freedom of information, and participatory democracy (Redclift 1989:182). 
8. Whilst generally true, it should be emphasised that, as the Baltic nations became more 
determined in their bid for independence, the Soviet Government retaliated with a sign of 
military clout in January 1991, invading Riga and Vilnius with Red Army tanks. In Lithuania 
13 people were killed. 
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These are areas of which Lithuanians were deprived. So, parallel to the 
nationalist uprisings, the Soviet Union witnessed an increase in 
environmental awareness (Peterson 1993:225). This awareness was, ironically, 
also facilitated by changes being made from above such as a more open 
media and opportunities for groups to express concerns. Environmental 
problems highlighted the lack of public participation in the political process 
and the suppression of information which, in turn, accentuated the 
powerlessness of everyday citizens to redress the impacts of the Soviet system 
on their personal lives. Environmental destruction thus became a focus for 
dissent: 
Environmental groups were the melting pot for the formation of active citizens 
and alternative elites; contacts were established between local activists, 
scientists within state-sponsored scientific establishments, and 
environmental groups in the west. The political changes of 1989 [and later 
in the FSI.J] threw many of these people into positions of political power 
(Fisher 1992:6). 
Environmental issues, as a focus for political change, played a large part in 
the restoration of independence in Lithuania and the Greens generated mass 
support. Unlike what is referred to as the Green movement in the West - a 
general term for the many environmental groups, and their supporters which 
seek to effect change and which assumes an underlying value system - the 
Green Movement in Lithuania is an organisation which was officially 
established in August 1988. It has functioned as an umbrella organisation to 
which various environment-based groups or "factions" have been affiliated. 
However, the spread of regional groups and organisations that came under 
the Green Movement also suggests the kind of 'movement' of people seeking 
change as understood by the term in relation to the West. Recent affiliation 
status with Friends of the Earth International will see the Green Movement 
change its name. 
References to the Green Movement in this Chapter refer to that Lithuanian 
organisation and affiliated bodies and do not, necessarily, refer to an 
underlying value system as would be assumed when referring to a Western 
notion of a Green movement. Nor do they refer to what became the Green 
Party. As founding member, Saulius Gricius said when the Greens began to 
lose their active base as a result of members moving into the bureaucracy 
and at the time when conflict was developing over the formation of a political 
party, 'it is unfortunate that the Lithuanian Greens do not understand all 
the ideas spread by the Greens around the world' (in Zemulis 1992:3). The 
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lack of an underlying value system amongst most of the supporters is at the 
root of the rather sudden decline in Green support. However, it could be 
said that the core groupm that has remained committed to environmental 
protection, has done so because it has based its activities on such a Green 
value system. There is also an historical connection with the environmental 
organisations that existed during 1921-1940 such as the 'Adorning of Lithuania' 
which aimed to educate others about ecological matters, even though the 
problems were a lot different then without an intensive industrial sector. 
The organisation was abolished in 1940 by order of the Soviet Minister for 
Interior Affairs (Seselgis 1991:2-3) (see also 7.2.2.4). 
Lieven (1993:220) cautions Western observers on using the term 'Green' in 
relation to the parties in the Baltic States since 'in all three countries, the 
Green parties stand on the nationalist Right, and their current activity is 
agitation for the removal of the Russian armed forces'. Such a phenomenon 
is partly due to their common origins in the national dissident movement. 
It is also related to the perception of the centrality of nature to Baltic culture, 
as discussed in 4.2.1, resulting amongst some nationalists in a kind of 'blood 
and soil' ideology whereby nationality is linked directly to the land (Lieven 
1993:220). In this thesis, the term 'Green' is justified because it is argued that 
the Greens that remain (which were the core activists in its formation) do 
represent the kind of value system normally associated with Greens in the 
West. The Green Party, however, cannot be seen in this light which is why 
the Green Movement has remained separate from the Party since the latter 
was formed. Meanwhile, those with a 'blood and soil' ideology, can be 
found across environmental organisations and the Party. 
The Green Movement in Lithuania was born in the summer of 1987 when 
three young men (Saulius Gricius, Saulius Piksrys, and Remigijus Ciegis) 
decided to establish Atgaja in Kaunas. The group was founded near Kaunas 
castle in July 1987. This group was the beginning of the Greens as a movement. 
It was the beginning of organised environmental protest, however some 
action had taken place as early as 1986 on the initiative of Gricius and Piksrys 
such as a successful petition to halt drilling for oil in the Baltic Sea (Atgaja 
1992:2). Later, in August 1988, the Green Movement was formed as an 
official organisation and Atgaja became part of its structure (Atgaja 1992:2). 
At the founding meeting in Klaipeda, Gricius exclaimed: 'we have distanced 
9. Whom I have called the "Greens" as distinct from the "Greens' supporters". 
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ourselves from nature and deemed ourselves the gods' (Balbierius 1992:3). 
A conference in May 1989 at Rumsiskes, led to the formation of the Green 
Party, despite some opposition from people such as Gricius. Whilst he was 
not opposed to the creation of a party per se, he was not certain that those 
creating it had altruistic motives, believing that they were motivated by a 
career opportunism. Nor did he believe it was the right time to do so 
(Zemulis 1992:3). 
When the Movement first formed, access to the media was still restricted, so 
a Green newspaper was formed: Zalioji Taika which later became Lygsvara. 
The Greens at that time could be said to have constituted four main factions; 
Green Greens (such as Atgaja), Grey Greens (mainly scientists), Red Greens 
(pro-communists), and the Green Party (membership constituting mainly 
Grey Greens with a few Greens and Reds included) (Ruta Gajauskaite pers 
comm. October 1992). The Red Greens were derived from the communist 
Komosol groups in order to counteract the influence of Green Green activities. 
Such oppositional groups developed in a number of sectors but have since 
declined in number and influence. 
Besides some genuine concern for environmental devastation, there were a 
number of factors which influenced the fervour with which the country 
protested environmental problems (often with the co-operative support of 
Latvia and Estonia). Gorbachev's reforms in 1985 were to prove crucial to 
the rise of the green movement throughout the USSR and Eastern Europe. 
The environment issue was seen as relatively safe politically (Mason 1992:61) 
because debate on such issues did not, at first, question the prevailing political 
order nor did it possess an ideological history (Fisher 1992:5). In such a way, 
environmental issues 'could be presented as issues of rational economic 
efficiency and technical planning rather than as direct assaults on regime 
legitimacy' (Smith 1994:129). 
There was also a nationalistic concept of nature led to the perception that 
Lithuania's environment was another aspect of Lithuanian life that the 
USSR was destroying. So, in effect, environmental issues acted as a de-
legitimising agent in society, seen by the people as 'an indictment of the 
policies of the regime in all quarters' (Kabala 1993:50). Thus, the only 
perceivable remedy was the complete reconstruction of the political system 
(Kabala 1993:50) (see also 7.1). 
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In addition, the exploitation of Lithuanian resources for the benefit of the 
Soviet Union as a whole was seen as detrimental to both the economy and 
the environment in Lithuania. Environmental problems epitomised the 
failings of the Soviet system. For Lithuanian reformers, an easy focus of 
opposition was the destruction of their homelands. The lack of control over 
natural resources, which were exploited beyond the needs of individual 
republics, pointed to ecological colonialism. In essence, 'nature became a 
medium for social change' (Peterson 1993:216) as people realised that 'their 
bitter enemy is neither pesticides nor technology but the system that makes 
use of them' (Redclift 1989:180). Environmental issues, then, were important 
in overthrowing the communist system by 'providing an organisational 
basis, oppositional know-how, and political leadership for promoting the 
cause of national self-determination' (Smith 1994:129). As time has passed, 
the Greens have needed to turn their attention away from the Soviet system 
and the past and redirect it at independent governments. While this has 
been difficult for some (indeed it is at the heart of the decline in Green 
support as discussed in 4.3.4.1), there has been such a trend amongst the core 
Green activists who recognise that environmental problems remain, and 
have been generated, in independent Lithuania. Just as in the West, their 
campaigns are directed at the usual government bodies and agencies with a 
focus on public education (pers. obs.). Environmentalists have also developed 
their professional skills since the restoration of independence (Vainius 
1996:41) and this, together with their regular contact with organisations abroad, 
places them in a similar position to their counterparts in the West. - 
4.3.1.1 The Greens and Politics 
Nationalism amongst the majority of the Greens' supporters is the prime 
motivation for action. The core of the Green Movement (those pursuing 
environmental aims on the basis of an environmental ethic) also had a 
sense of national sentiment though this was not the primary focus. It is 
clear that the Green Movement viewed independence as necessary in order 
to protect Lithuania's environment. Janis Peters from the Latvian Popular 
Front summed up the feeling of Baltic nationalists and Greens alike in the 
late 1980s when he said that only independence 'now can lead us out of our 
political, economic, ecological, and national crisis' (quoted in Peterson 
1993:216). 
However, it must be noted that the core group has continued to apply pressure 
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to all subsequent governments in areas of environmental protection, 
including international issues. This demonstrates that at least a part of the 
Green Movement has been relatively independent of formal politics. At the 
same time, the political climate in which independence was restored provided 
a platform for voicing environmental concerns and therefore, was useful in 
generating widespread support which was necessary for success in achieving 
their aims. One means for a movement to achieve its aims is to increase its 
membership. The key to successful lobbying of government by such groups 
is organisation, numbers, and finance - the latter usually dependent on 
membership (Spann 1979:476-8). The success of attracting widespread 
membership was fundamental to the Greens and membership decline, the 
result of a number of influences, is a serious problem now faced by the 
Greens in Lithuania. A lack of finance during the economic turmoil of 
1991-2 also affected their ability to continue their aims. 
The Greens can never really be detached from politics since their actions are 
political and their aim is to affect policy. Indeed the formation of an 
environmental group was a statement on the right of autonomous social 
groups yet it could also be argued that such acts were unintentionally political 
(Fisher 1992:6). It has been established that the development of the Green 
Movement was influenced by the political climate of the time. Glasnost and 
perestroika had allowed a situation where such a movement could expand 
and be involved in the political process. Indeed, the environment obtained 
some of its legitimacy from the central government because of the increasingly 
obvious degradation, the international interest in environmental issues, 
and a need to ensure acceptable living standards (Fisher 1992:4-5). In 1993, a 
member of the Lithuanian Green Party suggested that the Greens' 1988 success 
in halting operations at the Ignalina Nuclear Power Station only happened 
because Gorbachev allowed it to happen (pers. comm. Ruta Gajauskaite). 
One might argue that this and other Green achievements were superficial 
and constituted part of Gorbachev's scheme to generate Western support for 
his reforms. However, it is also possible that the former President simply 
underestimated the influence the Greens would obtain. Peterson notes that: 
Ironically, nuclear power stations, noxious chemical plants, and hazardous 
waste disposal sites provided the first safe political space in which 
individuals could organize and work against the communist regime, because 
these targets of protest often were distant from the centers of political power 
and thus were not considered a direct and visible threat to the political 
leadership (Peterson 1993:225-6). 
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Fisher agrees, commenting that the communist regimes throughout CEE 
and FSU 'underestimated the symbolic significance of the environment, 
which raised questions by implication about economic, political, and 
ideological issues' which, coupled with an increase in dissemination of 
scientific material on pollution, left the environmental movements 'in an 
increasingly powerful position to undermine the carefully constructed facade • 
of order' (Fisher 1992:6). 
The formation of the Green Party split the Movement and it remained 
divided. Despite reservations from the core group, the Green Party went on 
to secure 4 seats in the parliament at the 1990 elections (10) . The cleft between 
the two widened in the following year as the Green MPs appeared ununited 
and lost contact with the Movement (Balbierius 1992:3). By the 1992 elections, 
support had already weakened and the Greens failed to win any seats. They 
did not contest the 1996 elections (more discussion on both elections is 
presented in Chapter 7). 
Now that Lithuania has regained and maintained independence for over 
five years, it is interesting to analyse the influence of the Greens today and 
the problems they face. The Soviet system has left its mark on every facet of 
society. The new political structures are by no means free from its impact. 
Communist Party politicians became accustomed to governing without 
interference from individuals and public interest groups. It is likely to take 
'decades of democratic experience to eradicate dictatorial tendencies that 
continue to pervade the political cultures of the newly independent republics' 
(Peterson 1993:221). Many bureaucrats are not willing to accept the notion of 
public involvement in the policy process (see also 7.2.3). The challenge for 
environmental groups is particularly difficult as other issues, such as the 
economy, gain precedence over environmental issues (see 4.3.1.2 and 
Chapter 5). 
Political antagonism toward the Greens has had implications for the 
effectiveness of environmental protection administration in Lithuania. For 
example, the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDDP) Government's 
Minister for Environmental Protection, Bronius Bradauskas systematically 
and openly implemented a political cleansing of his department and city 
agencies, dismissing employees actively involved in green organisations. 
Zigmas Vaisvila, Ruta Gaujaskaite, R.Astrauskas, and A.Taurantas. 
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At a time of increasing unemployment several people affected were unable 
to find replacement jobs quickly and when jobs were found, these often did 
not match their skills. The environment is the ultimate loser since those 
environmental advocates, while remaining involved in the various NG0s, 
were no longer in an official position to influence policy implementation. 
Such measures suggest a very low commitment to enacted environmental 
legislation given that those dismissed were committed and very skilled 
personnel. (11) As section 7.4.3.1 demonstrates, one of the failings of the new 
suite of environmental legislation in Lithuania is that the agencies obliged 
to implement them are not adequately resourced to do so (Fisher 1992). 
Such resources should include well trained personnel, preferably with an 
understanding of ecological systems and the threats to their integrity. 
Further, the apparent fall in support of the Green Movement (see 4.3.4.1) 
was influenced by the political and economic situation that followed. Like 
Sajudis, the Green Movement did not aim to be a political party, however, 
some members developed political aspirations. Unlike Sajudis, however, 
the Greens consciously worked at not officially entering the political arena 
evidenced by the opposition to creating a political party. Tensions within 
the Greens developed as early as 1987/8 when some members with political 
aspirations moved to Sajudis and took with them their energy, skills, and 
activism (Zemulis 1992:2-3). Sajudis, on the other hand, tended to develop 
into a political entity apparently unaware of the contradictions (see 4.3.3.1). 
The Green Movement, perhaps unwillingly at times, thus became entrenched 
in the political process. While many would claim to be apolitica1 (12), to be 
non-political would mean abandoning a desire to effect change. 
4.3.1.2 The Greens and the Economy 
It has also been argued that, in times of economic depression, environmental 
ii. 	• This information was relayed by some individuals affected from within environmental 
groups and no exact details or media coverage regarding the dismissals were obtained. 
12. 	i It s interesting to note that the results of a survey, carried out by the author to ascertain 
levels of environmental awareness and commitment in students and people involved in Green 
groups, indicated that 61% of people registered in a Green group would vote Green, 7% would 
not, and 30% were unsure. Of those Greens interviewed that were involved but not officially 
members of a Green group, 28.5% said they would not vote Green, 28.5% said they would and 
43% were uncertain, indicating that it would depend on the individual candidate. Although 
this survey was not repeated in later years, the further decline in the reputation of Green 
candidates would suggest that the number of members voting Green would have further 
decreased. 
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concerns are 'put on the backburner'. The economic hardship which followed 
the restoration of independence (as discussed further in Chapter 5) may 
have made it difficult for people to concern themselves with environmental 
quality when their own survival and that of their families became their 
highest priority. Further, the Greens have been the focus of criticism because 
their actions are seen as blocking or slowing economic recovery and growth 
(Peterson 1993:197, 221 and 225). They have certainly had a role in closing 
many polluting enterprises throughout the post-communist region and for 
that they have been able to engender mass support but have also been accused 
of economic sabotage. From the perspective of the environmentalists, they 
have been made scapegoats for the failings of the Soviet economy, pointing 
out that many factories were closed on economic grounds rather than solely 
environmental ones (Peterson 1993:222). The persistence of those working 
in the Green Movement today attests to the fact that it is not solely economic 
issues that have led to the decrease in support since they, too, have had to 
live in poor economic conditions. Some of these reasons are discussed in 
previous sections and later chapters are also dedicated to understanding the 
panoply of issues which have led to environmental issues being placed 'on 
the back burner', forfeiting any progress toward an environmentally 
sustainable society. One of these reasons is the nationalist origin of the 
movement. 
The success of the environmental movement in effecting change in the 
early years of its formation is founded primarily in the popular protests of 
environmentally degrading projects, such as opposition to the planned third 
and fourth nuclear reactors at Ignalina. There was not so much focus on 
pollution abatement or improving the conditions at existing factories. They 
have, therefore, been criticised for not offering alternatives in the face of 
economic decline. Thus, a more difficult task, faced by Greens around the 
world and noted by Peterson (1993:222), is in providing credible alternatives 
to the status-quo. It could be said that the Green Movement in Lithuania 
was never going to offer such alternatives in the early days of opposition, 
not least of all because the majority of the members did not have an intrinsic 
concern for the environment. They were, as it has already been stated, a 
basically independence orientated movement and, to that end, focused on 
the environmental issues resulting from Soviet occupation rather than on 
developing comprehensive alternatives. A related issue is that the economic 
depression affected the resources available to the Greens for funding 
campaigns (Peterson 1993:194) which led to an apparent 'silence' on specific 
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environmental issues in the early years of independence. Affiliations with 
international organisations such as the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) 
and Friends of the Earth International (FOEI), have eased the financial burden 
of the Green organisations in Lithuania, as has the development of skills, 
and the acquisition of office equipment. 
4.3.1.3 The Greens and Religion 
Several members, including those who founded the Movement, have also 
been involved in the pagan revival. There seems to be a mixture of 
nationalism and an identification with the value placed on the environment 
in Lithuanian paganism. Events, centred on singing national songs at sacred 
hills, were organised even before independence was restored. These national 
songs (dainos), although derived from ancient times when Lithuania acted 
as a crossroads between paganism and Christianity, are an essential element 
of Lithuanian identity and are, therefore, sung by pagans and Catholics alike. 
There are also people involved in the Green groups who profess Catholicism 
who endeavour to protect nature as stewards of God. Some members (such 
as Saulius Gricius) have found an ethic or philosophy of life in the pagan 
ways of their ancestors which they have actively followed as part of their 
concern for environmental protection. Gricius actively encouraged paganism 
and had a pagan wedding. He found his environmental ethic in paganism, 
declaring 'a song, a story, a legend of our forefathers is the Primer of nature 
protection' (in Zemulis 1992:2). However, it does not necessarily follow that 
paganism leads to an environmental ethic in the contemporary world. As 
discussed below in 4.3.2, although the primary pagan organisations in 
Lithuania express affinity with nature, they do not generally focus their 
attentions on contemporary environmental problems. Rather, their primary 
focus is on spirituality and heritage. 
4.3.2 Romuva - the Pagan Revival 
Romuva is the name given to a pagan organisation based on the spiritual 
tradition of ancient Lithuanians which has followers in Vilnius, Kaunas, 
Boston, Cleveland, Toronto, and Chicago. The congregations in Canada and 
the USA were established after World War II, while other groups were 
formed in Siberian exile. The Lithuanian groups have around 50 active 
members with a larger participation at special ceremonies and celebrations 
(Dundzila 1996:52-3). 
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The name 'Romuva', literally meaning both temple and harmony, refers to 
the Prussian Baltic sanctuary which was situated in Nadruva (near 
Chernahovsk in the Kaliningrad region). The sanctuary was the religious 
centre of all the Baltic peoples (Lithuanians, Prussians, and Latvians) and 
the spiritual leader, Kriviu Krivaitis, was said to reside in the sacred forest 
that formed part of the sanctuary. Statues of three major gods, Perkunas 
(thunder, lightening, and justice), Pikuolis (the dead and cattle), and Patrimpas 
(avatar of Dievas, the sky god) situated by a millennial oak tree, the focal 
point of the 'temple' (Dundzila 1996:52). 
Romuva is not only founded on spiritual folklore but also on the cultural 
traditions of Lithuania's predominantly peasant ancestry. Thus, groups meet 
to engage in the activities of their ancestors such as singing, dancing, games, 
proverbs, weaving, embroidery, sculpture, and the making of traditional 
musical instruments and ornaments. They also actively engage in 
intelligentsia-based discussions, studying the works of the 
archaeologist/anthropologist Marija Gimbutas, seminologist Algirdas Julius 
Greimas, and various mythologists (Dundzila 1996:52). 
Rituals are carried out for the important events such as Rasa, the: summer 
solstice as well as for events in the Christian calendar such as Christmas. 
The groups base their lives on the spiritual world view presented in folklore 
and, in such a way, have a strong sense of national identity. Another group 
in Lithuania, Ramuv a, has an even greater focus on national heritage and 
less on pagan spirituality. Like Romuva, they gather to sing national songs, 
play traditional music, and work on crafts. Many members of Ramu va are 
also practising Catholics (Jonas Trinkunas, pers. comm. November 1994). 
They have, therefore, an even more distinctly nationalist focus. 
According to one of Romuva's Elders, Jonas Trinkunas, the membership of 
neither group is based on an underlying environmental ethic. While some 
members may have such an ethic of which pagan spirituality and practices 
forms a part, in the main followers do not join with an aim of promoting an 
environmentally benign society (pers. comm., November 1994). As Lieven 
(1993:114) has pointed out, the pagan elements of Lithuanian culture are not 
the same as the paganism practised before, and for at least a century after, 
conversion in 1387. However, Romuva attempts to carry out ceremonies 
and other activities according to historical guidelines and have been assisted 
in this task by comprehensive scholarly works on the topic by Gimbutas and 
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Greimas. Yet there is no strong evidence in their activities of an 
environmental ethic, aside from a notion of connection with the soil and a 
nostalgia for the days of rural bliss. 
If a pagan revival was to become evidence of the development of an 
environmentally sustainable society as envisaged by those highlighting the 
pagan perception of nature, then one would expect support for groups such 
as Romuva to be much higher. More importantly, since it cannot be shown 
that those living according to a neo-pagan philosophy incorporate 
environmental protection into that world view (particularly one which claims 
authenticity), it might be said that a greater level of support would not lead 
to such a society either. The main issue seems to be that both Romuva and 
Ramuva are fundamentally nationalist organisations, albeit without political 
aims. They promote national culture on an exemplary basis. 
So, while the pagan revival is interesting, it demonstrates that historical, 
pagan-based perceptions of nature (particularly animism and veneration of 
the natural world) do not necessarily translate into contemporary notions of 
an environmentally sustainable society. The changes in society which saw 
the re-emergence of pagan practices also led to movements with a much 
larger support base, but also based on similar national sentiments; the Greens 
and Sajudis. 
4.3.3 Sajudis - the Reform Movement 
The Reform Movement (Lietuvos Persitvarkymo Sajudis - the Lithuanian 
Movement for Perestroika) entered public life in June 1988 responding to 
Gorbachev's call for the participation of social groups in the Nineteenth 
Party Conference aimed at reinforcing his programme of perestroika. This 
represented the opportunity for groups, particularly from the intelligentsia, 
to officially express concerns regarding the future of Lithuania's environment, 
language, and national culture. As early as 1986, the Writers Union had 
issued a statement condemning proposed oil drilling in the Baltic Sea and 
later included chemical fertiliser use and other influences on water pollution 
in their critiques. In March 1988, they accused the USSR of colonial-style 
management of the environment. The later programme of Sajudis, issued 
in October 1988, 'insisted on a rational program of economic development 
that would not injure the already-endangered environment of Lithuania' 
(Senn 1990:205). In April, they argued for Lithuanian to be made the official 
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language of the republic, the restructuring of the school curriculum, 
particularly history, and public discussion of any further industrial 
development. Later, a group of "creative artists" called on the Conference to 
afford each republic greater economic autonomy and to support the national 
cultures (Senn 1990:24 & 55-6). 
An Initiative Group of thirty six 'concerned intellectuals and other public 
figures' was formed at a meeting on June 2, 1988 (Senn 1990:59). Key figures 
in this group were Vytautas Landsbergis (a musician), Arvydas Juozaitis (a 
philosopher), Zigmas Vaisvila (a physicist), Vytautas Petkevicius (a writer), 
Kazimiera Pruskiene (an economist), and Bronius Genzelis (a philosopher). 
The group seized on the notion of perestroika and often used it as a justification 
for their activities. The original aim of Sajudis was, through enforcing 
perestroika, to obtain some political and economic autonomy for the republic. 
In the early stages no-one dared mention the word 'independence' and they 
professed no intention to become a permanent organisation, declaring that 
once the party had truly dedicated itself to perestroika, they would disband 
(Senn 1990:65). Communist Party member and future Prime Minister of 
independent Lithuania, Pruskiene, pointed out in August 1988 that Sajudis 
was a social movement with no intention of becoming a political party 
(Senn 1990:114-5). By August 1989, probably influenced by the events in 
Eastern Europe, they had acquired the confidence to call publicly for 
independent statehood (Smith 1994:132). The relative speed at which all 
three Baltic movements made this change has been noted by Smith (1994:132): 
That the Popular Fronts so quickly became separatist in their aims and in 
the process were able to convince their peoples so easily of the rightness of 
their cause were in one way or another linked both to the way in which 
powerful national symbols were drawn upon and equated with a pre-Soviet 
past and of the material benefits which sovereignty might again provide. 
Originally designed to be a ginger group, Sajudis had constantly to define 
itself in the face of both emigre and criticism from the Communist Party of 
Lithuania (CPL). The "extreme" LFL provided a radical benchmark as much 
as the party administrators demonstrated the conservative alternative. 
Sajudis, at least initially, tended to identify itself between these polar opposites. 
While LFL, with a focus on release of political prisoners, tended to bear the 
brunt of party criticism, Sajudis was also attacked for nationalistic behaviour. 
Prominent members constantly defended their statements and actions as 
being within the bounds of perestroika and not anti-soviet or nationalistic. 
Again, the negative view of nationalism presented over the previous fifty 
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years had some impact. However, their assertions that they were not 
nationalists were based on a perception of the term rather than an accurate 
description of their activities (see 4.3.3.1). League members admitted to 
presenting a similar platform as Sajudis but they argued more boldly for 'a 
free Lithuania in a confederation of European nations'. They criticised Sajudis 
for what appeared to be unnecessary diplomacy and cautiousness, declaring 
them as simply part of the system they were supposed to oppose (Senn 
1990:69 and Hiden and Salmon 1991:157). 
The mass rally of August 23, 1988, attended by an estimated 250 000 people, 
represented a turning point for Sajudis. This meeting brought the issue of 
national self-determination to the forefront. Priorities had adjusted to the 
wave of public support; Sajudis had a public mandate. 'Reform, as required 
and defined by the Lithuanians, advanced' while perestroika, as defined by 
Moscow, receded (Vardys 1991:14). Nevertheless these views were more 
modestly expressed in official forums. Just prior to its Congress in October 
1988, Sajudis published its programme in the daily press where it re-iterated 
its role as a citizens' movement supporting the principles of perestroika. 
The programme was divided into nine sections; General Principles, Society 
and the State, Human and Civil Rights, Social Justice, Nationality, Culture, 
Religion and Society, Economics, and Ecology (Senn 1990:203). 
4.3.3.1 Sajudis and Politics 
In the early stages of development, Sajudis made no attempt to produce a 
political programme. It arose in opposition to the undemocratic naming of 
delegates to the Nineteenth Party Conference yet 'produced no program for 
intra-party democracy, much less a multiparty system'. Its prime intention 
at that stage was to be a temporary movement with a general sense of reform 
(Senn 1990:65). Following the mass rally in August 1988, however, Sajudis 
almost stood as a second government. It had no legal power and could not 
pass any laws yet it had a moral authority endorsed by the population (Senn 
1990:136). No-one seemed to be concerned with the contradictions between 
the way Sajudis was now moving and those earlier claims of not becoming a 
political opposition (Senn 1990:166). Along with claiming no political 
intentions, the movement actively defended its activity as being in the name 
of perestroika. Its activities were 'not nationalism, but the wish that the 
republic should be the most Soviet, the most "socialist", in our Great 
Fatherland' (Juras Pozela, President of the Academy of Sciences in Senn 
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1990:103). 
The commitment of Sajudis to perestroika might be attributed to a number 
of reasons. The fact that over half of those involved were also members of 
the Communist Party of Lithuania (CPL) meant that Sajudis had to also 
consider party activities (Senn 1990:167). Many of the members were 
committed communists who believed in the reform package as presented by 
Gorbachev. They openly criticised the Stalinist version of socialism, preferring 
Marxist-Leninism as a "true" form of socialism (see Chapter 5). In addition 
to this connection with the party, no-one could imagine how far opposition 
would be tolerated. The movement had no any official status and had to 
face the possibility that the authorities would stamp them out. This called 
for caution and Sajudis continued to deal with the party up until the violent 
actions of the security forces at a rally in September 1988 (Senn 1990:178-83). 
In fact, even after those events, at a Sajudis press conference, Cekuolis asserted 
that they supported the line of perestroika and Petkevicius added that they 
'opposed only those "Stalinists" who did not understand the meaning of 
perestroika' (Senn 1990:214). This continued negotiation with the party along 
with their resistance to aligning themselves with the LFL brought suspicion 
and contempt from the emigre community. The 'LFL and its emigre 
supporters considered Sajudis a government stooge' (Senn 1990:76). 
To a point, the tactics of Sajudis had elements of political opportunism, in 
its understanding that to oppose the party boldly from the beginning might 
lead to its early demise. In such a way: 
The Lithuanians have used Gorbachev's original arguments and rationale 
for glasnost and perestroika to give their own aims legitimacy, while those 
aims have gone far beyond his (Vardys 1991:12). 
The more extreme LFL, for example, may not have survived had it not been 
for the moderating influence of Sajudis. But this is speculation. It is very 
difficult to predict what might have happened during this time, just as it 
was difficult for Sajudis to predict how far reform would go. In effect, most 
believed that they could only hope for autonomy within the Soviet Union. 
Future Chairperson of the Council of Lithuania, Landsbergis, for example, 
responded to another member's idea that Sajudis should prepare a policy 
statement on secession by declaring that he preferred to use the word 'self-
determination'. He explained that the future of the Soviet Union looked so 
promising under perestroika that Lithuanians would surely want to be 
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included in it, but added that it was good to have the alternative included in 
the constitution (Senn 1990:152). 
As noted earlier, the LFL was considered by government to be a radical 
anti-soviet group that had "provocative goals hostile to socialism" by aiming 
to restore bourgeois Lithuania (Senn 1990:186). It was also thought of as 
extreme by many members of the Initiative Group. The government used 
the "fascist" label it had employed for fifty years with respect to the right 
wing Smetona regime of the 1930s. Any system that was not 'socialist' was 
bourgeois and therefore against the people. To be labelled a 'nationalist' (or 
worse, a 'fascist') was highly derogatory and the indoctrination of such labels 
did not extend to Lithuanian emigres who spent the occupation period in 
the West. Thus, they tended to give stronger support and recognition to 
LFL, tending to view Sajudis as too cautious. Perhaps these were the source 
of Senn's 'observers from abroad'. Ironically, Lithuanians began to use the 
term 'fascists' to describe Party officials and the Saugumas (security 
forces/Lithuanian KGB). Bogusis, a leader of the LFL, recalled that following 
the intervention of the security forces at the rally in September, 1988, people 
had been shouting; 'Fascist occupiers out of Lithuania!' (in Senn 1990:186). 
Perhaps this was to make a point regarding the similarities between the 
German occupation in 1939 and that of the Soviets in 1940, or to attack them 
by using a term which they hated most, or perhaps because of a general 
understanding of its derogatory tone (for more discussion on the use of 
political terminology, see 7.2.1.1). 
Although previously having willingly accepted the participation of party 
members in its ranks Sajudis formally declared itself the opposition to the 
CPL in December 1989. This followed the party's announcement of a new 
Central committee over half of which constituted Sajudis supporters, 
including prominent members such as Pruskiene, Ozolas, and Genzelis. The 
overlap was becoming too great and Sajudis' aims blurred. The LFL continued 
to denounce both as collaborators. Sajudis had made its first steps of political 
representation by winning all four seats it contested at the by-elections of the 
Supreme Soviet in January 1989 (Senn 1990:250 & 254). At these elections, 
both Sajudis and the CPL supported Lithuania's sovereignty but held different 
interpretations about what this might mean. For the Party, sovereignty still 
referred to autonomy within a Leninist Soviet federation while for Sajudis 
it meant 'the natural and inalienable right to establish an independent 
Lithuania' (in Vardys 1991:18). With the cleft between the Party and the 
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Movement now clearly defined, different ideological positions and political 
aspirations of some members led members in different directions. What is 
evident is a shift toward a more active role in the formal political system. 
The Party, recognising the shift into a force for national rebirth and perhaps 
the need to save their own privileged positions, later became less critical of 
Sajudis. The tolerance was to be short-lived as the drive for political 
independence excluded any support from the CPL which could not remove 
itself so directly from its ideological position of communism. However, 
Sajudis was to become even more politically successful, gaining a majority 
of seats at the elections to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet in March 1990 
just after the declaration of independence which was officially restored in 
September 1991, following the failed coup in Moscow and culminating in 
Russia's secession from the USSR and their recognition of Lithuania as an 
independent nation (see Chapter 7). 
Since independence has been restored, a number of interesting events have 
taken place. Sajudis, with its aim of independence achieved, has struggled 
to remain cohesive and there have been several splits resulting in the 
formation of other political parties. The breakdown in cohesiveness could 
be symbolised in the speculation, just prior to the 1992 national elections, 
that the Sajudis figurehead, Landsbergis, might leave in order to join the 
Christian Democrats (Grineviciute 1992:1). The political arm of Sajudis held 
a majority in parliament but found it difficult to effect other changes in 
society under harsh economic conditions. New aims needed to be established 
and 'maintaining independence in Lithuania' was not enough. Regaining 
Lithuania's "economic independence" became the catch-cry in a period of 
economic transition made more difficult by Russian blockades (see 5.4.3). 
4.3.3.2 Sajudis and the Economy 
Integral to all of Sajudis' activities was the notion of economic self-
determination. In arguing for political autonomy, Lithuanians wanted control 
over their own resources and finances, including the re-introduction of the 
national currency. A Soviet journalist, writing in Sovetskaia Litva, in 
September 1988, questioned the need for a national currency and stated that 
Lithuania might face problems obtaining certain products under a market 
economy, warning 'we don't want to live worse than now even for one day' 
(Senn 1990:150). Such statements seem to have a prophetic taint in light of 
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the economic situation that ensued following the declaration of independence 
in March 1990 (see Chapter 5). Yet few would desire a return to the Soviet 
economic system now blamed for social and environmental ills in the former 
republics. The independence years from 1918-1939 demonstrate that the 
Baltic states are viable economies (Hiden and Salmon 1991:188). The fact 
that Estonia had an equal or higher standard of living than Finland at the 
outbreak of WWII (Senn 1990:232) highlights the possibilities for successful 
economies. Lithuania was generally poorer and more agricultural than the 
other Baltic states (Lieven 1993:64) which, some have argued, together with 
their more conservative approach to finance (Vardys 1965:25-7) meant less 
emphasis on industrial growth and other capitalist principles, ultimately 
leading to less pollution (see Banks 1991:33). 
Just as Sajudis recognised the role of the Soviet economy in environmental 
degradation, future governments, must envisage the possible environmental 
problems associated with a market economy. With economic recovery, it is 
important to consider environmental protection in order not to repeat the 
mistakes of the communist system under a new regime or those of the 
capitalist systems they seek to emulate (see Chapter 5). 
A blueprint for Lithuania's economic independence was developed by a 
committee from the Institute of Economics of the Lithuanian Academy of 
Sciences which continued its work under the auspices of Sajudis. The 
fundamental bases for the blueprint were that Lithuania's economic system 
should be independent from that of the USSR and that reform should be 
based on market principles. The first was considered a political and economic 
necessity. This required all economic activity to be under the control of the 
Lithuanian governments, all resources within their borders to republic 
property, and that the All-Union budget must see the Lithuania as a distinct 
economy that levy its own taxes (Samonis 1996:142-3) (see also 5.4.3.1). 
These reforms needed a legal framework so Sajudis drafted a new constitution 
which was approved by the council on November 13, 1988. It was expected 
that Lithuania's Supreme Soviet would accept the proposal on November 
18. However, Moscow found the reforms unacceptable. Gorbachev devised 
amendments to the All-Union constitution that actually called for greater 
centralisation restricting the rights and representation of the republics. All 
three movements joined forces to declare opposition to Gorbachev's new 
proposals and mass petitions were signed with 1.8 million people signing in 
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Lithuania alone. (Vardys 1991:16-7, Senn 1990:243, and Smith 1994:133). 
Economic concerns thus became influential in the collapse of the relationship 
between Sajudis and the Lithuanian Communist Party. Brazauskas, First 
Secretary, strongly supported the plans for economic self-sufficiency but split 
with Sajudis over the issue of constitutional reform. Moscow was clearly at 
odds with Lithuanian reformers and the Lithuanian Communist Party was 
in the middle (Senn 1990:243). 
4.3.3.3 Sajudis and Culture 
In the early stages, Sajudis did not have a formal programme but did issue a 
statement on the general lines of its focus. On the topic of cultural matters, 
two "commissions" outlined their intentions. The Cultural Commission of 
Sajudis , headed by writer Vytautas Bubnys, proposed: to mobilise intellectuals' 
unions in saving Lithuanian culture; to fill in the "blank spots" in the 
country's history; to obtain control over cultural monuments; and to facilitate 
closer co-operation with the emigre community on cultural issues. The 
latter, in the context of 'one nation, one culture', became a popular theme. 
These aims were not dissimilar to those reported in the Ausra newspaper in 
1833 when national sentiment was rising in opposition to Tsarist rule and 
in which language and history were the key (see 4.2.2.2). The Social 
Commission, headed by the philosopher, Bronius Genzelis, focused on the 
bureaucracy by calling for an end to their privileges and for increasing 
accountability (Senn 1990:62). It also pointed to increasing standard of living 
for workers and improving welfare benefits - the cornerstone provisions of 
a socialist system. 
A notable omission from these early "policies" was religion. The members 
of the Initiative Group were primarily intellectuals, products of an education 
system that excluded religious believers from intellectual pursuits. Although 
some had maintained religious convictions, generally Sajudis and the Catholic 
Church had distinct aims. The Reform Movement argued for genuine 
freedom of religion or spirituality as provided for in the Soviet Constitution. 
While they were not particularly religious themselves (Landsbergis came 
from a Protestant family), they recognised the role of the Catholic Church in 
Lithuanian heritage and welcomed Church leaders at their rallies (Senn 
1990:9 & 66-7). At the August 23 rally in 1988, Landsbergis interrupted a 
Catholic priest to point out 'We are against any sort of spiritual dictate; we 
are for freedom of spirit and mind in all respects' (in Senn 1990:126). There 
Chapter Four 
	 183 
were certainly national and religious symbols used in the Sajudis protests, 
including at their Congresses. Lieven (1993:109) noted the 'national-religious 
theatre' orientation of the opening session of the Third Congress in December, 
1991. At a mass celebrating that Congress and the birthday of the medieval 
king, Mindaugas, the priest prayed for Sajudis and its leaders and stated that 
the church was glad that they were the leaders of the Lithuanian nation 
(Lieven 1993:366). 
It was perhaps easier for Sajudis to deal with questions of minorities in 
Lithuania than the other Popular Fronts since 96 per cent of the founding 
delegates were Lithuanian (Smith 1994:131) and 85 per cent of the total 
population belonged to the same religion. The cultural homogeneity of the 
organisation, reflecting the situation in society, certainly facilitated the mass-
mobilisation of support. The LFL, which directly aligned itself with the 
Catholic Church, criticised the Reform Movement for being cool and 
unfriendly toward the church as well as other Lithuanian traditions. But, 
ultimately, the aims of both the Church and the LFL were facilitated by the 
activity of Sajudis (Senn 1990:69-70). 
The programme issued in the lead up to the Congress guaranteed 'social, 
economic, and cultural rights and freedoms' for all minorities, adding that 
equality can only be realised if all nationalities within Lithuania recognise 
the right of the Lithuanian people to self-determination and 'become 
acquainted with and respect the history, culture, and language of Lithuanians' 
(in Senn 1990:204). In discussing the programme, members emphasised that 
cultural freedom, cultural pluralism, environmental concerns, sovereignty, 
education, and a spirit of renewal were the prime areas of focus (Senn 1990:205). 
4.3.4 Sajudis and the Greens: A Fusion? 
As glasnost took effect in Soviet society, the concepts of nationalism and 
environmental protest often became interrelated (Pryde 1991:256). The non-
institutional character of social movements, such as Sajudis and the Greens, 
meant that they could unify supporters from differing, or even opposing, 
value positions (Pakulski 1991:35). They developed simultaneously and, 
although each had its own members, the overlap in objectives facilitated 
large-scale support. The distinction between these two movements was, at 
times, blurred and often mutually reinforcing (Peterson 1993:215). As noted 
by Redclift (1989:183), 'ethnic identity and environmental consciousness 
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function as two sides of the same coin'. The affinity between environmental 
and ethnic or national issues meant that environmental groups 'evolved 
into an important catalyst for change in the Soviet and post-Soviet era' 
(Peterson 1993:193). In the first stages of perestroika when political activity 
was still prohibited, environmental issues provided an opportunity for people 
to vent dissatisfaction with the Soviet system. Thus, 'environmentalism 
provided the issues and space around which other political movements 
could coalesce' (Peterson 1993:225). However, such unity is precarious and 
could only be maintained by using specific language and symbolism and 
adopting vague strategies and tactics (Pakulski 1991:35-6). 
The fusion of these movements can be attributed to the fact that they had a 
common enemy - the Soviet Union- and a common goal - independence 
(even if other aims were underlying these basic goals). The Greens' desire 
for independence came with the belief that an independent nation could, 
and would, protect its environment and its culture better than an occupying 
force. They were concerned with changing the system that denied them the 
right to decide how their own resources and environment were managed 
(Redclift 1989:182). A better environment was their ultimate aim, and this 
could only be achieved through regaining independence. Not only was it a 
question of independence being necessary for control over national resources, 
but opposition to the state was deeply rooted in opposition to the soviet 
"internationalism" which suffocated national identity. Thus, promotion 
and protection of cultural identity was seen by the Greens as integral to 
environmental protection. It was also closely related to a desire to effect 
change for future generations of Lithuanians. Sajudis wanted to create a 
better economic and cultural standard of living for Lithuanians which could 
only be achieved by regaining political independence over their rightful 
nation. In doing so, ecological protection was one of the few specific policy 
issues referred to in Sajudis speeches. For example, at the Third Congress in 
1991, Landsbergis declared 'nature is crying as it is murdered' but made no 
other specific reference to aspects of state policy (Lieven 1993:258). 
This fusion of the Green Movement and Sajudis was symbolised, or perhaps 
to some extent influenced by, the fact that Vaisvila was a leader in both 
movements. In Sajudis, he was a member of the Initiative Group and 
speaker for the Ecological Commission. Since, environmental concerns 
became the 'strongest rallying point around which Sajudis could collect 
support' (Senn 1990:64), it is not surprising that Vaisvila's interest in 
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environmental problems and his willingness to speak out against the Soviet 
Union led him to prominence in both groups. It also gave a wider audience 
for environmental concerns. To some extent, Alfred Senn's comprehensive 
account of the events leading up to the declaration of independence in 1990, 
also demonstrates the blurring of the two movements. The Green Movement 
is rarely mentioned in this account, although some ecological clubs are 
acknowledged. Environmental problems are also briefly discussed as are 
environmental protests but only in terms of Sajudis. The organisation of 
the protest at the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant in 1988, for example, is 
accredited to Sajudis (Senn 1990:169) while other sources (pers. comm. Green 
Movement members and Balbierius 1992:3) record it as an action of the 
Green Movement. No doubt, Vaisvila's positions added to the confusion, 
however it does demonstrate the greying of events at that time and the 
organisations involved in them. The significance of key leaders is also 
apparent given that subsequent actions of Vaisvila (such as the decisions 
surrounding Kruonis Hyrdo-accumulation Station discussed in Chapter 2) 
were extremely influential in the decline in Green support (see also 7.2.2.3). 
4.3.4.1 The Dissolution of Sajudis and the Greens 
Sajudis, as a social movement, could not maintain itself in its original form 
after having achieved its goal of independence. A dissolution of the Greens 
in Lithuania following independence can also be observed. Some supporters 
of the environmental platform of 1990 had an intrinsic concern for nature 
and a desire to protect it - these are still working for that cause in what 
remains of the Green Movement. They are the core that worked for 
independence in order to achieve the ultimate goal of a more environmentally 
sustainable society. Many other Green Movement supporters had a stronger 
desire to protect the nation which, at that time, included the protection of 
the environment within the nation's boundaries. However, they exhibited 
no lasting commitment to the environmental goals and were satisfied with 
achieving the aim of independence. As Anatol Lieven (1993:218) has acutely 
observed: 
to a far greater degree than most observers realised - and this is no doubt 
true of many revolutions - nationalist struggle in the former Soviet Union 
has been largely a function of small groups of activists, working upon much 
vaguer feelings held by the population as a whole. 
Whilst economic hardship may have been a factor in declining support, as 
discussed above, it is not a satisfactory explanation. The majority of those 
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who supported the Greens at protest rallies, and indeed the Reform Movement 
as a whole, during the fight for independence did so because the goal was 
independence and the enemy was the Soviet Union. They did not have the 
same level of involvement or commitment as the core group of activists 
and the environmental issues were sufficiently vague to gain support. As 
pointed out by Pryde, 'in areas where nationalism is already strong, 
environmental problems become a very convenient focal point for existing 
energies and organizations' (Pryde 1991:259). 
Once independence was achieved, the enemy could no longer be the Soviet 
Union. As Mason (1992:113) has accurately observed, the social movements 
in the region attracted mass support in opposition, 
offering solidarity, identity, moral purpose, and the vision of a common 
enemy. With the displacement of the enemy, much of this becomes lost in 
the messy business of democratic politics. 
Although the USSR still receives much of the blame for the state of the 
environment in Lithuania, the Greens have needed to focus elsewhere in 
order to protest current problems and their resolutions, as well as to oppose 
potentially dangerous new projects of the independent government. For 
nationalists, or patriots, it was much more difficult to consider the new 
independent government as an enemy and the Greens were ' not prepared 
for this turn of events neither politically nor psychologically (Balbierius 
1992:3). 'It was easier and more exciting to overthrow communism than to 
design a constitution or re-create private property' (Mason 1992:113). was 
compounded by the fact that the values and interests represented by Sajudis 
and the Greens were so diverse, once the less value-specific goal of 
independence was achieved. The diversity of interests represented by Sajudis 
added to their difficulties in achieving the more focused tasks of governing 
(Mason 1992:113). These problems were further compounded by the enormity 
of the political and economic situation in which the new leaders found 
themselves, dramatic transformations which had no working precedent. The 
conditions which followed also affected the energy and resources available 
to supporters. Thus, the movements gradually lost support. 
There has also been frustration on the part of concerned citizens at the lack 
of responsiveness of the new governments to environmental action as well 
as at the actions of key figures in the Movement or Party. Some of these 
figures probably "speculated" on the popularity of environmental issues in 
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their bid for power (Peterson 1993:226). Some oppositional spokespersons 
who went into public office, such as Vaisvila, began to champion the causes 
they previously fought (see 2.2.1, 2.4.5.1 and 7.2.3). The subsequent reputation 
of the Green Party in the wider community seemed to be transferred to the 
Green Movement as a whole, despite the fact that the latter emphatically 
maintains its autonomy. In the end, whilst Green parties tended to be the 
first to be formed in many areas of the FSU, they were quickly eclipsed by 
more conventional mass political parties which were nationalist in 
orientation (Peterson 1993:226). The national sentiment in the country led 
to a support for other parties and groups and made it easy to turn from 
"Greens" who were seen as traitors. As one environmentalist put it: 'the 
Green Party is red, blue, yellow - any other colour but green' (pers. comm. 
September 1992). 
There are several factors which have influenced the development of the 
Greens in Lithuania and, hence, their apparent downturn. Whilst occupied, 
there was no official focus on environmental issues nor were there avenues 
for public expression of environmental concern which may have enabled 
consideration at the political level. Even when independent, it has been 
argued, the threat (or perceived threat) of occupation dominated political 
decision-making and, thereby, could have distracted attention from 
environmental issues (Banks 1991:24). The way in which decisions have 
been made in the second period of independence (from 1991 until the time 
of writing) would offer some support to such an argument. As the case 
studies have shown and as Chapters 5-7 further demonstrate, the main focus 
of foreign policy in Lithuania has been incorporation into the EU and other 
international organisations such as NATO in order to lessen influence from 
Russia and feel secure in the knowledge that independence will be maintained. 
As noted by Lieven (1993:219): 
Under Landsbergis, between 1990 and 1992, nationalist activists attempted 
to stamp Lithuania with their own neo-tradionalist vision, a product partly 
of genuine religious and cultural values, and partly of a paranoid fear of 
Poland, Russia, of international traitors, and indeed of the cultural influence 
of the West. The story of those years is the story of the failure of this 
vision, though it would be unwise to predict that it has failed for ever. 
Lieven was rightly cautious in not declaring an end to political life for 
Landsbergis and his party and he has accurately described both the ideological 
basis for the national-type parties and the way in which they worked in 
office. It remains to be seen whether the new Homeland Union/Christian 
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Democrat Government will have a different approach. 
The development of the Greens was further limited by the arrest, deportation, 
and death of outspoken intelligentsia which significantly reduced the typical 
base for such a group (Banks 1991:25). During the period of independence 
(1918-1939), the intelligentsia were very nationalistic and strongly orientated 
toward the West (Vardys 1965:28). They also represented a tradition of 
intellectual dissent which was essentially linked to concern about the social 
reproduction of cultural (including linguistic) identity (Smith 1994:122). Yet 
between 1940 and 1983, many were incarcerated, some were killed or died in 
prison. For example, one in ten members of the Writers' Union were 
incarcerated in 1948 (Girnius 1986:40). In the West, intellectuals play a 
significant role in Green organisations. Those that remained (and their 
successors), did indeed emerge as leaders of the national and Green 
movements (Smith 1994:122). However, once independence was achieved 
many of these professionals moved on to positions of power and authority 
in the government or bureaucracy, removing part of the intellectual base of 
the active arm of the Movement (see also 7.2.2.3). 
The Movement also suffered following the suicide of Saulius Gricius in 
May 1991. He had been not only an active member of the Movement and a 
key public figure, but had also pushed for reforms from within the system 
firstly in the Soviet Nature Protection Committee and later as a councillor 
(and vice Mayor) of Kaunas. His primary goal was the construction of waste 
water treatment in Kaunas (see 3.4.1.1) during his five year term. He had 
been continually frustrated in his attempts to affect change in the 
environmental sphere while working within government: 
I have spent three years (1987-1990) working on this problem [waste water 
treatment] but the final result is zero. Sometimes I think, is it at all possible 
to do something good for nature? (in Zemulis 1992:11). 
The formation of organised groups was only in its infancy when the Greens 
formed in 1988. And all of the above-mentioned factors prevented the 
movement from achieving the depth found in Western environment 
movements. Without this depth, it was unable to withstand the political 
and economic pressures of transition which were major causes of the decrease 
in support. 
It must be added that the uneasiness with blaming the national government 
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has ebbed somewhat with time. It could be argued that it became easier to 
blame the LDDP Government, formerly the Communist Party, for 
environmental or economic problems, since they still have an image of 
having a Russian leaning. However, it is difficult to make this hold as a 
mono-causal influence since the LDDP and its leader, Algirdas Brazauskas, 
continued to lead in the popularity polls throughout most of their term in 
office. Another reason is that, under the pressure of low standards of living 
which have not improved as quickly as predicted, people need to protest and 
the government, which has the power to effect change, is usually the focus. 
The people have learnt to blame the government, and even the West or the 
capitalist system in general, for economic problems but not so much for 
environmental problems. This is mainly because of the lack of intrinsic 
concern for nature. While people may feel powerless to effect change in 
either area, they are more likely to protest about economic conditions than 
environmental ones even though both affect standard or quality of life. 
The seed of 'environmentalism' has been planted in the minds of Lithuanian. 
Even if today there appears to be a general apathy in relation to protection 
(see 7.2.2.3 and 7.2.3), 'environmental issues are not disappearing entirely 
from the political agenda, and environmentalism continues to shape the 
region's evolving political culture' (Peterson 1993:227). The initial support 
for the Greens at the time of independence was very important. It put 
environmental issues at the top of the political agenda for the first independent 
elections and it has allowed the Lithuanian Greens to begin to achieve what 
has taken groups in the West at least twenty years. Further, it is certain that 
environmental problems will remain for the Green Movement to continue 
• to fight against. They will also turn their focus to the capitalist state as the 
movement has done in the West. 
4.4 Conclusion 
Theories of nationalism and social movements have been useful in 
elucidating some of the causes, influences, and hindrances to the development 
of cultural identity, the mass mobilisation of people expressing it, the role of 
green issues in that expression, the fate of the movements which achieved 
dramatic success in 1990/1 and, ultimately, to the development of 
environmentally sustainable society. The nationalist (or at least pro-
independence) origin of both movements is a major cause of the decline in 
support for the Greens as well as the subsequent decline in government 
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action on environmental matters. The loss of large-scale opposition to 
environmental degradation most certainly influenced the priority given to 
it by governments. Also, since environmental issues were a platform for 
independence goals, it was easy for those within the Movement who were 
less concerned with environmental protection to move on. 
Economic adversity has affected both the decline in support of the Greens 
and the direction of Government activity. However, there are other reasons 
for the decline in support and, as the following chapters demonstrate, for 
the more general direction of policies away from the concept of an 
environmentally sustainable society. 
After the break up of the reform movement and the election of the LDDP 
Government, Sajudis still played a role in Lithuanian politics. The various 
groups and parties that have sprouted from the movement have aimed to 
take the Sajudis vision (or their variations of that vision) into the future. 
The Homeland Union headed by Landsbergis was prominent in opposition 
and, because of this, nationalism remained a political and cultural force in 
Lithuania right up until their re-election in 1996 (see 7.2.1.4). Likewise, it is 
not over for the Greens as a public pressure group, though the fate of the 
Green Party seems less certain. Environmental issues, as in the West, will 
continue to appear on the Lithuanian political agenda albeit more often on 
the periphery or only in the case of sensational circumstances. 
In 1992, the Greens hoped to eventually find an appropriate place in Lithuanian 
society, similar to that of Western countries (Balbierius 1992:3). Since the 
restoration of independence and the subsequent downturn in support, the 
Green Movement (as an organisation) has indeed tended to become more 
like Green groups in the West, lobbying and petitioning the Government 
about various environmental problems. Skills and strategies have become 
similar to comparable organisations in the West so, while they may not 
initiate an environmentally sustainable society in Lithuania, they are no 
less important than Green groups in the West. 
As the obstacles (see Chapters 5-7) to environmentally sustainable society (or 
indeed to a less ambitious situation whereby environmental issues are simply 
given more acknowledgment) are lessened over time, the issues should 
move from the periphery to a place of greater priority on the political agenda. 
In the short to medium term, however, those obstacles, including national 
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sentiment and the downturn in environmental action, as well as others 
discussed in the following chapters, will prevent the attainment of an 
environmentally sustainable society in Lithuania. In short, society has 
relatively quickly become similar to that in the West with economic issues 
being given a greater priority over environmental issues The reform 
movement has splintered into the various interests (particularly those with 
a nationalist basis) that fell into its ambit while the Green Movement has 
also fractured into smaller environmental groups, each with general areas 
of interest using various but typical methods of protest (see also 7.2.2.4). 
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Chapter 5: Economic Transition and the 
Environment 
5.1 Introduction 
There can be no doubt that Lithuania's economy is suffering but so too is the 
environment. Following the declaration of independence in 1990, inflation 
rose dramatically, total productivity decreased in real terms, while the standard 
of living decreased for the majority of citizens. These harsh economic 
conditions have been an influencing factor in the decrease in support for 
Green protests (see 4.3.1.2 and 4.3.4.1). The tension between economic 
development and environmental protection is not unique to Lithuania or 
the post-communist region. Unemployment, recession, pollution, and social 
inequity are now common throughout the world. These problems will 
become more intense in countries like Lithuania as they make substantial 
changes in the structure of society. It is, therefore, an opportune time to 
examine connections between economics and the environment in Lithuania 
which will help to formulate ways of integrating them into future policies. 
In Western economies, solutions to the recession have focused on more of 
the same (more trade, more deregulated commerce). Environment and 
social justice issues cannot be resolved, it has been argued, without an 
improvement in the economy. Lang and Hines (1993:7-11) suggest a more 
sensible position would be to acknowledge the connections between 
environment, economy, and social equity and look for solutions to all these 
crises together. 
Although these issues are not peculiar to Lithuania, there are specific 
influences and limitations relevant to post-communist nations currently 
undergoing political, economic, and social transition. This chapter aims to 
highlight similarities and differences in economic systems (and how they 
impact on the environment) in order to understand the continuing 
environmental problems in independent Lithuania. In doing so, it will 
discuss the issues associated with economy and environment in the free 
market, communist, and post-communist systems and combinations of those 
systems. Although these systems have varying impacts on the environment, 
ultimately they are all based on an anthropocentric, development-orientated 
view of nature. Neither system, nor the philosophies on which they are 
based, can be seen as having a monopoly on environmental degradation. 
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This might suggest that industrialism is therefore the culprit. This chapter 
argues, in line with the observations made in Chapter 4, that it is the way 
nature is perceived and the policies that flow from that perception which 
are most significant in explaining the degree of environmental impact from 
economic activity. An analysis of the perceptions promoted by economic 
systems in modern Lithuania will help uncover whether there is any basis 
for an environmentally sustainable society. 
Following from the discussion of the principles behind communism, 
capitalism, and various alternative systems, some details are outlined of 
these economic systems in practice (including the 'transition' period between 
the two) and their impact on the environment. The industry-based Soviet 
economy was resource-intensive with poor implementation of pollution 
guidelines, leading to large-scale environmental destruction in some regions. 
The environmental legacy left to Lithuania, although relatively clean 
compared with some other areas of the FSU, prompted much concern and 
cries for action (see Chapter 4). Some thought independence and a move 
toward a market economy would solve the problems. However, the 
subsequent economic crisis proved such hopes difficult to achieve. The 
problems remain. That is not to say that measures have not been taken to 
turn the situation around. (These are outlined in Chapters 6 and 7). Crucial 
to successful environmental rehabilitation and protection is a commitment 
to good policies which is difficult to obtain from governments (and the 
general population) in light of the perceived primacy of economic reform. 
An analysis of the Lithuanian economy since independence and its 
relationship to the environmental situation will highlight the link between 
economy and environment. This is, necessarily, presented from the orthodox 
economic perspective, using traditional economic indicators, since this is 
generally how it has been portrayed in the literature. 
Section 5.4.2 provides some lessons from Central and Eastern Europe where 
the transition to capitalism began two years earlier. It has become evident 
that the imposition of free market principles on the old command economies 
failed to adequately take the social, political, and psychological legacy into 
consideration. Old structures, technology, and administrators remained and 
could not easily be supplanted by new models. Manser (1993) has demonstrated 
the implications of the free market system for the environment in the region. 
A similar chain of events is occurring in Lithuania. The aim of Lithuania to 
join the European Union has been the paramount political concern of 1993-6, 
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so a discussion of EU environmental policy, and the implications for 
Lithuania's environment and economy if membership is granted, will 
provide a future perspective to the continuum. Such future directions are 
important in ascertaining commitment to environmental protection and, 
therefore, the likelihood of environmentally sustainable society in Lithuania. 
5.2 Linking Environment and Economy 
Over the last thirty years, environmental awareness has grown and opposition 
to development on environmental grounds has become common practice 
around the world. Environmental legislation has attempted to ensure that 
the impacts of economic development are considered by planners and 
developers. However, this has been limited by a commitment to economic 
rationalism which tends to give a low priority to environmental 
considerations. Economists concerned with environmental impacts have 
attempted to resolve such conflicts by including the environment as an 
externality. While it is important that natural resources, for example, have 
an adequate economic value in order to provide incentive for conservation 
(something the Communist system failed to understand), the attempt to 
"value" nature falls short since the value of the natural environment cannot 
be expressed by economics alone. The concept of "sustainable development" 
has aimed at balancing economic and environmental concerns. The term 
has become popularised and its meaning subjective. However, the original 
concept remains valuable in attempting to conserve resources and minimise 
the impacts of economic development. 
The relationship between economic development and environmental 
protection is not clear cut. It is not simply a case of economics impacting on 
the environment. Environmental protection often has economic benefits 
by, for example, conserving resources. Also, standard of living should not 
be measured purely in economic terms as the quality of one's environment 
is an essential factor in determining quality of life. 
It has been claimed that the downturn in the economy has led to a reduction 
in pollution since production has decreased. In late 1992, for example, the 
Bulgarian Minister of Environment, Valentin Vasilev, claimed that economic 
decline was the main reason for the 30-40 per cent reduction in pollution, 
although closures also contributed to the drop (Manser 1993:74). 
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Does this mean that as soon as the economy improves that environmental 
pollution will increase? This does not necessarily follow. Initially it might 
mean an increase in pollution levels, but if the appropriate action is taken, 
the economy and the environment can improve together. The environmental 
problems of Lithuania are often seen as a result of Soviet industrialisation, 
with the emphasis on large production output, using old, inefficient 
technology. So it is clear that a decrease in production will produce less 
impact. A December 1991 report from East Germany pointed out that 'a lack 
of thorough technical reconstruction and renovation could mean that the 
resumption of production will cause a rapid increase in pollutant emissions' 
(Manser 1993:75). However, to increase production again does not have to 
increase pollution, if the old technology is updated and other less costly 
measures are taken (it must also be noted that there are difficulties with 
introducing new technologies; these are discussed in section 6.2.4.2). Some 
of the existing problems are relatively inexpensive to rectify while others 
will require large amounts of funding and a longer time-frame (see Fisher's 
five categories of environmental problems in 1.3). The economic downturn 
also 'offers an opportunity to cap energy demand before it rises again' 
(Baumgartl 1994:151) (see also Chapter 2). What will be required is planning 
and a commitment to ensure the reverse trend does not take hold. Baumgartl 
(1994:151) suggests that, as the decline begins to reverse, the implementation 
of more stringent environmental policies would help prevent a worsening 
of the situation. 
The view that once the economy improves so will the environment (since 
there will be more money to use for environmental protection) is now 
common in Lithuania. Of course, there is no guarantee that when the 
economy does improve that more funding will be given for environmental 
problems - this will depend on priority and commitment to effective 
environmental policies. Chapter 6 reveals that government expenditure on 
the environment has decreased since 1995, despite the fact that traditional 
economic indicators (such as GDP and inflation rates) show general economic 
improvement since 1993 (see 5.4.3.1). 
As Lithuania moves further away from the collectivised social and economic 
structure, disparity between rich and poor will increase dramatically. 
Lithuanian society will pursue the previously restricted rights of the 
individual and capitalistic economic development and, as a result, 
unemployment, inflation, and pollution will disproportionately affect the 
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population. Mason points out that the enormous task of economic reform 
will affect all aspects of society by seriously affecting the distribution of 
resources: 
Such a transformation, from state planning to market, affects almost every 
aspect of political, social, and economic life. It affects employees' jobs, their 
incomes, and their relationships with their fellow workers and bosses. It 
creates new institutions (like private banking) and destroys old ones (like 
planning agencies and ministries). And it affects the country's social structure 
by creating new classes (entrepreneurs, a middle class) and widening the 
differences between wealthy and poor (Mason 1992:87). 
Free market economists might argue that everyone has the opportunity to 
increase their standard of living in the market economy and those who do 
not are either lazy or incompetent. But social and economic problems are 
closely connected. A sharp distinction between rich and poor is already 
becoming clear in Lithuania. Those who have the material possessions 
reflecting a higher degree of wealth are assumed to be part of an organised 
crime cartel known as the Mafia, although not having any connection with 
the Italian group (there is, however, a Russian connection) (see also 7.2.1.3). 
If this is true, what qualities does one need to succeed in the new system? 
Crime is a visible result of increasing unemployment and harsh economic 
conditions in which even those with jobs have difficulty in meeting basic 
survival requirements. Corruption, an embedded practice in a system of 
limited products and services, is also prevalent in the country causing many 
problems with collection of fines (including pollution related) and taxes 
from the fledgling private sector (see 5.4.3 and 5.4.3.2 and 6.3.1.2). 
5.2.1 Valuing the Environment 
When used in relation to economics, the term 'value' has a specific 
connotation, primarily a monetary one. Value is discussed in terms of the 
value of production, essentially the sum total of 'value added' (the price of 
inputs used) at each stage of the production process. This interpretation 
does not and can not include a notion of intrinsic value or indeed social 
value of the environment. Mainstream economics has not regarded 
environmental degradation as a serious problem, asserting that market forces 
will ensure higher prices and substitutes for depleting resources. For example, 
as the supply of hardwood timber decreases the price will increase making it 
more profitable to exploit softer plantation species (Hamilton 1994:55). The 
development of 'resource economics' attempted to cost the rate of depletion 
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of non-renewable resources (Hamilton 1994:56). 
As environmental awareness has increased, public pressure has forced 
Western market economies to begin to include the environmental "costs " 
of economic activity but usually as an externality. By the 1980s it had become 
clear that traditional economics could not adequately address the increase in 
environmental problems. This led to the emergence of the field of 
'environmental economics', the main premise of which is that the market 
is imperfect, leaving consumers unable to adequately express their 
environmental concerns through their market participation (Hamilton 
1994:56). As Bruce (1981:13) points out, most nations have begun with the 
right to pollute which means that, in order for the market to counteract the 
effects of pollution, a lot of money and effort is required; as well as significantly 
high levels of pollution to worry consumers into action. This relatively 
new field of environmental economics still tends to take a traditionally 
rational approach to protecting the environment. 
Valuing the environment using orthodox economic principles such as cost-
benefit analysis leads to the premise that 'we should protect the environment 
insofar as its value to us exceeds the cost of preserving it' (Jacobs 1991:63). 
The problem with this method is that while it might be possible to measure 
the costs of environmental protection it is much more difficult to measure 
the benefits, particularly in economic terms. The potential impacts of 
economic development are difficult to ascertain and if it is impossible to 
calculate the costs of pollution, 'we cannot estimate the benefits of preventing 
[it]' (Jacobs 1991:65). An emerging branch of 'ecological economics' attempts 
to transcend the rational approach by integrating economics, ethics, and the 
environment (Hamilton 1994:56). It seeks to overcome the value-free notion 
of conventional economic theory by insisting that choices are dependent on 
the objectives and attitudes of the decision-makers (Ekins et a/. 1992:30-1). 
What differs in the FSU is that the impact of production on the environment 
was not even considered as an externality. Authors Pearce, Markandya, and 
Barbier (1989) have argued that economies and the environment interact, 
necessitating the valuing of the environment. It is argued that since natural 
resources have in the past had a zero price there has been no incentive for 
their protection, resulting in extensive resource depletion. In the FSU, no 
price was attached to the environment and since there were no competitive 
markets for the resources or resulting products, resource depletion was more 
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rapid and economies were extremely inefficient. Does this mean that the 
free market system is preferable in terms of environmental protection? It 
does not necessarily follow. Both systems fail to accept that valuing the 
environment in economic terms is impossible since the human desire, 
obligation, or need to protect nature goes beyond the bounds of the rational 
choice model (see 5.3.2). A Green approach to economics sees the market 
and the state as complementary rather than in conflict. The state has a role 
in setting the context of the market, correcting market failures, and 
redistributing wealth. The state in a Green economy works at the local, 
national, and international levels (Ekins 1992:34-5). In order to establish 
similarities and differences between the environment and the economy in 
Lithuania before and after independence, a discussion of the environmental 
impacts of these two major economic systems follows (see 5.3 and 5.3.2). 
In conventional economics, price is value (Ekins et al. 1992:36). A price for 
resources is useful in terms of its influence over conservation, however, the 
value of the natural world cannot be adequately expressed through price. 
The process of discounting used in cost-benefit analysis assumes that future 
benefits are less valuable than present benefits. Economists explain this in 
terms of people preferring a dollar now rather than in five years time because 
of uncertainty, or the possible increase in salary which reduces the relative 
value of the dollar. This is much more difficult to apply to nature, the 
value of which tends to increase with time (Hamilton 1994:61). The placing 
of monetary values on environmental protection is complicated further 
where pollution is transboundary or global. It is not possible to accurately 
calculate the total costs of global warming or the benefits of rainforest 
protection, for example, making an estimate of the 'optimal' level of protection 
equally impossible (Jacobs 1991:66). 
There is an even more fundamental reason why rational economics, and 
much of environmental economics, does not adequately value the non-
human world. Both the free-market and command systems assume an 
anthropocentric (human centred) notion of the environment. An 
anthropocentric approach measures the environment only in terms of its 
value for humans (Jacobs 1991:66). While philosophers no longer need to 
explore the notion of human respect for other persons, the concept of a 
respect for nature has only begun. The assumption that only humans have 
an intrinsic value that demands respect and dignity (leading to a commitment 
to preservation) has resulted in a human-nature dichotomy where the 
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interests of humans preside over the non-human world (Eckersley 1992:1-2). 
The eco-centric position on the other hand stresses the intrinsic value of the 
non-human world and acknowledges the interrelatedness of all phenomena, 
thereby allowing for greater protection of the environment than is attainable 
from an anthropocentric position. Micheal Zimmerman has argued: 
If humankind is understood as the goal of history, the source of all value, 
the pinnacle of evolution, and so forth, then it is not difficult for humans to 
justify the plundering of the natural world, which is not human and therefore 
"valueless" (in Eckersley 1992:52). 
As Eckersley (1992:52) points out, when these anthropocentric perceptions 
are 'combined with powerful technology, the capacity for environmental 
destruction increases dramatically'. The rapid industrialisation of the Soviet 
Union occurred at great cost to the environment and it is evident that the 
failure of communism to reconcile the conflict between humans and nature 
(see 5.3.1 and 5.3.2) can be found in the anthropocentric view of nature 
combined with a technocratic philosophy of production. Chapter 7 will 
discuss the associated political philosophies which drove the economic vision. 
5.2.2 The Three Es - Economy, Environment, and Equity 
Tim Lang and Colin Hines (1993), in their compelling challenge to orthodox 
free trade economics, argue that the economy, the environment, and social 
equity are at the core of the global challenge. Neither free trade nor 
conventional protectionism, argue Lang and Hines, offer solutions to these 
problems since economic development fails to 'meet human needs and to 
sustain the environment on which life depends' (Lang and Hines 1993:7). 
Economic depression is common throughout the world and, with the 
globalisation of production and trade, a new system aimed at narrowing the 
gap between rich and poor nations (and within nations) whilst protecting 
the environment must have a global perspective. That is not to say that 
such a system would be global in nature, only that it would consider impacts 
on all nations and their environments. It would encompass the notion of 
"think globally, act locally". 
If the problems of social equity and environmental destruction are taken as 
given, what have been the benefits to justify these impacts? Orthodox 
economics tells us that a 'marginal utility' enables one to balance needs and 
impacts, taking the most efficient and rational decision. However, economic 
crises exist throughout the world in industrialised, newly industrialised 
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(NICS) and developing nations alike. Explanations for economic decline in 
industrialised countries tend to focus on social evils, modernising Victorian 
fears of crime generated from the lower class. Solutions focus on "belt-
tightening", harder work, better training, and improved efficiency of 
companies in order to improve national economies, thus improving 
competitiveness in the global market. An "us and them" mentality prevails. 
Meanwhile other countries promote similar policies (Lang and Hines 1993:8). 
There are always winners and losers in free trade economics (whether it's 
Keynesian or more liberal). Each country aims to have a positive balance of 
trade but for every country in the black, at least one will be in the red. The 
major losers have been the developing countries in the South. The equity 
crisis, a result of economic practice, also needs to be considered. 
Trade has brought benefits to the "winners" but many argue that global 
inequality is growing due to current trade practices. According to the United 
Nations Development Programme, 'the richest fifth of the world's population, 
by nation, today earns over 60 times more than the poorest fifth' (Lang and 
Hines 1993:8). Hand in hand with this inequality is a disproportionate effect 
of pollution on quality of life. The elite (the top two thirds in rich countries 
and, globally, the consuming nations) enjoy a high standard of living while, 
because of their high consumption, the poor suffer economically as well as 
environmentally. It is the poor who usually work in harsh conditions to 
produce energy and products and they usually live in the most polluted 
areas. As Herman Daly and Robert Goodland of the World Bahk's 
Environment division have argued: 
As capital leaves a country in pursuit of greater absolute advantage, then 
that country loses both capital and jobs and becomes worse off....There may 
be good arguments for free trade, but in a world of international capital 
mobility, comparative advantage cannot be one of them (their stress) (cited 
in Lang and Hines 1993: 22-3). 
The environment has deteriorated dramatically in the last thirty years and, 
while governments and companies have claimed concern about 
environmental impacts, 'their practices do not match their promises' (Lang 
and Hines 1993:9). The globalisation of trade has increased energy use as 
various goods are transported across the world. Proponents of free trade 
usually argue that issues like the environment and equity can be addressed 
once there is an improvement in the economy. To the contrary, Lang and 
Hines argue that the only way to address any of the three 'Es' is together. 
The economic crisis is in part due to the failure to include the costs of 
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environmental impacts of production and consumption (Lang and Hines 
1993:9). The view that environmental problems can only be dealt with once 
the economy improves is common in Lithuania. As discussed in Chapters 2 
and 3, the focus of governments has been on regaining economic 
independence often at the expense of the environment. Fisher (1992:1) points 
out that some environmental problems in the region are contingent on 
economic performance. It will be possible, he argues, to resolve some problems 
during the process of economic change and other more serious problems 
can be tackled when the economy has improved. There are other problems 
which might get worse or that will result from the process of change and the 
pattern of future development (see Chapter 1). It is the future path of 
development (and the extent of environmental consideration) that Lithuania 
chooses which is crucial for long term maintenance of environmental quality. 
Lithuania is a second world nation aiming to rejoin the first world. While 
it is more advanced and in a better social and economic position than many 
of the 'losing' developing nations (in terms of such indicators as housing 
and industry), it has many hurdles to clear before it can rejoin the international 
community. Countries like Lithuania have a mixed legacy from their 
incorporation into the USSR. Industrial development and military clout 
placed the USSR in the realm of the first world but the indiscriminate 
exploitation of resources, the pollution from the inefficient technology, and 
the quality of life of many citizens resembled (and probably more so now) 
that of a third world nation. The seceding nations now face problems related 
to both worlds. They have to find ways of dealing with pollution from 
high-technology such as nuclear facilities while at the same time finding 
ways and capital to provide basic services such as sewage treatment and 
garbage collection. A major focus has been on developing ties with the rest 
of Europe (particularly the West) which has led to the signing of a free trade 
agreement and a push for inclusion in the European Union. The post-
communist region, desperate to increase exports and join European and 
international trade, may replace Africa as the 'loser' of trade relations in the 
region. 
The impact of trade on the local economy was evident in Lithuania during 
the years 1992-1994. The European countries want to establish trade with the 
post-communist region, but only on their own terms. Although many of 
the trade barriers have been eased, the European Union and European Free 
Trade Area 'maintain tight restrictions on the most competitive products 
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from Central and Eastern Europe - products in which the region has a 
competitive edge' (Business Council For Sustainable Development 1994:35). 
Thus, imports to the region from Western Europe have been growing by 
around 30 per cent per year while exports have not been matched with 
tariffs set at 100 per cent or more on agricultural products (BCSD 1994:35) 
(see 5.4.4). The influx of European lifestyles and associated goods (often 
out-dated, unwanted, or low quality) was gradual at first and dramatic from 
1992 -1994, symbolically represented by the introduction of the modern 
supermarket. (Carrots, for example, formerly supplied by local growers, were 
suddenly replaced by a washed French variety pre-packaged in a plastic bag). 
The arrival of the supermarket seemed to represent both economic recovery 
and enlistment into the family of Europe. While citizens (and returning 
visitors) were amazed at the diversity of products available, only a minority 
could afford what was on offer and local produce seemed harder to find as 
growers too sought external markets. 
It is estimated that one eighth of world oil consumption is used in the 
transport involved in international trade. The cost of the energy to the 
producer is included but the large amount of transport involved inflates 
prices which in turn affects those in the lower socioeconomic groups. The 
environmental costs (such as resource depletion and air pollution) of this 
energy are rarely included in the price of the product, giving no incentive to 
change such practices. The over-use of the world's diminishing resources is 
a critical problem, yet transport multiplies this effect by its significant 
contribution to air pollution, leading to global problems of acid rain and the 
Greenhouse effect (see also 5.4.4.2). Lang and Hines (1993:11) argue for a 
'New Protectionism' which aims 
to protect the future through restrictions on international trade and by 
reorienting and diversifying entire economies toward producing the most that 
they can nationally, then looking to the region of countries that surrounds 
them, and only as a last resort to international trade.. ..More long-distance 
trade will only intensify the damaging trends which are already bringing 
the world to its current sorry state. 
The challenge is to develop policies which address the economy, the 
environment, and equity, thus reversing destruction and poverty around 
the world (Lang and Hines 1993:12). Crucial to such policies is "sustainability" 
(or 'self reliance' as Lang and Hines prefer to call it) where the emphasis is 
on diversity of production and retaining control over capital rather than 
'letting it flow around the world in search of the highest interest' (Lang and 
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Hines 1993:12-3). Lithuania could do well to avoid the traps of international 
trade as experienced by the developing nations of the South. It has been 
argued that the South must avoid not only the supposed gains of free trade 
policies but also the notion of self-sufficiency behind national barriers since 
both lead to under-development (Lang and Hines 1993:13). Post-communist 
countries such as Lithuania should also heed such advice. In particular, 
given the necessity for foreign assistance in restructuring, they should be 
aware that only one third of the US$1 200 billion Third World debt to First 
World banks in 1990 was the original debt (Lang and Hines 1993:13) (see 6.2). 
The New Protectionism stresses the need for the era of free trade to end. It 
argues for a shift in political thinking away from the free trade package, 
giving priority to equity and environmental protection; a decrease in 
international trade and an emphasis on regionalism - reversing the 
globalisation of production and minimising the use of transport; more 
intervention in the activities of Transnational Corporations (possibly through 
the UN); and, ultimately, for GATT (1) to become GAST, the General Agreement 
on Sustainable Trade (Lang and Hines 1993:14). For this to happen, what 
would be required is a complete reversing of current trends which cannot be 
achieved by a single country. Countries like Lithuania could choose to stand 
alone but this is unrealistic given that the system, dominated by the superblocs 
(EEA, NAFTA, Japan), is well established and the only course of action seems 
to be to link their economies to those existing trade patterns dictated by free 
trade ideologies (Lang and Hines 1993:40-1). However, the whole post-
communist region might improve economically and environmentally 
through regional co-operation. 
5.3 Economic Systems and the Environment 
As with much theory there tends to be disparity between economic models 
and the way in which they are implemented. The mistake has been to 
assume that central-planning is synonymous with communism and that 
the market is synonymous with capitalism. Capitalist systems have developed 
in a variety of forms with varying levels of central planning (which have 
increased during wartime) including very large welfare states, such as found 
in Sweden, while socialist systems have, at the very least, charged a rate of 
interest for working capital. The tendency has been to identify systems 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
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purely by the criteria of ownership. As the Yugoslav and Swedish examples 
will show (see 5.4.5), ownership alone is not enough in identifying and 
comparing economic systems. Equally important are Lhe functions performed 
by government, labour, and the private sector and the level of control placed 
on the latter (McFarlane 1991: 5-7). In addition, there are a number of factors 
which interrelate and contribute to the relative success or failure of any 
given system, such as the cultural, historical, and political context in which 
it operates. It is important to see the benefits and shortfalls of all systems, in 
relation to economic growth, equity, and environmental protection. Many 
Western economists are now acknowledging the inherent problems with 
capitalism and are searching for ways to achieve greater equity. The strengths 
of socialist economies are a useful starting point. However, the temptation 
in the countries of the FSU and CEE is to assume all factors of communism 
and socialism are problematic (indeed wrong) and therefore to be avoided. 
There are benefits, problems, and limitations to all systems. The focus here 
is on identifying a system that does not ignore social and environmental 
issues. Short of proposing total economic reconstruction globally, it seems 
appropriate to acknowledge the relative strengths and weaknesses of systems 
in theory and practice in order to extrapolate some features which might be 
implemented in Lithuania. 
After the declaration of independence in 1990, the government of Lithuania 
set about economic reform primarily to change from a centrally-planned 
economy to a free market system. Although initially some governments in 
the region canvassed the possibility of a "middle way" between capitalism 
and communism this was generally abandoned in favour of a full transition 
to a market economy - a difficult task given that such a system had developed 
over decades, even centuries, in other countries (Mason 1992: 120). Some 
examples of mixed economies are covered in 5.4.5, pointing to some of the 
problems and possibilities for an integrated economy in Lithuania. 
Problems have arisen due to the expectation that the transition to democracy 
would coincide with the establishment of a market economy. As Brucan 
(1992:19) points out, 'there actually is a striking contradiction between the 
two basic tasks'. Mason (1992:86-7) agrees, noting that changing the political 
structures is a much simpler task than economic reform. Parliamentary 
democracies were created in a few months, whereas, as Marx noted, everything 
in society was based on the economics "substructure" and only by changing 
that could society truly be transformed. Mason (1992:86-7) acknowledges 
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Marx's accuracy on this point since change has been painful and slow while 
the new economies develop. However, there is more to a successful political 
system than establishieng parliamentary institutions. The understanding of 
rights and possibilities to influence decisions is not yet well established 
amongst the general Lithuanian population. The ill-developed democracy 
and political culture necessary for its working are discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 7, along with the enormous legal changes that were required to 
legitimise the new system. The focus here is on the impacts encountered by 
the initiation of the market economy. 
The economic transition has led to a decrease in the standard of living 
which, at least initially, most people recognised as necessary for the short 
term. Five years on and the communist legacy of serious economic and 
environmental problems remain. Why? Lockean liberalism through to 
Marxist communism see economic activity as creating something valuable 
from something otherwise valueless, usually through technological progress 
(Eckersley 1992:23-5). The following sections will briefly discuss some of the 
elements of such philosophies relevant to environmental degradation and 
protection. 
Whilst the enormity of the task of economic restructuring must not be 
forgotten, the problems are far from being resolved. Inflation is still high 
while real wages are not - only a few have reaped the benefits of the free 
market. Inequity quickly developed (see 5.4.3.1). Meanwhile, the 
environmental problems which were a focus for political dissent still exist. 
The capitalist system (in all its varieties) developed over a long period of 
time. The less complicated economic recovery of Europe following World 
War II, for example, took at least a decade. In Britain, the sterling was not 
fully convertible for seven years during which food rationing and price 
controls continued (Mason 1992:122). The capitalist system only survived in 
the West through difficult economic times, such as the Great Depression, 
because of the mitigating effects of the welfare state and the legitimisation of 
trade unions (Galbraith 1990 in Brucan 1992:21). Society became sufficiently 
wealthy (through colonial exploitation and a beneficial trading situation 
with developing nations) to enable government agencies to redistribute some 
of the country's resources. Such sources of wealth are not currently available 
in CEE and FSU (Brucan 1992:21). Even so, the Western economists are 
urging a kind of capitalism on Eastern Europe that they would not entertain 
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in their own countries. Those pushing for private housing, for example, 
seem to forget the millions of homeless in western industrialised countries. 
As John Kenneth Galbraith pointed out, the West does not have the 
"traditional capitalism" that economists were selling to the East but "a still 
imperfect social democracy". He advised that the aim of both western and 
post-communist countries should be "to seek and find the system that 
combines the best in market-motivated and socially motivated action" (in 
Mason 1992:122). 
Governments in the area have become increasingly authoritarian not least 
because the economic models will not work in the region without 'a firm 
hand'. According to Brucan (1992), the West tends to favour the market 
over democracy and is often prepared to ignore failings in the latter. Support 
from the superpowers and organisations such as the IMF is often conditional 
upon market orientated reforms (see also 6.2.4.5). For example, China is the 
only country in the East to make the transition to a market economy whilst 
achieving a relatively high rate of economic growth. Chinese Premier Li 
Peng was welcomed in the West because of these reforms, yet the authoritarian 
nature of governing and human rights violations in China are forgiven in 
the name of the market (Brucan 1992:21-4). 
The problems with political reform, including the development of democracy 
and a political culture in the region, are discussed in Chapter 7. The perceptions 
of nature promulgated by the major economic systems, and the environmental 
impacts that flow from that, are discussed in the following sections. 
5.3.1 Marx on the Environment 
Although not dedicating any manuscripts solely to a philosophy of nature 
or humans' relationship to the natural world, Marx often referred to such a 
relationship when writing about the labour process (and the worker's 
alienation from that process) as well as his later investigations into economics. 
His central theme was the domination of "man" by "man", neglecting (to a 
point) the issue of "man's" domination of nature (as well as the domination 
of men over women in all classes). Some of Marx's comments on nature 
might be seen as positive in terms of the environment and a solid basis for 
an environmental ethic. Some Post-Marxist theorists concerned with the 
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modern environmental crisis (such as eco-socialists) (2) have seized on his 
statements as evidence of the ability of socialist ideals to solve the 
environmental crisis (even when that means some reworking of traditional 
interpretations). 
Some theorists have replaced the traditional subject (the proletariat) with 
nature, which is similarly seen as exploited and in need of emancipation 
(Grundmann 1991:50). However, the foundation for Marx's comments on 
nature is a commitment to the project of human mastery over nature and a 
notion of value whereby nature only has value once it has been transformed 
by humans. Eco-centric theorists, unlike ecosocialists, find it unnecessary to 
seek a theoretical basis in Marxist thought for recognition of the inequalities 
of capitalism or the ways in which it has impacted on the environment 
(Eckersley 1992:76). 
Marx (1844a) puts forward a concept of humans and nature as one: 
Nature is the inorganic body of a man, that is, in so far as it is not itself a 
human body. That man lives from nature means that nature is his body 
with which he must maintain a constant interchange so as not to die. That 
man's physical and intellectual life depends on nature merely means that 
nature depends on itself, for man is a part of nature. 
Such a concept is superficially attractive in developing an environmental 
approach to production in that it stresses that humans are a part of nature 
and thus it could be argued, if humans destroy nature, they destroy themselves. 
However, the concept is anthropocentric since, according to Marx, while 
natural objects 'form a part of human consciousness' and are an 'intellectual 
means of subsistence', humans 'must first prepare [natural objects] before 
[they] can enjoy and assimilate them' and nature is the 'tool of [their] vital 
activity' (labour) (Marx 1844a:81). Thus the focus is on nature's importance 
to humans. Through the production process nature appears as the workers' 
reality and they can look at their image in a world they have created (Marx 
1844a:82). 
In the Marxist analysis of the relationship of humans with nature, the 
development of the individual (his or her 'species-being') is directly linked 
2 Ecosocialism has been described as 'a concerted attempt to revise and reformulate the 
democratic socialist case in light of the ecological challenge' (Eckersley 1992:119). The 
ecosocialist position will be discussed in more detail in section 5.3.2. 
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with the understanding, appropriation, and mastery of nature (Marx 
1857(1941) in McLellan 1977:380). The material world is 'filtered' through 
human labour rather than 'created' by it (Schmidt 1973:70). Labour is the 
process (in which humanity and nature both participate) by which nature is 
transformed, a process which is started, regulated, and controlled by humans, 
in order to 'appropriate Nature's productions in a form adapted to [their] 
own wants' (Marx 1865:455). 
In the end, nature is there to be exploited. Engels recognised the implications 
of this, noting that we should not 'flatter ourselves overmuch on account of 
our human victories over nature. For each such victory takes its revenge 
on us' (quoted in Eckersley 1992:81). Marx occasionally made similar 
observations, yet both men continued to welcome capitalism for its role in 
preparing the way for the higher synthesis (the proletarian revolution) where 
advances in science and technology would enable humans to predict and 
control the environmental impacts of economic activity (Eckersley 1992:81). 
An ecocentric approach to environmental protection cannot be extrapolated 
from Marxism without severely altering some of the major philosophical 
tenets, such as his theory of human nature (Eckersley 1992:94). That is to 
say, 'the Marxist circle of compassion (concern with social and economic 
justice) is but a subset of the Green circle of compassion (concern that all life 
forms be able to "live and blossom")' which goes some way to explaining 
'the zeal with which the Left are prepared to pursue a road to social justice 
that wreaks havoc on the nonhuman world' (Eckersley 1987:25). The approach 
Marx took to the environment is important here for the purposes of historical 
context in the USSR and Lithuania and in illustrating that, in order to 
develop appropriate solutions to the economic, equity, and environmental 
crises, a fundamentally new approach will be required. The form this takes 
must be cognisant of particular cultural, historical, and political contexts and 
of the state of the environment. In Lithuania, the primary basis for a new 
economy is capitalism, as seems determined by the growing interrelationship 
of nations in the capitalist world order. Section 5.4.2 below indicates why 
popular economic models based solely on capital production and the profit 
motive are not necessarily the most appropriate for re-emerging nations 
such as Lithuania. 
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5.3.2 Communism or Capitalism: What Preference for the Environment? 
Some post-Marxists and Greens point to capitalism as the root cause of 
environmental problems, while others argue that industrialism is at the 
heart of the problems. Still others might suggest that the prevalent 
anthropocentric perception of nature is ultimately to blame. Joe Weston, an 
eco-socialist, has argued that Greens should acknowledge that it is capitalism, 
rather than industrialism, that is responsible for the problems of environment 
and equity (Eckersley 1992:121). Marx criticised capital for first creating 
bourgeois society then the universal appropriation of nature and social 
relationships: 
Nature becomes for the first time simply an object for mankind, purely a 
matter of utility; it ceases to be recognized as a power in own right; and the 
theoretical knowledge of its independent laws appears only as a strategum 
designed to subdue it to human requirements, whether as the object of 
consumption or as the means of production....Along with the constantly 
diminishing number of the magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolize 
all advantages of this process of transformation, grows the mass of misery, 
oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation (Marx 1857(1941):380 and 
1865:487). 
Some environmentalists might agree with such an analysis of the impacts 
of capitalism. Green leftists have often blamed environmental problems on 
the profit orientation of capitalism. For example, orthodox eco-Marxists 
(who have applied to nature the basic principles of the exploitation of humans 
by humans) also argue that capitalism is the main cause of environmental 
degradation. They argue that environmental problems are evidence of the 
inability of capitalism to provide wealth and security. Mandel wrote, 'the 
evil is private property and competition, that is, the market economy and 
capitalism' and similarly, Cohen argues, 'whatever the size of the problem 
would otherwise be, it is certain that capitalism aggravates it' (in Grundmann 
1991:49-50). 
Such an assertion tends to assume that the reverse would be also true: that, 
with the abolition of private property, environmental problems would 
diminish. If common property were the answer to social inequity and 
environmental ills, one would expect to find few problems in a country 
such as the USSR. But as is well known, many of these impacts can be 
observed in the Soviet Union, including significant environmental impacts 
(see 5.4.1). Thus, it could be said that it is not capitalism per se that is the 
root cause of environmental destruction. For example, Kassiola (1990), points 
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to an industrial crisis whereby the environmental and social consequences 
of industrialism are now more clearly understood by society. The 
environment movement, in highlighting the bio-physical limits to economic 
growth, have played an important role in this understanding (Kassiola 
1990:32-3). Graham Dunkley asserts that while many leftists are sceptical of 
the anti-industrial thread in much of environmentalists' critique of 
capitalism, it is industrialism and capitalism that have led to current ecological 
crisis and it is, therefore, both that need to change (Dunkley 1992:3). 
There is a difficulty in labelling any given nation in terms of the theoretical 
economic models. Certainly the USSR is a thorn in the side of those promoting 
socialist ideals. It might look more like 'state capitalism' or a 'social 
dictatorship' yet it is an example of a nation which built itself, or at least 
claimed to have done so, on Marxist principles. Thus it represents how, in 
one instance, such theories have been put into practice. There are several 
factors which make the USSR a specific case (see 5.4.1) - other communist 
countries have developed differently and have had varying impacts on society 
and nature (see 5.4.5). That is to say, each nation, regardless of which economic 
system it chooses, has a unique set of historical, cultural (including degree of 
ethnic homogeneity), and political circumstances which affect the 
development, relative success, and the type of social and environmental 
impacts of the system. 
The Henry George Model, Geonomics, has been described by Richard Noyes 
(cited in Harrison 1991:210) as 'the dialectical "synthesis": the uniting of 
what is best in the western market tradition (the freedom of the individual) 
with what is best in socialism (the spirit of the community), to produce a 
Weltanschauung that is sui generisi. This model proposes the use of rent 
for land and resources enabling individual possession within the context of 
community (to which the rent is paid) and aiding the protection of the 
environment. George, writing in 1879, is seen as ahead of his times in terms 
of his warnings on resource exploitation and his attempts to develop a unique 
approach to economics (Harrison 1991:210) (see also 5.4.3.2). In modern 
times, new economic models have been developed in opposition to the 
traditional rational models of both communism and capitalism in an attempt 
to address the environmental degradation (see also 5.4.5). 
Free market environmentalism (FME) asserts that ecological problems can 
be 'solved by the creation and enforcement of tradeable property rights in 
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environmental 'goods' and 'bads' which, they argue, leads to the most efficient 
allocation of resources' (Eckersley 1993:4). Further, 'it is not private capital 
but state regulation of, and 'political intervention' in, the economy (such as 
distorting subsidies, taxes or simply bad management) that is responsible for 
environmental degradation' (Eckersley 1993:5). The main argument put 
forward by FME protagonists is that private property rights depoliticise 
resource allocation and allow a personal stake in the environmental asset at 
hand. Governments, on the other hand, pursue political goals while the 
bureaucracy is inefficient (Eckersley 1993:6-12). Ultimately the market, too, is 
political. As mentioned above, if the starting point is a right to pollute then 
the market must be used to 'buy off polluters'. If, on the other hand, the 
premise is that pollution rights must be bought, the market can lead to a 
lower pollution level. The starting point of a government policy is based on 
values. 'Whether polluting is an industrial right or an imposition on society 
is a political question, the answer to which depends very much on our 
ethical position' (Bruce 1981:13). 
The market may effectively and efficiently allocate resources but it falls short 
in distributing income and setting a sustainable level of the economy relative 
to the environment (Eckersley 1993:6-12). The free market is not a panacea 
for ecological problems - as the Lithuanian experience has demonstrated. In 
fact, 
the introduction of the market system also means adding 'new environmental 
risks to existing ones. The transition period, in general, was characterised 
by little enforcement of environmental control. Waste production alone, to 
give an example, increased significantly during the last few years. Far from 
offsetting past and future environmental threats, the new economic system 
may only add new problems to the deficiencies of the former systems 
(Baumgartl 1994:151-2). 
Leftist thinkers have found themselves in a conundrum since while 
environmental problems are seen as closely connected with capitalism they 
recognise that such problems exist in all industrial societies (Grundmann 
1991:48) So, the problems that developed under the Soviet system do little 
to support the notion that ecological problems are specific to capitalist societies. 
Eco-socialists, such as Weston, argue that the centrally-planned Soviet system 
is not an example of communism or socialism but, rather, of "state capitalism" 
(Eckersley 1992:121). This allows them to continue to focus on the profit 
mechanism of capitalism as the main cause of the problems. Emancipatory 
theorists point out that the environmental crisis is a result of industrialism 
which encompasses "state capitalism" as well as market capitalism, both of 
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which are concerned with growth and a faith in future technological solutions 
(Eckersley 1992:22-3). Whether referred to as "state capitalism" or not, the 
Soviet system in practice is quite different from theoretical ideals (see 5.4.1). 
Grundmann (1991:267), for example, argues that Marx may have even been 
opposed to the command economy if its 'side effects and irrationalities' 
conflicted with the 'conscious control' of human fate. He claims that a 
Marxist framework requires both markets and plans. Markets to transform 
labour from concrete to abstract and planning to establish the social character 
of labour. 
The problem here is that the centrally-planned system of the USSR and CEE 
is the only type of communist society that has had a measure of 'success' 
and thus provides one of the few empirical examples by which to ascertain 
the environmental impacts. In order to grasp some idea of causal influences 
the focus needs to be on both the similarities and the differences between 
the systems. It may be that environmental degradation is more a consequence 
of industrial development, a feature common to both. Yet, the size and 
effects of environmental problems depends on three main variables; 
the population level, per capita consumption, and the environmental impact 
of the technology through which the consumption is delivered. Different 
technologies exhibit enormous differences in resource efficiency, pollution 
intensity, and in whether they reinforce or disrupt natural processes (Ekins 
1992:52). 
All these are directly linked. The per capita consumption, for example, is 
contingent on the resource-intensiveness of the technology used in 
production. Both the market and command economies exploit nature through 
technology while failing to value nature beyond using the price mechanism. 
The problems in societies based on these systems, however, have not been 
identical. (3) If, as is generally agreed, it is assumed that environmental 
degradation was more severe in the Soviet Union than in Western countries, 
there must be other factors which contributed to such a situation. The 
ill-considered use of technology is one factor in the severity of degradation 
under communism. The technology used in the Soviet Union did not keep 
up with advances in the West. Industry used economically and technically 
inferior technology with no concern for cost or quality (see 5.4.1.1). Such 
3 As the case studies demonstrated, the environmental problems in Lithuania and the political 
and economic climate in which they are to be resolved is somewhat different to that in Western 
Europe. 
Chapter Five 	 213 
technologies would not stand up to Western economic or environmental 
efficiency measures. 
In other words, the capital equipment manufactured and installed in Eastern 
Europe [and the FSIA can be expected to require more inputs, and hence be 
more expensive to operate, than capital installed in a capitalist economy. 
This is one reason why the fuel and raw-material intensity of production is 
much higher in the East than in the West (Keren 1992:243-4). 
As Grundmann (1991:46) has said, there is not a single factor responsible for 
ecological problems: 'The market and systems of common property may be 
equally beneficial or detrimental to the environment, depending on the 
concrete historical and cultural conditions'. While he argues this from an 
anthropocentric standpoint, I would argue that the perception of nature, 
which is contingent on historical and cultural developments (as well as 
specific economic conditions) is a key factor in understanding the link between 
economic systems and environmental degradation. It is such a perception 
that directs the formation of policy, establishment of protected areas, and the 
use of various technologies including whether or not it is important to 
improve the 'environmental friendliness' of production. 
A Green approach acknowledges 'both the ecological and social limits to 
growth' and is therefore concerned with three interrelated goals - economic 
efficiency, social justice, and ecological sustainability (Eckersley 1993:9&17) 
(see also Lang and Hines' "three Es"). There is, of course, debate amongst 
Green thinkers as to the appropriate means to achieving these ends but 
most are critical of highly centralised systems that limit participatory 
democracy as well as those based solely on free market principles since, 
although social relations are different in these systems, the relationship 
between humans and nature tends to be the same. Greens are, therefore, 
'concerned to find an alternative economic framework that ensures that the 
market is su bservient to ecological and social justice considerations' (Eckersley 
1993:10) (see also 5.4.5). 
So, perhaps the fundamental difference comes not in the role of the market 
or private property but in democratic principles - the role of public participation 
in developing policy. The democratic process links public perceptions of 
nature with political action. This requires market forces which make it 
more profitable for industry, for example, to use cleaner methods or market 
incentives to encourage energy conservation as well as state controls in 
developing and implementing environmental and related social policies. 
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As Chapter 7 demonstrates, the political suppression of public opinion in 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (together with the suppression of 
cultural identity as discussed in Chapter 4) is a crucial factor in the amount 
and types of pollution although not in the existence of the problems per se. 
In addition, the development of a democratic political culture will be 
fundamental to turning the environmental situation around (see 7.2.3). 
5.4 Economy and Environment in Practice 
As has been shown, the environmental impacts of economic activity have 
not been a major concern of the traditional economic models. Even so, 
some expectations of the relationship between economic development and 
the environment might be derived from the economic system in theory. It 
is also evident that there is often disparity between the economic model and 
how it works in practice since 'no social and political theory can be used by 
practical [people] in the shape given it by its authors; it must always be 
greatly simplified and often considerably changed' (Plamenatz 1954:318). This 
being the case, possible environmental impacts are even more removed 
from the realm of prediction. There are so many factors at play that a 
particular economic model may be seen as potentially more sensitive to 
nature but could become something completely different in practice. 
Therefore, an evaluation of economic systems as they are implemented in 
practice, and the environmental consequences involved, will highlight the 
way in which economic policies in Lithuania have affected the environment. 
The analysis begins with the economic system used in the Soviet Union, 
providing a historical context. This is followed by a discussion of the 
environmental consequences of transition in the CEE region, where the 
process began two years earlier and, therefore, should provide some lessons 
for Lithuania. This is compared with what has become evident in independent 
Lithuania, where a similar yet slower approach to reform was taken. An 
assessment of the relationship between economy and environment in the 
European Union provides a future perspective to the discussion since 
membership is a major economic and political goal for Lithuania. 
5.4.1 The Soviet Union 
As noted above, the communist economic system has its theoretical roots in 
the writings of Karl Marx. Communism was seen as the ultimate achievement 
for society; a trouble free existence. Marx expressed it as such: 
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Communism is the positive abolition of private property, of human self-
alienation, and thus the real appropriation of the human essence through 
and for man. It is, therefore, the return of man himself as a social, i.e. 
really human, being, a complete and conscious return which assimilates all 
the wealth of previous development. Communism as a fully developed 
naturalism is humanism and as a fully developed humanism is naturalism. 
It is the definitive resolution of the antagonism between man and nature, 
and between man and man. It is the true solution of the conflict between 
existence and essence, between objectification and self affirmation, between 
freedom and necessity, between individual and species. It is the solution of 
the riddle of history and knows itself to be this solution (Marx in Schmidt 
1973:128). 
However, communism (or more precisely Bolshevism) in the USSR did not 
originate from a proletariat-led overthrow of the bourgeoise as theorised by 
Marx. The system emerged in a relatively "backward" economy replacing 
Tsarist autocracy where there was virtually no history of bourgeois democratic 
institutions (Patnaik 1991:19). Plamenatz argues that it is precisely because 
Marxism was introduced before industrialisation that 'there never has been, 
and now probably never will be, either a bourgeois or a proletarian revolution 
in that country' (Plamenatz 1954:313). It is important to recognise this historical 
context in order to separate it a little from the egalitarian principles put 
forward by Rousseau and Marx. 
It is argued that Bolshevism, though having roots in Marxist thought, can 
neither be called communism nor socialism in the nineteenth century 
meaning of the words (Plamenatz 1954:319). The Bolsheviks took the 
predictions of Marx on board and decided to leap the preceding bourgeois 
revolution. They began this, under the leadership of Lenin, by forming a 
proletarian party in a country where there was not a proletariat and 
accomplished in a few generations what, theoretically, should have occurred, 
through several stages, over generations (Plamenatz 1954: 328-9). The stages 
were to involve reform of the feudal system, with the rise of capital production 
creating the bourgeoise. This form of society would then be overthrown by 
the proletariat leading to a classless and stateless society (Jones 1992:12). 
The enormity of their ambition and the certainty with which they pursued 
it drove the Bolsheviks to reject all tradition in politics, all conventions in 
morals, all constraints of science. As heralds and engineers of a new age, 
they had not just overthrown the past but superseded its rules and limits 
(Feschbach and Friendly 1992:28). 
Essentially, they 'declared possible what must be impossible, if theory is true; 
they... also created new kinds of inequality and oppression as extensive and 
self-perpetuating as the old' (Plamenatz 1954: 329). So, the style of 
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Communism that emerged so quickly in Russia was not so much successful 
Marxian socialism at work, as a result of the visions of ambitious and powerful 
people. The spread of communism from Russia to other parts of Europe 
during and following WWII was not due to its popular support but, rather, a 
consequence of Soviet military power (Plamenatz 1954: 327-9). So, while a 
Lithuanian delegation went to Moscow to "ask" to be incorporated into the 
Soviet Union, they were in fact unwilling supporters of communism. 
The autocratic system that existed prior to 1917 is also an important factor in 
the style of communism that developed. Marx envisaged the proletarian 
revolution occurring in an established capitalistic democracy. The secrecy 
required by Lenin and his party in a police state had significant implications 
for its workings and the lack of democratic principles that followed (Plamenatz 
1954:324) (see 7.2.2.1). 
Lenin adhered to Marx's notion of nature discussed above; 'the dialectical-
materialist view that [humans], whatever historical conditions they live in, 
see themselves confronted with a world of things which cannot be transcended 
and which they must appropriate in order to survive' (Schmidt 1973:63). 
While it is reasonable to argue that humans must 'appropriate' certain matter 
from nature to ensure survival, the means and extent of this appropriation 
is the key concern. Can the production of an ever increasing amount of 
goods, together with the waste, pollution, and habitat and species Joss that 
results (i.e. from capitalism or communism), be justified as necessary for the 
survival of humanity? 
Communism, as it has been borne out in practice, 'must be seen as an 
aberration rather than an example of the inherent tendencies or "logic" of a 
planned economy' (Eckersley 1992:137). 
The old Stalinist economic model was a politico-ideological construct, in 
which social (dictatorship of the proletariat) and political (party monopoly 
of power) considerations overshadowed economic [and environmental] ones. 
Economic data were tailored to fit ideological claims; the whole economic 
picture was a big hoax, but the painting was so well done that even Western 
economists were sometimes taken in....[T]he demolition of that monumental 
hoax is not only a daunting economic and social undertaking but also a 
psychological trauma for the people involved (Brucan 1992:19). 
The contradictions between German Marxism and Russian Communism 
(particularly in the use of violence and the oppression of the workers) is an 
important distinction for the issue of social justice yet perhaps it has little 
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relevance in terms of the environment. As has already been discussed, 
socialism/communism (in theory and in practice) has no better record for 
acknowledgment of the nonhuman world. While environmental issues 
might not be expected to be considered (and the extent of environmental 
destruction foreseen) during these developments from 1902-1917, and even 
later as the Soviet system grew, it seems the Soviet system also failed on the 
central issue of equality. As Plamenatz explained in 1954, 'the Bolsheviks, 
though their achievements are great, have brought more suffering to the 
workers and peasants than to any other class' (Plamenatz 1954:330). He went 
further to point out that in their efforts to make Russia a rich country they 
were willing to sacrifice the welfare of the people to their 'future 
aggrandizement' (Plamenatz 1954:330). It is this aggrandisement in the pursuit 
of industrial development, together with the lack of a structural system for 
public participation, that was at the core of environmental destruction in 
the USSR. 
5.4.1.1 Industrialisation and Resource Efficiency 
An official tenet of the Marxist-Leninist ideology was that socialism, contra 
capitalism, was able to avoid the ecological costs of modern society because 
they could be taken into account in the so-called rational process of economic 
planning. Reality proved otherwise (Norgaard and Pedersen 1994:100). The 
excesses and inefficiencies of the resource-intensive Soviet system, as outlined 
in section 2.2.1, were acknowledged from within during the late 1980s. In 
1990, Soviet scholars estimated that the economic cost of environmental 
degradation in the 1980s was approximately eleven to fifteen times greater 
than the amount spent on environmental protection. Those calculations 
did not include the cost of illness (including sickness benefits and production 
forgone) much of which was associated with pollution and which accounted 
for around four million Soviet absentees each day (Feschbach and Friendly 
1992: 254). 
The most inefficient aspect of the Soviet economic system was that industries 
were developed to accommodate the whole of, or large regions within, the 
USSR. Huge factories were designed to produce one product, or even a 
single part of a product, for the region. These parts would be passed on from 
republic to republic for value-adding (Lieven 1993:334). Such practices, 
designed to ensure interdependence amongst the republics and thereby hinder 
secession, significantly increased costs and pollution. For example, a group 
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of factories in Kaunas produced every single television tuner in the Soviet 
Union (Lieven 1993:334). Thus, the new countries have in place factories 
with capacities well above their domestic needs (such as Ignalina NPP) and a 
reliance on inputs from elsewhere in the Soviet Union, the supply of which 
has been disrupted or halted. 
Environmental costs were not even considered as externalities in the Soviet 
Union where the entire economy was included in a 'gigantic monofirm'. 
The lack of agencies, which in capitalist economies help alleviate social and 
environmental costs, meant that environmental impacts were not considered. 
Those environmental agencies that were formed had a very low standing in 
the bureaucracy. Incentives mechanisms for fulfilling targets were offered 
independently from the use of resources in the process (Norgaard and Pedersen 
1994:100). The mentality where production targets are more important than 
economic efficiency and ecological sustainability is still firmly entrenched in 
the system. 'Therefore, the negative investment in the environment is 
very difficult to halt, and the cumulative damage to the environmental 
capital cannot be remedied in any brief period of time' (Keren 1992:245). 
5.4.2 Environmental Consequences of the Market: Lessons from CEE 
The CEE countries that abandoned communism after the revolutions of 
1989 provide an example for the FSU countries following in their path 23 
years later. Already it is clear that similar processes, policies, and impacts 
have developed in Lithuania as experienced in Poland, Czech Republic, 
Bulgaria, and Hungary. Despite the intrinsic belief of many of the right-of-
centre leaders in the CEE that the free market system would 'succeed where 
communism had failed', the transition left unchanged many of the 'economic 
and social structures inherited from communism' (Manser 1993:147-8). 
There seems to have been an imbalance in the policy directions. Thus, 
while old polluting coal-fired power stations remained in operation, 
governments were promoting investments in the nuclear industry, leaving 
little incentive to conserve energy or develop renewable sources. Production 
targets took precedence over energy efficiency. Less expensive technologies 
were used in preference to cleaner, modern solutions (Manser 1993:148-9). 
As Chapter 2 demonstrates, the Lithuanian government has committed itself 
to a new oil terminal which has been criticised as economically and 
environmentally unsound. The support for the terminal is contrasted with 
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the argument that, due to the recession, funds are not available for 
decommissioning Ignalina or for seriously developing alternative energy 
sources. Meanwhile, the consumer-orientated promotion techniques used 
by Western companies to sell more cars and household products in the CEE 
undermine moves to reduce transport emissions and the phosphate content 
of sewage (Manser 1993:148-9). Around sixty percent of air pollution in 
Lithuania is derived from transport and the phosphorous content continues 
to be a problem in the face of inadequate sewage treatment (see Chapters 2 
and 3). Therefore, active promotion of foreign consortia which use such 
techniques may have a more significant impact on the environment than in 
Western countries where environment agencies have been established and 
measures have already been put in place to withstand some of the impact. 
Foreign assistance has also been unevenly spread. Hundreds of millions of 
dollars have been granted for economic and structural reform in the CEE 
while comparatively small amounts have been directed toward 
environmental rehabilitation (Manser 1993:149, see also 6.2.1.1). 
Despite the rhetoric of developing a "third way", the governments of CEE 
tended to follow in the footsteps of the West, a trend that the Baltic States 
have continued. Western advice to the CEE and FSU directed the new 
leaders away from more radical, environmentally sensitive policies. Manser 
(1993:149) contends that: 
Madical environmental policies which would have enabled the region to 
overtake the West and provide an economic and environmental infrastructure 
for the 21st century were considered inappropriate. Thus zero import duties 
on turbines for small hydroelectric power plants, costly royalties on the 
exploitation of non-renewable resources, road charging and tax breaks for 
households investing in energy saving were all rejected, partly because there 
was no Western example to follow. 
It seems that the rhetoric over both the importance of environmental 
protection and the need to develop the economy without sacrificing the 
environment was short lived such that 'the apparent strength of this universal 
commitment to the environment quickly faltered, and a very different picture 
emerged' (Fisher 1992:7) (see 5.4.5). Rather than taking advantage of the 
commitment and spirit of the population following the 1989 revolutions as 
an opportunity to avoid the environmental and economic mistakes of the 
West, the CEE governments (followed closely by those in the FSU) chose 
instead to mimic them. The acceptance of ideal models unsuited to the 
specific problems of the region has threatened to make the impact of such 
mistakes much worse. Acknowledgement that economic and environmental 
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reform must go hand in hand was replaced by a perception that the major 
role of government agencies was to clean up after industries. 'In other 
words, the clear pro-active environmental remit of the quiet revolutions 
was replaced by a retro-active approach' (Manser 1993:150). 
5.4.2.1 The Environmental Action Plan for Central and Eastern Europe 
There has been no evidence that recommendations drafted at the first 
Environment for Europe conference held in Czeclvslovakia in 1991 have 
been implemented. Further recommendations were made for integrating 
environmental considerations into economic reform at the second conference 
in Switzerland in 1993 (Manser 1993:151). According to Baumgartl, it is 
evident that the Environment for Europe Process has 'definitely shifted into 
a lower gear' in comparison with the broader intentions of the first conference 
(Baumgartl 1994:147). The 1993 recommendations were outlined in the 
Environmental Action Programme for Central and Eastern Europe (EAP) 
which has been criticised for being 'overly optimistic about the positive 
impact of market reforms and industrial restructuring on the environment' 
since without effective environmental policies the market cannot facilitate 
restructuring (Pesko 1993 in Manser 1993:151). The programme assumes 
that economic measures such as paying for pollution, debt for nature swaps, 
or increasing energy prices would be enough to reduce impacts. However, 
what is not clear is how such a programme could stimulate the development 
of renewable energy sources, organic farming, eco-tourism, or triple glazed 
windows for example, needed to support the economic measures if the 
environmental situation is to be turned around (Manser 1993:151). In other 
words, the level of commitment to programmes is not only reflected in the 
financial and technical transfers. A supportive infrastructure is necessary 
which is mindful of the interrelationship between economics, society, and 
the environment. It is, therefore, essential that new programmes are 'backed 
up with vigorous implementation and evaluation; their political credibility 
is undermined when this kind of support decreases' (Baumgartl 1994:147). 
Another criticism of the plan has been that it fails to recognise the differences 
and specific needs of the included countries as it treats the region as a single 
unit. Further, it has been criticised as being politically driven rather than an 
action plan designed to improve environmental quality (Gyulai 1994). As 
discussed in section 6.2.4 and later in Chapter 7, there are economic and 
political limitations to successful implementation of national and 
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international environmental schemes. 
The environmental ministers at the conference (European, G-24, ex-USSR) 
'adopted a declaration that "endorses" manifold measures but "adopts" very 
few of them' (Baumgartl 1994:148). Commitment being the difference between 
the two. The commitment to the recommendations of the EAP is questionable 
given the substitution of the term "project preparation committee" for "project 
preparation facility". The planned facility would have been a new institution 
overseeing environmeital projects in CEE with a capacity to implement the 
immediate action programme, requiring a strong commitment. The amended 
committee may be less susceptible to politicisation and bureaucratisation but 
it has 'no authority, capacity, or power to push forward and implement 
projects' quickly' (Baumgartl 1994:147). The EAP necessarily involved 
compromise and the formulation was cautious and diplomatic, with a focus 
on creating guidelines. 
Baumgartl (1994:147)argues that the inclusion of viewpoints from CEE experts 
and NGOs provided a more realistic framework 'for for the EAP and this was 
rewarded by its general acceptance. If implemented, says Baumgartl, the 
programme could dramatically improve the environmental situation in CEE, 
however, the implementation cannot be carried out by its authors and the 
environmental threat will continue for at least two decades since governments 
are not supporting it with an adequate infrastructure. 
5.4.3 Independent Lithuania 
As the examples in Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate, the economy and the 
environment are closely interrelated in Lithuania. The common catchcry of 
"for Lithuania's economic independence" took precedence over earlier 
commitments to environmental protection. Given the arduous economic 
circumstances following the reinstatement of independence (see 5.4.3.1 below), 
it is difficult to condemn the Lithuanian government, other governments 
in the region, or the Lithuanian public for making economic progress their 
primary concern. At the time, when the extent of environmental destruction 
in the USSR was revealed to the West, environmentalists pointed to the 
need to improve the situation. But a year or so after regaining independence 
it became more difficult for Lithuania to remain committed to environmental 
rehabilitation in the face of rising inflation. 
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During the first period of independence in 1918-1940, Lithuania's economic 
development was seen to be on a par with some Central European and 
Scandinavian countries. Lithuania was predominantly agricultural, exporting 
poultry and pork products to Germany, the United Kingdom, and Scandinavia 
while importing machinery and other industrial products. A macroeconomc 
equilibrium was established relatively quickly and was sustained throughout 
the interwar period (including the Great Depression) and the currency was 
one of the strongest in Europe (Samonis 1996:141). In trying to enter Western 
markets now, Lithuania faces greater internal obstacles than they did in the 
1920s. They also have more significant barriers from the West (Lieven 
1993:332). 
When Lithuania was incorporated into the USSR, the economy was 
transformed until, by the mid-1950s, it was barely distinguishable from 
elsewhere in the Union. All major economic processes and activities were 
undertaken by the All Union Government in Moscow. The Soviet approach 
to production, particularly nstorming" (4) to meet production targets and 
subsequent inflationary pressures, resulted in significant inefficiencies (see 
5.4.1.1) which were reflected in the liberalising Lithuanian economy of the ?- 
early stages of transition. Once the system was 'freed' from its artificial - 
structures, inflation skyrocketed (World Bank 1993:3 and Felmingham 
1992:104). Thus, they not only had the unprecedented task of transforming 
their economies from plan to market, but they had a rather depressed situation 
from which to begin. However, it was the same central government that 
established some relatively sophisticated industries in the country, such as 
machine building and metal working which became the main export 
industries with the textile, leather, and agricultural industries also being 
important (World Bank 1993:4) (see also 5.4.1). 
The gradual relaxation of central control over Lithuania's economic activity 
in the 1980s did not stimulate an economic revival, primarily because the 
basic economic system remained the same. The World Bank (1993:4) noted 
that: 
4* This refers to the habit of storming (or rushing) at the end of each production period in 
order to meet subscribed targets. This means that the next step in the production cycle (typically 
at another factory, even in another republic) is also confronted with larger amounts of inputs 
at certain times, resulting in troughs and peaks in the cycle (Felmingham 1992:104). 
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increasing political and economic turmoil in the entire Soviet Union and, in 
particular, the lack of effective enterprise control, intensified macroeconomic 
imbalances and led Lithuania's economy, an indeed all the economies of the 
FSU, into an unprecedented crisis. 
Since independence, this crisis has intensified and Lithuania has been faced 
with incredible increases in prices and inflation (up to 1160 per cent per 
annum), disproportionate rises in wages, declining production, supply 
shortfalls (primarily from Russia), and increased unemployment. As a result, 
during 1990-1992, GDP fell by an average of 19 per cent per year (with a 
decline of 35 per cent in 1992), while energy shortages and rationing of goods 
and services compounded the effects for the local population (World Bank 
1993:4-5) (see 5.4.3.1). 
The fragility of the new independent governments in the CEE (and this is 
equally applicable to Lithuania) limits them to a very short term perspective 
while the variable interest rates constrain long term investment plans, 
including environmental projects. There are also significant pressures from 
industry lobbies. As Fisher (1992:9) notes; 'Such a situation militates against 
the implementation of any policy which requires the complex synthesizing 
of abstract and long-term interests, such as environment and development'. 
The attitude of those in government (and indeed that of the general 
population) is summarised by a statement from Yuri Shcherbak a year before 
he became Ukraine's environment minister: 'It's rich countries that can 
allow themselves the luxury of comprehensive environmental protection' 
(in Feschbach and Friendly 1992:253). However, the inseparableness of 
environment and economy means that 'without cleaner air, purer water 
and agriculture less dependent on dangerous chemicals, advances in other 
measures of social and economic well-being could not be sustained' (Feschbach 
and Friendly 1992:253-4). 
Whether it is the more obvious connections such as the production and 
supply of energy or the less apparent link between forest protection and 
tourism potential, the relationship is not unidirectional. The latter is certainly 
an opportunity for Lithuania as the many lakes and afforested areas are rare 
in Europe. The tourism ministry is acutely aware of this with some 
promotional material emerging which emphasises Lithuania as a place 
offering history and nature. However, a lot still needs to be done to attract 
tourists from Western Europe and abroad. 
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5.4.3.1 Economic Review 1990-1996 
Much has been written on the economic situation in the Baltics and other 
FSU and CEE countries since the end of communist rule. It has been an 
underlying assumption so far in this thesis that there were adverse economic 
conditions in Lithuania following the restoration of independence in 1990/1. 
The aim of this section is to briefly, and by no means comprehensively, 
outline the economic situation and thereby provide evidence of the assumed 
economic hardship referred to earlier which has been a contributing factor 
in the decline of the Green movement, the decreased urgency in 
environmental decision-making, and the push towards economic rationalist 
policies. However, again, it is only one of a myriad of issues which have led 
to the decline in the perceived importance of environmental issues and to 
the complexity of the reform process in which environmental policy must 
be formulated. 
A blueprint for economic independence was developed in 1988 (see also 
4.3.3.2) and adopted by the Reform Movement, Sajudis as an essential 
component of political independence. It stated: 
the time has come to design and implement the system of sovereign 
Lithuania's economic organization and management which would be capable 
of raising the unjustifiably low living standards and of assuring the 
appropriate satisfaction of social and spiritual needs of all the social strata 
(in Samonis 1996:142). 
Fundamental to such aims was the economic sovereignty of Lithuania from 
the USSR. The blueprint proposed the reintroduction of the national currency 
and the establishment of a national bank with the usual powers of regulation 
and analysis of such banks in market economies. The Bank of Lithuania 
was established in February 1990 (Samonis 1996:143). Whilst economic 
sovereignty need not mean a market economy (see 5.4.5), this has been the 
path taken by Lithuania. There have been serious economic consequences 
for Lithuanians and the 'unjustifiable low living standards' referred to in 
the blueprint worsened. A UNICEF report claims that the reforms in China, 
which have been slower and have not aimed for a 'full-fledged liberal model', 
have produced more positive results in terms of income distribution, poverty, 
and child welfare than have resulted in the CEE/Baltic region but admits 
that another path was severely restricted (indeed rendered impossible) by 
the political disintegration (UNICEF 1995: 55). 
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The worst years seem to have been 1991 to 1993 when Lithuania experienced 
an economic recession due to the contracting export market in the East and a 
reduction in domestic demand due to the declining real income of the 
population (Kalinauskas and Kaminskiene 1996:10). During this time, 
inflation rose from 380 per cent (1991) to 1160 per cent (1992) and 190 per cent 
(1993). Meanwhile real industrial output decreased from minus 5 per cent 
to minus 52 per cent and minus 46 per cent respectively (Samonis 1996:145) 
and GDP fell by as much as 35 per cent. Whilst changes in producer prices 
impacted on inflation levels, the fundamental factor was a shortage of currency 
(Markelevicius 1996:38). Markelevicius, therefore, argues that the re-
introduction of the litas in July 1993 was most influential in controlling 
inflation as well as the introduction of a currency board which regulated the 
litas according to the US dollar. Samonis (1996:156) has questioned the 
value of such a board in the Lithuanian case, particularly since inflation was 
already dropping and the litas was appreciating. Markelevicius (1996:38) 
argues that despite the negative consequences of the currency board it did 
have a significant role in decreasing inflation. 
The supply shortages of inputs, particularly energy, caused problems for the 
already inefficient industries. Construction, transport, and other material 
services were hardest hit. Agriculture's share in production fell from 35 per 
cent to 17 percent during 1990-1991 while industry temporarily rose to 60 per 
cent but then was drastically reduced by around 50 per cent within the first 
half of 1992. The shortage of goods, which led to a period of rationing, 
together with rising prices and the comparative decline in real wages, led to 
a sharp decline in private consumption and in overall investment (World 
Bank 1993:5). 
The relatively fast pace of price reform had temporary benefits for Lithuania's 
trade balance in 1991. The price of exports was increasing faster than the 
imports from the FSU, resulting in a trade balance shift from a deficit of 9 
per cent in 1990 to a surplus of 9 per cent in 1991 (World Bank 1993:7). 
However, the price reform in Russia the following year which led to the 
switch to world market prices, essentially reversed this situation and the 
trade balance began to fall (World Bank 1993:7 and Markelevicius 1996:47). 
The oil prices were especially difficult for Lithuania to cope with and the 
resulting 'trade shock' has been described as more severe than the Western 
5.  Rationing was enforced on items such as butter, sugar, flour, and cereal. 
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oil crisis of the 1970s (Samonis 1996:150) (see Chapter 2). Lithuania also 
recorded budget surpluses in 1991, 1992, and 1993 which Samonis (1996:148) 
accredits to 'the most conservative and sound [fiscal policies] in the world, 
perhaps in continuation of the interwar tradition'. 
By 1994, general economic indicators had begun to improve. GDP began to 
increase which is attributed to a growth in trade and the services sector in 
1995, accounting for 26 per cent and 59.9 per cent of GDP respectively. GDP 
was expected to increase by 4 per cent in 1996 (Kalinauskas and Kaminskiene 
1996:10). Inflation, too, has been declining. In 1994, it had declined to 45 per 
cent and to 35.7 in 1995 (Lithuanian Department of Statistics 1996a:6-7). 
The contribution of agriculture has continued to decline and, by 1995, it 
represented about 9.5 per cent of GDP (Kalinauskas and Kaminskiene 1996:10). 
This is due in part to the pressure of the EU trade agreements and the limit 
of 8.5 per cent on agricultural production for membership consideration (see 
5.4.4 and 7.4.1.4). The EU's Common Agricultural policy in general will be a 
'curse for the Baits as for the rest of Eastern Europe' (Lieven 1993:332). The 
trend away from agriculture is also evidenced in the structure of investment 
proposed under the national Public Investment Programme 1996-1998. The 
agricultural sector receives only one per cent of allocations. The 
environmental sector accounts for a significant proportion of the programme, 
primarily due to capital costs associated with waste water treatment 
(Kalinauskas 1996:19). It remains to be seen whether the new conservative 
government which came to power in October 1996 will continue to support 
the environmental sector (see also 6.3.2.2). 
Average wages continue to improve but still remain much lower than 
elsewhere in Europe. Average wages increased from 316 litas (USD 79) per 
month in January 1995 to 485 (USD 121) litas per month in 1996. Approximately 
74 per cent of this is absorbed in food, rent, heating, and electricity. While 
wages and pensions typically constitute around 50 per cent of a Lithuanian 
household's disposable income ), it indicates the difficulty faced by most 
families, particularly in the winter season when heating costs are at their 
greatest. 
6 Other income is primarily generated from self employment (selling of garden produce for 
example) but can also include income from rent and welfare benefits (Lithuanian Department 
of Statistics 1996a:40). 
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Unemployment has increased significantly following the restoration of 
independence due to the removal of artificial Soviet job structure and 
declining production. This was initially controlled by restraints on 
administrative lay-offs and remained below one per cent in late 1992 (World 
Bank 1993:6). In May 1996, the national unemployment rate had increased 
to 7.4 per cent with some regions registering 14-18 per cent unemployed. 
Most of the registered unemployed belong to the 30-49 age group (54.6 per 
cent) followed by the under 24 age group (16 per cent) (Lithuanian Department 
of Statistics 1996a:32-3). Employment levels have also been affected by the 
decrease in population and a decrease in the proportion of 'able-bodied 
persons' (Gruzevskis and Misiunas 1996:24). 
Pensions are allocated on the basis of a base pension which, according to law, 
must be at least 110 per cent of the minimum living standard (90 litas per 
month as at June 1996). The average retirement pension amounts to 180 
litas per month (USD 45), significantly below the average wage (Lithuanian 
Department of Statistics 1996a:11). 
An evaluation of the economic performance of the Baltic States in 1995 
showed that Lithuania had a lower standard of living than Estonia and 
Latvia. While the 25 per cent inflation target was, quite rightly, seen as 
optimistic, Lithuania's long term prospects are viewed as reasonable given 
the large domestic market. According to Lucas (1995a), the aspect requiring 
most change is the attitude within the state bureaucracy (Lucas 1995a) (see 
also 7.2.1.3, 7.2.3, and 7.4.4.1). 
5.4.3.2 Privatisation 
As discussed above (5.3.1 and 5.3.2), the abolition of private property was an 
integral feature of the communist system. Thus, privatisation becomes 
fundamental to any transformation of that system. Aside from North Korea 
and Cuba, all command economies have undergone significant changes in 
economic, political, and social policies (UNICEF 1995:54). The extent and 
time frame of and the way in which this is carried out, is significant in terms 
of its social, economic, and environmental implications. As Dharam Ghai 
(1995:6), Director of the United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development, has argued, the introduction of the market and the privatisation 
of state enterprises in the CEE region 'has been accompanied by reduction or 
restraint in government expenditure, often involving cuts in social services, 
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welfare and security and the phasing out of subsidies on items of mass 
consumption.' 
Henry George argued for guaranteed possession based on a rental system 
whereby 'the rental value of natural resources would be sufficient to finance 
socially-necessary expenditure' (Harrison 1991:207). Such a system would 
aim to retain the communal spirit of socialist philosophy while at the same 
time securing some benefits of free enterprise and avoiding the cyclical 
recessions that afflict Western economies. George was also aware of the 
problems of resource exploitation, arguing that full rent to the community 
for the privilege of exploiting finite resources would in turn conserve nature 
(Harrison 1991:207-8). Harrison argues that 'Rifle Western tenanted sector 
works as efficiently as the owner-occupied sector, so private ownership is 
not a precondition for kick-starting the economy in the direction of the free 
market' (Harrison 1991:212). Samonis (1995:149) disagrees: 'privatization 
and the associated demonopolization is by far the most important element, 
indeed the backbone of transition from plan to market'. 
Poland's now famous "shock therapy" involved massive and speedy 
privatisation while Lithuania followed suit, albeit eventually at a slower 
pace. Initially, Lithuania was seen as one of the most aggressive privatisers 
in the post-communist region. The Primary Privatisation Law of March 
1991 established a voucher system for Lithuanian citizens in order for them 
to purchase homes, shares, or bonds (Samonis 1995:151, Berliner 1992). 
Initially, the scheme was egalitarian, with limits on individual investment. 
This meant that around 10 people would be needed to by a small shop. 
Under Western pressure, as well as the practicalities of the process and the 
need for hard currency, the egalitarianism was modified and by the end of 
1992 it had disappeared (Lieven 1993:341). By 1992, over 50 per cent of 
enterprises had been privatised, representing over one third of Lithuania's 
productive assets (Samonis 1995:146, 150). This pace was slowed somewhat 
on the election of the LDDP Government in October 1992 (see 7.2.1.2). The 
Government halted the privatisation process for two months, resuming it 
in the winter of 1993 and hastening it toward the end of 1994 (Samonis 
1995:151-2). 
In 1991, Fred Harrison (Director of Incentive Taxation in London) had warned 
that 'by adopting the western model of property rights in land, the Soviets 
would recreate the social divisions, anchored in the power of land ownership, 
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which caused the revolution in 1917' (Harrison 1991:215). It has been estimated 
that Lithuania suffered one of the steepest increases in poverty levels (along 
with Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, and Azerbaijan, with Estonia and Latvia 
not far behind) during the 1989-1994 period. In 1994, around 39 per cent of 
the Lithuanian population was in poverty compared with around 1.5 per 
cent in 1989. A further 26 per cent were affected by low incomes which, 
although over the absolute poverty line, limited full participation in social 
life (UNICEF 1995: 7-8). 
The liberalisation of markets world wide, it has been argued, has had a 
contractionary impact on the economy leading to an increase in poverty and 
unemployment as well as the associated symptoms of social disintegration 
such as crime, violence, drug abuse, divorce, stress, and alienation which, in 
turn, 'provide fertile ground for the escalation of social conflicts and the 
generation of authoritarian regimes' (Ghai 1995:7). The privatisation process 
has so completely absorbed the post-communist economies that they are in 
danger of relinquishing state controls and assets still held in Western 
democracies. Up until June 1996, Lithuania was the only Baltic State not 
permitting foreign ownership of property (Lucas 1995a). Estonia is in the 
midst of a large-scale privatising process (including transport, 
telecommunications, and utilities). The process is slowing now but when 
complete (with assistance from the EU's PHARE programme), Estonia will 
have one of the most privatised economies in Europe (Lucas 1995). 
The transfer of ownership of state enterprises in CEE and FSU is more 
complicated than the privatisation of government services in the West. It 
involved several dimensions: allowing the formation of new companies; 
dismantling the large state enterprises into smaller independent units to 
foster competition (demonopolisation); allowing inefficient companies to 
close; selling most of the state industrial sector; and selling (or transferring) 
agricultural land to the private sector. The last two are what is generally 
known as privatisation (Mason 1992:91). It was extremely difficult to establish 
the value of the enterprises because of a lack of Western accounting practices 
as well as the false value of local currencies. Thus, the privatisation process 
'was inextricably linked with the development of a convertible currency, the 
establishment of a banking system, and the creation of stock markets (Mason 
1992:91). Keren argues that, without reorganisation, the process is 'very 
difficult, unprofitable and time-consuming, and may permanently damage 
those economies' since 'the existing enterprises are of little value, their 
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capital stock may be ill-adjusted to the task of generating profits and their 
capital value is highly uncertain' (Keren 1992: 239). 
There were many other problems associated with this process. Not least of 
these was establishing who owned the enterprises - especially in the FSU, 
where state enterprises were previously owned and controlled from Moscow. 
Some Lithuanians might have hoped that some of the more inefficient and 
polluting enterprises would be the responsibility of Russia but eventually it 
was agreed that all enterprises within the republic belonged to Lithuania.° 
The national sentiment in the country was a force behind their decision. It 
was not seen as justifiable or desirable to have Russian owned factories in 
Lithuania. Following from this, some argued that the employees owned the 
enterprises and that the government should transfer ownership to the 
workers. Had some form of market socialism been the aim rather than a 
capitalist system such suggestions, which could have materialised in the 
form of workers councils as in Yugoslavia (see 5.4.5), may have had benefits 
for both productivity and employee morale. 
The privatisation process was also characterised by widespread corruption 
which saw enterprises sold cheaply to Directors, bribery amongst local 
government officials and the judiciary, bidding by Lithuanian citizens on 
behalf of Russian businessmen and organised cartels, and theft of equipment. 
By 1994, around 2.5 billion litas (USD 625 million) of state assets had been 
illegally privatised (Samonis 1995:152-3). 
Land ownership was also problematic since the farmers living on the land 
were often in conflict with pre-annexation owners and their descendents 
who were attempting to reclaim their property. This was more complicated 
in areas that had been designated National Park status. Brukas, the Secretary 
of the Ministry of Forestry, recalled that the privatisation of forests was a 
controversial issue in Lithuania and debate in Parliament slowed down the 
process. Examples of well managed state-owned forests such as in Canada 
were compared with less successful examples such as China, demonstrating 
that the political situation is important in establishing whether state or 
communal ownership of forests is more beneficial than private ownership 
for the environment (Brukas 1994). It has been estimated that 30-40 per cent 
Disagreements continue over ownership of more lucrative enterprises such as an oil drilling 
platform off the coast close to the Kaliningrad/Lithuania sea border. 
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of Lithuania's forests could become privatised (Vaitkevicius 1994). 
The process has been toward small ownership with an average area estimated 
to be about 6 hectares and leading to a possible increase to 100 000 individual 
owners. The Forestry Ministry is generally against the proliferation of owners 
but the notion of community ownership was rejected by parliament (Brukas 
1994). It could be said that the use of organic methods of farming and small 
scale economic activity is more likely to be carried out on small properties. 
On the other hand, the concentration of animals stocked on a small area and 
the concentration of pesticides and fertilisers could increase causing problems 
for ground water (see also 3.4.4 and 7.4.1.4). 
The current land reform legislation groups forests into four categories. The 
fourth category, 'economic use', makes up around 75 per cent of the afforested 
area while the first three: 'reserved forests' where no economic activity is 
allowed; 'specific use' has some parts wholly protected, allowing certain 
activities such as recreation and some felling of mature trees (but not clear 
felling); and 'reserved areas' aimed primarily at soil protection, make up 
around the remainder. When privatisation is completed, forests will be 
allocated to a certain category and the owner will be required to become 
familiar with what is permitted and be obliged to comply with those conditions. 
Accordingly, it would be possible for land currently under strict reservation 
(a National Park) 8) to be reclaimed by a former owner as long as the new 
owners understood that they must comply with any restrictions. 
Compensation is also a possibility and land tax exemptions would apply in 
protected areas (Brukas 1994). 
Other incentives, disincentives, and effective policing of these regulations 
would be necessary if abuses by owners are to be avoided. Given the economic 
situation, there is likely to be a temptation to secure income from felling. In 
October 1995, the Forestry Ministry issued a warning to the 40 000 owners of 
afforested land due to the apparent devastation being caused by logging (ELTA, 
October 1, 1995). The 1997 revisions to the law on the restoration of property 
include the provision of compensation in the form of afforested land rather 
than agricultural lane and many claimants have begun to take this option 
8 This does not include Kursui Nerios Park on the coast which has been designated a special 
area and is thus exempted from private ownership given that there is no history of agricultural 
activity and there have not been any native owners. 
9 This change is presumably to restrict the number of people working agricultural land, 
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and to harvest the timber. The Green Movement has begun a campaign for 
forest protection in Lithuania in protest of the amendments (Linas Vainius, 
pers. comm., March 1997). 
The Landsbergis Government (March 1990 to October 1992) was much criticised 
for its privatisation policy. Many argued that it was implemented too quickly, 
particularly in the agricultural sector. Farmers struggled to make a profit 
under the new system, which appeared to be a crucial factor in the defeat of 
the Landsbergis Government at the elections of October 1992; the major 
swing toward the Democratic Labour Party came mainly from rural areas 
(see also 7.2.1.2). The Brazauskas Government has been similarly criticised 
for halting the privatisation process. Samonis (1995), for example, clearly 
believes that the approach of the LDDP Government has unnecessarily delayed 
Lithuania's transition from a planned to market economy. 
It has been argued (Keren 1992) that the privatised state enterprises will in 
fact hinder growth in the private sector because their structures have been 
based on completely different premises. The aim of state enterprises was to 
meet production targets rather than to maximise profits. In addition, there 
is the problem of human resources. Managers and employees do not have 
market orientated skills and the 'Soviet style' of business will take a long 
time to disappear. The inefficiency of this approach is likely to: continue 
under market conditions unless there is reorganisation of capital; both physical 
and human. Keren therefore suggests that there is a need for a new private 
sector instead of directing a lot of investment into old enterprises where it is 
essentially wasted. Building a new private sector should begin with the 
privatisation of small businesses and small areas of land rather than large 
state enterprises (Keren 1992: 239-46). Further, Peterson (1993:255) provides 
several examples of the way in which investment has often exacerbated 
environmental problems in the Soviet region. This has been primarily 
through funding the extraction of resources or production of goods for 
Western purposes using Western technology without employing pollution 
control features or ensuring maintenance of equipment as would be expected 
in the West. 
Interestingly, investment from the West tends to be more accepted by Green 
activists (as is industry funding of their activities) in the former communist 
encouraging other forms of economic activity and avoiding conflict with the EU over agricultural 
policy. 
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bloc than among their counterparts in the West. The Green groups in the 
region have not had the same conflictual relationship with private industry 
(only with the state monopoly) that has been experienced in Western 
countries. Thus, Western investment is generally regarded as necessary for 
economic and environmental recovery (Fisher 1992:18) (see also 6.2). 
Yet investment has failed to produce new capital. Much of what has been 
recorded as investment has simply maintained antiquated machinery. 
Cleaner, cost saving technology is slow to infiltrate the post-communist 
economies. This is not simply because funds have been sustaining old 
technology at the expense of the new. The tendency is for industries and 
other businesses to continue with old, obsolete practices or incorporate new 
installed capacity with the old. It is not clear whether the failure of new 
technologies to supplant obsolete ones is simple conservatism or a deliberate 
attempt to retain old facilities as a buffer (Keren 1992:241-3). Old habits are 
not easily transformed. The usual way of business, or life in general, can not 
be expected to undergo such a fundamental change quickly. The rules for a 
new focus of work need to be formulated and internalised. Learning new 
practices requires time and energy which participants might not be prepared 
to give (Keren 1992:247). Anecdotal evidence from Lithuania's early years of 
independence demonstrates Keren's point. Charity donations of modern 
equipment in hospitals and dental surgeries lay idle while medical 
practitioners preferred equipment and practices which were well known to 
them. Patients too seem to have preferred the safety of the old ways rather 
than trust the unknown. The 'Soviet style' service in restaurants and shops 
also shows how the change to a profit orientated approach will involve 
major adjustments in work place practices. 
5.4.3.3 Industrial Pollution and the Economy 
The Ministry of Environmental Protection points to the inclusion of Lithuania 
in the Soviet economy as the cause of the present fiscal problems. It recognises 
the limitations that the state of the economy places on the implementation 
of its policies and therefore sees foreign capital investment as crucial to 
economic reform (Environmental Protection Department 1992:29-34) (see 
also 6.2). Factories closed as a result of supply shortages, the glaring economic 
inefficiencies in their production, and the efforts of environmentalists. In 
1992, industrial output fell by more than 50 per cent (Lieven 1993:330). As 
noted in Chapter 3, the decrease in production referred to above led to an 
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improvement in the environmental situation. Section 5.4.3.1 presents 
indications of an improving economy, with increases in GDP and declining 
inflation. Such improvements will necessarily involve increased pollution 
and measures should be taken to ensure the efforts in environmental 
protection over the last few years are not counteracted. As noted by Fisher 
(1992) some of these measures are not necessarily expensive but could go a 
long way to maintaining decreased pollution levels. Improved technology 
will be important as will effective monitoring and policing programmes (see 
6.3.1.2), but none of these can be effective without financial and structural 
support from the Government which ultimately rests on commitment. 
Section 5.3.2 points to the inability of the market to provide such support on 
its own. Therefore, if Lithuania is to take advantage of the improved 
environmental situation and establish an environmentally sustainable 
society, such commitment from the Government will be necessary. 
Issues such as waste water treatment require large capital costs and have, 
therefore, required foreign assistance (see also 3.4, 6.2, and 6.2.3.2). Thus, 
there does need to be an improvement in the economic situation in order to 
fund the enormous costs of implementing some environmental policies. 
However, some environmental protection cannot wait for such an 
improvement, particularly since increased economic activity typically causes 
more environmental degradation: 
Continued disregard of the environment will not only affect the quality of 
life of the population, but also ultimately reduce economic productivity and 
increase production costs. Thus, environmental improvements must proceed 
hand in hand with economic structural reforms (Helsinki Commission 1992, 
Ch. 4:3&6). 
Whilst the LDDP economic policies have been criticised as 'detours' from 
the road to a market economy (Samonis 1996), they have essentially had a 
rational economics approach and an orientation toward EU membership 
which have had various implications for the environment. There has been 
essentially little difference in the political programmes of LDDP and the 
Sajudis camp and they both implemented conservative style economic policies 
whilst the "Right" have, at times, supported interventionism (see 7.2.1.1). 
The new conservative Government may redirect Lithuania back on to the 
road to a free market economy by taking a more liberal approach which 
should lead to improvement in traditional economic indicators. Yet as 
noted in 5.2-5.3, the typical implications of such policies are not only increased 
environmental degradation but also a widening gap between rich and poor. 
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It seems almost certain that the new Government will not be giving 
environmental protection any more consideration than the past government 
indeed it may in fact place less priority on the environmental sphere. The 
focus on EU membership could have some positive implications for 
environmental policy in Lithuania, however, in the main, EU policies are a 
hindrance to the establishment of an environmentally progressive society 
(see 7.3.1.3). 
5.4.4 The European Union 
The European Union (EU) (10) is an interesting example for discussing economic 
systems and the environment. While it is based on a market economy with 
an emphasis on free trade, it also encompasses principles of integration and 
co-operation which formed part of the philosophy of the Soviet Union. It is 
relevant here because Lithuania has been accepted as a member of the Council 
of Europe (a stepping stone to the EU) which will have political, economic, 
and environmental consequences for the country. Many environmentalists 
view membership to the European Union as a means of constraining the 
environmentally degrading activities of domestic industry (Fisher 1992:18). 
This support is not matched by Western European Greens, many of whom 
are uneasy about the supposed benefits of membership, including the impacts 
of increased transport (see 5.4.4.2). The Norwegian environmentalists, for 
example, were opposed to membership which was eventually granted 
following a referendum in 1994. Their opposition was based on the patterns 
of growth and free trade within the EU and the impacts these had on the 
management of natural resources, environmental standards and regulations, 
and democracy (Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature 1994:1) 
(see also 7.3.1.2). 
The environment has had a role in EC policy since 1972 but it was not until 
1987 that environmental policy was enacted by amendments to the Single 
European Act of the Treaty of Rome. This decision to give legal and political 
support for the concept of environmental protection in Europe was based on 
the understanding of the transboundary nature of pollution and followed a 
The European Union was established by the Maastricht Treaty which was ratified in 
October 1993. The treaty introduced citizenship of the EU and aimed to increase inter-
governmental co-operation in several areas. The EC continues to exist, having competence in 
matters relating to the Treaty of Rome (Europa World Book 1994:137). For the purposes of 
this thesis, EU and EC have been used synonymously since discussion essentially relates to the 
general concept of a united Europe and EC is used to cite publications written prior to 1993. 
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series of environmental accidents which proved this beyond a doubt" (EC 
1990:5-7). Essentially an organisation designed to facilitate free trade, the EU 
must be able to demonstrate that environmental policy does not infringe 
economic activity. Therefore, conflict arises between economic and 
environmental priorities just as it does within the individual Member States. 
.However, the Commission claims that a key principle of EU policy is that 
the strict standards developed are both environmentally and economically 
necessary thereby dispelling myths that environmental standards are an 
unnecessary burden on industry and emphasising that they can, and should, 
be part of economic growth and job creation (EC 1990:9). In practice, the 
concept of free trade often has precedence over environmental protection. 
However, countries like Lithuania with struggling economies might benefit 
by taking the EU standards on board, with or without inclusion in the 
organisation. 
Expounded in the environmental policy of the EU are the notions that 
"economic expansion is not an end in itself" and "prevention is better than 
cure" (EC 1990:5&10). The transboundary nature of pollution demonstrates 
clearly how it is a matter of international concern and, therefore, that it 
must be guided from that level. Given these transboundary effects, the 
single market agenda of the EU could be affected by environmental concern, 
since the poor environmental record of one member affects both the 
environment and the economy of another. The EU acknowledges that a 
single market will only operate properly if the Member States, all with varying 
levels of Green concern, are able to agree and apply common standards of 
environmental protection. Therefore, there is a strong incentive (other 
than intrinsic concern for the environment) for the Community to take 
action. However, a recent report from the European Commission questions 
'the ability of EC environmental Legislation adequately to protect the 
environment in the face of adverse trends in past and future consumption 
patterns' [sic] (Lang & Hines 1993:67). 
The aim of the internal EU market is to create economic growth in addition 
to the growth already created in the Member States. Associated with this 
additional economic growth is a growth in nitrous oxide emissions (12-14 
per cent), sulphur emissions (8-9 per cent) and carbon dioxide (15 per cent) 
11 For example, in 1986, a fire at a chemical plant in Switzerland caused between 10-30 tonnes 
of chemicals, including mercury, to be released into the Rhine. Also in 1986, the nuclear 
accident at Chernobyl left a legacy of impacts in several countries. 
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by the year 2000 (Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature 1994:2). 
Another complication for serious action is the variation in measuring 
pollutants across Europe which gives the impression that levels rise and fall 
at national borders. The European Environment Agency (EEA), which 
formally came into being in 1993, has the task of standardising data that 
countries provide in varying terms or not at all. In light of the envisaged 
enlargement of the EU and the nature of transboundary pollution, the role 
of the Agency is intended to extend beyond the EU, co-operating with countries 
in the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) (Wright & Shorey 1994). Lithuania, 
Latvia, and Estonia signed free trade agreements on July 18, 1994, effective 
from January 1, 1995, bringing them into the EFTA (Eesti Ringvaade 1994). 
5.4.4.1 Free Trade: Winners and Losers 
Free trade has its roots in the writings of David Ricardo and Adam Smith 
and is based on the notion of 'comparative advantage' whereby all countries 
find their forte and fulfil that niche in the world market. Proponents of free 
trade argue that; the private sector is more efficient than the state, living 
standards rise in a free trade system (with the 'trickle down effect' alleviating 
resulting inequalities), it provides more choice to consumers, and it provides 
the most efficient use of resources, people, and capital (Lang and Hines 
1993:20). But even with such a 'trickle down' effect, relative inequalities in 
wealth and power usually remain (Eckersley 1993:15). As discussed in 5.2.2 
there has been criticism of free trade, in particular because of its effect on 
social equity and the environment. Eckersley argues that the disparity between 
rich and poor is likely to increase as we approach the physical limits to 
growth. 
Indeed, the long-term consequences of zealously pursuing the privatisation 
of environmental resources in an increasingly crowded world is likely to be 
the intensification of the already wide gap between the propertied and the 
propertyless, and the rich and the poor, both within and between nations 
(Eckersley 1993:15). 
John Maynard Keynes, who originally saw free trade as almost being part of 
moral law, later argued that it was no longer obvious that a concentration of 
national effort to secure foreign trade was beneficial. Aside from the superblocs 
(EEA, NAFTA, and Japan) most countries have experienced adverse 
environmental, social, and economic effects as a result of the free trade system. 
Mahatma Gandhi realised this over fifty years ago: 'Free trade for India has 
proved her curse and held her in bondage' (Lang and Hines 1993:27-8). 
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The demand and supply mechanisms of the market cannot be used to manage 
finite natural resources; it is not only the poorer countries which have beeñ 
impacted by the belief that they do. The EU has overfished most of the 
stocks in its oceans and continued to build the roads of free trade through 
untouched areas such as the Pyrenees in Austria. The notion of free trade in 
agriculture has also led to negative effects on economics, environment, and 
health within Member States (Norwegian Society for the Conservation of 
Nature 1994:6). 
Articles 100 A and 130 R, S, and T of the Single European Act (the 1987 
amendment to the Treaty of Rome) acknowledge 'the need to combine free 
trade objectives with a high level of environmental protection, as well as 
the desirability of pursuing environmental objectives as a legitimate end in 
itself' (EC 1990:20). So while the formation and maintenance of a common 
European market is the primary incentive for environmental policy, there 
is, theoretically, some measure of protection for the environment's sake. 
Article 130 R, paragraph 2, encompasses the EU's underlying philosophy: 
[alction by the Community relating to the environment shall be based on the 
principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental 
damage should as a priority be rectified at source, and that the polluter 
shall pay. Environmental protection requirements shall be a component of 
the Community's other policies (EC 1990:20) (see also 7.3.1.2). 
There are of course problems with putting such policies into practice. Some 
of these were discussed earlier - local economic situations and strong national 
sentiment - but there are other issues which must also be considered. That 
it is profitable to import fruit from the south into Europe while large quantities 
of Mediterranean fruit are dumped, indicates the problem of costing. This is 
largely due to lower wages, combined with the lower cost of energy, in 
developing countries (Lang and Hines 1993:61). The countries of Eastern 
Europe are in danger of entering a similar situation. While the countries of 
CEE and FSU have lower costs of production which might give some advantage 
for export, the amount of resources used is significantly higher which is 
detrimental to both the local environment and the economy. This, together 
with the lower wages and working conditions of the people, is a barrier 
difficult to transcend. 
Developing countries are often trapped by their need for hard currency to 
pay for their increasing foreign debt and/or economic restructuring. This 
leads to over-exploitation of their own natural resources and energy in order 
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to capture export markets or the acceptance of toxic waste in exchange for 
cash. A Greenpeace study revealed that more than half of exported waste 
has ended up in developing countries or in CEE where regulations have, in 
the past, tended to be less strict (Lang and Hines 1993:63-4). In 1994, the 
Klaipeda branch of the Lithuanian Green Party alleged that the Government 
had been accepting hazardous waste from Germany for the previous four 
years (Lithuanian Green Party - Klaipeda Branch 1994:1-2). 
The major restriction to implementing policies like those espoused in EU 
policy documents is the GATT. It might appear to aim for a balance between 
free trade and environmental degradation, however, in practice, the 
commitment to free trade is paramount. 
Present international trade rules and those of regional trading blocs encourage 
more environmental degradation by maximising trade. They hinder national, 
regional and international measures to protect the environment by calling 
them 'barriers to trade' (Lang and Hines 1993:64). 
Countries that try to avoid the trap of over-exploiting their resources in the 
name of trade have had little success in protecting their own economies and 
environment because such measures are often seen as a 'barrier to trade' 
and, therefore, a contravention of the GATT. For example, in 1985, Indonesia 
banned the export (though not the felling) of raw logs and rattan from its 
rainforests. The EC argued that Indonesia was restricting supply in order to 
increase its manufacture of value-added products, such as furniture, which 
were previously made in Europe and Japan, thus contravening Article 1 of 
the GATT (Lang and Hines 1993:63). 
Free trade not only increases pollution and restricts environmental progress 
by attacking national regulations as barriers to trade but makes it possible for 
countries with depleted resources to go elsewhere to find them, and facilitates 
the spread of disease through the movement of animals and plants 
(Norwegian Society of the Conservation of Nature 1994:3). However, free 
trade need not always have negative effects on the environment. Trade in 
cleaner technology, for example, particularly in environmentally progressive 
countries which have strong environmental legislation could have benefits 
for the global environment. The countries of the FSU are in need of more 
efficient technology which would significantly reduce resource-use and 
emissions. The renewable energy industries have also expanded to 
international markets. Such trade would be useful in Lithuania to establish 
the role of renewable energy, assisting self-sufficiency of supply following 
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the recommended decommissioning of the nuclear power station at Ignalina. 
5.4.4.2 Transport 
The transport issue, involved with free trade within the EU, reveals an 
interesting situation. Goods do not move freely; they are transported. It has 
been argued that the single market in Europe has allowed a situation where 
products are transported at various stages of their production to different 
countries where they are altered in some way (12), thereby increasing resource 
depletion, air pollution, acid rain deposits, and global warming from 
unnecessary oil-fuelled transport (Lang Sr Hines 1993:61-2). One European 
country can specialise in a product with all of Western Europe as a market. 
Such a situation is reminiscent of Soviet economic policy which rendered 
all republics reliant on one another in an attempt to prevent economic 
independence. While the former republics struggle to maintain this 
disintegration, Europe continues its aim of an ever-greater union, processes 
which consume most of the political energy of both the Former Soviet Union 
(FSU) and the EU (Kennedy 1993:256). While the harmonisation of laws in 
Europe is not, in itself, the same as a centralised administration, 'any increased 
propensity on the part of the central authority to insist on uniformity can be 
seen as an increase in central interventionism' (Auster 1988:276). That is 
not necessarily a problem, especially if the intervening body has set itself 
high environmental guidelines such as those set out by the EU. However, 
the issue of transport-generated air pollution must remain a significant 
concern. 
In 1992, the Commissioner for Transport put forward proposals to expand 
the European transport network. European policy has shown a bias toward 
road transport (the key to trade links in Europe) since the end of WWII. The 
1992 proposals paid little attention to the environmental impact of the new 
roads despite being required to include an environmental element under 
the Single European Act. Statements regarding the impacts were included 
in the Green Paper but omitted from the White Paper, demonstrating that 
12 For example, a potato might be grown in Belgium, peeled, chopped and packaged in Spain, 
and fried and eaten back in Northern Europe. Or a situation might arise such as in the UK 
where croissants are imported from Spain and sold in grocery stores whilst locally made 
croissants are available in bakeries on the same street. It begs the question - 'does it really 
make sense to transport identical goods around the world in the name of free trade?' (Lang & 
Hines 1993:61-2 and Norwegian Society for the Conservation of Nature 1994:3). The inefficiency 
and increased pollution affect of such a process is not dissimilar to that of the Soviet Union. 
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the Commission was aware of the conflict between its aim to increase transport 
infrastructure and its environmental commitment. Phrases such as 
"sustainable mobility", argues Bowers (1993) did not hide the fact that transport 
growth was connected to economic growth which was given priority over 
environmental issues (Bowers 1993:125-6). Given its commitment to the 
Union and the concept of free trade between members, such conflicts are not 
easily resolved and will be analysed on a case by case basis. Further challenges 
are likely as the objectives of free trade and environmental protection will 
often conflict. 
5.4.4.3 Eco-Taxes 
The EU has signed several international conventions relating to 
environmental protection, including the Vienna Convention for the 
Protection of the Ozone Layer in 1985, and a protocol in 1987 controlling the 
production of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). A total ban on production, import 
and use of CFCs was effective from the end of 1995. The community has 
also agreed to stabilise carbon dioxide (CO 2) emissions at 1990 levels by 2000 
(2005 for UK). An energy tax was proposed to help limit CO 2 emissions but a 
failure to agree on the tax by the end of 1993 has made the year 2000 goal 
unlikely (Europa World Book 1994:152). The main argument against such a 
tax focuses on what is called 'environmental pricing'. In effect, it is argued 
that the tax, by including an environmental cost, was an impediment to free 
trade - in particular, its effect on competition with USA and Japan. The tax 
is supported by Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, France, Germany, and 
Italy, while less affluent members are concerned that a harmonised tax would 
affect their growth (Lang & Hines 1993:91&144). So, it can be seen that even 
a majority decision can be difficult to obtain. The various political and/or 
economic situations of the Member States can affect their decision which 
can have implications for the environment since the longer negotiations 
continue over such matters, the longer it will take to achieve goals. 
Some Greens, too, are doubtful of the effectiveness of such taxes since they 
can become a "right to pollute" and companies with adequate resources 
might prefer to pay the tax than make necessary adjustments to reduce 
emissions. According to Ivan Gyulai (Hungarian Ecological Institute for 
Sustainable Development), such taxes can actually encourage more production 
and consumption and in turn conserve the source of pollution by creating 
an interest in maintaining its operations. There is also concern that the tax 
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is purely fiscal and the revenue is not all used for environmental protection 
measures (Gyulai 1994). In addition, governments in recession become reliant 
on the funds secured in this manner. The desire for hard currency for 
improving economic conditions in the countries of CEE and FSU (as noted 
in 5.4.4.1) mean it is easier to give the right to pollute in order to receive 
revenue than to take a more preventative approach. Permit charges and 
fines for exceeding allowable levels can provide finance for environmental 
projects but these too need to be backed up with government allocations (see 
6.3-4). 
5.4.5 Alternative Systems? 
The search for an appropriate model to steer economic development in 
Lithuania began around 1990, although it appears that the governments in 
the region eventually had little choice in the form this would take. While it 
is clear that Lithuania, along with other post-communist countries, has 
embarked on a path of free market economics it is worth discussing possible 
alternative systems that are based on either a mix of socialist and .capitalist 
principles or on another premise such as ecocentrism. In doing so, the 
environmentally and socially beneficial features of both are identified. Not 
all commentators would agree with such an approach or with the notion of 
governments actively seeking appropriate economic models. Indeed, it has 
been argued that 
[t]here is an important role for government, but it is not searching for some 
kind of new economic model that is somehow different from market economies 
and command economies. A necessary condition for economic improvement is 
the development of government institutions compatible with a market 
economy (Thomas Grennes pers. comm., February 9, 1996). 
However, this thesis contends that, in light of the on-going economic and 
environmental problems on a global scale in general, and on a regional scale 
in particular, the scrutinising of such systems and the identification of their 
valuable facets is justified. As is the extraction of equally valuable principles 
from the socialist tradition in an effort to address the three Es. 
The move toward decentralisation in the CEE/FSU region did not suddenly 
appear in the late 1980s or indeed with the initiatives of Gorbachev in 1984. 
The downfall of the Stalinist model had already begun. The systems put in 
place by Yugoslavia in the 1950s (following an internal revolution) and 
Hungary (following the Soviet invasion in 1956) indicate a type of "market 
Chapter Five 
	 243 
socialism", the possibility of which was debated among Western economists 
such as Dickinson (UK) and Lange (USA) in the 1920s and 1930s. These were 
more directly tied to the ideas of Lenin (rather than the Stalinist model) 
who introduced the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1921. This policy was 
designed to improve the economy that was suffering due to a marked decrease 
in industrial output since 1913 as a result of civil wars and inappropriate 
socioeconomic policies. It is an example of how market forces can be used 
within the framework of socialism in order to promote economic 
development. The NEP introduced new "incentive arrangements" which 
improved individual and collective output. During the time of NEP (1921-28) 
the private sector accounted for 88 per cent of small factories while the state 
sector owned 90 per cent of the larger plants. The private sector controlled 
58 per cent of the retail trade while the state controlled over 90 per cent of 
wholesale trade. The vision was to strengthen the material base of socialism 
and provide an opportunity for various forms of socialist ownership to 
develop, with the peasantry becoming more prosperous. This was superseded 
by the Stalinist model which incorporated the use of force, unrealistic targets, 
and a obsession with the plan itself. However, the lessons of combining 
enterprise and planning and private-public sector partnerships were not 
forgotten as the continued re-emergence of NEP in centrally planned 
economies testifies. However, the use of NEP has tended to be only for 
short periods (McFarlane 1991:27-8, 50-2, 61, 76). 
A mixed market or market socialism formed the economic basis of Yugoslavia 
between 1950 and 1974 (the year of Tito's death). The system developed 
because of a number of reasons not least being the personal animosity between 
Tito and Stalin. The latter wanted complete subordination among the 
communist states outside the Soviet Union. Initially Stalin's greatest ally, 
Tito became the only man to successfully defy Stalin (13) (Mason 1992:22-3). 
The resulting standoff in 1948 led to a Soviet imposed trade and aid embargo 
on Yugoslavia (not unlike the methods to be used in the late 1980s to control 
and avenge rebellious republics such as Lithuania) which in turn created an 
economic crisis. While Tito and his colleagues found ideological support 
for their reforms (particularly in the ideas espoused by Marx in the Paris 
Commune and followed up by Lenin in State and Revolution), the new 
economic system was essentially a pragmatic response to the economic 
13. Stalin was later to try fourteen communist leaders throughout Eastern Europe as "Trotskyite-
Zionist-Titoist-bourgeois-nationalist traitors" to quash any likely following of Tito's example. 
All were found guilty and eleven were hanged (Mason 1992:23). 
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situation (McFarlane 1991:51-2). 
The essential feature of the economic system in Yugoslavia was a commitment 
to "social ownership" as a higher form than "state ownership" contrary to 
the views of the Soviet system. To this end, workers' councils were created 
as the trustees of social property. The councils were elected from the factory 
floor and managers were elected through an appointed committee in each 
industry. Later, these too were formed by the workers' councils. The councils 
were seen as a counter to increasing bureaucratisation, a resolution to the 
schism between manual and intellectual labour, and provided moral 
incentive for workers by nature of their direct involvement in the 
management of the firms (McFarlane 1991:51-52). Meanwhile, forty years 
later in the West, "managerialism" and bureaucratisation threatens to cause 
greater inefficiencies, through low morale and poor service quality (in the 
private sector and the more traditionally public sector alike) than the original 
cost-cutting measures which aimed to improve economic efficiency. Critics 
are again pointing to such structures as workers' councils to counteract the 
trends. 
While participation in decision-making gave Yugoslav workers a greater 
sense of freedom (possibly a lesser sense of alienation), the liberalisation of 
travel greatly increased freedom by enabling citizens to work abroad (Ignatieff 
1994:14). Another feature was the use of the market to allocate resources 
within the confines of five year plans. During 1957-67 the Yugoslav economy 
performed well but later slowed in the 1980s (McFarlane 1991:51-3). 
The early success of this experiment was a standing rebuke to the more 
authoritarian and centralized Soviet model, and it set a pattern of diversity 
that was to plague the Soviet leadership for the next forty years (Mason 
1992:23). 
Yet Tito cannot escape criticism for his own authoritarian activities which 
are said to have been at the root of the collapse of the entire state structure. 
It is argued that had Tito facilitated the emergence of a civic, rather than 
ethnic-based, party system, the fragmentation of Yugoslavia could have been 
avoided. A plural political culture would have allowed a non-ethnic basis 
for political affiliation to take hold (Ignatieff 1994:16). 'In the end, his regime 
was no different from the other communist autocracies of Eastern Europe' 
(Ignatieff 1994:16). 
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This demonstrates, once again, that the political context and in particular 
the nature of powerful and ambitious leaders, is a significant factor in the 
way an economic system operates. The ethnic diversity of Yugoslavia (a 
Federation of seven nationalities) is another facet which limited the success 
of market socialism. The problem of inequality within the Federation was 
difficult to resolve and had a major role in the war which began in 1991. 
The resentment of the richer republics, Slovenia and Croatia, that their 
economic success was "creamed off' to support Serbia was part of nationalists' 
convictions to become independent (Ignatieff 1994:18). The ongoing war in 
the region has led to horrific crimes against humans and nature. 
'Unfortunately, then, we do not know how market socialism might have 
worked in the absence of these ethnic and federalist forces' (McFarlane 1991:54). 
Other economic reasons contributed to the failure such as the complicated 
taxation system that was continually changed to account for problems as 
they arose, monopolistic competition, inflationary bias, and the growth of 
corruption (McFarlane 1991:53-4). 
The West has played a significant part in the Yugoslav drama. The use of 
market measures itself could be seen as an attempt to please Western nations 
whose economic assistance Tito knew would be required (Plamenatz 1954:333). 
Western nations are again taking this approach in the CEE/FSU region (see 
also 5.4.2 and 6.2.4.5). In addition, argues Ignatieff, the West failed to construct 
a comprehensive territorial settlement following the end of the Cold War, 
adjudicating between rival claims and guaranteeing minority rights which 
would have helped avoid the new order of ethnic cleansing (Ignatieff 1994:40). 
The features of the Yugoslav system most responsible for the breakdown of 
market socialism - ethnic heterogeneity and a lack of a pluralistic political 
system - are not found in Sweden. So what of the success of a mixed economy, 
known as 'functional socialism' by Swedish economists? 
The socioeconomic system in Sweden is based on 'private ownership of 
major industries but large-scale government redistribution of national 
resources for social objectives' (McFarlane 1991:63). This system has yet 
another concept of ownership where there is a mix of private and state 
ownership with function and control being equally important. The underlying 
principles are a belief in the balance of power (including controls on 
corporations), a commitment to non-violent solutions to social conflict, and 
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a practical approach to state intervention in the economy for welfare purposes. 
Around 85 per cent of assets remain in the private sector but the right to 
profit from their use is controlled through a system of taxes and controls 
even to the point of locking up corporate resources in boom time to be 
released during recession (McFarlane 1991:64-5). 
Of particular interest are the functions of the major players; business, 
government, and labour. A certain rapport has been built up whereby business 
recognise the benefits of the government controls. Welfare (health and 
maternity insurance, hospital care, workers' compensation, pensions, and 
allowances) is seen as a 'growth promoting social cost' rather than purely 
expenditure; that is recognising it as an investment. Thus, Sweden spends 
twice as much on welfare, as a proportion of GDP, than Australia. Despite 
this, Sweden rarely has over five per cent unemployed and prior to 1971 
enjoyed near full employment (McFarlane 1991:66-7). 
Besides the cultural homogeneity, Sweden has also built up political cohesion 
with a long period of Social Democratic government which has certainly 
been a crucial factor in the working of functional socialism. The economy 
did begin to slow down in the 1970s and sources for welfare became less 
generous so payroll and income taxes were increased leading to a backlash 
and election loss for the Social Democrats. The warning was heeded and, 
when restored to office, the government recognised the financial limit society 
had placed on the welfare state (McFarlane 1991:68). 
The well established democratic political culture facilitating public comment 
on policy, a homogenous ethnic make-up, and the economic status to improve 
technology have allowed some reprieve for nature in Sweden. However, 
environmental problems still exist. Some are a result of transboundary 
influences from the South while others are a result of economic development 
as elsewhere in the Western world. The continued promotion of nuclear 
power is also a major concern for environmentalists. This is of particular 
importance since the Swedish Nuclear Inspectorate (SKI) is heavily involved 
in decisions regarding the future of nuclear power in Lithuania (see Chapter 
2). The more recent decision of the Swedish Government to end nuclear 
power in their country, to be replaced primarily by the use of biomass, is a 
promising sign for the region. 
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Lithuanian society is also relatively ethnically homogenous (80 per cent 
Lithuanian) so should avoid the kind of violence that emerged in Yugoslavia. 
Chapter 7 discusses the importance of now building up a democratic system 
and a civic society will be crucial for effective environmental protection. 
That is not to say that supplanting a model of market socialism would be 
more beneficial than model capitalism (see 5.4.2), yet some of the equity 
related measures in the workplace and an integration of market forces and 
government intervention in redistribution of resources are strengths that 
ought not be ignored. The tendency has been, however, to reject all socialist 
fundamentals and resist government intervention in social and economic 
life (although some would argue that Brazauskas has not rejected all of 
these principles). The transition period referred to in Lithuania and other 
countries of FSU and CEE has created many economic difficulties not least of 
which has been the high inflation leading to unaffordable prices (see 5.4.3.1). 
McFarlane has noted that market socialism is helpful in overcoming the 
problem of split-level pricing (14); a common feature of economies stuck between 
central-planning and market economies. He argues that full market socialism 
avoids the unstable situation by not giving automatic priority to heavy 
industry (McFarlane 1991:61). 
Lithuania with its desire for inclusion in the European Union is more likely 
to follow the line of Sweden. Its form of socialism - or welfare state economics 
- would be considered far more acceptable especially given the high standard 
of living the Swedish people enjoy. The Swedish model has economic 
success to recommend it and FSU and CEE governments could gain insight 
from the system that uses a market mechanism to increase standard of living 
while maintaining some government assistance in the name of social justice. 
However, its unique historical evolution and cultural development make it 
difficult to copy in other countries (McFarlane 1991:64). Also, Lithuania 
does not have the same degree of indigenous natural resources to form a 
secure economic base. 
While it could be argued that both market socialism and functional socialism 
address the first two 'Es 1(15) : there must be other factors at play for an 
14 This refers to the situation where the prices of some consumer goods are determined by the 
market whereas others, for 'social' reasons, are kept down by subsidies and controls (McFarlane 
1991:61). It is referred to as 'price rationalization' by Mason as a step by step approach to 
economic reform as opposed to the "shock therapy" used in Poland (Mason 1992:87,89). 
15. However it must be noted that the former has, in general, been implemented by an 
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environmental benefit to be observed. In particular, a well established 
democracy and political culture which enables the concerns of citizens to be 
accounted for in decision-making and a commitment to addressing 
environmental issues from those in power. Also, well developed 
administrative structures which facilitate effective implementation (Fisher 
1992:10). For these reasons, along with ethnic homogeneity, thorough 
education, and considerable natural wealth, Sweden can be recognised as 
more successful (if long term maintenance of the underlying principles are a 
measure of success) both in terms of social equity and environmental 
protection (although environmental progress may be limited by EU 
membership - see 7.3.1.2). So, the failure of the system in Yugoslavia is not 
necessarily an indictment of market socialism per se. 
According to a UNICEF report, the 'socialist market economy' that has 
developed in China was a deliberate mixing of socialist ideals with 
decentralisation and market incentives. The state retains a strong participation 
in the industrial sector and in the overall direction of the economy. The 
social benefits have been noted with poverty declining from 28 to 9 per cent 
between 1978 and 1990 (although tending to rise again in the mid 1990s) and 
indicators of human welfare showing improvements while regional 
imbalances in income remain. In contrast, the CEE/Baltic region 'experienced 
widespread deterioration in economic performance, living standards, poverty, 
mortality rates and child welfare' (UNICEF 1995: 55). There are a few 
explanations for this difference. Firstly, the changes in China were 
implemented at a much slower pace than experienced in the post-communist 
region of Europe. In addition, external factors such as the dismantling of the 
CMEA aggravated the economic situation in the CEE and the Baltics. It has 
also been argued (Cornia 1994 cited in UNICEF 1995) that the disintegration 
of the political system in Eastern Europe rendered a slower transition 
impossible (UNICEF 1995:56). While the improvements in human welfare 
indicators along with economic growth are laudable it is, however, hard to 
justify the human rights situation in terms of such marginal economic success. 
The tendency is, however, to therefore measure the economy successful (see 
also 5.3). In terms of environmental problems, market socialism (as it has 
been used in practice) is still somewhat inadequate. The high consumption 
rates in Sweden are also of concern in relation to global environmental 
issues. Other combinations of market and socialist ideals have claimed to 
authoritarian regime leaving benefits counteracted in other areas of social life. 
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have environmental protection at their core. Would these provide a more 
environmentally sensitive economic path for Lithuania? 
Some socialists, recognising the dilemma for left thinking following the 
demise of the communist bloc (although few lament the downfall of the 
totalitarian style), fear that 'the traditional socialist aspiration for an equitable 
society may be lost in an unplanned dash for growth and an obscene scramble 
by Western interests for morsels from the corpse of communism' (Dunkley 
1992:1). These aspirations form a part of the Green vision combining social 
justice, environmental protection, and ecologically sustainable development. 
Thus, many socialists, understanding the need to address the environmental 
concerns of society have attempted to liken themselves to the Greens. 
Devereux, for example, asserts that environmentalists are the new 'socialist 
radicals' and that there is essentially no difference in the objectives of Greens 
and socialists. Meanwhile, capitalists have sought to create a rift between 
workers and environmentalists (Devereux 1992:99). While the two groups 
may essentially agree on issues of equity and income redistribution, there is 
a significant difference in their approach to the environment. 
The new breed of eco-socialists have taken on board an environmental focus 
recognising the limitations of orthodox Marxism in developing an appropriate 
environmental ethic. They attempt to address the historical legacies of 
socialism such as bureaucratisation, the unlikelihood of the proletariat being 
the major proponents of change, and the growth orientation applied to poverty 
issues which have a techno-centric focus in aiming for a better mastery over 
nature (Eckersley 1992:119). Ecosocialists blame the competitive and 
expansionist nature of capitalism as ultimately responsible for the ecological 
crisis but recognise that centrally planned economies share a belief in the 
infinite capacity of the earth (or at least that technology will develop ways to 
extract more (or new) resources). Their vision is for a non market allocation 
of resources yet this should involve democratic planning. To this end, they 
argue for widespread public participation, public accountability, and political 
pluralism. 
For the ecosocialists, community empowerment should be facilitated by the 
state (contra ecoanarchists) to ensure redistribution between classes. The 
significance of the state is expressed by Frankel; 'democracy would not survive 
the abolition of state institutions' (Eckersley 1992: 123, 134, 136). This mix of 
market and state controls is not to be confused with market socialism which 
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Frankel has criticised 'on the grounds that ecological and social justice 
objectives would be continually compromised by national and international 
market forces' (Eckersley 1992:136). It is interesting to note here that Yugoslavia 
was far from an 'open economy' and was not subject to international market 
forces. However, this in fact contributed to its failure as monopolies tended 
to develop within the country. 
The challenge for ecosocialism is to avoid the problems of bribery and 
corruption, dictatorship, economic inefficiencies, intolerance and suppression 
of political dissent, and environmental devastation that is characteristic of 
command economies (Eckersley 1992:136). Ecosocialism acknowledges the 
limits to growth (as, arguably could authoritarian or fascist regimes), however, 
it is more limited than the environmental ethic espoused by ecocentrism. 
Its concern for human autonomy and its criticism of capitalism's affect on 
both humans and nature is an important step forward for the socialist tradition. 
However, the domination and protection of nature is seen purely in terms 
of the affect on the human world. From the ecosocialist perspective, it is 
morally wrong to dominate nature because it gives rise to the domination of 
humans thus, protection only occurs if it in turn facilitates some measure of 
human emancipation (Eckersley 1992:128-9). 
Green economists, working on an ecocentric premise, are critical of both 
corporate capitalism and a highly centralised state. They do, however, 
ultimately favour the market over highly centralised and bureaucratised 
economies. Daly and Cobb, for example, argue: 
If one favours independence, participation, decentralized decision making, 
and small - or human-scale enterprises, then one has to accept the category 
of profit as a legitimate and necessary source of income. There is plenty of 
room to complain about monopoly profits but that is a complaint against 
monopoly, not against profits per se....If one dislikes centralized bureaucratic 
decision making then one must accept the market and the profit motive, if 
not as a positive good then as the lesser of two evils.... We have no hesitation 
in opting for the market as the basic institution of resource allocation (in 
Eckersley 1992:141). 
The emphasis is on scale; that the material-energy throughput of all economic 
activity (state and private) should be reduced and be made more responsive 
to the environment (Eckersley 1992:140-1). While Green economists 
acknowledge the value of the price mechanism they do not accept 'the existing 
pattern of ownership, control, and wealth distribution nor the scale and 
reach of market penetration in everyday life' (Eckersley 1992:141-2). In 
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determining the scale of economies, consideration must be given to the 
needs of present and future generations of the human and nonhuman world 
(Eckersley 1992:142). The focus too has been on ethical investment, small 
business, community level decision-making, worker participation in 
management, as well as market incentives for reduced consumption and 
environmental protection (Eckersley 1992:143). It will be extremely difficult 
for a single nation to pursue such a programme while the rest of the 
increasingly interdependent world continues to put growth ahead of 
environmental protection (Eckersley 1992:144). So what relevance has this 
for nations like Lithuania who have been actively searching for an appropriate 
economic system following the reinstatement of independence? 
At the time of independence, commentators were suggesting that post-
communist societies might lead the world in developing an environmentally 
sustainable economy. The success of the Green movements in shutting 
down polluting enterprises indicated a high priority for environmental 
rehabilitation in the FSU and CEE. Politicians and activists within the region 
were also acutely aware of the environmental destruction in their countries 
and advocated an integrated approach to the problems of economy and 
environment. Such sentiments are expressed in the statements below: 
The activities of all government bodies will be planned so as to assure 
continued economic use of the natural environment, whilst actively protecting 
it in order to raise the quality of life of the entire nation and, in turn, help 
the Polish economy' (Bronislaw Kaminski Polish Minister for Environmental 
Protection 1990, in Manser 1993:14). 
[The] government wishes to develop the economy and the environment 
together in a sustainable way with the reservation that in the case of a 
conflict between these two areas, it will place short range economic interests 
after those of ecological stability (Sandor Kerestes, Hungarian Minister for 
Environment and Regional Policy 1990, in Manser 1993:14). 
Given its historical connection to nature, Lithuania was also seen as a possible 
model for an environmentally friendly society, avoiding the inefficiencies 
of communism as well as the excesses of the West (for example, Banks 
1991:82). Even in 1995, Kritkausky, still attested to the possibility of remarrying 
economics and ecology thus avoiding the environmental devastation of 
both systems and claimed that 'Lithuania is fertile ground for such an 
experiment' (Kritkausky 1995:139). This is, to some extent, supported by the 
National Environment Strategy of Lithuania, the objective of which is 'to 
ensure that the concept of environmentally sustainable development 
underpins Lithuania's transition to a free market economy' (Ministry of 
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Environmental Protection 1995b:1-3). However, it would appear that it is 
probably too late for such an experiment. As discussed in Chapter 4, such 
optimism has been quashed by the economic recession that accompanied 
independence, the fall of environmental issues from the pinnacle of the 
political agenda, and the dissolution of the Green movement. Additional 
reasons are presented in Chapters 6 and 7. 
As noted by Eckersley above, there would be difficulties for Greens in 
convincing voters to pursue such a system while the rest of the world watches. 
Likewise the countries of FSU and CEE were hard pressed to choose a mixed 
economy (particularly one with an ecological focus) for a number of reasons. 
The economic realities of everyday life were certainly instrumental in the 
demise of environmental activism in Lithuania supporting, to a point, the 
notion that the environmental movement is a luxury of the wealthier class 
or more accurately, the wealthier nations. Alternatively, as discussed in 
Chapter 4, the concern over environmental problems may have had more 
to do with securing political independence than a commitment to the rights 
of the non-human world. 
There are national and international factors involved in the inability to 
integrate environmental considerations into economic policy as originally 
claimed at the time of secession. Nationally, the political and administrative 
structures have been an obstacle, together with the fragility of governments 
and the aforementioned economic crisis (Fisher 1992:8). Internationally, the 
desire to be accepted by the Western world and receive some of the pie that 
had been denied them for fifty years is linked to the domestic environmental 
situation. The lure of the European Union (see 5.4.4 and 7.3.1), particularly 
in terms of the standard and quality of life experienced in Member States, 
has also played a crucial role in the decisions made by Lithuania and others 
from FSU and CEE. Interestingly, the EU also offers some legitimacy to 
environmental issues and sets relatively high standards for new members 
(see 5.4.4). The nature of the world economy; increasing interdependence 
through free trade, the influence of transnational corporations, and pressure 
from the big money lenders to pursue certain reforms in return for financial 
assistance has made it impossible for such countries to follow through with 
innovative, and pro-active forms of economic management and government 
(see Chapter 6). 
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5.5 Conclusion 
It has been established that a mutually influencing relationship exists between 
economy and environment. Although based on fundamentally different 
philosophies, from liberalism to Marxism, all economic systems have negative 
consequences for the environment. In terms of creating an environmentally 
sustainable society in Lithuania, or any other country for that matter, economic 
decisions must take their environmental and social impacts into 
consideration. 
The free market system has had serious implications for the environment 
around the world due primarily to its failure to adequately "cost" 
environmental damage. The notion of free trade promulgated by the capitalist 
system has not only led to increased use of finite resources and increased 
levels of pollution associated with energy use but also to the growing disparity 
between rich and poor. 
Whilst reform of the inefficient and environmentally destructive practices 
of the past is clearly important for Lithuania's cultural and natural heritage, 
it is less clear that rational economic models from the West are adequate 
either economically or in terms of environmental rehabilitation and 
protection. The experience of CEE suggests many problems associated with 
supplanting such models. Lithuania's path to a market economy, then, 
cannot be seen as a panacea for the Soviet environmental legacy. 
The economic recession that followed the restoration of independence has 
contributed to the decline in Green support and in the priority given to 
environmental issues in general. Thus, the changes made so far indicate a 
priority for economic concerns, essentially at the expense of "soft" issues 
such as the environment and thereby explaining, to some extent, why 
environmental problems remain. But, as Chapter 4 argued and as Chapter 7 
further demonstrates, there is a myriad of other reasons why Lithuania has 
not embarked on the road to an environmentally sustainable society. The 
international community, for example, has influenced the chosen path both 
directly and indirectly. The attraction of joining the EU predominates decision-
making, while free trade agreements limit any progress toward an 
environmentally sustainable society. As Chapter 6 demonstrates, 
international donors and money lenders have also influenced the process by 
providing assistance conditional on economic reform. There are also problems 
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associated with political and legal reform which have hindered a more 
environmentally sound direction (see Chapter 7). 
Lithuania has not made any clear progress toward the creation of an 
environmentally sustainable society as someexpected. Given that Lithuania 
has "chosen" a free market economic system, it could be possible for the 
market to be used, if not to create an environmentally sustainable society, 
then at least to maintain the environmental improvements so far which 
have, primarily, resulted from economic decline. The financing of 
environmental protection could provide some evidence of a commitment 
on the part of the Lithuanian Government to resolving environmental 
problems. Therefore, an analysis of the methods used to finance 
environmental rehabilitation and protection is presented in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 6: Financing Environmental Rehabilitation 
and Protection 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter is composed of two parts. The first evaluates the role of 
international assistance in funding environmental recovery and the second 
discusses the system of generating domestic input. The international 
assistance section is an updated and modified version of conference papers 
presented in Adelaide, Australia in 1995 and Vilnius, Lithuania in 1996 (see 
Banks 1996 and Banks 1997). The direction of both domestic budget allocations 
and international assistance toward environmental projects is demonstrative 
of commitment to environmental protection. An analysis of such funding 
could, therefore, indicate whether Lithuania has given priority to 
environmental issues in funding decisions, an important aspect of 
environmentally progressive society. 
The funding required for environmental recovery in CEE and FSU is 
enormous. Early on, few estimates were offered, mainly because it was not 
clear what needed to be done. One guesstimate of USD 600 billion over a 
twenty year period was mentioned for CEE countries alone (Manser 1993:86). 
The Helsinki Commission (1993b, Ch.5:32) estimated that an investment of 
at least 512 million ecus (USD 680 million) would be required to curb the 
effects of Lithuania's hot spots. 
Given the difficult economic situation that Lithuania faced following the 
restoration of independence, the possibility of generating the required funds 
for environmental rehabilitation and protection from domestic sources 
seemed unlikely. As the severity of environmental destruction in the former 
communist bloc became known, it also became clear that international 
assistance would be needed in order to rehabilitate and protect the 
environment. Such assistance has been minuscule in comparison with 
economic aid. However, international environment assistance can lend 
legitimacy to environmental issues in the post-communist world, and it can 
help to keep those issues on the political agenda (Fisher 1992:1). 
According to Manser (1993:88), most of the environmental investment in 
the CEE region has so far has come from the local economies rather than 
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from international assistance. During 1990-92, for example, 85 to 90 per cent 
of total environmental expenditure in CEE was domestically generated. The 
contribution from the international community to the CEE region has been 
less than 1 billion per year; a twentieth of what is required (Manser 1993:88). 
It was difficult to ascertain whether a similar pattern could be found in 
Lithuania due to discrepancies in figures. If the domestic allocations to the 
environmental sector for 1992-1995 are added together with the total 
environmental assistance, as recorded in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
database for the same period (MFA 1995), it seems that a total of USD 127.89 
million was provided for environmental projects during 1992-5 (MFA 1995)m. 
Around 85 per cent of this (including income from environmental taxes 
and pollution fines) was domestically generated. However, the database 
does not appear to include all of the larger contributions for waste water 
treatmentm. Information taken from the MEP annual report indicates that 
'aid and other international assistance' amounts to 385 million Litas (USD 
96.25 million) for 1994 and 1995 alone (Edmundas Greimas and Arvydas 
Dragunas pers. comm.). However, this figure includes loans provided for 
waste water treatment which have not been included as assistance in this 
thesis. While an accurate figure could not be established, it seems that a 
significant proportion is generated domestically. All other calculations 
referring to proportions of assistance provided are derived from the MFA 
database. 
The national budget of Lithuania is still comparatively small (around USD 
1.3 billion), meaning that the amount spent on the environment is small 
compared with Western countries. The amount provided for environmental 
purposes could be increased at both the international and state level. A 
relatively small shift in the direction of the aid and state funding could 
significantly increase the actual amount spent on the environment given 
that it now represents only a small percentage of the total. There is also a 
These figure exclude funding of energy and nuclear safety which comes under the direction 
of the Energy Ministry rather than the Ministry of Environmental Protection. 
2 The sum total of projects relating to waste water treatment (including training and seminars) 
amounts to USD 4.13 million (MFA 1995) whilst it is stated elsewhere that international 
assistance for treatment plants in Kaunas and Klaipeda amount to at least USD 7 million and 
USD 9 million respectively (World Bank 1994:14-15, MEP 1994, and EBRD 1996:32). 
3 Based on these figures for 1994 and 1995, the proportions of domestic and international 
assistance in that period would be 33 per cent and 67 per cent respectively. 
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small amount of funding derived from pollution charges, fines and taxes 
(see 6.3.1). 
6.2 International Assistance for Environmental Rehabilitation 
International environmental assistance comes in the form of technical or 
capital grants. Firstly, it is necessary to define what is meant by environmental 
assistance, or aid. The main distinctions relevant here are between economic, 
social, and environmental assistance. These types of aid are identified by 
their intended aims. For the purposes of this thesis, 'economic aid' relates 
to all assistance that aims to reconstruct or develop the economy (including 
agriculture, industry development, financial reconstruction). 'Social aid' 
refers to assistance directed toward areas such as health, welfare, education, 
and transport. 'Environmental aid' is aimed at environmental rehabilitation, 
pollution control, or nature protection. 
There is significant overlap between the desired aims of these types of 
assistance. Environmental assistance, such as the construction of ,a sewage 
treatment plant, stimulates the economy as much as any other development 
(at least initially). It also has implications for health. Measures which 
improve environmental efficiency often have economic benefits. Assistance 
directed toward the agricultural sector can have both economic and 
environmental benefits. However, it must be noted that some projects in 
the agricultural sphere may have detrimental effects on the environment in 
that they can involve subsidising the purchase of chemicals (fertilisers and 
pesticides) which may be used inappropriately. Funding for ecologically 
based projects such as using manure as fertiliser or to generate energy is 
desirable. The economic situation has tended to reduce chemical usage as 
they have become too expensive for farmers. This, in turn, has reduced the 
biological load on the rivers. However, subsidising the purchase of pesticides 
and fertilisers can have the opposite effect. In this thesis, assistance provided 
for problems relating to energy and nuclear safety have been separated from 
that directed at environmental, economic, and health sectors, although it is 
clearly an issue for all three. 
During the 1991-1995 period, Lithuania received approximately USD 881.5 
million in assistance. Environmental assistance amounted to around 2 per 
cent of that total (18.4 million) while economic assistance totalled USD 324.7 
million (37 per cent) (MFA 1995) (4) . Assistance provided for environmental 
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purposes comes in a variety of forms. Technical assistance grants involve 
the transfer of technology while capital assistance grants involve financial 
transfers, with expertise being associated with both. Assistance can be 
multilateral (provided by international organisations such as the World Bank, 
EBRD, or UN) or bilateral (provided by a single donor country). Assistance 
to Lithuania has been generally technically based. Loans have also been 
negotiated for environmental purposes such as energy efficiency measures. 
For example, EBRD agreed to lend Lithuania USD 50 million for building 
fuel storage units, designed to increase the efficiency of boiler houses, and 
for purchasing equipment such as gas and water meters. This aimed to 
economise on fuel use and reduce heat losses in power stations and amongst 
domestic consumers (The Baltic Independent, 3(138); 5, November 1992). 
Five major priority sectors for environmental assistance have been identified 
in Lithuania. These are both pollution control and prevention orientated. 
Sewage treatment plants, solid waste management, and air pollution 
monitoring have a focus on control while energy and nature conservation 
emphasise prevention (Flagerhall and Flagerhall Aniansson 1995:25). Other 
assistance has been provided for improvements at Ignalina nuclear power 
plant, the inventory and clean-up of former military sites, environmental 
education and literature, policy and legislation development, and 
organisational support for environmental NGOs (Danish EPA 1994:3, MEP 
1994:3, MFA 1994:26-8). Lithuania is likely to be reliant on such assistance 
for these larger projects in the medium to long term. 
6.2.1 Who Provides Environmental Assistance? 
6.2.1.1 Bilateral Donors 
Table 6.1 provides a selection of assistance provided to Lithuania and the 
proportions of these contributions directed at environmental issues. Denmark 
is one of the main contributors of environmental assistance to Lithuania. 
During the period 1991-1995, USD 44 million was provided by Denmark 
with 22 per cent for environmental projects. This accounts for more than 
half (53 per cent) of the total received by Lithuania for environment purposes 
(MFA 1995) (5). A further 24 per cent of the Danish contribution was directed 
4 These figures refer to all assistance, including projects that had not been approved at the 
time but were 'planned or had a 'firm commitment'. The amount received (completed, underway, 
or approved) during 1992-1995 was USD 493 million (around 59 per cent). 
260 	 Chapter Six 
at energy and nuclear safety. Denmark also has a good record in Eastern 
Europe, particularly by supporting renewable energy and cleaner technology 
which would go some way toward promoting self-sufficiency in the recipient 
countries (Manser 1993:91). 
Sweden has also orientated its assistance toward environmental projects. A 
total of USD 36 million in assistance was provided by Sweden in 1991-1995, 
of which around 10 per cent was for environment related purposes. This 
accounted for around 20 per cent of the total environmental assistance 
provided to Lithuania. In addition, 18 per cent of Swedish assistance was 
Table 6.1 Bilateral Assistance to Lithuania: 1991-1995 
Donor Country Total Aid 
USD (millions) 
EnergyNuclear % Environmental 
Aid  % 
Proportion of Total 
Environmental Aid % 
EU 138.0 11.4 1.5 11.2 
Japan 44.2 99.0 0 0 
Denmark 43.9 24.0 22.0 53.1 
Sweden 35.9 18.6 9.8 19.1 
Italy 32.0 0 0 0 
Germany 23.1 0.7 0.4 0.5 
USA 17.0 20.8 8.6 8.0 
UK 8.2 35.5 0 0 
Switzerland 6.6 0 0 0 
Norway 6.4 11.5 9.9 3.6 
Netherlands 6.4 0 1.4 0.5 
France 1.8 6.9 11.8 1.2 
Finland 0.7 0 34.5 1.4 
Adapted from: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania (Aid Coordination Secretariat) 1995; 'Project 
Database - Summary Report' (5th ed.), Vilnius) 
5 ' A discrepancy between the MFA (1994) database and the Danish EPA database was noted 
by Banks (1996 and 1997) where the former source was used to maintain consistency. Information 
exchanged at meetings between MFA staff and coordinators of Danish Environmental aid in 
Lithuania has been included in the 1995 database (MEP, pers. comm., August 1996). Both 
total aid and environmental assistance provided by Denmark appeared to have more than 
doubled between 1994-1995, yet most of this was due to the updating rather than a sharp 
increase in provision. This is substantiated by the fact that all projects are listed as starting 
in 1994 or earlier in the 1995 edition of the database (MFA 1995). As a result of the updated 
information the reported proportion of total environmental assistance provided by Denmark 
increased from 35 per cent to 53 per cent. 
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spent on energy and nuclear safety. The EU has contributed a significant 
amount of assistance to Lithuania (USD 138.02 million) but only 1.5 per cent 
has been allocated for environmental purposes (MFA 1995). Given that this 
amounts to a reasonable proportion of Lithuania's total environmental aid 
(11.2 per cent), a small change in the direction of this assistance could 
significantly increase the actual amount received for environmental projects. 
Norway's assistance has been more evenly spread with aid being provided 
for energy and nuclear safety (11.5 per cent), environment (10 per cent), 
agriculture (10 per cent), education (10 per cent), and health (8 per cent). 
Given that many of the projects in agriculture and nuclear safety (and indeed 
some industry related projects) have positive benefits for the environment, 
it can be seen that assistance from Norway has an environmental direction. 
Assistance from Germany, on the other hand, has tended to be directed 
toward the social sphere. Germany's contribution to environmental assistance 
is significantly less than the other donor countries in the region with energy 
and nuclear safety receiving 0.7 per cent and 0.4 per cent provided for other 
environmental purposes. The Netherlands directed assistance primarily 
toward health (45 per cent). At the end of 1994, no assistance had been given 
by the Netherlands for environment or energy and nuclear safety, however, 
a total of six environmental projects had been proposed (MFA 1994). Three 
of these projects were underway or completed by September 1995, while the 
remaining three were still under consideration. They accounted for a mere 
1.35 per cent of the Netherlands total contribution and 0.5 per cent of total 
environmental assistance (MFA 1995). 
6.2.1.2 Multilateral Donors 
Lithuania has also received aid and loans through such multi-lateral donors 
as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund, and the United Nations. The IBRD and the EBRD have 
contributed the most funds with a total of USD 312.5 million provided to 
Lithuania. Nuclear safety has clearly been a priority for EBRD with 
approximately 22 per cent directed toward energy and nuclear safety (MFA 
1995). The majority of this allocation funded the preparation of Emergency.  
Planning for Lithuania (Lahmeyer International and LEI 1996). However, 
the environment does not appear to be on their priority list. Only 0.11 per 
cent of EBRD funding was earmarked for environmental projects between 
1991 and 1995 (MFA 1995). The IBRD has clearly had an economic focus 
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with USD 120 million (54 per cent) provided for economic and industrial 
reconstruction. Approximately 19 per cent of IBRD funding was directed 
toward energy and nuclear safety while no assistance was provided for 
environmental purposes (MFA 1995). 
While such organisations do not have the same political pressures involved 
in donating as discussed below, they also act primarily out of self interest. 
The majority of financial transfers from these institutions has been in the 
form of commercial loans (albeit sometimes subsidised) rather than aid as 
such. The dilemma has been that while the international financial institutions 
can borrow more cheaply than individual countries, they still must operate 
under normal banking practices, thus requiring a reasonably high security 
for the loans. In addition, many CEE countries are reluctant to borrow from 
the West unless there is some guaranteed income in Western currency as a 
result. Hansen (1995:21) points out that the policies of such institutions are 
reflections of the governments and, therefore, the solutions rest with them. 
He suggests that capital be made available for environmental improvements 
'in the common interest of East and West under conditions more favourable 
than normal market terms' by merging donor assistance with either 
commercial loans or profit from the World Bank's activities to reduce the 
burden of interest. The PHARE and TACIS programmes allocate EU funding 
some of which is directed toward the environment. This thesis focuses on 
bilateral donors. 
6.2.2 Why Provide Environmental Assistance? 
There are a number of reasons why governments have provided 
environmental assistance to Lithuania and other post-communist-countries 
in the region. These range from altruism, responsibility, efficiency, and the 
development of markets for various environmental technology. The Danish 
perspective points to global responsibility for protecting and managing the 
environment as well as the clear self interest in preventing transboundary 
pollution (Hansen 1995:20). Assistance is administered through the Danish 
Environmental Support Fund for Central and Eastern Europe (ESF). The 
focus is on Cleaner Technology, Institutional Strengthening, Hazardous 
Waste, and Nature Protection, with collaboration on Energy projects with 
the Danish Energy Agency and the Ministry of Housing (Danish EPA 1996a:1-2). 
In Sweden, the question of whether to provide environmental assistance 
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was first debated in 1989, following an EPA study which focused on the 
country's role in international environmental cooperation. The study 
recommended care be taken to identify and prioritise problems before 
committing aid. It also warned that Sweden could become directly responsible 
in the future for the environmental measures it funds (Liifstedt 1995:43) (see 
also 6.2.2.2). 
Along with fears of transboundary influences, the 'neighbour interest' is 
another factor in determining the provision of environmental assistance. It 
is a notion referring to the physical proximity of the recipient countries 
where social, economic, and environmental problems are more visible than 
similar problems in the Developing World (Lofstedt 1995:41). Fisher notes 
that some have argued that western interest in the environmental situation 
in the region could be regarded as 'eco-imperialism'. But he contends that 
the international interest in CEE 
is matched by an equally intense interest on the part of these countries to 
re-enter the international community. Thus, international interest has a very 
significant impact on domestic policy (Fisher 1992:3) 
In addition to the physical closeness of countries like Lithuania to European 
donors, the opinion of policy-makers tends to be that these countries are 
more similar economically and culturally. The economic and environmental 
problems are viewed as transitory and it is assumed that CEE societies will, 
in the medium term, be similar to those in the West, while the problems in 
the Third World are seen to be longer term (Lofstedt 1995:42). Environmental 
assistance has been based on two other important reasons: efficiency and 
responsibility. 
6.2.2.1 Efficiency 
The efficiency argument stresses that more can be gained by improving 
environmental conditions in the FSU and CEE than investing the same 
amount in the donor countries, where advanced technology already exists. 
It was on this basis that a report from the Swedish Energy Administration 
indicated that environmental assistance should be provided to CEE. It argued 
that more environmental improvements would be gained in both the donor 
and recipient countries (Lofstedt 1995:44). French (1990:9) also noted the 
cost-effectiveness of investing in pollution control in the former communist 
region as a way of 'cleaning up at home'. 
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The argument is particularly pertinent in Sweden's case since around 90 
percent of damage from acid rain in the south is caused by emissions primarily 
from Eastern Europe. Therefore, in order to improve the situation in Sweden, 
it is necessary to assist the economically disadvantaged post-communist 
countries to reduce pollution at the source (Lofstedt 1995:44). It has also 
been an important argument in the cleanup of the Baltic Sea where the 
wealthier nations in the catchment have provided assistance to the poorer 
(and more polluting) nations to fund sewage treatment plants and effluent 
reduction facilities for cities and industries located on the rivers leading to 
the Sea (see Chapter 3). The investment in Baltic sewage treatment helps 
Sweden cleanup its own beaches (Peterson 1993:254); an investment which 
would be more costly if made in Sweden since pollution from the external 
source would continue to counteract the domestic measures. The Dutch 
Electricity Generating Board used the efficiency argument to support 
installation of desulphurisation scrubbers in Poland pointing out that it was 
more cost effective for Europe's environment (Manser 1993:76). 
There have been criticisms that the assistance based on the efficiency principle 
is not always efficient in practice. For example, installing scrubbers on obsoltte 
factories might be considered to be an inefficient use of resources since such 
plants could face closure in the short term. In addition, it is argued, the 
economic decline in the region has led to a 'natural' decrease in emissions 
(through a decrease in production and, therefore, energy consumption); a 
reduction which did not cost anything. For example, in 1992 the decrease in 
energy consumption in Estonia (where almost all of SO 2 emissions are a 
result of power generation) led to a 6 per cent reduction in emissions. This 
is compared to an investment of 24 million Finnish marks for new scrubber 
technology in a Polish factory which brought about a reduction of SO 2 
emissions of less that 0.5 per cent of the national Estonian total (Lofstedt 
1995:44). 
The problem with such criticisms is that they ignore the cost of the economic 
decline in the recipient countries. While the current economic climate in 
the donor countries might not be ideal, to assume that the decrease in pollution 
(as a result of economic decline) has not cost anything ignores the difficulties 
experienced by the people of those countries. In addition, since the problems 
are considered transitory and such countries are expected to be economically 
similar to the West in the medium term, it would perhaps be more beneficial 
to recognise the likelihood of an eventual increase in economic development 
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and assist in the preparation for the associated increases in pollution. 
Lonnroth has argued that a more efficient way of gaining environmental 
improvements is to help the post-communist countries make the transition 
to a market economy by removing trade and import barriers. This notion 
has apparently had support, in both Sweden and the recipient countries, 
from policy makers and academics who believe that a strong economy is 
needed to achieve a clean environment (cited in Lofstedt 1995:45). If Sweden 
is serious about promoting the development of the market economy by 
lifting trade barriers then arguments about the greater benefits achieved 
from economic decline carry little weight as a reason not to invest in 
environmental projects. Active development of the market economy in the 
recipient countries could actually counteract efforts in environmental 
rehabilitation rather than facilitate them. Environmental guidelines for 
other foreign investment, then, need to be stringent so as not to make the 
environmental situation worse (see 6.2.4.5). While it is acknowledged that 
economic improvements will be necessary in order to successfully implement 
various environmental projects, the market economy should not be seen as 
a panacea for environmental ills (see 5.2.2). 
It has also been argued that only 1.5 per cent of the total SO 2 and NOx 
produced by coal plants in Poland actually falls as acid rain over Sweden. 
Most falls over Poland and its most immediate neighbours or into the Baltic 
Sea where the damage is limited. For Sweden to install scrubbers in Polish 
plants, then, would assist Poland and its near neighbours much more than 
itself. Thus, from Sweden's point of view, this would not be an efficient use 
of resources. It could only be seen as such if the total environmental benefits 
for the region as a whole are considered (Lofstedt 1995:44). 
The efficiency argument can also take on a more global scale. Western 
assistance to improve leaking gas pipelines in the FSU would reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions at a lower cost and with less disruption than 
decreasing emissions elsewhere in the world (Peterson 1993:254). So, if the 
improvements to the environment in general are considered, rather than 
purely those to the donor country, then such investments could still be 
considered to be efficient. More environmental gain would be achieved 
than similar measures in donor countries where technically advanced 
emission control equipment already exists. 
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The accident at Chernobyl in 1986 highlighted the potential environmental 
impacts, aside from the ongoing problem of acid rain, that could be derived 
from sources outside national borders. Hence the direction of funding to 
the Chernobyl-style plant at Ignalina (see 6.2.3.1). Concern regarding 
transboundary pollution was an impetus for support, but it was not until 
three years later when the political climate started to change that Western 
countries in the region began to give more environmental assistance to 
Eastern Europe. This points to the intrusion of political motivations in the 
provision of aid. 
6.2.2.2 Responsibility 
The responsibility argument has played a central role in the 1990-91 
environmental aid debate in Sweden. The richer nations, the argument 
goes, have a responsibility to assist with the environmental rehabilitation of 
poorer countries. This is an example of the 'victim pays principle' which is 
a consequence of the inability of the recipient nations to meet the cost of 
implementing the 'polluter pays principle' which they have written into 
their own legislation. The notion of responsibility is cited as one of the 
main motivations for providing support to the Baltic States. Some have 
argued that policy makers have a 'bad conscience' about their past relationship 
with the Baltics. As mentioned earlier there is a strong historical connection 
between the Baltic nations but many want to make up for past mistakes 
(such as their failure to support the countries at the time of Soviet annexation) 
and thus re-establish economic and cultural links (Lofstedt 1995:46-7). Sweden, 
in particular, has suffered from a guilty conscience as one of the few Western 
countries to formally recognise the annexation (Lieven 1993:380). 
Counter to this is the 'victim pays' contention that such assistance infringes 
national sovereignty and that the donors are, therefore, ultimately responsible 
for the projects in the long term. The transfer of technology is a particularly 
contentious part of environmental aid debates. Donor countries are reluctant 
to take responsibility for the measures they fund (Lofstedt 1995:47). While 
this is understandable, they should also accept some responsibility to ensure 
that the project is successful and does not lead to further problems. As 
Lofstedt points out, donor countries are 'unlikely to fund a technology's 
upkeep indefinitely, but adequate attention is seldom paid to equipping the 
recipient nation with the skills and resources to adequately maintain the 
technology' (Lofstedt 1995:47) (see also 6.2.4.2 and 6.2.4.4). 
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The case of Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant is a particularly interesting example. 
The Swedish Nuclear Inspectorate (SKI) along the National Institute for 
Radiation Protection (SSI) and two utilities have been involved in the 
installation of safety equipment at the plant over the last few years. The 
Lithuanian Ministry of Environmental Protection has since argued that 
Sweden should be financially liable for the measures that have been installed. 
The Swedish government has refused on the grounds that Ignalina has 
some inherent design faults. If not resolved, it is likely that Sweden will 
withdraw its support which could have implications for its political 
relationship with Lithuania. Sweden has developed bilateral insurance 
agreements with its Eastern European recipients in an attempt to reduce the 
problems of international environmental responsibility (Lofstedt 1995:47). 
6.2.2.3 Self Interest 
If, as Lofstedt asks, environmental assistance from Sweden is provided 
primarily to alleviate domestic problems, then efficiency might be measured 
in terms of the greatest environmental benefits for Sweden alone. If this 
were the case, Sweden would direct most of the assistance to Poland since, 
among East European sources, its air pollution has the greatest impact on 
Sweden's environment. The Baltic States have similar pollution patterns 
but these are generally less marked. So why provide environmental assistance 
to the Baltic States? Political factors have strongly influenced the provision 
of all assistance to the Baltic States. There are strong cultural and historical 
ties between Sweden and the Baltics. Poland, on the other hand, has 
historically been seen as an enemy, has a population four times that of 
Sweden and is, therefore, unlikely to be politically influenced by Sweden. 
Thus, the funding of a sewage treatment plant in Lithuania would have 
greater positive political implications than a similar project in Poland (Lofstedt 
1995:45). 
Economic benefits to the donor country are a strong motivation for the 
provision of aid. It is most common that equipment and expertise is purchased 
in the donor country and the salaries, travel, accommodation, meals, and 
printing costs of consultancies consume a large percentage of the funding 
allocated. For example, it is claimed that around one third of Danish assistance 
goes directly to environmental investment and equipment and the rest is 
consumed by Danish companies and consultants (Chong and van der Hoek 
1996) (see 6.2.4.4 below). The Swedish aid agency is actually obliged by law to 
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employ only Swedish companies and consultants (Chong and van der Hoek 
1996). While such assistance may look impressive for the donor countries, 
it can create, rather than solve local economic or environmental problems 
in the recipient nation. Thus, the aid is really spent in the donor country, 
thereby stimulating their own economy. In this way, it is not likely to be 
economically cost-effective since the higher prices in the donor countries 
increase total project costs (Chong and van der Hoek 1996). The ideal is a 
"win-win" situation where the donor and recipient economies and 
environments benefit from the project. 
Another motivation for providing environmental aid (particularly technical 
assistance) is the development of a market for equipment made in the donor 
country. Setting up renewable energy projects in Lithuania, for example, 
provides companies from the donor country with new customers (at least 
until local companies develop their own technology). This has spin-offs for 
the economy of the donor nation and, therefore, could also be brought into 
the efficiency argument. The provision of aid also fosters trade relations in 
general by increasing communication between the countries and thereby 
developing a peaceful rapport. Aid based on commercial and political 
motivations is not necessarily doomed to failure but without the environment 
or even the recipient's economy as the focus of the project, aid is at least 
potentially ineffective (Cassen 1986:15). 
6.2.3 Where Does Environmental Assistance Go? 
6.2.3.1 The Nuclear Bias 
Since 1991, Lithuania has received more environmental assistance than the 
other Baltic States due to concern regarding the safety of Ignalina Nuclear 
Power Plant. However, if the support for Ignalina is excluded, Lithuania has 
received the least funding for environmental purposes (Swedish EPA 1995). 
According to the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), around 
USD 151 million (22 per cent) had been provided for energy and nuclear 
safety between 1991 and 1994 - more than ten times that provided for 
environmental rehabilitation (MFA 1994). This is significant in light of the 
argument made elsewhere (see Banks and Todd 1995) that continued 
investment in Ignalina NPP tends to prolong the inevitable closure, while 
absorbing funds that may have been used to alleviate other environmental 
problems. This would assume that such assistance would still be made 
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available if there was not a nuclear power plant. Obviously concern about 
the safety of the plant has led to more funding in Lithuania but considering 
that it would receive the least support otherwise one could conclude that 
Ignalina does detract assistance from other areas. That is not to say that such 
assistance has not had any benefits and the direction of aid away from Ignalina 
could only come in conjunction with serious moves to discontinue its use. 
It is not surprising that this sector receives a large proportion of environment 
related assistance since 'problems related to energy production are perhaps 
of greatest concern' in Lithuania (Kritkausky 1995:130). The inclusion of 
energy and nuclear safety figures significantly increases the percentages of 
contributions for environmental purposes. Most of the projects involved 
could be included as environmental assistance, however, it is important to 
separate the two sectors in order to distinguish proportions. In this thesis, 
the amounts given to this sector have not been itemised to ascertain the 
percentage given to Ignalina NPP by each donor. However, as an example, 
Sweden, which has a number of cooperative projects with Lithuania on 
nuclear safety, provided approximately USD 7 million for energy and nuclear 
safety between 1991 and 1994 with 76 per cent of this assistance going directly 
to Ignalina (MFA 1994). Denmark, on the other hand, donated a total of 
USD 10.6 million on energy and nuclear safety between 1991 and 1995, 
approximately 11 per cent of which was specifically earmarked for Ignalina. 
The majority of the Danish contribution (55 per cent) funded renewable 
energy, conservation, or efficiency projects while a further 33 per cent was 
directed at the energy system in general including infrastructure development 
and training programmes for district heating operators (MFA 1995). The 
Danish EPA actually states their intention to, in cooperation with the Danish 
Energy Agency, promote projects which 'help Lithuania to promote energy 
production from sources other than nuclear energy' (Danish EPA 1996a:8). 
Most of the countries that have provided assistance to Lithuania have given 
significant proportions for energy and nuclear safety. Japan has provided 
just over USD 44 million in aid to Lithuania, 99 per cent of which was 
provided for energy and nuclear safety. The United Kingdom, which has 
ongoing agricultural problems related to the Chernobyl accident, provided 
35.5 per cent of total assistance for nuclear safety but no other contribution 
toward environmental rehabilitation. Energy and nuclear safety was also a 
concern for the USA. The greatest proportion of funds from the USA was 
provided for the industrial sector with energy and nuclear safety receiving 
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the second highest (21 per cent) proportion and around nine per cent for 
environmental projects (MFA 1995) (see Table 6.1). 
It is also evident that energy, in particular nuclear safety, will continue to 
receive a significant proportion of assistance to Lithuania. The MFA databases 
have listed projects by status; proposed, expression of interest, firm 
commitment, financing decision taken (approved), underway, completed, 
and continuous. If the last four categories are taken as an indication of what 
has been done and the first three categories as indicative of what will be 
done in the future, it is clear that energy and nuclear safety will continue to 
gain support whereas assistance for environmental purposes appears to have 
become of less concern. At the end of 1994, for example, assistance for 
environmental projects amounted to approximately USD 11.7 million (98 
per cent of total environmental aid) while planned assistance (using the first 
three categories) had a projected cost of USD 227 000 (2 per cent of the total). 
In comparison, approximately USD 78.6 million had been donated for energy 
and nuclear safety projects that have been completed, are currently underway, 
or have had a financial decision taken and approximately USD 72.5 million 
was planned for the same purposes (MFA 1994). At the end of 1995, the 
percentage of planned environmental investments had actually increased to 
24 per cent of total environmental assistance indicating that interest in the 
environment has improved, yet it remains a lower priority than nuclear 
safety. The energy and nuclear safety sector has continued to attract support 
with USD 81.8 million provided in the same period and another USD 86.8 
million was earmarked for projects under consideration, planned, or having 
received a firm commitment (MFA 1995). 
It might be argued that, after the initial concern, particularly in relation to 
the lack of sewage treatment facilities and the implications this has had for 
the Baltic Sea, governments and organisations have tended to focus on other 
issues. This might reflect the diminishing public voice on environmental 
issues in Lithuania discussed in Chapter 4, since projects are often proposed 
from within the recipient country. It may also be connected with the priorities 
of the Lithuanian government who have a role in attracting aid. This 
would also help explain the much larger amounts provided for economic 
reconstruction. Problems in the economies of the donor countries mean 
that priorities had to be set and questions asked regarding whether it was 
necessary, important, or obligatory to provide such assistance. Nuclear safety 
has obviously been seen as a priority for environment related assistance. 
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6.2.3.2 Other Priorities 
Waste management has been another major focus of environmental 
assistance, particularly since the construction of sewage treatment plants is 
very capital intensive. Construction and upgrading of five sewage treatment 
works is now underway. Of particular importance is the plant at Kaunas 
which has a population of over 500 000 and no sewage treatment (see also 
3.4.1.1). Financing for the Kaunas plant will come from an EBRD loan and 
USD 5 million in equities from the Stockholm Water Company which will 
be supplemented by a grant from the PHARE (6) programme. Sweden, the 
World Bank, Finland, and the PHARE programme are all involved in 
financing the Klaipeda plant. Meanwhile negotiations continue (as at 1994 
end) with the Danish Government regarding grant and loan financing for 
the upgrading of the Vilnius plant. Assistance has also come from PHARE 
for upgrading mechanical equipment (MEP 1994). 
The main areas receiving grants through the Danish Environmental Support 
Fund (ESF) have been water pollution (50 per cent), waste management (21 
per cent), air pollution (12 per cent), and agricultural pollution (7 per cent). 
However, it was agreed by the Danish EPA and the Lithuanian MEP that 
future activities in the waste water sector will be mainly the responsibility of 
the Lithuanian Government (Danish EPA 1996a:8 and Danish EPA 1996b:2). 
Waste water treatment has also received the biggest proportion of funds 
from the State budget. In 1994, 150 million litas (USD 37.5 million) was 
allocated for waste water treatment (3.8 per cent of state budget) and 105 
million litas (USD 26.3 million) in 1995 (2.2 per cent of the state budget). 
This is compared with 1.325 million (USD 0.33 million) allocated for other 
environmental projects. Once the sewage treatment plants are completed, 
there is no guarantee that a similar amount will still be allocated to the 
environment. For example, the allocation to the environment sector in 
1996 was reduced by almost a third to 39.69 million litas (USD 9.9 million) 
amounting to around 0.8 per cent of the state budget (Kalinauskas and 
Kaminskiene 1996:12 and Arvydas Dragunas pers. comm. February 1996). 
6 Originally set up by the EU to give assistance for economic reconstruction in Poland and 
Hungary but later expanded to include the larger CEE and FSU region. It has a larger technical 
assistance element than other lending agencies and has directed funding to education and 
training (14%), private sector development (9%) and environment and nuclear safety (9%) 
(Manser 1993:56). 
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This suggests that the environment sector will not attract the earlier levels 
of support now that treatment plants are nearing completion. 
Other related water pollution control issues include protection of drinking 
water (EC funded), and Baltic Sea Projects which have included tertiary 
education programmes, marine protection projects (funded by EBRD, 
Sweden). Assistance for water pollution, particularly for waste water treatment 
and Baltic Sea projects, has been influenced by international agreements 
such as the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of 
the Baltic Sea Area which requires significant reductions inpollution loads 
(see Chapter 3). There has also been quite a lot of interest in the development 
of policies, strategies, and the legal framework for environmental 
management (MFA 1994). For example, the Danish EPA has directed 4 per 
cent of grants (excluding energy) to 'institutional strengthening' with a focus 
on capacity building in the areas of environmental protection, resource 
management, and nature conservation. The ESF has also supported a mission 
on strengthening related laws such that they approximate EU requirements 
(Danish EPA 1996a:5 and Danish EPA 1996b:2) 
One area which has not received great attention is organisational support 
for environmental non-governmental organisations (NG0s). The Danish 
EPA provided funds for the Lithuanian Fund for Nature (LGF) with the aim 
of improving efficiency and strengthening its capacity to conduct research 
and develop proposals for nature protection (Danish EPA 1994). Such support 
is not only crucial for the Lithuanian environment, but it is also an important 
part of rebuilding the system of democracy in which various interest groups 
are able to participate in the political process. 
6.2.4 Problems and Advantages Associated with Environmental Assistance 
6.2.4.1 The Development Approach 
Whilst environmental assistance has enabled the development and 
implementation of several useful projects in Lithuania and the rest of the 
former communist bloc, there are limitations associated with its relative 
success. The countries in the region are considered to be 'second world', 
with some environmental problems indicative of the third world but also 
with considerable scientific expertise. What has been missing in the past is 
policy direction and enforcement and, since independence, investment and 
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technology. The donor countries have been directing their assistance to the 
Developing World where technical skills are often limited. Thus, agencies 
might not realise the considerable expertise that exists in the Baltics. The 
tendency to employ consultants to assess the assistance needed alienates 
local experts who consider themselves amply qualified for the task. The 
salaries, accommodation, meals, travel, and printing costs of consultancies 
consume a large percentage of the funding allocated. Fisher (1992:10) points 
out that mistrust of domestic expertise also exists within the countries where 
scientific research has been used to justify now destructive activities. There 
is also mistrust given the past manipulation of most scientific data, particularly 
as it related to the environment. 
6.2.4.2 Technology, Training, or Investment? 
An independent assessment of Swedish environmental assistance to the 
Baltics focused on critical evaluations from people involved in the recipient 
countries. The general criticisms were that the balance between technical 
and capital assistance was tipped in favour of the former; that there was 
insufficient use of local expertise, and too much use of consultants in technical 
assistance; that there were often delays in processing projects; and that there 
was generally a lack of co-ordination and follow-up evaluations (Hagerhall 
and Hagerhall Aniansson 1995:25). Representatives from Swedish industry 
expressed similar concerns. They pointed out that the role of consultants in 
assistance programmes was 'at the expense of technology transfer and direct 
investment projects with tangible environmental benefits' (Hagerhall and 
Hagerhall Aniansson 1995:25). Manser argues that, during 1990-92, only a 
few projects in Eastern Europe addressed the major problems directly, with 
most assistance being 'soft'; consisting of 'research, institution building and 
training, often involving foreign consultants' (Manser 1993:76). There is, 
then, a view that technical assistance is preferable as it is more likely to 
achieve practical results. Yet technology and financial transfer are also 
problematic without education and training. 
Lofstedt points out that while in the past most of Sweden's environmental 
assistance has paid Swedish consultants to prepare pre-feasibility studies, 
there has been a recent change with the government directly financing 
infrastructure projects such as sewage treatment plants. He argues that a 
desire to be seen as serious about its intentions to cleanup the Baltic, and 
thereby set an example for other Western nations in the region, is behind 
274 	 Chapter Six 
this change in the Swedish government's environmental assistance policy 
(Lofstedt 1995:48). 
If Lithuanian authorities are going to successfully develop environmental 
management skills, training will be important. The Danish ESF concentrates 
efforts in 'sectors where the Danish knowledge on the environment and 
technology to protect the environment and nature is especially competent to 
provide qualified assistance' (Danish EPA 1996a:2). That is not to say that 
significant expertise does not already exist in Lithuania but one cannot ignore 
the impact of 50 years of Soviet thinking on the administrators. Assistance 
with developing such skills should also be backed up by environmental 
education throughout the school system. The United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) has been involved in several education 
programmes in Lithuania. These have included training of environmental 
authorities in the principles of environmental impact assessment and risk 
assessment (October 1993 and January 1994) and strengthening the capacity 
of environmental educational institutions (April 1994) (MEP 1994). 
6.2.4.3 Reliance and Resentment 
The issue of reliance appears to be a double edged sword. On the one hand 
there is the fear of being reliant which is strongly connected with national 
sentiment and, on the other hand, a tendency to expect assistance. -The 
Ukraine government, for example, has agreed to close the remaining three 
reactors at Chernobyl as long as the West provides the USD 3 billion to pay 
for it (Mackenzie 1995:10). While expecting assistance, recipient countries 
like Lithuania also often resent it at the same time. Being a recipient of 
assistance automatically puts the country, particularly the personnel involved 
in specific projects, in a position of reliance and perceived inferiority. This 
situation is delicate and is at the root of criticisms from scientists about the 
over-use of foreign experts at the expense of local knowledge. Thus, on the 
ground level where the assistance is put to use, resentment can arise from 
the apparent arrogance of foreign consultants, often tied up with both academic 
and national pride. 
The provision of aid can also be a sensitive matter at the government level. 
As mentioned earlier, it is politically important for the wealthier neighbouring 
countries to assist Lithuania and disagreements regarding the assistance could 
have serious repercussions. The strong national sentiment in Lithuania 
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could lead to a wish not to be reliant on others (such as in the case of the oil 
terminal discussed in Chapter 2) as well as a feeling of resentment, despite 
the understanding that the country needs such support. It is unlikely that 
national pride would lead to a refusal of financial support for environmental 
clean-up (or for other forms of assistance) yet the fact that national sentiment 
is deeply entrenched creates a conflict between the notion of a strong nation 
and the position of reliance. It might be argued that Lithuania is not becoming 
reliant on environmental assistance, given the figures presented at the 
beginning of this chapter which indicate the large percentage of funds that 
are domestically generated. However, it is clear that, for the larger projects 
at least, the Lithuanian government is reliant on foreign assistance, 
investment, or loans in order to implement the proposals. Westing (1989b) 
has argued that environmental cooperation (including the provision of aid 
for environmental projects) has a role in fostering friendly relations between 
countries and therefore in creating a greater level of political security. 
Assistance should empower the recipient nations to act for themselves. It is 
not purely the fault of the recipient countries that it often does not. Soft aid 
that has tended to pay consultants to prepare studies and set up projects 
reinforces the donor-recipient relationship. Working with local experts is 
essential as well as ensuring follow-up monitoring, education, and training. 
One project initiated with this in mind was funded by USAID. The aim of 
the project is to 'improve the indigenous capacity to address environmental 
problems' (MFA 1994). Without fostering local capacities, countries like 
Lithuania will always be on the receiving end of economic and environmental 
assistance. 
6.2.4.4 Project Effectiveness 
As mentioned in 6.2.2.2, donor countries are unlikely to provide for the 
long-term maintenance of a project, however more attention should be paid 
to evaluation of internationally funded environmental projects and of aid 
programmes in general. There has been very little evaluation of bilateral 
environmental assistance in CEE, primarily because donor countries are 
lacking clear environmental objectives for their programmes, ultimately 
leading to an inefficient use of funds (Lofstedt and Sjostedt 1995:368). 
The Swedish Government created a Secretariat with the specific task of 
analysing Swedish assistance. It aims to increase the effectiveness of aid 
276 	 Chapter Six 
through achievement of the goals set out by the Parliament, namely 'increased 
resources, economic and social equality, economic and political independence, 
the democratic development of society, and the long-term management of 
natural resources and care of the environment' (Secretariat for the Analysis 
of Swedish Development Assistance 1994 in Chong and van der Hoek 1996). 
Such broad objectives, while commendable, are a difficult yardstick for 
evaluating the effectiveness of aid programmes in general as well as specific 
projects. The European Investment Bank provides loans meeting their 
criteria. 'All projects must be economically justified, technically viable and 
environmentally sound; in addition, productive sector investment must 
offer an adequate financial return' (EIB in Chong and van der Hoek 1996). 
The same authors note that measuring cost-effectiveness is difficult and is 
largely dependent on the bench-marks used. For example, a project with 
broad goals or lax budgets can meet its limits with ease. The goals established 
by Swedish Parliament could assist in directing assistance into appropriate 
areas. 
An evaluation has been defined as 'an assessment, as systematic and objective 
as possible, of an on-going or completed project, program or policy, its design, 
implementation and results' (OECD in Chong and van der Hoek 1996). Such 
comprehensive evaluations have not been undertaken very often, although 
some project-specific analysis of cost-effectiveness has taken place. 
Evaluations that have been carried out have tended to have 'the (implicit) 
intention to justify the policy pursued rather than obtain an objective 
assessment of the results' (Chong and van der Hoek 1996 - their brackets). 
The Danish EPA acknowledges the difficulty in surveying results but has 
employed a programme coordinator who will visit ongoing projects in order 
to assess effectiveness (Danish EPA 1996b:3). Completed projects also need 
to be assessed if project effectiveness is to be established. 
According to Chong and van der Hoek (1996), one of the central reasons for 
inefficiency is the lack of coordination and control of international assistance. 
Some surveys have been carried out, such as the OECD survey of CEE 
assistance, but these do not contain an evaluation of the effects. Some 
effects are positive such as the reduced pollution in Lithuanian rivers 
following the construction and/or upgrading of sewage treatment plants. It 
is not easy to prove this connection given that pollution loads have been 
reduced through the downturn in production (see Chapter 3). The Danish 
EPA evaluated the effects of waste water treatment projects in Lithuania in 
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connection with a report titled Improvement of the Baltic Sea: Activities 
Financed from the Danish EPA Funds which indicated a reduction in water 
pollution as a result of Danish funded activities, corresponding to the load 
produced from approximately 95 000 people per year (Danish EPA 1996b:4). 
There may be other, perhaps unintentional, effects of international assistance 
some of which may not be apparent initially and would, therefore, only be 
identified as part of longer-term evaluations. Some planned effects, too, 
might not be immediate. Therefore, it is important to have project specific 
evaluations to assess whether objectives have been met and whether there 
have been any unwanted side effects. Peterson (1993:255) points out that, 
given the strong connection between environmentalism and national 
sentiment in the FSU, a perception of Western exacerbation of environmental 
devastation has in turn reinforced the 'environmentalist-nationalist nexus'. 
Thus, the political implications of environmental assistance might not be as 
positive as countries like Sweden might hope. If environmental projects 
are unsuccessful (which is possible, according to Cassen (1986), when the aid 
is given out of self interest or political reasons) then there could be negative 
political repercussions. 
Each donor country should evaluate their overall assistance programme to 
ensure that the resources have been used efficiently. Of course, efficiency 
could be subjectively interpreted given the economic benefits to the donor 
countries outlined in 6.2.2.3. Chong and van der Hoek (1996) note that 
evaluations have tended to be for internal use and perhaps "accurate" 
evaluations are more likely from an independent coordinating source. They 
recommend tandem evaluations from both donor and recipient. This method 
might be criticised on the basis that it is likely to consume significant 
proportions of allocated funding. 
Economic cost-effectiveness is not the only measure of a successful project 
yet it does highlight certain problems or benefits of the work. Chong and 
van der Hoek (1996) suggest ways of achieving cost-effectiveness such as 
using a tender process for particular needs based projects, asking independent 
sources for the most appropriate solution to the problem at hand, and 
following operational guidelines such as those relating to feasibility, tender, 
monitoring, and post-project evaluation. 
What the discussion by Chong and van der Hoek (1996) misses is an analysis 
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of effectiveness or efficiency in terms of achieving aims outside of completing 
the project within budget or creating other economic spin-offs. There does 
not seem to be any attention to results or effectiveness in terms of 
environmental gain or impact. It is important that the recipient gets good 
value by using the tender process, for example, but it is also important that 
the economic, social, and environmental goals of the project are met. 
Although their paper is not specifically discussing environmental assistance, 
it does refer to such projects. 
An evaluation of the environmental impacts of PHARE programmes in the 
Visegrad States (Hungry, Poland Czech and Slovak Republics) from the point 
of view of local NGOs was conducted by WWF UK in 1994 and presented to 
the European Parliament. The report revealed that, while there were some 
obvious positive results of environmental programmes such as the transfer 
of pollution prevention technology, there have been several negative or 
unknown impacts as a result of PHARE programmes. A major problem 
identified was an incapacity on the part of the recipient countries to administer 
the sudden influx of substantial grants resulting in unmeasured and unmet 
objectives as well as conflicting aims. It was also revealed that there were no 
mechanisms within the overall PHARE programme to maximise the positive 
environmental impacts and to minimise the negative effects (WWF UK 
1994:5-6). Another concern raised by the report was that: 
the lack of public participation, the difficulties in accessing information on 
PHARE's operation and results, lack of communication and absence of 
mechanisms to achieve it and lack of efficiency within the programme. In 
addition, different projects and programmes are shown to often have 
contradictory objectives or outcomes (WWF UK 1994:6). 
The report focused on programmes in the spheres of energy, environment, 
nature protection, transport, water management, and agriculture. Thus, the 
impacts are derived from projects with a general environmental bent, not 
from those with primarily economic aims which may involve still further 
environmental impacts. For environmental assistance, in particular, it is 
crucial that evaluation and monitoring is undertaken to assess the 
environmental benefits, or perhaps detrimental impacts, of various projects. 
In such a way, ineffective projects can be avoided in the future. General 
criticisms from people involved suggest that there are serious problems 
with the direction of assistance causing inefficiency. In this sense the 
inefficiency is not so much whether the project over-spent but whether it 
has been in a priority area and achieved good results. In Lithuania, there 
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have been few comprehensive evaluations of environmental projects. 
6.2.4.5 Linking in Other Assistance and Investment 
The financing of environmental projects comes not only from grants but 
also from private and official loans or investment. Loans are often subsidised 
in that they involve lower interest rates or longer grace and repayment 
periods than are available from world capital markets (Bond 1991:4). For 
example, a World Bank loan of USD 7 million as part of the funding for the 
waste water treatment facility at Klaipeda on the coast of the Baltic Sea was 
signed with an interest rate of 7-8 per cent and ten years grace (pers. comm. 
Winfried Pietersen, P1-TARE adviser to MEP, November 1994). The project 
was co-financed (9.1 million) from Finland, Sweden, and PHARE together 
with a local contribution of USD 7 million (EBRD 1996:32) (see also 3.4.1.1). 
Most of the official financial assistance to the CEE and FSU has been provided 
on commercial terms, with only a small percentage in the form of grants or 
concessional loans. For the donor/lender, this is seen as appropriate because 
of the relatively high per capita income in the region as compared with the 
developing nations (Bond 1991:5). As mentioned in section 6.2.1.2, while 
international financial institutions can borrow more cheaply than individual 
countries, they still must operate under normal banking practices, thus 
requiring a reasonably high security for the loans. Hansen (1995:21) argues 
for subsidised loan agreements and for a merging of aid with either commercial 
loans or profit from the World Bank's activities in order to lessen the burden 
of interest repayments. 
Many loans also carry conditions relating to the recipient's policies. Private 
loans are primarily commercial considerations (such as risks involved in 
securing repayments) but official financial transfers are often influenced by 
the economic, social, and political policies of the recipient country. The EU, 
for example, requires 'recipient countries to have pluralistic political systems 
with no institutionally favoured party, to make movement toward free market 
economies, to have free labour unions, and to demonstrate respect for human 
rights' (Bond 1991:6). An IFI study stressed that all assistance to the FSU 
should be predicated on the commencement of major structural reforms. 
However, interestingly, they suggested that projects in the energy and 
environment sectors might be excepted given that they could have immediate 
benefits for the FSU and the world (Bond 1991:34). So, in some circumstances, 
the environmental projects escape political involvement. However, it is 
also apparent that the increasing hard currency debt has political, economic, 
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social, and environmental ramifications. 
The increasing debt is a burden which governments might attempt to ease 
by inappropriate means such as allowing environmentally unsound 
investment. Therefore, it is also important that foreign investment and 
assistance be administered in an environmentally sound manner. The 
Lithuanian Government introduced 'Environmental Guidelines for Foreign 
Investors' which outline the legal obligations of potential investors (see 
7.4.1.6). It is also important that Lithuanian governments do not fall into 
the debt cycle where they must continue to borrow whilst only repaying 
interest on existing loans. A situation is possible as in the developing countries 
of the South where 'indebtedness is a major factor contributing to poverty 
and environmental destruction' (Lang and Hines 1993:84). The structural 
reform specifications relating to loans from major lending institutions such 
as the IMF and the World Bank have focused on earning more and spending 
less. The implication here is that spending is usually cut in areas such as 
health, education, and the environment (Lang and Hines 1993:85). 
6.2.5 Implications for Environmental Policy in Lithuania 
As with the economic, political, and social record of the recipient country, 
environmental policies could be an important factor in the decision whether 
or not to provide environmental assistance. Some might argue that 
environmental assistance is pointless where legislation and guidelines 
continue to permit the destruction that the assistance is designed to remedy. 
Such an argument has been presented by Cassen (1986) in relation to the aid 
debate in the 1980s which focused on economic development to relieve 
poverty in the Third World. He acquits aid of a bias toward particular 
countries based on economic policies but recognises that donor countries 
must make the judgement when deciding the destination of aid (Cassen 
1986:243). The argument is also relevant in relation to environmental 
assistance to the former communist bloc. Given this potential situation, 
donor countries might, once again, question their contribution in terms of 
the efficiency argument. 
Lithuania has begun developing environment related legislation (including 
EIA, environmental protection, pollution taxes, an environmental guidelines 
for investors) which should ease any concerns of donor countries. Much of 
the legislation has been developed with the help of funding from PHARE, 
IJSAID, and Danish EPA (MEP 1994). The National Environment Strategy 
for Lithuania was also funded by PHARE (see 7.4.2). Funding the development 
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of environmental legislation might be one way for donor countries to ensure 
that other environmental assistance is not wasted. Yet, as noted by Fisher 
(1992), often the administrative structures are not equipped to cope with the 
deluge of new legislation, thus widening the gap between legislation and its 
implementation. In addition, as discussed above, aid, loans, and investment 
in other sectors may have serious implications for the state of the 
environment. It is also essential that Lithuania does not become reliant on 
outside assistance for environmental rehabilitation as it pursues other 
priorities. Further conclusions are presented at the end of this chapter. 
6.3 Legal and Fiscal Strategies for Domestic Environmental Investment 
Although international assistance has been important, and will remain so 
in the medium-term, domestic investment in environmental clean-up and 
protection has exceeded foreign aid. (7) There have, however, been difficulties 
financing the many necessary environmental improvements. As the 
previous chapter demonstrates, this is primarily due to the limited budget of 
the Lithuanian government which has been faced with reforms in all spheres 
of society. Thus, as well as budget allocations, the Lithuanian Government 
has relied heavily on fiscal strategies for generating environmental protection 
funding. 
The amount allocated for environmental purposes (primarily related to 
construction and upgrading of sewage treatment plants) is still comparatively 
small in relation to other domestic investment. In 1993, the Lithuanian 
Government allocated around 1.3 per cent of the national budget for 
environmental purposes. This dramatically increased in 1994 but dropped 
again in 1995, with the allocation amounting to around 3.7 per cent and 2.2 
per cent respectively. The latter allocations were skewed toward waste water 
treatment with at least 80 per cent funding the new plants. In 1995, 106.715 
million litas was allocated for the environment sector. Waste water treatment 
received 105.4 million of this through the Public Investment Programme 
(see 6.3.2.2). The remainder was allocated to the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection (Arvydas Dragunas pers. comm., February 1997 and MEP 1995b, 
Section 9:3, 11). The 1996 allocation dropped significantly (to 0.8 per cent) as 
the demands of treatment plant construction decreased (Arvydas Dragunas 
pers. comm. February 1996). The National Environment Strategy 
7. Excluding funds allocated to nuclear safety. Domestic allocations to Ignalina are included 
in the Energy Ministry's budget. The domestic allocation would perhaps not be greater if 
private foreign investment were also included in the total international contribution. 
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acknowledges the skewing of public sector environmental financing to waste 
water treatment as a disadvantage since virtually no finance is made available 
for other environmental protection projects (MEP 1995b, Section 9:5). A 
greater proportion of financing is generated from sources other than the 
state budget. 
Regardless of which political party is in government, finances need to be 
raised for environmental rehabilitation and protection. The ideological 
orientation of those in power will have an influence on the perception of, 
and therefore priority given to, the environment and the types of strategies 
that are employed to raise such funds. The general belief in Lithuania has 
been that the prevailing economic conditions necessitate the delay of 
environmental investment until the economy has sufficiently recovered. 
Therefore, a significant proportion of the funds allocated are raised by fiscal 
means rather than directly from the budget. 
The priority given to economic reconstruction and the consequent market 
orientation of policies has influenced Lithuanian environmental policy in a 
number of ways. Firstly, it has limited the domestic allocation for 
environmental purposes. Secondly, it has led to market orientated approaches 
to raising capital for environmental investment such as permits, charges, 
and taxes. Thirdly, some environmental problems have been exacerbated by 
the economic approach of the government which may have long-term 
consequences. 
The use of economic instruments in environmental policy is codified in 
Chapter VI of the Law on Environmental Protection 1992. The law states 
that the 'ecological and economic interests of the state shall be coordinated 
by the economic mechanism of environmental protection' such as taxes on 
resource use, charges for pollution, economic sanctions and compensation, 
state subsidies, price controls, and credit policies (Supreme Council of 
Lithuania 1992b). The first three are the main mechanisms used in Lithuanian 
environmental management, the last two are not in use at all, while subsidies 
for environmental protection measures are primarily offered to the state 
sector (Semeniene et a/. 1996:2). 
Although there have been some problems in collecting taxes and fines owed, 
this has improved over the last three years. In 1992, the amount generated 
in this way was USD 3 million which increased to 4.55 million in 1993 and 
to 10 million in 1994 (Edmundas Greimas pers. comm., September 1995). 
The following section provides an overview of the strategies used in Lithuania 
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to raise finance for environmental investment while discussing the overall 
benefits and disadvantages of the system in place. 
6.3.1 Pollution Permits, Charges, and Penalties 
Environmental management in Lithuania is a mix of administrative 
measures (emission standards) and economic instruments such as pollution 
charges and natural resources taxes (Varneckiene 1997). As enshrined in 
law, the aim of the charges is 'to stimulate pollution abatement and reduce 
the harmful impact on environment' (Supreme Council of Lithuania 1991b). 
Semeniene et al. (1996) argue that the system does not achieve this aim as 
well as it might, yet it represents a commitment to the "polluter pays" principle 
(PPP) which may be developed in the future. Other possible aims are identified 
by Bluffstone (1995) including financing environmental investment, 
"Greening" the tax system by substituting income taxes for pollution charges, 
and achieving a target level of emission reduction. While the system may 
be falling short of its stated goal of influencing the level of emissions by 
polluters, it appears that its main focus is the unstated goal of providing 
finance for environmental investment. Although this, too, is not as effective 
as it might be (see 6.3.1.2). 
Each enterprise must obtain a permit which stipulates its maximum emissions 
and/or extraction of natural resources. Each permit is composed of four 
parts: air, water, waste, and natural resources. While in the USA, a developer 
would need to obtain a separate permit for each part of the operation 
(Harrington 1993:8), Australian counterparts have an inclusive permit such 
as in Lithuania. The Ministry of Environmental Protection determines the 
standards and issues the permits. The focus in this thesis is on emissions 
although it is worth noting that permitting of waste disposal is in its infancy. 
No permit is required for disposal of non-hazardous waste and a permit for 
hazardous waste disposal has only been required since 1992. As a result, 
information on hazardous waste generation and disposal has been poor but 
data collection since that time will improve the situation (Harrington 1993:9). 
There are two types of permits; Maximum Allowable Pollution (MAP) Permits 
and Temporary Allowable Pollution (TAP) Permits (see 6.3.1.1). The system 
consists of base rate charges (for emitting an agreed amount) which are 
indexed quarterly, penalty rates when emissions exceed standards, and 
preferential rates when emissions are below the agreed MAP. Emitting 
below the agreed level opens the way for possible trading of pollution permits 
(see 6.3.1.3). Charges are estimated at the beginning of each year and are paid 
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quarterly, in advance, on the assumption that companies will emit the agreed 
maximum. The account is settled at the end of the year to ensure that the 
amount owed is equal to previous payments (Semeniene et al. 1996:14, 
Varneckiene 1996). 
The unit charge for various pollutants increases along with emissions levels, 
therefore 'the rate an enterprise pays for emissions of a given pollutant will 
be different from that paid by any another enterprise' (sic) (Semeniene et al. 
1996:14). If an enterprise emits a particular pollutant at a level less than 50 
per cent of its agreed standard, it pays no pollution charges. Also, if an 
enterprise emits less of one particular pollutant, a preferential rate is applied 
to all pollutants it emits. Likewise, to those that exceed their level, a higher 
rate is applied to all pollutants emitted and not just those exceeding the 
permitted level. This, potentially, creates a relatively high marginal penalty 
rate and, therefore, incentive to maintain emission levels below their MAP 
or TAP permitted levels (Semeniene et al. 1996:15). The incentive tends to 
be reduced once the MAP level is crossed (see 6.3.1.2). 
6.3.1.1 Maximum and Temporary Allowable Pollution Permits 
The MAP is not a static level which, if exceeded, companies are required to 
pay a penalty. Rather, it is a firm-specific level of allowable pollution 
negotiated by individual enterprises and the MEP. The limits are set so as to 
not disturb the ambient air and water quality standards for which -every 
location has a Maximum Allowable Concentration (MAC). Most ambient 
norms are derived directly from the Soviet system and include a range of 
hazardous substances which have never been emitted in Lithuania or will 
not be emitted in the future. Some of the ambient standards are more strict 
than those in the EU or US and many are currently under revision 
(Varneckiene 1996). 
TAP permits are typically less strict than MAP permits, offering enterprises 
an opportunity to phase in environmental improvements. If an enterprise 
cannot meet the determined MAP standards, very often they convince MEP 
departments to replace them with TAP standards. The TAP levels are 
negotiated between Ministry inspectors and the firm. TAP permits can also 
be allocated if the emissions from a proposed economic activity lead to 
violation of the MAC (ambient standard) for the area (Zajankauskaite 1995:6). 
The TAP permits have a maximum duration of 5 years and must specify the 
time-frame for reaching MAP standards in the future. TAP permits are 
most often obtained by water polluters. In a random sample of 366 sources, 
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all of which met the criteria requiring them to calculate their MAP levels, 
around 76 per cent were operating under TAP permits (Varneckiene 1996, 
Bluffstone 1995:7, and Semeniene et a/. 1996:9-10). 
The widespread use of TAP rather than MAP permits, argues Bluffstone 
(1995), undermines the regulatory structure outlined in the legislation yet it 
also highlights the necessity of ensuring that meeting MAP standards is 
economically possible when distributing permits. He suggests that because 
many polluters do not have access to information about possible technological 
improvements, or have limited available funds for investment, 'making 
such deals with inspectors is really the only recourse for sources having 
difficulties complying with MAP standards' (Bluffstone 1995:7). Because the 
technology is generally older, achieving a given percentage reduction in 
emissions is potentially cheaper in Lithuania than in Western countries. 
The problem seems to be that despite the fact that low-cost (or even no-cost 
solutions) for emissions reduction are available in Lithuania, there are no 
incentives given to polluters to seek out those solutions. Theoretically, 
charges for pollution should be an incentive to invest in technological 
improvements. However, since, 
the charge rates for most pollutants are too low to influence behaviour, the 
system operates like a pure standard regime ... in that emissions are kept 
below the MAP level, but no other incentives or opportunities for adjustment 
are provided by the system (Bluffstone 1995:14) (see 6.3.1.2). 
6.3.1.2 Advantages and Limitations of the Permit System 
The main advantage of the system is that charges for deviating from the 
"standard" raise revenue for the state and municipal environment funds 
(see 6.3.2). In 1994, for example, a total of USD 5.4 million was raised from 
base rate charges and penalties for above-limit emissions. Approximately 70 
per cent of collected charges are allocated to municipal environment funds 
with the remaining 30 per cent going to state coffers. The average annual 
contributions to these funds is USD 250 000 which is inadequate for large 
investments such as required for waste water treatment plants. 
The revenue raised from penalties for exceeding standards is accumulated 
in the State Nature Protection Fund (Semeniene et a/. 1996:3, 13-4) (see 6.3.2). 
However, the same report highlights the inadequate level of fines which 
limit their capacity to act as an incentive not to pollute (Semeniene et al. 
1996:18-21). Thus, revenue raised from penalties could also be potentially 
greater. Harrington (1993:22) points out that the high inflation rate in 
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Lithuania since the restoration of independence has meant that enterprises 
prefer to pay the penalties than reduce emissions. Yet, inflation also erodes 
the value of fees and collected revenue. This is not easily remedied since 
the charge rates are specified in the legislation rather than a regulatory measure 
outside the law, thereby restricting flexibility in adjusting rates in line with 
economic change (Bluffstone 1995:5). 
An analysis of the marginal cost of increasing pollution by one unit when 
operating under a MAP permit highlights a problem with achieving the 
emissions reduction goal and with revenue raising. The cost to polluters if 
they keep emissions below the MAP is very low. Thus, there is a tendency 
to keep just below the MAP, in order to avoid penalties which means there 
is a low contribution to the State Nature Protection Fund. The marginal 
cost jumps sharply at reaching MAP but, once crossed, incentives to reduce 
dramatically decline. Just crossing the MAP level increases the charge by 137 
times compared with the basic rate. For polluters who emit way over their 
MAP, the charge rate drops to 3.2 times the basic rate (Bluffstone 1995:7). So 
while there is some incentive to keep emissions below the MAP, if they are 
too strict, or if an enterprise chooses to pollute more, there is little incentive 
to avoid such emissions. 'In fact, the feature that the marginal penalty falls 
so sharply after the MAP emission level has been crossed implies that at 
emissions levels near the MAP point incentives can be somewhat perverse' 
(Bluffstone 1995:14). It is also important that other tax incentives (such as 
allowing charges to be tax deductible) do not counteract both the revenue 
raising and the emissions reduction functions (OECD 1995:33). 
The complexity of the system could be seen as a disadvantage, particularly 
because its administration is so resource-intensive. '[T]his complexity probably 
contributes little to achieving the environmental goals of the Republic' 
(Semeniene et al. 1996:26). Maximum Ambient Concentrations have been 
established for 500 air pollutants and the MEP currently assesses 100 air 
pollutants and 51 water pollutants (Environmental Protection Department 
1992). Since there are around 600 major emission sources, a large amount of 
monitoring is required in order to be effective (Harrington 1993:11 and 
Varneckiene 1996). Bluffstone (1995:12) suggests that, in light of the 
enforcement capability of the MEP, some pollutants could be eliminated 
from the list. He argues that Lithuania will need to harmonise the charge 
system with the goals the Government has indirectly set itself through 
becoming a signatory to international agreements. Such harmonisation 
would include adjusting those ambient standards which are more strict than 
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in Western Europe because they are seen as placing an excessive compliance 
burden on Lithuanian enterprises (Semeniene et a/. 1996:27). 
A problem of incompatibility arises when both the stated goal of pollution 
abatement and the unstated goal of generating finance for environmental 
purposes are considered. If the system is meeting the aim of reducing emission 
levels, available revenue will decline over time. If the main aim is to raise 
revenue, the danger is that a reliance on the income source develops, implying 
that pollution should continue (Smith 1993 in Lehoczki and Peszko 1994:26) 
(see also 5.4.4.3). For this reason, penalties and fines should not be the main 
source of revenue for Environmental Funds which reallocate the collected 
penalties (Lehoczki and Peszko 1994:27). Government allocations and private 
investment are necessary contributors (see 6.3.2). In general, the 
environmental taxes and charges in the CEE and FSU are too low to act as an 
incentive for reducing emissions, leaving revenue raising as their main 
function. Even when .fines are higher it is important that infringements are 
adequately patrolled and limits enforced. The expected cost to a polluter is 
the probability of detection multiplied by the size of the fine. When the 
probability of detection is very low, as identified in the Lithuanian system, 
the expected cost of violation is low even if the fine is high. (Andreasson, 
1992:6). 
The low level of fines in Lithuania, together with problems of collection 
and the prevalence of TAP permits mean that the revenue raising function 
is also limited. There is even the possibility that the Lithuanian Government 
'is actually losing money in calculating, administering, and collecting charges' 
(Varneckiene 1996). Trading pollution permits could further decrease the 
amount of revenue available for the State Nature Protection Fund (see 6.3.1.3). 
6.3.1.3 Trading Pollution Permits 
Air pollution permits often include multiple sources within an enterprise 
allowing them to propose an increase in emissions from one source, provided 
emissions have been reduced from another source and ambient air quality is 
maintained. Trading across enterprises is also possible, but, as at 1995, no 
documentation of such practice existed in Lithuania (Semeniene et a/. 1996:9). 
It has been argued that allowing permits to be transferable within an 
appropriate region increases the cost-effectiveness of the system. Following 
from this, Semeniene et al. (1996) suggest that this aspect of the system 
should be made more explicit and actively promoted. They argue that the 
burden of calculating standards already rests with the firms so it would not 
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be difficult to allow firms to propose permits involving bubbline ) of sources 
within the enterprise or netting emissions with other enterprises in the 
region (Semeniene et a/. 1996:25, 28-30). 
Given the current low charge rate, tendency to grant TAP permits, and 
infrequent application of penalties, also noted by Semeniene et al. (1996), it 
could be argued that trading standards would reduce MEP revenue further 
(in particular the State Nature Protection Fund) while keeping aggregate 
emissions the same. It may be cost-effective for the enterprise, and even the 
MEP in terms of administrative costs, yet it does not appear to be helpful in 
achieving the goal set out in law 'to stimulate pollution abatement and 
reduce the harmful impact on environment'. If an enterprise can receive 
more money by selling their "excess polluting capacity" than by receiving 
the preferential rate for the reduction or if an enterprise can buy excess 
capacity for less than applicable penalties then they will do so. In each case 
the MEP loses funds for environmental protection and the overall pollution 
is not decreased. It has been suggested that this be avoided by permitting the 
discharge of only a fraction (say 90 per cent) of the capacity purchased, resulting 
in a net reduction of emissions (Harrington 1993:34). Harrington also-notes 
the possibility of governments purchasing and retiring emissions capacity. 
Because such trading has not begun in practice, it is not clear whether a 
company that has reduced emissions and sold their "excess polluting capacity" 
would still receive the preferential rate for emitting below their MAP. If 
this were possible, environmental revenue is further reduced. Harrington 
(1993:30-1) highlights a problem with establishing rules for the trading of 
permits from a closed plant. While plant closures offer a sure way of reducing 
emissions, there could be difficulties in Lithuania where numerous closures 
are likely. The question is whether enterprises should receive emission 
credits from others that were going to shut down anyway? 
Bluffstone (1995:14-15) points to the extensive use of tradeable permits in the 
USA to regulate air emissions. The focus is on the quantity, rather than the 
price, of pollution and on allowing enterprises to trade permits giving them 
a greater flexibility in complying with environmental standards. This reduces 
the cost of meeting environmental goals. Smaller and less complex examples 
8 Bubbling refers to calculating total emissions for the enterprise or for a region, rather than 
from each stack or emission source, allowing a company to have increased emissions from one 
source if that increase is compensated for a decrease in the same type of emissions from another 
source. 
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are found in countries more similar to Lithuania. In Poland, for example, it 
was found that trading of air pollution permits significantly reduced 
compliance costs. In one case, a firm would have had to be closed because it 
could not meet the air quality standards. Bluffstone argues that the trading 
of permits reduced costs and saved jobs. This might be true, however, what 
is the environmental benefit? A polluting factory has been allowed to continue 
production solely because another firm was able to reduce it's emissions. 
Such practices will not help reduce total emissions. Rather, it maintains 
emissions at the level framed within maximum ambient concentrations but 
which has often been arbitrarily agreed upon by Ministry inspectors and 
enterprise managers (see 6.3.1.1). 
6.3.2 Environmental Funds 
Environmental Funds are institutions designed to channel earmarked 
revenues (OECD 1995:9). In the CEE and FSU, environmental funds have 
emerged as an important and useful financing mechanism for environmental 
rehabilitation and protection. Comprehensive Environmental Funds (9), in 
particular, can be effective instruments for the re-allocation of environmental 
taxes and pollution permit charges and penalties. They are a policy instrument 
as much as an economic one. With a clear set of priorities for environmental 
spending developed by the Ministry, the Funds can redirect funds from 
polluters to address specific environmental problems (Lehoczki and Peszko 
1994:1, 10). Particularly in times of political and economic difficulties, they 
act as a useful mechanism for creating .a more secure source for environmental 
investment in the longer-term (Lehoczki and Peszko 1994:11). In terms of 
environmental planning, Environmental Funds have the capacity to support 
and facilitate both the development and implementation of Environmental 
Action Plans (OECD 1995:13-4) (see 5.4.2.1 and 7.4.3). 
Environmental Funds may also facilitate the development of skills and 
expertise required for preparation and evaluation of environmental projects, 
leading to better environmental management (OECD 1995:13). In addition, 
they can act as a catalyst for further involvement from the private or 
commercial sectors in financing environmental projects. Presumably, once 
9. Comprehensive Environmental Funds provide finance for a wide range of environmental 
purposes. Specific Environmental Funds, on the other hand, focus on a single need such as 
water quality management. The latter is most common in developed market economies and 
the former is the usual type used in CEE and FSU. (OECD 1995:9-10). The remaining discussion 
on Environmental Funds refers to the comprehensive type found in the transition economies. 
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the economic situation improves and the banking sector plays a greater role 
in financing projects, the need for comprehensive Funds will decrease 
(Lehoczki and Peszko 1994:11). 
The usual source of finance for Environmental Funds is pollution charges. 
International assistance in the form of capital grants and allocations from 
the State budget also contribute. The Funds can direct foreign assistance 
toward nationally prioritised projects (such as outlined in the National 
Strategy), which could overcome the problem of ineffective projects designed 
by the donor and not necessarily based on recipient needs. State allocations 
are usually for a specific project, and in this way, Funds are used primarily as 
a vehicle for transferring money. 
Lehoczki and Peszko (1994) argue that it is important for the emissions 
charge system to be easy to enforce and monitor in order to supply the 
Funds with sufficient capital. As noted in section 6.3.1.2, the Lithuanian 
system is very complicated which may be a hindrance to supplying the State 
Nature Protection Fund with adequate finance. Product charges (10), it is argued, 
may be more effective in providing a stable source of revenue for 
Environmental Funds in transition economies. Product charges are 'generally 
more easily enforced and are more readily incorporated into the tax system 
(Lehoczki and Peszko 1994:3-4, 28). 
Despite the advantages of Environmental Funds, it has been argued that 
they should be considered as transitional instruments. It is argued that, in 
the longer-term, earmarking public resources can become inefficient. Not 
least of which is the issue of high inflation in the region which could erode 
the value of revenue placed in Environmental Funds (Lehoczki and Peszko 
1994:30). There may be long-term environmental management issues such 
as waste water treatment that will continue to require state funding but 
these might be better addressed through Municipal development Funds or 
utilities' agencies (Lehoczki and Peszko 1994:1-2). 
In terms of market economies' standards, the continued use of Funds, the 
argument goes, 'is a "second-best" solution as an environmental policy 
instrument' (OECD 1995:9). However, it could also be argued that the existence 
of such Funds ensures at least a measure of commitment to environmental 
io. Product charges can be on inputs such as chemicals or fuel or on final products that impact on 
the environment at the time of consumption or disposal (Lehoczki and Peszko 1994:27). 
Chapter Six 	 291 
protection on the part of governments. After all, it is not only in transition 
economies that competing sectors place demands on governments for budget 
allocations. Government allocations to such Funds, then, are important 
and may help alleviate the reliance on raising revenue through pollution 
charges. In addition, the existence of Funds secures at least a portion of 
collected revenue for environmental purposes rather than for general 
government coffers from where it may be allocated elsewhere. Section 5.2 
highlights the connections between the environment and other sectors of 
society and stressed the importance of integrating these in policy decisions. 
So, while it may be that as the economy develops 'resources [from Funds] 
may be channelled into problems that are no longer priorities' (OECD 1995:15), 
a commitment to environmental protection and social equity is crucial to 
economic success and a sustainable society. 
It was reported in March 1995 that EU PHARE were considering a 2.5 million 
ecu grant for the establishment of a new Environmental Fund in Lithuania 
(Penn 1995:12), suggesting a measure of faith in Environmental Funds in 
general - perhaps with some modifications. Penn (1995) recommends 
restructuring the Fund to create a "financial assistance programme" offering 
interest rate subsidies to borrowers (municipal governments or enterprises) 
who intend to use the loan for environmental investments (Penn 1995:12). 
6.3.2.1 State Nature Protection Fund 
As a first step to create a permanent source of funding for environmental 
protection, the State Nature Protection Fund (NPF) was established in 1988. 
This preceded the related laws of independent Lithuania such as the Law on 
Taxes (1991) and State Owned Natural Resources and the Law on Charges 
on Environmental Pollution (1991) which created the system of economic 
instruments discussed above (Semeniene et al. 1996:3). Penn (1995:12) 
recommends restructuring the NPF into a financial assistance programme 
whereby borrowers, typically municipal governments but also private 
industry, could have access to interest rate subsidies for environmental 
investment. Given the low incentive of fines and charges discussed above, 
such a programme could be useful in encouraging environmental 
improvements. 
6.3.2.2 Lithuanian Public Investment Programme 
On January 23, 1995, the Lithuanian Parliament adopted a Public Investment 
Programme (PIP) for the period 1995-1997 proposing 916.2 million litas (USD 
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229.05 million) for financing environmental projects through municipal 
budgets (Penn 1995:3). The PIP is a combination of State budget allocations, 
foreign grants or concessional loans and municipal resources. Each year, the 
PIP will have to be approved as part of the State budget" (Penn 1995:3). It 
presents Lithuania's sectorial investment priorities and provides direction 
to potential donors and lenders wishing to provide financial assistance to 
Lithuania. The priority sector areas are energy, transport, and environment 
(MEP 1995b, Section 9:3). 
Agriculture is allotted only 1 per cent of investment despite the need for 
large investments in technological improvements for farming and for the 
storage of fertilisers, pesticides, and manure. The energy sector is the most 
heavily supported by the programme (46 per cent), followed by transport (28 
per cent), and environmental protection (13 per cent) (Kalinauskas 1996:19). 
Ninety eight per cent of the environment allocation is earmarked for waste 
water treatment (Penn 1995:3) (see Chapter 3 and 5.4.3.1). 
The environmental allocation includes that provided from the state budget, 
combined with secured or expected international grants or loans, an municipal 
funding. In 1995, the 105.4 million litas allocated from the state budget for 
waste water treatment amounted to 41 per cent of the total PIP environment 
allocation for the same year. Approximately 51 per cent was derived from 
international grants or loans (MEP 1995b, Section 9:3). The National 
Environmental Strategy (MEP 1995b, Section 9:3) indicates that allocations 
from the state budget would increase in 1996 and 1997 to 161.6 and 166.2 
million litas respectively. As mentioned in section 6.1, the environmental 
allocation actually decreased significantly to 39.7 million litas, confirming 
the declining priority given to environmental issues, as well as questioning 
the value of such investment programmes for environmental protection. 
6.3.2.3 International Assistance and Environmental Funds 
Environmental Funds can administer foreign resources in the form of grants 
or concessional loans from bilateral donors or commercial loans from IFIs. 
The main advantage of this is that finances are distributed based on the 
prioritised needs of the recipient country. Some people involved in 
implementing aid projects at the ground level in Lithuania criticised some 
of the projects derived in donor countries. Sometimes this is due to the 
11 ' The National election in October where the government is expected to lose control of the 
Parliament may affect such initiatives as the PIP (see also Chapter 7). 
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self-interest motive which leads to projects that are designed to suit the 
expertise and technical capacity of the donor country at times ignoring the 
needs of Lithuania (see also 6.2.2.3 and 6.2.4.2). The Funds also provide an 
opportunity to match foreign assistance for specific capital-intensive projects 
(Lehoczki and Peszko 1994:33). 
Donor countries might also use Funds to direct their assistance. The Danish 
Environmental Support Fund for Central and Eastern Europe, for example, 
provides support to activities limiting pollution through air, water and waste, 
supports the strengthening of the institutions that are responsible or involved 
with the effort to reduce pollution, and supports efforts for the preservation 
of natural amenities (Danish EPA 1996a:1). 
Interestingly, as part of the strengthening of the institutional framework for 
environmental management in Lithuania, the ESF aims 'to promote the 
development of a flexible, result-orientated approach towards permitting 
and management of industrial pollution'. The related project is currently 
under review (Danish EPA 1996a:5). 
Problems with using Environmental Funds to channel foreign assistance 
include the possibility of divergent priorities and procedures. The liability is 
also an important question since Funds are separated from the State budget 
and governments may disclaim any responsibility; a sovereign guarantee 
must then be negotiated (Lehoczki and Peszko 1994:33) (see also 6.2.2.2). 
As shown in the first section of this chapter, much of international assistance 
to Lithuania comes in a technical form for specific purposes and is not, 
therefore, easily channelled through an Environmental Fund. However, if 
capital assistance were placed in such Funds, the recipient country would 
have more control over spending and therefore be more efficient in meeting 
local needs. 
6.3.3 Private Investment in Environmental Projects 
Private investment in the environment is extremely limited, particularly 
since financial profits are not always lucrative. There is scope for private 
investment in Lithuania in environmental improvements in areas such as 
recycling and eco-tourism, which could also have financial returns. It is not 
possible to discuss these in detail but environmental protection measures, 
including habitat protection or improving water quality in lakes would be 
beneficial for companies promoting tourism outside the cities. The Soviet 
recycling system collapsed soon after the restoration of independence and it 
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quickly became uneconomical for municipalities to pursue collection. The 
numerous collection points known as "punktas" gradually disappeared. By 
1996 even conscientious companies (including Shell Lietuva) had difficulty 
in finding a way of off-loading the growing mountains of used office paper. 
Developing an efficient system of collection and processing and a market for 
the recyclables is a potential environmental project for a private investor. 
This would reduce the amount of waste being burned or landfilled whilst 
also reducing the load on municipal waste management system which has 
struggled with the increasing waste and restricted budget since independence. 
As noted above, industry investment to improve the environmental impact 
of their operations is also limited as companies are reluctant to spend limited 
resources on such improvements and certainly not beyond their legal 
obligations. Education on available technology and possible "win-win" 
process changes might help direct company resources to this area. There is 
certainly evidence to show that even small improvements can be both 
economically and environmentally rewarding (see Tiberg 1992). 
Limitations to economic investment in Lithuania apply also to the 
environment sector. But there is an added factor which has an impact on• 
the willingness of other countries to supply finance or equipment whether 
in the form of aid or private investment. The question of responsibility is a 
hindrance to investment in environmental projects, particularly if they are 
related to the nuclear power plant or if they are experimental. Investors do 
not want to be held responsible for technical breakdown or environmental 
pollution associated with their projects. Mackenzie (1994:12) noted such 
concerns in relation to upgrading RBMK nuclear reactors (see also 6.2.2.2). 
Foreign investment in Lithuania has increased from USD 8 million in 1991 
to USD 360 million in 1995. By amending the 1990 law on foreign investment 
in 1995, the government has provided a number of incentives to encourage 
investment including the removal of permit requirements and three years 
income tax free for investments over USD 2 million (with at least 30 per 
cent foreign capital) followed by a 50 per cent exemption (EBRD 1996:7). 
While incentives are a necessary part of economic recovery, this should not 
be at the expense of environmental obligations to which the companies are 
subject in other countries. Depending on the activity proposed, there are 
various categories of 'environmental risk' which then determines the process 
of Environmental Impact Assessment including the authority responsible 
for evaluation. The MEP has overall responsibility for the environmental 
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review and approval process in Lithuania (Bank of Lithuania 1995:21). The 
legal requirements are outlined in more detail in section 7.4.1.3. 
Foreign investment itself has tended to exacerbate environmental problems 
in the post-communist region, counteracting some of the investment in 
environmental rehabilitation. The largest investors in Lithuania are the 
companies Philip Morris, Kraft Jacobs Suchard, and Shell (EBRD 1996:7) which 
do not have a good environmental reputation. The theoretical priority 
given to the environment by the new governments and their original 
enthusiasm for developing alternative approaches to development were 
largely subsumed by the policies of privatisation and the reduction of controls 
in order to foster foreign investment, particularly from multi-nationals. Few 
were direct attempts to avoid environmental restrictions but, asserts Manser 
(1993), where a beneficial deal could be negotiated, it was. Some of the 
contracts that have been negotiated in the CEE would not have been tolerated 
in the West. For example, investors have 'sought ways to avoid paying 
environmental fines, to obtain subsidized sulphur dioxide polluting power 
or to set up operations firmly regulated elsewhere' (Manser 1993:14-15). The 
introduction of multi-nationals encouraged consumerism and actually tended 
to increase waste. In the early days of independence, governments in the 
region were quite firm about their commitment to the environment. 
However, as time went on foreign debt increased and unemployment rose 
dramatically leaving the often unstable governments unable to dictate 
environmental conditions of investment (Manser 1993:15). 
6.4 Conclusion: The Future of Environmental Financing 
Environmental financing in Lithuania is generated from a combination of 
domestic and international sources. International assistance has been an 
important feature of economic development and environmental 
rehabilitation since the restoration of independence. The domestic 
contribution has been greater in some areas but outside funding will still be 
necessary for capital intensive projects in the medium term. Both 
international and domestic contributions for environmental improvements 
could still be increased given that, proportionally, environmental investment 
is only a fraction of that directed toward the economic sphere. This indicates 
that environmental issues have not retained their priority position on the 
political agenda and that commitment to environmental rehabilitation is 
not perceived as politically expedient (see also Chapter 5). 
The environment is certainly an issue in Lithuania as the general focus of 
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international assistance from countries in the immediate area demonstrates. 
But assistance is a business - as the motives of donor countries indicate - and 
is not necessarily, therefore, an indication of environmental concern or 
commitment. The aid system in all countries is actually predicated on tangible 
(usually economic) benefits to the donor. It does not pretend to be otherwise. 
The domestic contribution also indicates a certain level (albeit it fractional to 
economic support) of interest in environmental rehabilitation. 
Environmental protection issues receive far less than economic issues. While 
domestic investment indicates some support for environmental 
rehabilitation and protection it does not demonstrate a commitment to 
environmental sustainable society in Lithuania. The allocation has already 
declined since waste water treatment plants near completion. Further, a 
purely fiscal approach to providing finance for the environmental sector, 
relies too heavily on polluters (a "right to pollute"), placing no responsibility 
on the government to commit reasonable allocations of the state budget. 
International funding has been generally motivated by self-interest, 
particularly in the perceived economic (and, to some extent, environmental) 
benefits for the donor country. The focus has been on nuclear power which 
may have detracted funds from other priority issues. Waste water treatment 
has also received significant attention from both domestic and international 
sectors. It is, understandably, a priority given the poor state of water quality 
(see Chapter 3) which has economic, social, health, and environmental 
implications to both donor and recipient. Such assistance has also been 
influenced by international agreements such as the Helsinki Convention on 
the protection of the Baltic Sea. The effectiveness of such assistance could be 
improved by an acceptance and use of local expertise and by carrying out 
more comprehensive evaluations of individual projects as well as overall 
assistance programmes. 
The system of generating internal funds for environmental rehabilitation 
and protection is very complicated and is not very effective in achieving its 
aim of pollution abatement. Nor is it effective as a revenue raiser. There 
are a number of complicating economic circumstances which have restricted 
the effectiveness of the system. The level of fines could be higher which 
might make it more economical to implement improvements than to be 
subject to penalties. However, the tendency is to avoid fines by transferring 
to a TAP permit, in which case, the level of fines becomes irrelevant. The 
economic situation, outlined in Chapter 5, has limited the ability of companies 
to survive the so-called 'transition period' and the investment required to 
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meet their MAP levels is often seen as too high. Therefore, the proliferation 
of TAP permits is directly related to the perceived need to assist companies 
through the difficult economic period with a plan for meeting those standards 
in the future. Also, as noted by Bluffstone (1995), enterprises are not always 
aware of the potential technological improvements available to them, often 
at low cost. 
All assistance and investment should involve training and education, make 
use of local expertise, and be backed up with support at the state level. Thus, 
financial and technical support for environmental education, policy 
development, and environmental NGOs is perhaps most crucial for long 
term environmental awareness and protection. Monitoring and re-
evaluation will also be important steps in ensuring that assistance is well 
spent and that desired aims are achieved rather than exacerbating existing 
problems. There needs to be some integration and communication to avoid 
investment in one sphere counteracting any benefits from another. And, 
most importantly, international assistance should aim to foster local capacities 
so as to avoid long term reliance on its provision. 
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Chapter 7: Political and Legal Reform and the 
Environment 
7.1 Introduction 
As the preceding chapters show, the Soviet system had social, economic, and 
environmental impacts that will take some time to reverse. The resource-
intensiveness of the Soviet system, the Marxist ideology of growth at the 
expense of nature, and the antiquated machinery used in production have 
all been discussed as elements of the environmental crisis in the post-
communist region. Equally important were the political features of the 
system of central planning and management (Norgaard and Pedersen 1994). 
As with economic reform, political and legal reform involved extensive 
changes and institutional development over a short period of time, unlike 
other democratic societies where such change occurred over centuries. This 
chapter reviews the political and legal changes made since 1990 in respect to 
the environment. In doing so, it discusses the possibilities of democratic 
reform, particularly the issue of public participation, which is considered 
crucial to an environmentally sustainable society. Although necessary 
preconditions for successful environmental protection, democratic and 
institutional reform in themselves will not be sufficient (Eckerberg and 
Pedersen 1997) (see also 7.2.1). 
The Soviet economic system was inefficient in that the associated 
administrative culture that developed had a deleterious affect on the very 
functions that an economy should perform. The secrecy, institutionalised 
nepotism, or "nomenklatura", and a desire to meet production targets at all 
costs led to a poor quality of information, uninformed decision-making, and 
distorted evaluations. It was also very resource-intensive. Thus, the 
environmental problems are clearly related to the pattern of development 
rather than any natural phenomena (Kabala 1993:49-58). This raises the 
question of whether it was necessary to completely overturn and reconstruct 
the political system or whether economic measures could have been 
implemented in order to eradicate inefficiencies and take more account of 
environmental impacts. Duncan Fisher (1994) provides an answer: 
Experience worldwide has shown ... that the main determinant of the balance 
between conflicting economic, social and environmental considerations in 
development is the country's overall political and institutional framework. 
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The socialist countries were no exception; both their politics and their 
administrative structures were heavily geared towards economic growth, 
with little consideration of social and environmental issues, both of which 
were weakly represented in politics (Fisher for EBRD 1994:xi). 
Social and environmental activists throughout FSU and CEE called for 
political reconstruction as the fundamental facet of any social or 
environmental reform. Besides, as discussed in 5.4.5, the economic reforms 
under Stalin and Gorbachev failed to fundamentally change conditions 
relating to basic freedoms and expression. Further, as noted in Chapter 4, 
pollution became a topic for public opposition to Soviet policies in all spheres 
of society and a platform for political change. The perceived solution to 
environmental problems was 'not specific governmental regulatory policy, 
but rather fundamental transformation of the country's political system' 
(Kabala 1993:50). 
Drewnowski pointed out that the suppression of "truth" or information - an 
element of degradation that stems from the notion that Marxist doctrine is 
right and will prevail over other ideologies - led to a reluctance to impart 
necessary information and, thereby, seriously affected the quality of decision-
making that had to take place in any case (in Kabala 1993:57). Further, the 
elimination of avenues for dissent 'limits the range of meaningful discussion 
and destroys the very capacity for self-correction to which socialism has for 
so long ascribed its theoretical superiority over market systems' (Kabala 
1993:57). The capacity for self-evaluation and correction is an essential part 
of democratic systems. Dryzek (1992:47-8), for example, refers to the necessity 
for 'negative feedback' mechanisms which counteract deviations, thereby 
minimising shortfalls in the system. 
Given the fundamental and inherent problems such as those described above 
(which rendered the Soviet economic system incompetent) the usual 
economic reform package was irrelevant. Drewnowski attested that solutions 
would not be found in introducing material incentives or a measure of 
decentralisation, nor in modifying planning principles. Rather, he insisted, 
an effective remedy rested only with the restoration of basic human freedoms 
and democratic rights (in Kabala 1993:58). Section 7.2.3 demonstrates that 
some of these undemocratic features remain in Lithuania and act as a 
hindrance to the rebuilding of democracy and the development of a new 
political culture. Further, as discussed in 7.2.2.3 and 7.4.1.3, there are only 
limited avenues for public participation in the decision-making process or 
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in scrutinising the implementation of environmental policy. The 
international community is an influential group in the formulating of policy 
in Lithuania. Section 7.3 discusses the proposed inclusion of Lithuania into 
the European Union along with other international obligations which affect 
environmental policy. Section 7.4 highlights the way in which environmental 
concerns have been activated in the Lithuanian political arena and the various 
legal instruments that have been used to address such concerns are reviewed. 
7.2 Post-Independence 
Kabala argues that earlier policy changes in environmental and economic 
spheres in Poland were not dissimilar to the reform package of the current 
transition to a market economy. 'The critical difference is the wholesale 
change of the political background, which was the crucial variable all along' 
(Kabala 1993:61). This thesis has provided evidence of the impact which 
Soviet annexation had on the Lithuanian environment and, thus, the 
importance of political reform. However, it should be noted that some of 
the earlier political attitudes and methods of decision-making remain in 
Lithuania and, combined with a renewed desire for economic growth, have 
continued to have a detrimental effect, becoming an obstacle to environmental 
rehabilitation and protection. However, environmental reform has occurred 
and legislation is currently being amended or drafted to deal with specific 
environmental issues. As with the transition to a market economy, political 
reform has not been a panacea for environmental problems, not least. of all 
because 'people want any style of political organisation that will generate 
economic prosperity' (Gibson 1996:401). 
Governance in Lithuania has been circular (not unlike other democratic 
countries as voters attempt some sort of recourse for various problems in 
society only to find that either the same or new problems occur under the 
previous opposition) with the post-Sajudis camp (Homeland Union) 
reclaiming control of the parliament at the national elections in October, 
1996. This has provided an opportunity for observers to note differences in 
policy development and approaches to reform. In terms of the environment, 
there is essentially little difference between Lithuanian Democratic Labour 
Party (LDDP) and the Homeland Union coalition. An environmental strategy 
(see 7.4.2), a Public Investment Programme with a reasonable allocation for 
environmental protection, and various environment-related laws have been 
prepared under the LDDP Government. Whether the new conservative 
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government continues with these commitments remains to be seen but it is 
almost certain that the efforts will not be improved upon as the Homeland 
Union will continue to develop liberal market policies (see Chapter 5). 
7.2.1 Politics, Economy, and Environment 
The links between the economy and the environment are outlined in 
Chapter 5. The way in which economic activity impinges on the environment 
(and the way in which degradation has implications for the economy) has 
been fundamental to this thesis. The political context in which economic 
decisions are made is also an important factor to be considered. It has been 
argued that, in Lithuania, politics has had the most influence on the 
environment (see Banks 1991:7-9). Having accepted the pivotal role that 
political change played in addressing economic, social, and environmental 
problems in Lithuania and the rest of the post-communist region, an 
evaluation of the main facets of this change will now be presented. The 
process of democratisation, along with the transition to a market economy, 
have been heralded as the panacea for environmental problems in the region. 
However, the process of change has, itself, caused various environmental 
problems. Meanwhile, economic concerns have secured dominance on the 
political agenda. Green political theory, borrowing from liberalism, has 
subscribed to a democratic principle of government by consent; a decentralist, 
participatory form of society (Dobson 1990:25). While rebuilding democracy 
and a political culture is essential for environmental protection by improving 
public participation and the influence of various environmental interest 
groups, it does not guarantee ecological sustainability. The pluralist political 
system advocated by Green political theory is both friend and foe of the 
notion of an environmentally sustainable society (see also 7.4). As Nergaard 
and Pedersen (1994:102) point out, 
it is far from obvious that transition will produce an environment receptive 
to soft political issues such as environmental protection. Hence, the transition 
to market economy and liberal democracy does not automatically increase 
the salience of environmentally issues on the political agenda of post-
communist societies. The extent to which environmental problems will be 
addressed by the new regimes will be defined in the political arena of the 
new states. 
This thesis has shown that the salience of environmental issues has not 
increased with reform and that the governments of Lithuania have not 
given the environment a high priority. Despite issues of national identity 
or economics, a commitment (or lack thereof) to environmental protection 
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is essentially politically motivated. Decisions, such as the construction of an 
oil terminal on the Baltic coast (see 2.3.1) and the continuance of nuclear 
power (see 2.4.3), are fundamentally political, albeit disguised as economic or 
technical decisions. Furthermore, decisions are made in an atmosphere of 
corruption and political and administrative uncertainty by those with a 
protective attitude toward information and with little regard for the 
environment or public involvement. Gorz (1980) noted the tendency of 
government and bureaucracy to hide behind the technical complexity of 
issues such as nuclear power, designating it the exclusive domain of scientists. 
In this way, public dissent is, more easily, disregarded as uninformed. He 
asserts that 'from the very beginning the nuclear option has been described 
as incompatible with democracy' (Gorz 1980:100). 
The oil terminal was not a question of economics as argued by the 
Government. In fact, according to energy experts interviewed by the author, 
the construction of a terminal and the upgrading of Mazeikiai refinery were 
clearly economically inefficient. The primary motivation for such a decision 
was to facilitate trade from countries other than Russia. Construction was 
eventually halted due to a lack of finance and, in particular, an inability to 
attract investors but support for its completion remains (see 2.3.1). In addition, 
rumours of corruption suggest that such decisions lead to the financial gain 
of a few (see also 7.2.1.3). Claims that nuclear power is necessary to avoid 
reliance on Russian oil, the supply of which cannot be guaranteed, do not 
correspond with the parallel decision to obtain oil from elsewhere. Public 
concern is allayed with arguments of economic independence and by the 
fuelling of their fears of Russian dominance. 
These examples show that political climate is a major factor in environmental 
decisions and the fate of environmental policy in Lithuania. Political decisions 
on the environment (or in other areas with an environmental impact) can 
be made in direct contradiction to policy or stated commitments, the only 
recourse being democratic elections at which time it may be too late to reverse 
any impacts. The subsequent sections present an overview of the political 
climate in Lithuania following the restoration of independence, providing a 
context in which decisions have been made and in which legislation has 
been developed. 
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7.2.1.1 Party Formation: Finding a Niche 
The elections to the Congress of Peoples' Deputies in March 1989 were, for 
Sajudis, the first opportunity to challenge the establishment at which they 
managed to obtain 36 out of the 42 Lithuanian seats. The elections to the 
Lithuanian Supreme Soviet in February of the following year signalled that 
Lithuania had begun the process of democracy with the formation of a multi-
party system. Since that time, many political parties have been developing, 
reformulating, and disbanding as they find their place in the new political 
system. Despite the formation of around 30 political parties, the political 
system has been generally bipolar in nature. It has tended to reflect the 
individual politicians' perception of history (namely of the Smetona era and 
the Soviet annexation) and has largely resulted in a communists verses 
anti-communists competition, however this does not amount to a Western 
Left-Right division (Viesulas 1993:11 and Lieven 1993:215-6). 
The national elections have reflected this "us and them" tendency with the 
popular Sajudis victory in 1990, followed by a more disgruntled support of 
LDDP in 1992, and a return to the post-Sajudis camp in 1996. Although 
differing ideologically, there has been very little difference in policy 
programmes. Early programmes were inspired by a rejection of the past 
rather than a coherent vision of the future (Viesulas 1993:14). Parties were, 
then, not formed on the basis of sociopolitical cleavages as in the West but 
on the evaluation of history as well as the tacit influence of Western ideas 
on the party elites. Politicians and journalists have used Western political 
models to describe party alignment which do not suit the contextual 
framework in which the parties have been created and within which they 
continue to function (Lieven 1993:214). They were formed from the top 
down and thus have no tangible links with any particular social group. The 
result has been 'a widening gap between the world of politics and the world 
of everyday life' (Viesulas 1993:19) (see also 7.2.3). 
Owing to the political monopoly held by the Communist Party in the past, 
there was initially little trust placed in political parties. For example, at the 
1990 elections, more than 50 per cent of the newly elected parliamentarians 
had expressed no party affiliation (Viesulas 1993:13). Many that did, also ran 
under the security of the Sajudis umbrella (given that the "pro-independence" 
aim was common to all), highlighting the eventual bipolar tendency. This 
continued for the 1992 elections, despite the formation of more parties. It 
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was a competition of Sajudis-led Government verses the Communist 
opposition in which the latter reclaimed power. 
For many parties, identifying and expressing their ideological differences 
from other parties and finding a niche which they can fill has been problematic. 
Not least of all because of the tendency to use current popular Western 
terminology to describe their leanings which have conflicted with the 
terminology of the past. Chapter 4 discussed the ambiguous nature of the 
term 'nationalist' and the evolution that has taken place in Lithuania such 
that it is now a reasonably acceptable label. Other conflicts include the term 
'conservative' which was previously used to describe the Communist die-
hards but which has a completely opposite meaning in the West. Likewise, 
'radical' and 'radicalism' tend to be attributed to socialist groups in the West 
while, in the Soviet system, Sajudis and the Lithuanian Freedom League 
were the radicals. The Greens too struggled with identity. In the West the 
label Green (particularly Dark Green) is associated with an ideological package 
which has also tended to be left in its orientation because of its focus on the 
minority interests in society, such as ethnic communities, women, and the 
environment, as a priority over economic progress. For the Green party of 
Lithuania, which had already split from the Green Movement over ideological 
and practical differences, the left orientation was not only a possible barrier 
to electoral success but also contradicted, to some extent, with their own 
values of national sovereignty and patriotism (see also 4.3.1)." 
During 1990-1992, while promoting the usual conservative values of private 
property, such as the demonopolisation of industry and decollectivisation of 
farms, the Right (post-Sajudis, Homeland Union camp) have also upheld 
non-laisse faire interventionist controls on private enterprises. This could 
be more to do with limiting the influence of the former Communist elites 
who had retained property and capital following the elimination of the one 
party system (Viesulas 1993:16). Others have pointed to the more conservative 
aspects of the 1992-1996 Brazauskas era which have promoted a "wild 
capitalism" and the left-wing orientation of some of the Homeland Union's 
economic policies (Zydowicz, K., BALT-L internet posting; no. 6992, December 
1996). Zydowicz argues that the Liberal Union is the only true free-market 
party while the rest of the "Right" have a mixture of socialist ideas as to the 
running of the economy and right-wing ideological leanings in terms of 
values such as religion, tradition, nationhood, and the family. This might 
1. Or perhaps these contradictions come only from the perspective of a Western observer. 
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explain the similar programmes of most political parties in Lithuania, despite 
varying ideological "tags". However, even staunch capitalists have begun to 
warn of the social and economic implications of the free market system and 
perhaps the political situation in Lithuania is such that all parties can not 
ignore the welfare of its citizens. Welfare orientated platforms could be a 
result of the "communal" notions of the Soviet philosophy and a familiarity 
with the welfare system that has become entrenched in society but it would 
be to Lithuania's advantage in the longer-term if most political parties 
continued to include such "left" ideas in their platforms. Yet, as noted by 
Viesulas (1996:16) in the Sajudis case, their "left" policies of government 
intervention are driven by a desire to rid Lithuania of communist influence. 
In their efforts to do so, argues Viesulas (1996:17), they were prepared to 
implement 'undemocratic means' (see also 7.2.2). 
Perhaps, ultimately, it is not useful to use "labels" to describe Lithuanian 
parties since they tend to assume a complex package of values and priorities 
based on perceptions of specific historical events and of future orientations. 
Viesulas (1996:17-18) has pointed out that [at least initially] 'all Lithuanian 
parties lack[ed] the internal ideological or policy coherence which would 
give them some content beyond the "designer" labels which they wear'. 
7.2.1.2 Ex-Communist Victory 
Much of the detail of the Sajudis victory in 1990, led by Landsbergis, has 
been covered in Chapter 4. This chapter focuses on the events following the 
restoration of independence beginning with the return to power in 1992 of 
Algirdas Brazauskas, leader of the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party, a 
restructured version of the Communist Party of Lithuania. The restructured 
communist party was a common feature of political reform in the FSU and 
CEE. The parties pledged themselves to a plural parliamentary democracy, a 
mixed market economy, and Western democratic principles. They also, to 
varying degrees, renounced the authoritarianism of the past. Many of these 
parties were not dissimilar in political leanings to socialist or social democratic 
parties of the West. However, to many in those countries, including Lithuania, 
the past could not be forgiven by a change in name (Mason 1992:70). 
Consequently, LDDP's astounding victory at the 1992 national elections 
shocked Sajudis supporters, academics, and Lithuanian emigres. 
The establishment of a democratic political system (including the electoral 
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system) was a difficult and much-debated task. The end result was a mixture 
of proportional and majority rule voting based on a variety of Western 
models. Thus, the new Lithuanian electoral system is made up of two 
rounds. The first involves a vote for a party and seats are awarded pro rata 
to party list candidates based on the total number of votes received. In the 
second round, constituents vote for single members representing a district 
where a candidate must receive more than 50 per cent of the vote. Run-off 
elections are necessary when no candidate has managed to secure the majority 
vote. Because LDDP received so many votes in the first round (42.6%), as 
well as a similar percentage of the second round votes, they were eligible for 
74 seats but only 71 candidates ran on the LDDP ticket. 
Unlike the elections in 1990, there were no public announcements of 
environmental policies by any party other than the Greens. Some parties 
did, however, include environmental issues in their statutes, yet it was clear 
that the environment was not seen as a "vote-winning' issue. The Green 
Party, who had two seats in parliament, failed to retain their seats, indicating 
the general demise of interest in environmental issues. The elections were 
held at one of the lowest points for the Lithuanian economy. Good's and 
services were still scarce, relations with Russia were extremely tense causing 
concern over the reliability of oil and gas supplies, wages were low, inflation 
had reached 1160 per cent, and a national exchangeable currency was yet to 
be re-introduced (see also 5.4.3.1). As discussed in Chapter 4, such 
circumstances contributed to the falling of environmental issues from the 
agenda. But there are also the arguments regarding the influence of the 
dissolution of the reform movements and the role of national sentiment in 
reducing involvement in environmental protest (see 4.3.4.1). Could one 
expect that, as conditions improve, environmental issues will (as a post-
materialist concern) return to a position of importance on the political agenda? 
The inflation rate had decreased to 36% in 1995 yet environmental issues 
were still absent from political campaigns in 1996 with only a few parties 
mentioning the environment in their party manifestos. The Green Party 
did not even participate. Although the situation is still very difficult for 
many Lithuanians, a comeback for environmental issues could have been 
expected. That is if the premise that economic hardship was the principle 
cause for the decline is accepted. This thesis demonstrates that there have 
been many more influencing factors other than economic adversity which 
have contributed to such a decline. Chapter 4 highlights some of the other 
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issues involved while Chapter 5 argues that economic concerns are closely 
related to environmental problems and that ignoring the latter does not 
necessarily lead to the improvement of the former. Chapter 6 indicates the 
relatively low levels of support for environmental rehabilitation and 
protection and the problems Lithuania faces by using only fiscal measures 
for generating environmental funding. The Homeland Union Government 
of 1996 plans to reduce inflation to 7 per cent and claims that average salaries 
will double by 1999 (OMRI Daily Digest, no. 249, December 12 1996). Should 
an increase in the salience of environmental issues thus be expected by this 
time? Clearly, there are other factors at play, including other policy decisions 
which conflict with any notion of environmental protection. Further, by 
expressing their plans to reduce inflation as the first goal of their 1997-2000 
government programme on being sworn into office, the Conservative 
Coalition has demonstrated its economic focus which has been shown to 
have serious environmental implications (see also 5.2, 5.2.2 and 7.2.1.4). 
Economic adversity, therefore, can not be regarded as the major reason for 
the waning of environmental issues. It has, however, been touted as a 
principle reason for LDDP's victory. Citizens (particularly in the northern 
rural areas where LDDP were most successful) were disappointed with the 
economic situation independence had afforded them, a situation that had 
generally been worsened by the change. LDDP were seen as experienced 
politicians and administrators and, therefore, more likely to alleviate the 
situation. They were also expected, by some, to be more successful in 
negotiating with Russia over oil and gas supplies. The perception of LDDP, 
and Brazauskas in particular, as politically experienced was not the sole 
contributor their electoral victory. Practical expertise was also an important 
feature in their campaigning techniques. This was something the post-Sajudis 
camp developed while in opposition and which played a significant role in 
their 1996 success. 
Perhaps the most important task of new post-communist governments was 
the design and implementation of new constitutions (Mason 1992:70). In 
Lithuania, drafts of the constitution were debated for 2 years. The final draft 
was accepted by a referendum held on the same day as the national election. 
Earlier, in May 1992, a referendum on the establishment of a presidential 
system was unsuccessful. The 'no' vote was attributed to a fear of 
authoritarianism (Grineviciute 1992:1). Yet, the new constitution on which 
Lithuanians were to vote, established the office of President and the powers 
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allocated to that position. Despite support for a parliamentary system (which 
was evidenced in the earlier referendum), the Homeland Union-Landsbergis 
Government had incorporated the position of President into the constitution. 
There was a lot of anxiety about the lack of a constitution and the public 
were ready to accept what was put before them. Thus, the presidential 
system was established. Ironically, Chairman Landsbergis did not have the 
opportunity to fill the position. The return of a Landsbergis-led government 
at the 1996 elections and the likelihood of his success in the Presidential 
elections of 1997 are discussed in 7.2.1.4. 
7.2.1.3 Corruption 
Corruption under communism became a way of life and the danger of it 
becoming endemic in the state and society is probably the most serious problem 
faced by the Baltic countries (2) . Some believe it will only subside with new 
generations, leading to calls for a 'moral regeneration of the nation' (Lieven 
1993:318). In Estonia, the Right wing politicians that formed government in 
1992 have an apparent honesty and dedication which stems from their strong 
sense of nationalism. Such a connection is less apparent in Lithuania where 
'there is often a very catholic gap between the rhetoric of high ideals and the 
actual practice of government' (Lieven 1993:318). 
Since the restoration of independence, the political environment has 
continued to be characterised by 'bitter polemics' and corrupt decisions 
(Girnius 1995:56). In particular, during the reign of LDDP, the opposition 
sought to exploit the declining popularity of the government, often 
emphasising corruption. Whilst some of the allegations may have been 
more about fuelling the decline in LDDP's reputation and thereby improving 
their own, there is some evidence at least that corruption has pervaded 
government and the bureaucracy. Businesses have acknowledged the 
payment of bribes to officials (see 7.2.3), and Ministers have been shown to 
have used 'insider' information to avoid financial loss. For example, in the 
most famous and influential case, the Prime Minister, Adolfas Slezevicius 
and Romasis Vaitekunas, the Minister of Internal Affairs withdrew personal 
deposits from the faltering Lithuanian Joint Stock Innovation Bank after the 
decision had been made to suspend the bank's activities, two days before it 
had been publicly announced or implemented. In addition, it was revealed 
2.  For a comprehensive analysis of corruption trends in communist systems, see Holmes (1993). 
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that the men received nearly twice the usual interest on their deposits (Girnius 
1995:57). Despite calls for the resignation of Slezevicius and two unaccepted 
protest resignations from other members, Brazauskas initially allowed both 
Vaitekunas and Slezevicius to remain in government. On January 24, 1996, 
Brazauskas asked Slezevicius to resign, however the LDDP council 
overwhelmingly supported Slezevicius in not accepting the President's 
advice. Eventually, on February 8, 1996, the Parliament voted in favour (89 
to 3 with 11 abstentions) to remove the Prime Minister from his office 
(OMRI Daily Digest, nos. 5, 18, 19, and 20 on January 8, 25, 26, and 29 1996). 
Commentators believed this clearly signalled a victory for the Conservatives 
in the upcoming national election. Prior to this incident, another member 
of parliament, Romualdas Ozolas from the Centre Union, openly accused 
Slezevicius of corruption and stated that he had enough evidence to place 
the Prime Minister under arrest. Although such evidence was never 
produced, the popularity of Ozolas soared while that of the Prime Minister 
plummeted (Girnius 1995:57), highlighting both the public's concern regarding 
corruption as well as a measure of political naivety. 
The increasing crime rates, particularly in organised crime, have also been a 
major concern in Lithuanian society and may have depended on some sort 
of government sanctioning, albeit not openly. Violence, murder, and 
bombings of businesses have become a common occurrence. The network 
of organised crime is often referred to as the 'Mafia'. While these rings are 
involved in large-scale smuggling, theft of state property (particularly through 
the privatization process) as well as protection, extortion, and prostitution 
rackets, there internal structures are not similar to the Sicilian Mafia (Lieven 
1993:346). Physical attacks on the media have also been frequent and are 
particularly relevant here as they represent attacks on freedom of expression, 
a cornerstone of democracy. A Lithuanian journalist with Respublika, Vitas 
Lingys, was shot and killed in 1993 following revealing stories on a particular 
organised crime gang in Vilnius. The leader of the gang, Boris Dekanidze 
(the same man at the centre of sabotage threats at Ignalina NPP) was convicted 
of pre-meditated murder and sentenced to death in November, 1994 and 
executed in July 1995. The execution, Lithuania's seventh since the restoration 
of independence, was condemned by Amnesty International but Government 
spokesman, Vilius Kavaliauskas, responded that while capital punishment 
was not exemplary of good democracy, its abolition was not on the 
government's agenda. The President later pointed out that the death sentence 
was incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights which 
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Lithuania would need to sign for acceptance into the EU. A moratorium 
was placed on the death penalty but there have been renewed calls from the 
Homeland Union Government to re-instigate it (Girnius 1995: 59-60 and 
OMRI Daily Digest, no. 138 July 18 1995). 
In November 1995, the bombing of the offices of Lietuvos Rytas, one of the 
major Lithuanian dailies, was condemned by all political parties. It was 
suspected that the attack was sparked by a series of crime exposés printed in 
the newspaper. Although the Government offered a USD 25 000 reward for 
information leading to a conviction of those responsible, the media attacked 
them, through the Free Speech Foundation (FSF), for directly fostering an 
intolerant and hostile attitude toward the media. The FSF was set up in 
October, 1995 by the directors of the major mass media outlets to fight what 
they considered were threats to free speech and free enterprise (Girnius 1995:59 
and OMRI Daily Digest no. 226; November 20 1995). They declared that 
Lithuania was 'only one step away from the water-shed dividing democracy 
from dictatorship' (cited in Girnius 1995:59). 
The new "Right-wing" government has also been accused of corruption. 
Prime Minister Gediminas Vagnorius, in particular has been accused of having 
links with Vladas Laurinavicius, a millionaire of dubious reputation. 
Newspaper reports allege that the millionaire financially supported the 
Homeland Union, although Vagnorius vehemently denies the allegations 
(OMRI Daily Digest, no. 54; March 18 1997). 
Other incidents have included border officials involved in smuggling and 
bribery. Aside from the larger, politically significant bribes, there is a culture 
of smaller bribes in varying forms that pervades Lithuanian society. A 
legacy of the Soviet system whereby bribes ensured the availability of certain 
goods or bureaucratic action, bribery continues amongst the fledgling 
administrative structures. Bribes are still used to avoid police fines, to enter 
university, and to get licences, papers, passports and the like more quickly. 
7.2.1.4 Elections 1996 
Twenty eight parties comprising 1 400 candidates and an additional 30 
independent candidates competed for 141 parliamentary seats in the elections, 
held on October 20, 1996 (OMRI Daily Digest, no. 180; September 17 1996). 
The Sajudis-derived Homeland Union won 70 seats in the parliament with 
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their nearest rival, the Christian Democrats, gaining 16 seats. LDDP only 
managed to retain 12 of their 71 seats. Vytautas Landsbergis (Leader of the 
Homeland Union and likely President of Lithuania) and Gediminas 
Vagnorius (who became Prime minister) were the only candidates to get 
more than 50 per cent of the constituent vote. The two top candidates in the 
remaining 65 districts, where no one gained a majority, competed in runoff 
elections on 10 November. The Homeland Union did not have a majority 
in the parliament but formed government with support from the Christian 
Democrats. The new Government was sworn in on December 4 by President 
Algirdas Brazauskas. The Cabinet is comprised of eleven Homeland Union 
ministers, three Christian Democrat ministers, two Centre Union ministers, 
and one from the Confederation of Industrialists. Four ministers are not 
members of the parliament (OMRI Daily Digest, no. 234; December 5 1996). 
Other parties now represented in the parliament are; Centre Union (13), 
Social Democratic Party (12), Democratic Labour Party (12), Democratic Party 
of Lithuania (2), Lithuania Farmers Party (1), Liberal Union (1), Christian 
Democrat Union (1), Women's Party (1), Lithuanian National Union (1), 
Young Lithuania Nationalists (1), Poles Electoral Action (1), Union of Political 
Prisoners and Deportees (1), Independents (4), Undecided (4) (Lithuanian 
Electoral Commission internet site). 
A notable omission from the 29-strong party list was the Green Party. Primarily 
a reflection of unresolved conflicts within the party, no Green candidates 
stood for parliament. While this helps to explain why environmental issues 
were not a dominant feature of the election campaigns (because there was 
not a formal party voicing environmental concerns and stimulating debate), 
it also highlights the way in which individual personalities are influential 
in promoting environmentalism. Without strong leadership and a public 
appearance of cohesiveness, the party is unlikely to gain popular support. 
Further, .the failure to stand may have been that party members were 
unhopeful of success or perhaps they were unable to generate the minimum 
number of signatures supporting registration. 
Environmental issues had some representation by inclusion in the election 
programmes of other parties. The Liberal Union, for example, mentioned 
environmental protection in their platform, namely the need to avoid a 
contradiction between economic growth and environmental protection with 
an emphasis on the "polluter pays" principle. However, their principle 
economic aim is for the state to create conditions for the functioning of the 
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free market. This has been shown to have serious implications for 
environmental protection and social justice (see 5.2.1 and 5.4.4.1). The 
Homeland Union (holding the most seats) did not refer to environmental 
issues at all, while their ally in parliament, the Christian Democrats do refer 
to a policy on the natural environment. Neither the Lithuanian Democrats, 
Party of Economy, LDDP, Lithuanian Freedom Union, nor the Lithuanian 
Social Democratic Party referred to environmental protection. The Women's 
Party and the Centre Union did include statements on environmental issues. 
The programme of the former stressed that humans are an integral part of 
nature, thereby requiring the careful use of resources, an open approach to 
public information on environmental hazards, a priority for ecologically 
safe production and agriculture. The Centre Union, then, is the only party 
currently in the parliament which includes environmental protection in its 
election programme albeit thirteenth out of fifteen priority areas (Department 
of Administration, Kaunas Technical University internet site). 
The Municipal elections held in March 1995, were closely watched as an 
indicator of the national elections which followed about 18 months later. 
The right-of-centre parties were obvious victors with the Homeland Union 
securing 29 per cent of the votes, LDDP gaining 20 per cent and the Christian 
Democrats obtaining 17 per cent (Girnius 1995:58). The latter's vote indicated 
that they had become the third major party in Lithuania and a clear rival in 
the 1996 national elections. Interestingly, the elections were marked by apathy 
with less than half (43%) of eligible voters participating. Similarly, the national 
elections in 1996 showed a decline in voter participation relative to the 1992 
elections. It was expected that the participation rate would be around 66 per 
cent but only 53 per cent of eligible voters took part (pers. comm. Algis 
Krupavicius and Department of Administration, Kaunas Technical 
University, internet site). Seats in four electorates remain undecided (as at 
February 1997) as voter turn-out was below the 40 per cent minimum with 
re-runs required within six months of the election (OMRI Daily Digest, no. 
206; 23 October 1996). It has been argued that the Conservatives' win in 1996 
was actually facilitated by the poor turnout with the difference in LDDP 
votes being similar in number to the decline in turn-out which could be 
attributed to LDDP voters lack of participation (Krzysztof Zydowicz, BALT-L 
internet posting; no. 6992, December 1996). Likewise, the turnout at the 
Municipal elections might have favoured the Conservative win. 
After the 1995 Municipal elections, the various right-wing coalitions took 
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control in almost all regional and municipal governments. Understandably, 
tension between the local and national governments increased. In fact, the 
local governments claimed that the LDDP Government was thwarting the 
administering of local areas by not honouring financial commitments and 
by establishing the non-elective office of Regional Governor which had 
subsumed many of the rights and responsibilities of municipal officers. In 
response, representatives from 53 of the 56 municipalities formed the 
Association of Lithuanian Municipalities which complained to the Council 
of Europe that local government responsibilities were being curtailed (Girnius 
1995:58). The tension between the levels of government clearly had a role in 
the Conservative victory in the elections of October, 1996. 
7.2.2 Rebuilding a Democracy 
In the fight for independence, the Lithuanian Reform Movement focused a 
lot on the independence years of 1918-39, modelling their symbolism, 
ideologies, parties, and state institutions on those of that era (Lieven 1993:55). 
Many, deflecting criticism of the Smetona era, refer to the democratic 
parliamentary constitution of 1922. One of the problems with this constitution, 
it has been argued, 'is that it was too democratic for its own good' (Lieven 
1993:64). Parliamentary control was such that it was capable of forming the 
government and accepting its resignation. The constitution, based on the 
Estonian model, was egalitarian and parliaments were elected by universal 
suffrage and full proportional representation (Lieven 1993:64-5). It is these 
elements that, ironically, led to the demise of democratic pluralism and the 
introduction of authoritarianism (see 4.2.2.2 and 4.2.2.4). 
The more recent democratic changes began under Gorbachev with the 
introduction of glasnost and perestroika, when the public were actively 
encouraged to voice opinions through media or politicians. But it was the 
resistance to the coup of 1991 which signified a commitment to democratic 
values on the part of the people across the Soviet Union and facilitated the 
secession of several republics, including Russia. The path to democracy in 
the region was bolstered by this relatively peaceful demise of the Soviet 
Union. Fukuyama has noted that the 'willing retreat' of those in power, 
although often stimulated by a crisis, was an acknowledgement of the growing 
understanding that 'democracy is the only legitimate source of authority in 
the modern world' (in Giddens 1994:106). Although Gorbachev did not 
foresee the complete devolution of power from the centre to the republics, 
314 	 Chapter Seven 
the emancipation of the republics was a crucial step in democratisation 
developing from below (Karklins 1994:xviii) (see also 4.3). Rigby (1992:21) 
argues that the movement toward democracy would not have gone so quickly 
or so far (if at all) had it not been for the existing elements of civil society. 
These elements include the democratic structures which were symbolic in 
nature only and the development of various groups forming a 'shadow 
culture' which could come to the fore once the coercive controls of the 
regime were relaxed (Rigby 1992:21-2). 
Whilst Sajudis was unquestionably important in the restoration of Lithuanian 
independence and the establishment of democratic principles, the 
preparedness of the Landsbergis Government to promote non-democratic 
behaviour is a set back for the rebuilding of democracy. The most significant 
charge against Landsbergis (amongst many criticisms) is that 'he left the 
nation more divided than when he became its leader, and Lithuanian 
democracy badly scarred' (Lieven 1993:274). 
It is not the purpose of this section to critically analyse theories of democracy 
nor to discuss the aspects of modern society which may or may not be 
democratic. For instance, the formal equality assigned to citizens in a 
democratic society only partially ameliorates the economic inequality which 
has become a recognised cost of market capitalism. It is now questionable 
whether such formal rights will continue to compensate for the economic 
disparity (Somers 1993:587-588). Thus, there have been calls for an extension 
of democratic theory to include social and economic domains (Gould 1988:80- 
90). Others, such as Giddens (1994:116), have argued for the continued 
separation of political life from other aspects to avoid the tendency for 
government to become an autocracy as in the case of the Soviet Union. 
Interesting and more detailed analyses, including the limits of conventional 
liberal democracy, can be found in the works of David Held (1992, 1993), 
Anthony Giddens (1994), Christopher Pierson (1993), Chantal Mouffe (1992), 
David Beetham (1992), and Carol Gould (1988). 
For the purposes of this thesis, it is assumed that democracy is a good thing 
for society, that it is generally attainable, and that it is an important factor in 
obtaining accountability for decisions which affect the economic and 
environmental well-being of citizens. It is also assumed that democracy 
entails a pluralist society hinging on public participation, parliamentary 
process, the separation of powers, and the rule of law, offering rights and the 
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protection of those rights to all from others, including the state. In relation 
to reform in Lithuania and the post-communist region, democracy is 
considered to be a fundamental aspect of reform in all spheres of society but 
in no sense is it guaranteed. It is seen an essential prerequisite for a modern 
environmentally sustainable society yet it does not, necessarily, lead to such 
developments. 
The discussion here will focus on the prospects for democracy in the region 
and the perceptions of democracy held by citizens. The particular features of 
democracy which are important to environmental sustainability are the right 
to free elections, to free assembly, to protest and petition, to access information, 
to form a political party, and participate in environmental decision-making. 
Facilitation of such involvement for concerned citizens is an indication of 
the government's willingness to accommodate political expression of 
environmental concerns. Therefore, an evaluation of democratic processes 
in Lithuania will act as a test to the hypothesis that environmental concern 
in general and government commitment to environmental rehabilitation 
and protection in particular will decline following the initial excitement of 
restoring independence since such perceptions and processes have the capacity 
to promote an environmentally progressive society. 
Focusing on 3 out of the 5 major indicators, surveys have revealed that 
democratic values, in general, are more prevalent in Lithuania than in Russia 
and the Ukraine (Reisinger et al. 1994:211). Is this a permanent feature of 
Lithuanian society or could it come unstuck under increasing economic 
pressure? As noted by Ruperez (1994:ii), 'democracy is a set of values that 
has to be acquired and nurtured'. 
The political dominance of the Communist Party along with the well 
documented accounts of suppression of internationally accepted citizenship 
rights is a legacy which some theorists believe too strong for democracy to 
take hold in the longer term. But, according to Reisinger et al. (1995:942), no 
one has made a strong empirical case that communist rule left citizens with 
attitudes unfavourable to democratisation. Arguing on the basis of surveys 
conducted pre and post communist rule, they identify democratic values in 
the community which offer a more optimistic conclusion. For example, 
Reisinger et al. (1994 and 1995) and Gibson (1996) have argued, contra common 
assumptions, that considerable democratic attitudes amongst members of 
Soviet society have formed a solid basis for developments since independence. 
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The historical context still has a significant role in the way democracy is 
perceived and formulated. This is discussed in 7.2.2.1 below. Further, there 
are problems associated with the rebuilding of democracy which are discussed 
in 7.2.3 following a more detailed account of the results of social surveys in 
the region and the similarities and differences in perceptions amongst those 
living in Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania. The question is 'Can a people 
make democracy work when they have grown up in a polity that forced and 
directed certain kinds of behaviours while prohibiting many others commonly 
found in democracies?' (Reisinger et a/. 1995:942). 
Reisinger et al. (1994:184) point to three assumptions which act as starting 
points in answering such questions. There are those who believe that historical 
development is most influential in the establishment of democratic values 
in society and, therefore, one should find a Russian political culture, a 
Lithuanian political culture and so on. Others focus more on the similarities 
of the development of social and political traditions in the Soviet region. A 
second group argue that indoctrination of Marxist-Leninist values shaped 
all those living in Soviet societies. Industrialisation, urbanisation; and 
education under the Soviet regime has been the focus of a third group. 
Since such processes of modernisation have elsewhere shaped political 
attitudes, they should also play a significant role within Soviet societies. 
The first two assumptions tend to lead to pessimistic forecasts for democracy 
in the region. Those concluding that modernisation has been most influential 
expect to find values supportive of democracy within such societies. 
The conclusions of Reisinger et al. (1994 and 1995) and Gibson (1996) suggest 
that, for the moment at least, there is reason to be optimistic regarding stable 
democracy in those countries. But perhaps it is too early to know whether 
the data more accurately reflects fashionable and ephemeral views expounded 
in the early stages of reform. Gibson (1996:397) acknowledges that many 
writers fear that such shallow support for democracy is unlikely to withstand 
the political and economic pressures over time. International pressure may 
be one mechanism for ensuring democratic reform is more extensive than 
establishing a multi-party political system in which free election of 
representatives is a central part. As discussed in Chapter 6, much international 
assistance is predicated on political and economic reform. A major focus of 
this has been democratic processes. It might be argued that democracy should 
be a precondition for other reforms yet it does still play a secondary role in 
most aid programmes. For example, 'while economic restructuring is the 
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primary aim of PHARE, a secondary aim is to promote democracy' (WWF 
UK 1994:12). Part of PHARE's aim to promote 'civic society' has involved 
the support of NGOs which is crucial not only because of their role in 
promoting environmental protection issues but for democratic reform by 
assisting such bodies to participate in the political process (see also 6.2.3.2). 
If democracy is secured in Lithuania there are still other possible threats to 
its retention. Lieven (1993:71) has argued that democracy was strong in the 
Baltics during 1990-1993 because it was equated with economic prosperity 
which everyone was seeking. He further argues that the hegemony of 
democratic principles in contemporary Europe added strength to Baltic 
democracy, reinforced by the attraction of EU economic power and Western 
lifestyles (Lieven 1993:71). The Norwegian Society for the Conservation of 
Nature (1994:4-5), on the other hand, expressed concern that democratic 
principles of closeness, openness, and public participation are actually 
compromised by EU membership. They argue that decision-makers are 
geographically, culturally, and linguistically removed from the citizens of 
most countries which hinders participation. Further, there are no laws 
securing involvement or information regarding decision-making giving little 
control to people over what their representatives' say on their behalf. It is 
also argued that national decisions are no longer based on democratic 
principles. In Denmark, for example, 3200 of the 3493 laws and regulations 
passed in 1991 came directly or indirectly from the EU with the remainder 
originating from the Danish Parliament. Decisions at the national level 
usually involve public debate, in the press, public hearings, rallies. However, 
in the EU, there is no common ground for decision-making; there is no 
common language, no common newspapers, and very few common 
organisations. Co-ordinating cooperation among concerned environmental 
groups for lobbying is, therefore, very difficult. Traditional democratic 
concepts such as responsibility and accountability are also more difficult to 
procure in large, non-state based political systems. 
7.2.2.1 Historical Context 
Whatever their original good intentions, the Russian and Soviet belief in 
the primacy of the community over the individual, of collective good over 
individual rights (along with other efforts to abolish such liberal notions in 
the name of a more perfect democracy) succeeded only in 'cutting the 
democratic ground from under their feet' (Beetham 1992:42). Rigby (1992:17) 
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points out that democracy originally formed a genuine element of the 
Bolshevik tradition but the transformation into mono-organisational 
socialism left democratic structures with a mere symbolic role. They were 
primarily 'a device for legitimating the power of the apparatus'. So despite 
the original Bolshevik claims of representing the people and their needs, 
there was no democracy under the Tsarist police state and 
no party can claim to speak for a class except in a democracy; and no modem 
democracy has known for more than a few years what could properly be 
called "the party of a class". Indeed, it is a thing dangerous to democracy, 
though democracy alone makes it possible (Plamenatz 1954:324). 
Whilst the "democratic" structures in the Soviet Union essentially served to 
endorse official decisions, their existence had a role in the acceptance of 
democratic principles. As noted by Rigby (1992:17): 
like all such exercises in institutionalised hypocrisy, which serve to affirm 
a value or ideal in the very process of betraying it, the daily travesty of 
democracy helped to nourish the soil for its eventual revival. 
Unique characteristics of Russia's or Lithuania's past have had a direct impact 
on the shape of current political values. A society's political culture, consists 
of the collective orientations and attitudes of the citizens. Each society's 
political culture differs according to their unique experiences. A country's 
political culture has continuity in that past distributions of values fashion 
future distributions (Reisinger et al. 1994:187). The experiences : of some 
societies may facilitate the working of democracy better than others. 
Lithuania's period of independence during the two world wars and the 
centuries of partially-democratic rule under the 'Union of Lublin' with Poland, 
together with the geographical closeness to Western Europe, has been noted 
as favouring the development of democracy since 1990 (Reisinger et al. 
1994:187, 189). Smith (1994:130) has noted that the existence of a pre-Soviet 
civic culture in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia (unlike other Russian 
Republics) which would be more conducive to political participation. 
Although acknowledging the importance of history, Reisinger et al. (1994:187), 
arguing against those who emphasise the weight of history, point to 
urbanisation and modernisation as the major factor in changing political 
culture. 
The heritage of Russian authoritarianism has led some theorists to argue 
that people in the former communist bloc are ill prepared for securing 
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democracy. Likewise, indoctrination of ideological values, which down-
played the notion of individual rights and pluralism, is generally viewed as 
a hindrance to the development of democratic institutions (Reisinger et al. 
1994:184). The Soviet authoritarian strain tended to instill in the people a 
desire for order and a preference for strong leadership. Owing to the different 
historical experiences, the Russian leaning towards authoritarianism is not 
a part of Lithuania's patrimony. Therefore, pro-authoritarian values should 
be greatest in Russia and Ukraine and lower in Lithuania. The data obtained 
by Reisinger et al. (1994) indicates that, while Lithuanians on average scored 
slightly lower, the differences in the means between Lithuania and the either 
of the other two states is not statistically significant. Further, the desire for 
order increased in all three states from 1991 to 1992 when rising economic 
and physical insecurity made order more appealing. Lithuanians showed 
less concern for order in 1991 than the other two states but this jumped 
sharply in 1992 undercutting the earlier distinction. They, therefore, reject 
the "historically derived political culture" hypothesis (Reisinger et al. 
1994:191). 
As noted below, Lithuanians also showed a high level of support for Stalin 
at this time which might suggest support for order and strong leadership. It 
is, therefore, difficult to make asserted conclusions about such responses. 
For example, one could point to a two-way influence in Lithuania. A history 
of occupation and of independence and leadership. The fifty year annexation 
during which citizens were subjected to indoctrination and sovietisation 
forms a recent historical influence and the centuries of Russian occupation 
form a deeper historical influence. This is juxtaposed with the memory of 
independence in the inter-war period, together with an affiliation with the 
era of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The memories of the independence 
interlude served to amplify the dissatisfaction with the Soviet system and, 
therefore were an important impetus for secession and for the way in which 
the political system has developed (Viesulas 1993:5). Hence, there exists in 
Lithuania a general rejection of Soviet ideology and strong support for 
democratic indicators as well as some Soviet impacts on democratic values 
and on the political and legal structures which affect the way in which 
people can participate (see 7.2.2.3). 
Reisinger et al. (1994) also reject the hypothesis that indoctrination is the 
major influence on the political culture of post Soviet societies. The logic 
behind this hypothesis is that 'what makes Communist societies unique is 
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the aggressive effort on the part of all the regimes over several generations 
to make basically the same official political culture the only political culture" 
(McGregor in Reisinger et a/. 1994:195). The indoctrination process is viewed 
as anti-democratic and its influence a problem for the fledgling democracies 
in the region. According to such proponents, the only hope for democracy is 
that indoctrination did not have a permanent hold on the citizens. Reisinger 
et al. (1994:195) point out that recent surveys indicate unexpectedly high 
levels of support for non-Soviet values such as individual rights and 
democratic institutions. If indoctrination had the desired effect, support for 
communist values should be high and particularly higher in Russia and 
Ukraine than in Lithuania given that the latter spent twenty years less under 
Soviet rule during which time they experienced democratic rule. Yet, survey 
data indicates that, in 1992, Lithuanians were more supportive of Stalin's 
contribution to society than the Ukraine and only slightly less so than Russia 
at the same time. Support for Stalin was significantly lower in Lithuania in 
1990 but increased to similar levels as Ukraine and Russia in 1991 and then 
doubled in 1992. The authors conclude that the indoctrination hypothesis 
cannot explain why Lithuanians would given Stalin greater credit than those 
in Ukraine. They do, however, note that the Lithuanian responses most 
closely support the indoctrination theory when they are separated into age 
groups (Reisinger et al. 1994:196-97) (see also 7.2.2.2). 
Reisinger et al. (1994:200-201) refer to a large body of research which claims 
that modernisation produces fundamental shifts in attitudes and behaviour 
in society. They suggest that the modernisation changes in the 1920s and 
1930s such as industrialisation of the economy, collectivised agriculture, 
urbanisation, increased literacy, and access to education, made Soviet society 
more open to democratic and market reforms. Others have disagreed saying 
that Soviet society was always rural and pre-modern and that the 
industrialisation period was not the same as experienced in the West and 
would not have produced equivalent changes in values and behaviour. 
As noted above, Reisinger et al. (1994) ultimately reject the historical and 
indoctrination hypotheses in favour of the modernisation theory. It seems 
that the authors perhaps try too hard to dismiss the first two hypotheses in 
support of their preferred modernisation theory. One could argue that both 
indoctrination and modernisation are actually part of the history of each 
state in the region and the impact will vary in each country depending on 
various other influences and events. Further, indoctrination was part of the 
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modernisation process. Therefore, it is not necessary to reject such hypotheses 
but, rather, acknowledge the unique combination of factors relevant to the 
particular society's development. The authors do, however, argue that neither 
history nor indoctrination 'can account for the diversity of political outlooks' 
(1994:204) and, in this way, acknowledge the interrelationships. They also 
accept the role recent tumultuous history has played. In Lithuania, accounts 
of Lithuania's dominance in the region in the fifteenth century, partial 
democratic rule together with Poland, Czarist rule, independence 1918-1939, 
cultural and political suppression, secrecy, and corruption under the Soviets, 
and the legacy of administrative and political structures which do not favour 
public participation have all impacted (positively and negatively) on the 
political culture of the country. There are, then, reasons why democracy 
should be more secure in Lithuania than Russia or Ukraine but there are 
also problems associated with historical developments and with more recent 
experiences. 
7.2.2.2 Perceptions of Democracy 
Reisinger et al. (1994:196) note that analysts predict a generation's values 
based on the experiences of that generation as young adults. They therefore 
assume that, allowing for a greater impact of indoctrination on the young 
adults of 1920s and 1930s who now form the older cohort of respondents, 
acceptance of Soviet values should be highest among that generation and 
lower but stable across later generations. This premise does not seem 
appropriate in the Lithuanian case given that young adults in the 1920s and 
1930s were experiencing a period of independence and might be, therefore, 
more likely to support the rights of individuals and pluralism than those in 
Russia and Ukraine. Older Lithuanians remember this period and have 
tended to be most consistent in their democratic behaviour such as 
participating in protest rallies while the youngest generation have experienced 
the period of political excitement and renewal. They have also had the 
opportunity to travel and experience other political systems in the West. It 
is not surprising, then, that the Reisinger etet al. al. (1994:198) found the 
older cohort less supportive of Stalin and communist values than the next 
four decades with the youngest group the least supportive of Stalin's ideology. 
Whilst they appear surprised that Lithuania most closely supports the 
indoctrination hypothesis with the middle range of respondents most 
supportive of Soviet ideology (having come of age during the Soviet period) 
and, therefore, most affected by the indoctrination process, this should have 
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been largely expected. The authors then reject the hypothesis that 
indoctrination had a society-wide impact noting that proponents of the view 
do not argue that only one or two generations will be affected. Such conclusions 
tend to undermine their own findings. They suggest that regime 
indoctrination had to compete with other influences such as societal 
transformation or modernisation. 
Postmaterialist values are considered an indicator of democratic values in 
society and were used in surveys designed to identify democratic tendencies, 
along with interpersonal trust, support for party competition, belief in the 
right to oppose government, and a commitment to individual rights. It is 
interesting to note that environmental concern is often referred to as a 
post-materialist value since it does not necessarily involve material concerns. 
According to Reisinger et al. (1994:211), postmaterialist values were found to 
be more widespread in Lithuania than in Ukraine and Russia which, they 
conclude, indicates economic and internal security concerns are unlikely to 
weaken commitment to liberal democracy. The afore-mentioned fears of 
the ephemeral nature of democratic values in the region are valid and are 
also relevant to the demise of environmental concern in Lithuania since 
the restoration of independence (as discussed in Chapter 4). In this sense, 
environmental concerns, relayed by the community not only as part of public 
surveying but openly as a political protest, were a fashion (not unlike Snickers, 
Beneton, or Coca-Cola) which have not withstood the test of time. Whilst 
the fervour of social protest has definitely waned, however, the considerable 
defeat of the Democratic Labour Party in October 1996 might suggest a measure 
of active concern amongst the population. Yet, on the other hand, the poor 
voter turn out (52%) has led some to argue that the Conservative victory 
had more to do with former LDDP voters opting not to participate in the 
elections than with a massive swing to the right (see 7.2.1.4). 
The argument - that support for democracy [along with environmentalism] 
has not involved internalised calculations of the costs and benefits and is 
only a passing phase - holds some wait but has been strongly and adequately 
challenged by Reisinger et al. (1994 and 1995) and Gibson (1996). But Gibson 
(1996:400) points out that such survey data was collected at a time of 'wild 
optimism about the possibilities of democracy' which tend to have been 
deadened by the 'often distasteful realities of democratic politics'. However, 
if it is the case, the weakened democratic values (and, possibly, environmental 
values) may also be strengthened with time. The decline in support under 
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various materialistic pressures would be regained over time as Lithuanians 
and others in the region develop and internalise such values as a country 
rather than espousing them in populist political protest. This would partly 
occur as a result of international relations and cooperation. 
Support for individualism was found to be highest in Lithuania and lowest 
in Russia but generally well accepted in all three (Reisinger et al. 1994:211). 
As noted by Gibson (1996), demands for liberal rights seem to coexist with a 
desire for order. Lithuanians espouse a desire for strong leadership, but this 
is not necessarily an anti-democratic preference. Desire for leadership scored 
highly in Lithuania in 1992 surveys conducted by Reisinger et al. (1994). 
This could be correlated with the national election in which Brazauskas 
became leader in the ensuing Presidential elections. Voters saw a need for 
experience in government, especially with regards to economic conditions 
which were particularly unstable. They have since exercised their right to 
dismiss the government at the 1996 national elections. 
7.2.2.3 Citizenship and Public participation 
'From the ancient Greeks onward, theorists have argued that democratic 
institutions must quickly fail without supportive public behaviour' (Reisinger 
et al. 1994:204). Values which will accommodate democracy need to be present 
in society at the time of establishing democratic institutions. The concern is 
that 'in the absence of such values, a burst of pro-democratic enthusiasm or 
a stratum of elites committed to democracy are unlikely to translate into 
stable democratic institutions' (Reisinger et al. 1994:204). This argument has 
had widespread acceptance and has been used to make pessimistic forecasts 
for democracy in the FSU. In fact, much of the political behaviour in Russia, 
Lithuania, and Ukraine appears to observers as undemocratic due to the 
political and economic turmoil in the region (Reisinger et a/. 1994:205). The 
sections above have provided some evidence that democratic values were 
present in Lithuania at the time of secession which should provide the 
opportunity for maintaining democracy. The concern is, however, legitimate 
and, given that participation rates (particularly in protest action) have dropped 
since 1991, has some relevance for the prospects for democracy in the country. 
As mentioned in 7.2.2 above, it may be that such levels pick up again over 
time as the public internalise democratic values and learn how to participate 
in the political sphere if legal reform facilitates such involvement (see also 
7.2.3). 
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Values are not always reflected in action. Support for democracy does not 
always lead to democratic behaviour. The theoretical basis for Gibson's 
(1996:396) article is that 
[in] order for mass political culture to influence politics, citizens must hold 
views toward democracy that are temporally stable, impervious to short-term 
economic failure, and connected to actual political behaviour. 
Thus, action or behaviour is perhaps more important than the values 
respondents espouse in surveys. Action, in turn, is contingent on several 
factors, including the economic experience. Action, in the form of public 
participation, is central to democracy not only because it controls elite 
behaviour but because 'an active citizenry is involved in the actual processes 
that make democracy what it is; the members of society must do democracy' 
(Reisinger et al. 1995:944). The surveys do, however, give an indication of 
potential, even if other factors hinder acting on those apparent values. 
Participation in various social and political organisations is one indicator of 
democracy working in a society. In Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania, 
membership levels in social and political organisations are low (11.2 per 
cent in 1990 and 8 per cent in 1992) compared with other democratic, "civil" 
societies leaving the formal democratic structures without the support of 
various NGOs as found in those other societies. Membership of political 
parties is even lower (1 per cent) and is minuscule even considering the 
secular decline in party membership found in some Western democracies 
(Reisinger et al. 1995:942, 959). Factors affecting the membership decline 
include the realisation of the difficulties of reform, economic hardship as a 
result of market reforms, and increasing problems of law and order. But 
perhaps the most influential factor has been the fact that secession was a 
major motivation for political activism in the late 1980s and early 1990s and, 
once achieved, people's interest in politics decreased (Reisinger et al. 1995:951) 
(see also Chapter 4). The Green movement and other environmental groups 
in Lithuania have faced reducing membership in the years since independence 
was restored. Section 7.2.2.4 provides an overview of those groups and 
discusses their role in the public sphere. 
During the same period, Lithuania experienced a decline in "unconventional" 
behaviour such as participation in strikes and rallies. In 1990, 79 per cent of 
the population had been involved in such behaviour while this fell to 64 
per cent in 1992 (Reisinger et al. 1995:964). There has been a clear decline in 
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the number of and participation rates in green protests or, at least, a decline 
in their effectiveness. As Chapters 2, 3, and 4 demonstrated, the Green 
movement has been successful in halting a number of environmentally 
degrading projects. Most of these have occurred in the 1988-1990 period 
such as the halting of construction of the third unit at Ignalina, the end to 
construction at the Kruonis HAS, the halting of oil drilling in the Neringa 
National Park and Baltic Sea, successfully opposing a local airport, Presidential 
villa, and church in the same coastal park, and influencing the site location 
for the proposed oil terminal (Stec 1995:117-118 and personal communication 
with Green members). Although the Lithuanian Green Movement, 
particularly Atgaja, have continued with public education programmes in 
the fields of bicycle promotion, waste reduction and collection, and organic 
farming, these have not attracted the level of support that characterised 
rallies in the 1988-1991 period. Nor have they had such dramatic results, not 
least of all because of the resistance and unresponsiveness of government. 
Voter turn-out has also been declining since the 1992 national elections. 
The significance of that election drew 75 per cent of eligible voters to the 
polling booths, slightly higher than participation in the 1990 elections (72 
per cent). But only 43 per cent turned out for the municipal elections in 
March 1995 which were seen as a turning point for the right-of-centre 
opposition parties and confirmation of the Christian Democratic Party as the 
third major party (Girnius 1995:57) in a field of around twenty eight parties 
in Lithuania. The national elections held in October 1996 attracted only 52 
per cent of eligible voters and the vote in some constituencies could not be 
decided due to poor participation (see 7.2.1.4) (Vyriausybes Zinios, no. 111 
1996; 3 and Algis Krupavicius pers. comm., March 1997). 
Low level membership in organisations, low levels of support for democratic 
institutions, and poor electoral turnout might be more an indication of the 
public's opinion of candidates, institutions, or parties than a reflection of 
undemocratic values in society (Reisinger et al. 1994:206). For example, the 
fall in Green support in Lithuania is directly linked to the action of key 
figures who have either moved on to government positions or become 
private consultants (Stec 1995:88). This trend has also contributed to the 
reduction in numbers at environmental protests because key figures are no 
longer there to attract support as well as the sense of abandonment and 
disillusionment felt by previous supporters over actions of their former 
leaders (see also 4.3.4.1). It is, therefore, important to separate public opinion 
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from other aspects of society which hinder or promote democratic behaviour. 
As already noted, for example, economic problems (materialist concerns) 
hinder the process. The economic capacity of individuals affects there ability 
to be involved in political decision-making in any democracy and it is 
particularly marked in the post-communist region. However, there are other 
factors such as the ill-equipped administrative structures and laws (see 7.4) 
which restrict participation and, therefore, the democratic process. 
When citizens are willing to be participate in the process, the legal structures 
often restrict involvement not only due to a lack of understanding regarding 
rights and available opportunities for participation. The Lithuanian 
Government, in its report to UNCED 1992, stated that it aimed to establish a 
system of informing the public and relevant NGOs about environmental 
matters, particularly matters of environmental policy. By doing so, they 
aimed to secure 'broad public participation in a national discussion of possible 
measures to continuously improve upon and enhance existing 
environmental practice' (Environmental Protection Department 1992:101). 
However, there are no laws or regulations which provide for any form of 
public involvement procedure in the drafting of laws or deliberations 
concerning them at either the parliamentary or governmental level. Further, 
the provisions for public participation in the Law on Environmental 
Protection 1992 (Chapter 2, Article 7) are too broad to be translated . into 
practice. 
There is an opportunity for citizens or public organisations to participate in 
the legislative process by submitting draft legislation to the Supreme Council 
for consideration, however this must be accompanied by a petition of at least 
50,000 eligible voters regardless of whether the issue originates in the city or 
whether it is a local problem where communities are smaller. In practice, 
NGOs are unlikely to be invited to contribute to the drafting process. The 
calling of referenda requires 300 000 signatures which causes more problems 
for local communities. The right to referendum has not been used for the 
purpose of environmental protection (Vainius 1995:89 and Stec 1995:87, 95-6) 
(see also 7.2.2.4). According to Article 8(9) of the LEP, environmental protection 
officers have a duty to encourage public participation, while Article 7 states 
that citizens have the right to 'insist upon the punishment' of officers who 
have improperly carried out the duties ascribed to them. The latter could be 
used to ensure officials comply with their duties under Article 8(9). 
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Public participation in the political sphere is one aspect of democratic 
behaviour which has been shown to be on the decline. But democracy also 
depends on the behaviour of those in power. In terms of the prospects for 
democracy, the values held by the elite (including government) and the 
strategies they employ are more influential and, therefore, more important 
to analyse, than those of the citizenry since they are the ones in powerful 
positions with the capacity to control political direction (Reisinger et al. 
1994:220). 
In both Lithuania and Russia, Reisinger et al. (1994:217) found urban 
professionals to have the highest score on questions relating to democratic 
values. Professionals are more likely to be politically influential and active 
in any society and they were an influential group in the transformations of 
1990 throughout the communist bloc. In some ways, their values may be 
more indicative of the prospects for democratisation than the mean of society 
attitudes. This is especially likely give that, in most democracies, only a 
small minority participates in political activity beyond voting (Dalton 1988 
in Reisinger et al. 1995:943). Those with these values are typically younger, 
financially better off and claim to be more participatory (Reisinger et al. 
1994:217). The data collected by Reisinger et al. (1995:966) suggests that Ukraine, 
Lithuania, and European Russia have higher levels of political activism 
than generally found in the West in terms of "unconventional" behaviour 
but membership levels in social organisations and political parties are lower 
than in Western democracies. 
7.2.2.4 Environmental Non-Government Organisations (NG0s) in Lithuania 
It is argued in 6.2.3.2 that NGO support was crucial not only because of their 
role in promoting "soft" issues such as the environment, but because 
facilitating their participation in the political process ensures environmental 
issues remain on the political agenda. Such participation is also a fundamental 
facet of democratic society. The Green Movement (incorporating 
environmental NG0s) can help deepen democracy in Lithuanian society 
through the promotion of an environmental ethic, thereby increasing public 
awareness about the value of an unpolluted society and the role of the 
public in bringing this about (Peterson 1993:227). The administrative structure 
in Lithuania still does not effectively accommodate participation by NG0s. 
Some internationally supported technical assistance organisations are, at 
times, invited to contribute to working groups for legislation preparation 
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but grassroots NGOs are generally excluded (Stec 1995:97). 
Unlike some countries, the Lithuanian Green Movement is a formal 
organisation of which various other organisations and individuals are 
members. It acts as an umbrella organisation to the approximately 80 
environmental NG0s, however, it also acts as an independent body. Not all 
environmental NGOs are affiliated with the Green movement. The 
Lithuanian Green Movement has combined office space with Atgaja, an 
environmental organisation in Kaunas established by Saulius Gricius, Saulius 
Piksrys, and Remigijus Ciegis, the founding fathers of the Green Movement 
(see 4.3.1). They have shared offices and there is a significant overlap in 
active members. Atgaja, the Lithuanian Green Movement, Lithuanian Fund 
for Nature (LGF), the Lithuanian Orthonological Society, the Lithuanian 
Society of Geographers, and the Lithuanian Society of Nature are the main 
environmental NGOs that engage in research, public actions, legislation 
drafting, and preparation of inventories and reports (Vainius 1996:41). 
The majority of national and local environmental NGOs co-operate with 
foreign or international organisations and some are funded by such groups 
(Vainius 1995:93). Interestingly, the international affiliations have influenced 
their focus and style of operation. LGF is funded by World Wide Fund for 
Nature which has traditionally focused on wildlife protection and tends to 
employ relatively conservative strategies. Atgaja, or more specifically, the 
Lithuanian Green Movement, has had a long involvement with Friends of 
the Earth and was recently accepted as a member in 1997. FOE have been 
involved in a long campaign against nuclear power as well as nature based 
programmes. Atgaja and the Green Movement jointly house the Energy 
and Air Pollution library in their Kaunas offices. It will be to the benefit of 
the Lithuanian environment if such groups continue to focus on a range of 
issues and with a variety of strategies. The conservative approach of LGF 
has enabled them to become the most involved in law drafting and other 
government initiatives. For the first five years of their existence, LGF held 
offices in the MEP building which also influenced their relationship with 
government. In general, the relationship between ministries and NGOs is 
described as the worst while relations between environmental groups and 
local authorities and the parliamentary committee are considered to be better 
(Vainius 1995:93). Meanwhile the more radical approach of the Lithuanian 
Green Movement has continued to keep environmental issues in the public 
view under difficult circumstances, particularly in relation to nuclear power. 
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The Lithuanian Society for Nature has its roots in the Association for the 
Adorning of Lithuania which operated from 1921-1940 as well as the Nature 
Protection Association of Lithuania which was established in 1960.(3)  The 
regulations of the organisation were registered with the Department of Justice 
in May 1991. The main goals of the group were stated as; to protect and 
foster the nature of Lithuania and her natural monuments, to adorn the 
natural surroundings of villages and cities, and to foster forests, waters, and 
their shores (Musu Gamta 1991, volume 6:6). In order to achieve these 
goals, the organisation has a public education focus, in particular in arranging 
courses, lectures, and meetings on ecological matters. On the announcement 
of their registration, they asserted that they would collaborate with the various 
authorities, other environmental organisations, schools, and religious 
organisations in order to promote environmental protection (Musu Gamta 
1991, volume 6:6). 
Unfortunately, only a third of NGOs are active in using and promoting 
avenues of public participation to protest against certain activities, or to 
support environmentally sensitive projects. Individuals citizens are even 
less active. Vainius (1996:41) argues that this is related to the psychological 
climate whereby support for such groups is less likely. He also notes the 
problem of redirecting opposition to environmental degradation from the 
Soviet authorities to the Lithuanian authorities which, was discussed in 
Chapter 4, is related to the national orientation of the movements. 
7.2.3 Problems in Developing a New Political Culture 
As noted in section 7.2.2, there has been concern expressed that support for 
democratic institutions and processes is transitory in Lithuania and other 
countries in the FSU. Those who hold such views do not hold much hope 
for democracy in the region. The argument is occasionally put that economic 
values (i.e. a desire for prosperity) has been the controlling influence for 
change in the FSU. Thus, democratic values are seen as a reflection of 
economic concerns especially given that, generally, people's interest in 
political organisation is governed by their desire for economic well-being 
(Gibson 1996:401, 406). In such a way, democratic reform might have a 
purely instrumental value, a means to improved economic conditions. 
3. Such groups were tolerated in the Soviet Union in the 1960s if they focused on nature protection. 
Confronting industrial pollution was considered to be subversive (French 1990:30). 
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As noted in the previous Chapter, economic aid has often been conditional 
upon political reforms which may have exacerbated the tendency to value 
democracy as an instrument for economic reform (Gibson 1996:406). If this 
is the case, democracy may weaken if economic conditions do not improve 
in the near future. Ruperez (1994:ii) argues that the deterioration of economic 
conditions in the FSU is a major stumbling block for democratisation. Gibson's 
data suggests that economic optimism was more likely to be associated with 
greater support for democratic institutions but, in general, preferences for 
democracy are relatively independent from the economic experiences of most 
people (Gibson 1996:409, 416). The economic difficulties currently faced by 
many in Lithuania (as discussed in Chapter 5) can at least be seen as a 
hindrance to democratic support and behaviour (as they are in any democracy). 
Yet the public's role of controlling the elite, making them accountable for 
their actions, has not been institutionalised in a network of social groups 
and organisations which tends to characterise stable democracies (Reisinger 
et al. 1995:967). 
The failure of public scrutiny to become institutionalised as yet can be explained 
by a number of factors. As discussed in 7.4, there are many laws and regulations 
in Lithuania which relate to environmental protection in some way. Some 
of these pay only cursory or broad attention to the avenues of public 
participation or consultation. Others such as the compilation of land use 
laws have more detailed mechanisms. Thus, inadequate provisions and 
mechanisms for public involvement in environmental decision-making is 
the primary reason why a political culture of public involvement has not 
yet matured. In addition, the laws are, at times, contradictory and, therefore, 
difficult to use (Vainius 1995:95). 
There are other reasons such as a loss in enthusiasm among the public due 
to the government's failure to support and promote the avenues which do 
exist. Stec (1995:88) noted that there was 'a general feeling among interested 
members of the public that the government [was] becoming increasingly 
isolated from public participation'. For example, during the oil terminal 
"debate" which is discussed in Chapter 2, the Government did not initiate 
any meetings or public hearings (Vainius 1995:94). This has exacerbated the 
decline in environmental action since those who are committed, despite 
economic problems, are discouraged by the unresponsiveness of government 
to public opinion (Stec 1995:114). Further, notes Stec (1995:89), the relationship 
between the green movement and the government is reportedly the worst 
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among the Baltic States. Stec (1995:114) refers to the characterisation of the 
public, amongst officials, as "creating problems" for the government including 
some working in the Ministry of Environmental Protection. There is an 
assumption that the public is against all development or activity. This is 
somewhat misplaced given the evidence provided in this thesis as to the 
factors in people's lives which have influenced their concern and/or action 
over environmental problems. As a result of the bureaucracy's attitude 
toward the public, NGOs and other citizens are normally excluded from 
decision-making groups such as the advisory board on environmental 
expertise (Stec 1995:114). 
A consequence of such attitudes is a tendency not to release information and 
to attempt to keep activities secret from potential opposition. Thus, public 
participation and the development of a new democratic political culture are 
further hindered by a delay in the announcement of proposed or pending 
decisions, plans, and regulations (Vainius 1995:95). Such undemocratic 
behaviour is reminiscent of the Soviet period and, if it continues, is certainly 
destructive to the process of democratisation. What is sometimes declared 
as the 'Lithuanian way of doing things' is actually the classically Soviet way 
of doing things (Lieven 1994:31). The problem is that the political 
transformation mainly consisted of the displacement of the Communist 
Party and the legal setting in which other parties could develop. However, 
'the institutions of government, the bureaucracy, and the economy largely 
remained in place' (Mason 1992:69). As a fundamental facet of these structures, 
a mind-set of ideas and practices also remained. Although the reforms 
eliminated the Communist party's political monopoly, the economic and 
financial resources of the former Communist elite were left intact. They 
also had the advantage of an extensive membership and established office 
facilities (Viesulas 1993:16). Thus, 'it will take decades of democratic experience 
to eradicate dictatorial tendencies that continue to pervade the political 
cultures of the newly independent republics' (Peterson 1993:221). 
Corruption, as mentioned in 7.2.1.3, is often responsible for the lag in public 
announcements. A recent survey revealed that of 200 Lithuanian businesses, 
54 per cent had paid bribes to government officials while 80 per cent of the 
200 foreign businesses interviewed had been asked for bribes with 90 percent 
indicating that corruption was an obstacle to economic development and 
investment in the country (Girnius 1995:57). Among the public, there is 
concern regarding being involved in protests about controversial businesses 
332 	 Chapter Seven 
(much of which is considered to be controlled by a "Mafia") for fear of 
violence directed at them or their property (Vainius 1995:95). Such fears are 
not allayed by trust in the security provided by the government, particularly 
given the general perception of government corruption and the criminal 
activity openly directed toward businesses and the media. In 1995, less than 
25 per cent of Lithuanians surveyed trusted the parliament, government, 
police, the courts, and the President's office (Girnius 1995:57). 
The failure of Government to promote public participation and the legal 
avenues available to facilitate it is related to another problem in developing 
a new political culture. Citizens are generally unaware of their rights (aside 
from voting rights) and/or the way in which they can defend them. The 
deluge of legislation that has been formed or amended is difficult enough 
for the lawyers to keep up with. In fact, many lawyers are not familiar with 
the environmental legislation which restricts any desired action in court. 
There have not been any comprehensive public education programmes aimed 
at informing citizens of their rights and duties in relation to environmental 
issues (Vainius 1995:92-3). Also, voters are still unfamiliar with bargaining 
with their voting power. Further, this bargaining power of votes is not fully 
appreciated by Lithuanian politicians. Viesulas (1996:22) has asserted that 
Lithuanian voters 'are not used to being heard except by non-democratic 
means such as bribery, extortion and nepotistic money-making in the black 
market economy'. 
Another problem is that there is little legal assistance for concerned citizens 
or groups when using participation avenues such as the courts. Lawyers are 
generally reluctant to assist complainants or are uninterested in 
environmental problems (Vainius 1995:93, 95). A further limitation of the 
prospects for democracy is the region's poor record on political tolerance, 
particularly in Ukraine and Russia. Ruperez (1994:ii) contends that: 
Most former Soviet Republics still lack a "democratic culture", which involves 
the respect for others, the ability to distinguish between personal opinion 
and political programmes, the acceptance of the need to relinquish as well 
as assume power, a capacity for rational debate and, finally, a spirit of 
compromise. 
Respondents of surveys overwhelmingly supported the notion of repression 
against their political enemies, indicating that while there is widespread 
support for institutions and political rights of the majority, there is generally 
opposition to those of unpopular political minorities (Gibson 1996: 400, 403). 
Chapter Seven 	 333 
However, as economic conditions improve, together with a stronger 
internalisation of democratic values as a norm of society, support for 
democracy and associated democratic behaviour should be strengthened. 
The historical context (namely the influence of the authoritarian one party 
system) of democracy in the FSU presented in section 7.2.2.1 has been the 
basis for arguments that democracy is unlikely to be maintained in such 
countries. It is, however, generally presumed that in the future Lithuania 
will be less authoritarian and less indoctrinated by communist ideology and, 
therefore, more democratic than Russia or Ukraine. Yet the research surveys 
indicate that this is not the case. Reisinger et al. (1994:220) argue that if 
Lithuania's prospects are better it is because of common acceptance of 
democratic principles across social classes, a feature not found in Russia and 
Ukraine. Since organisational development remains limited, democratic 
institutions and processes lack the support which exists in established 
democracies. Reisinger et al. (1995:967) conclude that while there are clear 
signs of democratic values and behaviour in Lithuania, 'democratic 
governance in the Soviet successor states will remain fragile for some time'. 
7.3 Rejoining the International Community 
7.3.1 Preparing for Membership of the European Union 
The concept of a unified new Europe seems more likely to be realised following 
the breakdown of communism which has left several re-emerging nations 
anxious to join the European Union (EU). For Lithuania, membership is an 
"end goal" which would be the culmination of a period of transition in the 
year 2000. The transition is from Soviet membership to European 
membership. One problem has been that the Europe to which many politicians 
would like to return is not the Europe of today but an idealised Europe of 
the 1920s and 1930s (Lieven 1993:374). 
Lithuania has submitted application to the EU (December 1995) and has 
already been accepted into the Council of Europe (CE). Given the strict 
environmental standards of the EU, Lithuania's inclusion in the community 
is certain to have an impact on environmental policy. The EU itself has 
problems balancing economic and environmental objectives (see 5.4.4 and 
5.4.4.1) and will be well aware of Lithuania's particular difficulties, given the 
poor state of their economy. As discussed in Chapter 6, Lithuania has already 
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begun the process of harmonising environment laws with EU standards. 
Theoretically, acceptance may depend on a commitment to improving 
environmental standards and their enforcement, however, inclusion is more 
likely to depend on economic performance. The EU does not have 
environmental requirements for membership, however, there are economic 
stipulations such as a minimum level of inflation. (4) 
All three Baltic States have been pushing for membership of the European 
Union and, in this way, will need to look more closely at levels of cooperation 
with each other and the rest of Europe. They have been granted membership 
of the CE and the respective Presidents believe full membership of the EU 
will follow. According to some reports, whereas in the past Brussels has 
been inward-looking, 'the Baltic region [is] now a major focus of EU policy' 
(The Baltic Independent 5(214), 2; May 1994). One step toward creating closer 
connections, thereby allowing environmental cooperation, was the 
development of the EU Department of Eastern and Central European 
Countries and Baltic States, a delegation of which has begun talks with a 
Lithuanian team headed by the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
In the last few years Lithuania has stepped up the campaign to join the EU. 
Membership is unanimously approved by the major political parties and 
polls indicate that around 70 per cent of Lithuanians support integration. 
According to the Deputy Minister, Albinas Januska, it is no longer a purely 
an objective of foreign policy, it has also become the priority of internal 
affairs (Januska 1996:12-13). From the middle of 1995, says Januska (1996:12), 
Lithuania began the task of harmonising the legal system with that of the 
EU in an effort to comply with the recommendations on the integration 
into the internal market of the union. There have also been institutional 
changes, including the introduction of a system of Euro-institutions in May, 
1995 and various commissions and committees designed to facilitate, support, 
4 The environmental problems of the United Kingdom, although not ignored by the EC (EU), 
have been allowed to persist despite membership. The environmental policy of the EC did 
have an impact on the UK, particularly in regard to water quality at beaches which was poor 
yet, at the same time, there have been concessions of longer time frames the stabilisation of 
certain emissions and they have continued to struggle to achieve EC water quality standards. 
Another example of the Council of Europe's consideration of membership based on factors 
other than economy is its encouragement of the Latvian parliament to reconsider some elements 
of its proposed citizenship laws. These have been reviewed several times and, at the time of 
writing, some articles were still under consideration. The general view is that the CE will 
expect certain human rights issues regarding Russians in Latvia to be resolved before 
membership is granted. [However, some might view this unfavourably given Russia's admission 
into the CE in January 1996 despite ongoing problems in Chechnyal. 
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and coordinate the necessary steps toward inclusion (Januska 1996:12). In 
addition, the future of the environment might mean that Europe will not 
be able to ignore the problems in Eastern Europe. While Western Europe 
could, feasibly, resolve future problems (such as those associated with global 
warming) by technical means, their most serious environmental concerns 
will arise from developments elsewhere, such as Eastern Europe. The legacy 
of Communist rule will not easily be reversed, even by the wealthy EU 
(Kennedy 1993:277-8). 
The CE is the broadest-based international organisation for European 
countries, promoting human rights, parliamentary democracy, and the 
integration of Europe (Wolfgast 1993) and membership is seen as a stepping 
stone to the EU. Lithuania became a member on May 11, 1993 by a unanimous 
vote and Estonia gained membership on May 13, 1993 by a majority vote. (5) 
President Algirdas Brazauskas, admitted that EU membership would mean 
forgoing a small part of sovereignty and increasing involvement in tough 
competition (Uzkalnis, 1993). However it could mean being part of the 
future world power. 
The European Community, if it were to become politically cohesive, would 
have the population, resources, economic wealth, technology, and actual and 
potential military strength to be the preeminent power of the twenty-first 
century (Kennedy 1993:258). 
From a local environmental point of view, Lithuania's (as well as Estonia's 
and Latvia's) full membership of the European Union, would be extremely 
important since all Member States must comply with the EU's strict standards. 
This membership, together with the fact that Lithuania has become a signatory 
to such international agreements as the Baltic Sea Declaration, will put 
increasing pressure on the newly independent states to measure up to the 
environmental requirements. However, the broader environmental and 
social problems associated with modern life may not be addressed by such a 
regional block. Firstly, because of environmental problems, such as air 
pollution which the free trade dependent EU exacerbates and, secondly, because 
of the way in which the EU can restrict environmentally progressive measures 
in order to promote free trade (see 5.4.4.1). 
5 Two members of the Council, one from Greece and the other from Portugal, voted against 
Estonia's admission. The vote for Estonia's admission was successful despite efforts of the 
Russian delegate to prevent it on the grounds of human rights violations against Russians 
living in Estonia (The Baltic Independent 4(162), 1; May 21-27 1993). Latvia then faced the 
same criticism before eventually being accepted as a member. 
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7.3.1.1 Integration or Separation 
In 1991, Lithuania escaped from the grasp of the internationalist Soviet Union 
whereby the interdependence of all the republics had been constructed with 
the specific purpose of preventing secession. Although this was, in the end, 
unsuccessful, the republics are left with fragile economies and many micro 
problems related to the former macro approach. It appears ironic that 
Lithuania should desire entry into yet another union which openly espouses 
the concept of interdependence and internationalism. Both Gorbachev (who 
was always mistrusted in Lithuania) and Pope John Paul II (the leader of the 
majority religion in Lithuania) visualised a European Union with boundaries 
into Eastern Europe, Ukraine, and European Russia. Gorbachev defined it 
as a 'community of sovereign democratic states with a high level of 
interdependence' and that 'European culture.. .has many faces, yet forms a 
single entity' (Story 1990:42, 49). These statements could have easily been 
made by European leaders. 
Yet there are, of course, differences between the two unions. Whilst Story's 
essay ('Europe's future: Western Union of Common Home?' 1990) points 
out that no Soviet troops stirred during the revolutions in East Germany, 
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania in 1989, it should be noted that the 
essay was written before the massacres of January 1991 in Lithuania and 
Latvia, where Soviet tanks crushed civilians protecting media outlets. The 
EU has a rigid democratic structure for election of representatives as well as 
for decisions made within the various committees. While the EU is unlikely 
to suppress religion, culture, and language (though it could suppress an 
economy) as part of its policy or to send tanks into Member States to reinforce 
its central authority, the similarities between the two unions of independent 
states remains rather striking. 
7.3.1.2 Environmental Policy in the EU 
As discussed in section 5.4.4, the environment has had a role in EU policy 
since 1972 but an environmental policy was not enacted until 1987. This 
decision to give legal and political support for the concept of environmental 
protection in Europe was based on a growing concern over transboundary 
pollution in the region (EC 1990:5-7). The Commission has claimed that a 
key principle of EU policy is that the strict standards developed are both 
environmentally and economically necessary thereby dispelling myths that 
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environmental standards are an unnecessary burden on industry and 
emphasising that they can, and should, be part of economic growth and job 
creation (EC 1990:9). As demonstrated in Chapter 5, in practice, the concept 
of free trade often has precedence over environmental protection. However, 
the acceptance by Lithuania of EU standards might be of environmental 
benefit, with or without inclusion in the organisation. The recently drafted 
and/or enacted laws relating to the environment have been based on EU 
requirements (see 7.4). 
There will always be conflicts between environmental aims and the 
maintenance of free trade in the EU. Common standards are generally of 
benefit to the environment but could suppress ecological advances in 
individual Member States which want to implement more stringent 
standards. Such a situation could not occur in the USA, where national 
standards are set as a baseline leaving the option to set higher standards 
with the State governments. The EU has been an important ally to the 
environment movement in the UK by challenging the UK government's 
deregulating policies. However, in a country with a good environmental 
record such as Denmark, EU laws have tended to weaken domestic regulations 
(Lang & Hines 1993:67-8). The legalities of implementing environmental 
policy have already begun in the European Court of Justice while political 
divides and financial costs to the Community also complicate matters. 
The Commission (the executive branch) is the guardian of the Maastricht 
Treaty, so decisions largely rest with its members who do not necessarily act 
on the vote of the European Parliament. Previously, environmental proposals 
required a unanimous vote but, since 1987, a majority vote will now suffice, 
leaving it impossible for one or two "dirty" countries to block Community 
action. Equally, however, a few of the more environmentally conscious 
Member Sates may be outvoted by a cautious majority. Once the decision is 
made, the Commission might not agree to amend the proposal. Proposals 
of the Commission can only be overturned by a unanimous vote of Member 
States (EC 1990:21 & 23). 
The Commission can be overridden by the European Court of Justice. In the 
Danish bottle case, for example. The Commission ruled that the requirement 
of returnable containers for beer and soft drinks and the licensing of new 
containers, was a barrier to trade and therefore should be outlawed. The 
court decided that the Danish system could be justified on the grounds of 
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environmental protection (EC 1990:22). This is only part of the result. To 
implement the refillable policy it required a limitation on the bottle sizes 
and shapes of both domestic and foreign bottles. This was not successful for 
imported bottles. The judgement thus favoured recycling over reusing (Lang 
& Hines 1993:68). 
The EC developed a more dynamic environmental policy partly because of 
public opinion polls which suggested a swing toward the Green approach. 
However, political differences between the governments of Member States 
have complicated the process of consensus within the Community. Thus, 
politics (aside from national sentiment) can also hinder the effectiveness of 
a single European policy (EC 1990:15). The priority given to environmental 
protection by each Member State is bound to affect their vote at the Community 
level. The extent of Lithuania's commitment to environmental protection 
is therefore significant if the country is to be accepted into the Community. 
The EC has taken as a base a high level of protection put forward under 
Article 100 A of the Single European Act. 
The recently formed European Environment Agency (EEA) does not have 
power and influence comparable with the US's Environmental Protection 
Agency, but a review in 1995 could see it take on further functions, including 
a key role in Environmental Impact Assessment (ETA) policy, though control 
over eco-labelling is a more likely concession. It would indeed be valuable if 
the EEA were given the task of revising and applying the ETA directive since 
it is 'currently one of the thorniest and most widely disregarded of the EU 
laws' (Wright & Shorey 1994). It is also suggested that the EEA assist the 
Commission with monitoring the implementation of the EU environmental 
laws but it is unlikely that this would include enforcement (Wright & Shorey 
1994). According to James Cameron, a U.K. barrister and director of the 
Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development, there 
will be more opportunities for victims of pollution to sue infringing 
companies when the EU confirms its policy on civil liability for environmental 
harms (Knight 1994:68). 
7.3.1.3 Implications for Lithuania 
The previous chapters demonstrate the way in which environmental issues 
played a major part in the secession from the Soviet Union. Lithuania's has 
historical connection with the land inherited from its pagan ancestors 
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contributed to the national sentiment that led thousands to protest the 
construction of a third reactor at Ignalina NPP in 1989. Yet even with this 
heritage and a precedence of successful community action against 
environmental degradation, environmental issues soon dropped from the 
pinnacle of the political agenda following the restoration of independence 
in 1990/91. 
Some action on environmental issues has been taken by independent 
governments and, in theory, Lithuania is well placed to act responsibly toward 
the environment. Yet the economic focus is and still will be the primary 
concern of the Lithuanian government. Decisions based on rational 
economics are more likely since the election of the conservative Government 
in October, 1996. The way in which environmental issues have lost support 
and particularly the way in which the governments of Lithuania have failed 
to fund adequately fund environmental issues supports the hypothesis of 
this thesis that, despite vehement environmental protests in the 1989-1991 
period, economic issues, national sentiment, and weak administrative 
structures will predominate in Lithuania and limit effective environmental 
rehabilitation and protection. Inclusion in the EU will not change this 
situation. While it provides a yardstick in terms of environmental standards 
for Lithuania to follow, inclusion focuses on economic performance. In this 
way, membership (including the several-year process of applying) is more 
likely to aggravate Lithuania's internal conflict between economic, social, 
and environmental concerns. Hansen (1995:20) argues that membership 
should not be granted to the countries of CEE and FSU if it means degrading 
the environment whilst competing with other member states. 
Since 1991, Lithuania has created several new conservation areas bringing 
the total of reserved land to approximately 11.2% of its territory. Varous 
laws have been prepared. Much of the legislation is primitive compared 
with the advances made in environmental legislation elsewhere in the world 
(such as Australia) yet needs to be considered in terms of the specific economic, 
social, and political problems (see 7.4.1). The success of Lithuania's 
environmental laws and policies is hard to determine. Decreases in pollution 
have tended to be due to a decrease in economic production rather than an 
indication of good environmental policies at work. While this is an advantage 
for the environment, the situation needs to be turned around so that when 
the economic situation improves environmental pollution does not increase. 
To ensure this, Lithuania needs to enforce the standards strongly and use 
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cleaner technology. Not all of such measures are expensive. Some emission 
control technology, for example, is relatively inexpensive and would decrease 
taxation fines by reducing waste (see 1.5). 
Will Lithuania's environmental record affect their EU membership 
application? It is unlikely that membership will depend on environmental 
commitment - although comments made by the Commission regarding 
Sweden's application might suggest otherwise: 
The accession of Sweden [to the EC], with its sound and long-term 
environmental policy, would not only add to the quality of environmental 
standards, but would also promote a comprehensive approach aiming at 
overall integration of environmental considerations in all relevant policy 
areas (quoted in Lang & Hines 1993:70). 
Whilst it might appear that environmental policy in Sweden contributed to 
'their successful application to the EU, the sentiments of the Commission 
have failed to materialise. This is evident in the EU warning to the Swedish 
government that its proposed ban on imports of products containing ozone-
depleting substances was contrary to the trade agreements of the EU (Lang & 
Hines 1993:69). Thus, once again, the EU has shown that it places free _trade 
above its stated environmental concerns. The Norwegian Society for the 
Conservation of Nature (1994:3) have also noted the low priority given to 
environmental quality in terms of membership consideration, pointing out 
that membership is only contingent on the sate of the economy. 
7.3.2 International Cooperation on Environmental Protection 
As discussed in Chapter 3, international cooperation is difficult to achieve. 
The balancing of national and international interests is a feature of 
international law with which all countries are faced. Consensus on 
environmental measures is particularly difficult given the transboundary 
nature of a large percentage of pollution. Identifying where liability lies for 
infringements or determining the balance of inputs necessary for 
improvements is complicated by concerns for sovereignty. Lithuania has 
signed a number of international agreements on the environment (see Table 
7.1). Becoming a party to such agreements and conventions could be seen as 
an indicator of commitment toward environmental protection. In this way, 
membership of conventions along with national legislation might be seen 
as a test of whether the government is committed to environmentally 
sustainability. 











(.3 Table 7.1 Environmental Conventions and Protocols Binding on Lithuania, 1995 
Convention Date Acceded Date Ratified 
Convention on Climate Change Rio 1992 June 1992 23'd February 1995 
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat Ramsar 1971 10th June 1993 No need for ratification 
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources in the Baltic Sea and Belts Gdansk 1973 14th July 1992 No need for ratification 
Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area Helsinki 1974 and 1992 9'h April 1992 No need for ratification 
Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the North-West Atlantic Fisheries Ottawa 1978 14th July 1992 No need for ratification 
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution' Geneva 1979 27th October 1993 No need for ratification 
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (inc Amendment and Protocol) Vienna 1985 19th December 1994 No need for ratification 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer Montreal 1987 19th December 1994 No need for ratification 
Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats Bern 1979 10th June 1993 28th September 1994 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Rome 1950 28th September 1994 
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency Vienna 1957 1991 18" November 1993 
Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials 1957 1993 6'h January 1994 
Convention on Nuclear Safety (NAA) Vienna 1994 12th June 1996 
Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy Paris 1960 1992 
Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Vienna 1963 15th September 1992 15th December 1992 
Convention on Early Notification of Nuclear Accidents Vienna 1986 16th November 1994 16th December 1994 
Protocol on the Application of the Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Vienna 1963 1992 30th November 1993 
Joint Protocol Concerning the Application of the Vienna and Paris Conventions on Liability for Nuclear Damage Vienna 1988 20" September 1993 20' December 1993 
*insufficient or conflicting information 
'None of the following associated protocols have been signed by the Lithuanian Government: 
on Long-Term Financing of the Co-operative Program for Monitoring and Evaluation of the Long Range Trans mission of Air Pollution in Europe (EMEP) (Geneva, 1984). 
concerning the Control of Emissions of Nitrous Oxides or their Transboundary Fluxes (Sofia, 1988) 
on the Reduction of the Volatile Organic Compounds or their Transboundary Fluxes (Geneva, 1991) 
Table 7.2 Environmental Conventions Lithuania Intends to Ratify 
Convention Date Acceded Date Ratified 
Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora (CITES) Washington 1973 Not yet acceded to 
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals Bonn 1980 Not yet acceded to 
Convention on the Control of Transboundanj Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal Basel 1989 Not yet acceded to 
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context 1991 Not yet acceded to 
Convention on Biological Diversity Rio 1992 11 th June 1992 Not yet ratified 
Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents Helsinki 1992 18th March 1992 Not yet ratified 
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes Helsinki 1992 18th March 1992 Not yet ratified 
Lithuania's desire to be readmitted into the international community via 
organisations such as the EU, UN, and NATO has been a driving force in 
signing international agreements on the environment. On one level, 
participation at the UNCED conference in Rio, 1992, demonstrated the 
Government's concern for environmental issues and an acknowledgement 
of Lithuania's role in the global environmental crisis. A commitment to 
sustainable development was also acknowledged through signing the Rio 
Declaration. However, on another level, the aim of participation could 
relate more to a concern for international acceptance than with a sincere 
commitment to environmental protection. Lithuania would not be alone 
in this reasoning. International pressure to conform achieves at least some 
measure of consensus on a wide range of international issues. For example, 
environmental groups can pressure the Government on the basis of their 
international commitments. However, it should be noted that Lithuania 
became a party to the Helsinki Convention on the protection of the Baltic 
Sea (see 3.2.3.2) in 1974 when under Soviet rule (Norgaard and Pedersen 
1994:104) yet it has been well established so far in this thesis that the Soviet 
Union did not portray a commitment to the environment nor take 
responsibility for the degradation which their policies created. 
Implementing such commitments requires sufficient funding which is still 
not forthcoming, with economic depression as the alleged reason. Thus, 
while Lithuania's international commitments and national legislation 
indicate some support for environmental issues, they do not prove the 
hypothesis since funding has been inadequate and environmental legislation 
has typically been subject to unnecessary delays (6) Further, environmental 
NGO representatives have lamented that some small worthwhile and 
inexpensive proposals have been rejected by government (Vainius pers. 
comm., August 1996). 
7.3.2.1 Lithuania's International Obligations 
The signing of international agreements is significant considering that the 
combined membership cost (designed to fund the running of the various 
secretariats) is an extra burden on an already strained national budget. This 
indicates some measure of commitment, although the extent to which the 
government considers these obligations in decision-making is debateable. 
6.  For example, the National Environmental Strategy was not ratified by Parliament for one 
year and EIA legislation has been in preparation since early 1994. 
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Peat extraction, for example, continues despite its impacts on important 
wetland species protected under the Ramsar Convention. Table 7.1 lists the 
agreements which are binding on Lithuania and Table 7.2 lists the conventions 
that Lithuania has signed but not ratified or that it intends to sign. 
The Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic 
Sea Area 1974/1992 (Helsinki Convention) was signed by Lithuania in 1992. 
The Soviet Union was a party to the 1974 convention which came into force 
in 1980. The new convention of 1992 included new text and updated legal 
matters and was signed in 1994. There was no need to ratify the agreement. 
The Helsinki Convention encapsulates both the "precautionary principle", 
and the "polluter pays" principle. The discussion in Chapter 6 on domestic 
sources of funding for environmental protection shows that Lithuania has 
employed a polluter pays principle as the basis for their environmental 
management system. It is less clear that a precautionary principle is enlisted 
in development. The case study of the energy system in Lithuania, presented 
in Chapter 2, for example, demonstrates that a precautionary principle is not 
at the root of environmental decision-making since the proponents of the 
oil terminal at Butinge appear to have ignored the opportunity to apply a 
precautionary principle by opting for construction, despite environmental 
concerns and an alternative which would allay such concerns (see 2.3.1). 
The continued operation of Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant in spite of safety 
problems could be seen as another example of rejecting such principles of 
precaution (see 2.4.2). 
There are also some problems with the conventions or their associated 
programmes which complicate the implementation of environmental aims. 
For example, the Environmental Action Programme, a requirement of the 
Helsinki Convention, (to which the EU is also a signatory) is a project guide 
for all Baltic countries and has been strongly criticised, primarily for its focus 
on free-market measures (see 5.4.2.1). 
Becoming a party to international agreements is not, in itself, demonstrative 
of a commitment to environmental protection. For example, there are a 
number of limitations which have been outlined in 7.3.2.2 and 7.4.3.1 in this 
chapter and also in Chapter 3. Most such agreements are non-binding (an 
attractive feature for potential signatories) and must be ratified by parliament 
at the national level and be provided with the necessary infrastructure for 
their implementation through national laws. For example, although 
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Lithuania signed the Convention on Biodiversity at the UNCED 1992 world 
congress in Rio de Janeiro, it was still not ratified by parliament in 1995. As 
shown in Table 7.2, other agreements and protocols are also waiting 
ratification. 
7.3.2.2 National Versus International Concerns 
The EU is a special form of international cooperation because its common 
legislation has direct policy effects on the Member States and because it 
facilitates the pursuit of particular interests through collective action (Wallace 
1981:115). Joining the EU (and the international community in general) will 
require cooperation between Lithuania and other Member States in many 
spheres, including the environment. Lithuania has already begun this process 
by becoming a signatory to various international conventions. However, 
there are limitations to effective cooperation that will need to be overcome 
if Lithuania is to be successful in its bid for inclusion. The strong national 
sentiment that pervades Lithuanian society could hinder successful 
implementation of international standards in the country. As acknowledged 
by the Lithuanian President, some autonomy would necessarily be transferred 
to the EU if Lithuania became a member: 
Community government coexists with national government but cannot be 
separated from it. It remains dependent on what politics within individual 
member states will permit. Yet the autonomy of national governments is 
circumscribed by their obligations to each other and by a shared commitment 
to preserve the common ground that has been established (Wallace 1981:113). 
As mentioned previously, there has been a tendency for the Lithuanian 
decision-makers to justify projects as necessary for Lithuania's economic 
independence thereby giving economic development priority over local 
environmental issues and possible international commitments (in 
environmental protection or otherwise). Malgosia Fitzmaurice (1992:59) 
points out that nationalism can affect the legal implementation of 
international agreements: 
National sovereignty, and the assertion of national autonomy in the use of 
territory and of permanent sovereignty over resources, limit the possibilities 
of international regulation, enforcement and oversight. 
It is clear that 50 years of Soviet occupation has had an impact on the thinking 
of Lithuania's decision-makers. For Lithuania, like Scotland and Northern 
Ireland, the existing nation state is the focus of political loyalty (Crouch & 
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Marquand 1990:ix). To have a strong national sentiment, while vying for 
inclusion in the European Community, is likely to have both economic and 
environmental consequences. The trend elsewhere has been away from the 
modern state system and toward a more pluralistic form with various levels 
of political authority. Thus, 'authority no longer rests as clearly as it used to 
upon the sovereign state, and there are other identities competing with the 
national one' (Joenniemi, et al., 1992:3). Lithuania must also shake the 
traditional concept of a territorial state and take on board new approaches 
that transcend old formations, structures, and boundaries. Yet, national 
concerns are even more likely to remain given the rebirth of nationalism in 
various parts of the world (see 4.2.2). 
The Baltic Cooperation Council aimed to facilitate cooperation and consisted 
only of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Annual prime ministerial summits 
are another avenue for cooperation between the countries. These meetings 
have increasingly resulted in stalemate on decisions regarding uniformity 
with economies, particularly the re-introduction of national currencies and 
negotiations with Russia. In June, 1993, Estonia pulled out of the Baltic 
Cooperation Council (BCC) which was set up in April, 1990, over a year 
before the Baltic states officially regained their independence from the Soviet 
Union. The executive of the Council was a standing commission consisting 
of two representatives from each country (011 1993). One of the Estonian 
representatives, Arvo Ukleika, believes that although it was once seen as an 
advantage to set up a 'Baltic common market', there are now major obstacles 
to effective cooperation. According to Ukleika, the problem lies in the fact 
that Itihey see one another as competitors rather than partners' (Quoted in 
011 1993). More recently, the three states have again tried to improve 
cooperation by forming a new Baltic Council. 
The disappointing degree of success of the concept of a common market 
between Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, demonstrates the difficulty of 
achieving such a goal. Could Lithuania successfully participate in a European 
common market if unable to do so with its near neighbours? A free trade 
agreement between the EU and each of the three Baltic States was signed in 
1994, effective from January 1, 1995. The signing between the Union and all 
three of the States followed months of negotiating regarding quotas, tariffs, 
and barriers, particularly in the area of agriculture (where the Union is most 
protectionist). Lithuania, with agriculture as a major sector of the economy, 
like Spain in 1985, could be waiting some time before gaining full EU 
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membership. Estimates of at least ten years have been reported. Resistance 
to Spain's membership was based on the probable upset of the equilibrium 
of the EC farm markets, thus, negotiations stretched for about six years (Story 
1990:41). Although many of the trade barriers have been eased, the EU and 
EFTA 'maintain tight restrictions on the most competitive products from 
Central and Eastern Europe - products in which the region has a competitive 
edge' (BCSD 1994). Thus, imports to the region from Western Europe have 
been growing by around 30 per cent per year while exports have not been 
matched with tariffs set at 100 per cent or more on agricultural products 
(BCSD 1994). 
The ongoing tension between Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, demonstrates 
the difficulty all three countries have in cooperating with regional neighbours. 
The resentment which can develop from a lack of control over the destiny 
of one's country, is not easily resolved. Not willing to trust Latvia (with a 
40% Russian population) to co-operate on projects such as the combined oil 
terminal and refinery exchange, yet pleased to welcome financial support 
and investment from the West for similar ventures, clearly (yet 
understandably) shows a bias in foreign relations. 
7.4 Legal and Institutional Framework for Environmental Policy 
As noted in Chapter 1, history is an important backdrop or analytical 
framework within which an analysis of present policies needs to be discussed. 
Reference has been made throughout this thesis to the legacy of Soviet 
incorporation and the way this has shaped the political, cultural, economic, 
and environmental situation in Lithuania. It is, again, relevant here in 
understanding the present situation regarding environmental policy and 
legislation. Essentially, the influential features have been the institutionalised 
pattern of vested interest (industry and military power); the resource 
intensiveness, derived from a lack of concern for effective utilisation of 
resources and facilitated by economic incentives to meet production targets; 
and a closed hierarchical political system that essentially blocked any political 
activity not carried out in the name of the Party. Given these political 
characteristics, the emergence of "post-modern" (or "soft") political issues, 
such as the environment, were unlikely in the USSR. This legacy, together 
with 'the emergence of new political forces in the transition to a market 
economy and liberal democracy ... provides an arena within which any political 
issues in the Baltic States may be viewed' (Norgaard and Pedersen 1994:101). 
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March 11, 1990 marked the beginning of legal reform in Lithuania when 
independence from the Soviet Union was declared. 'From this day, justice, 
not the will of the State [was] consolidated in law' (Zilgalvis et al. 1993:3). 
The dismantling of the Communist Party as the controlling institution should 
have led to a reduced role of the vested interests of industry and the military 
in decision-making. However, subsequent decentralisation of power has led 
to a kind of regional control pattern whereby regions within Lithuania 
compete to maintain their income base. Democratisation creates possibilities 
for horizontally organised groups such as green organisations to mobilise 
public opinion and thereby influence the decision-making process but it 
does not guarantee a commitment to environmentally sensitive decisions. 
Nor does transferring power to local authorities (Norgaard and Pedersen 
1994:102). While decentralisation and local democracy open the way to affect 
policy, it does not necessarily follow that decisions will be ecologically 
sustainable. For example, a local community might perceive that their income 
base is threatened by possible closure of a polluting factory. In this way, 
democratisation and the transition to a market economy are not necessarily 
the only changes required for environmental rehabilitation and protection 
in Lithuania. Thus, while it is the cornerstone of Green political thought, 
participatory democracy incorporating a panoply of views cannot, in itself, 
guarantee an environmentally sustainable society (see also 7.2.1). 
The enormous task of restructuring the legal system has also been an important 
aspect of transition. Along with increasing public awareness and education, 
legal and institutional measures in planning (particularly in ETA) have been 
recognised in the National Environment Strategy (NES) as the most important 
goals of medium and short-term projects (MEP 1995b, Section 6:47) (see also 
7.4.2). The legal framework is an integral part of ensuring an environmentally 
sustainable society. Like democracy, legal reform does not, in itself, guarantee 
environmental protection in Lithuania. However, it is a necessary and 
indispensable factor in moving toward such a situation. Environmental 
protection laws can provide a basis for control and monitoring of activities 
which impact on the environment as well as provide a basis for public 
scrutiny. While environmental law reform was a priority when independence 
was restored, it is now proceeding largely on momentum (Stec 1995:88). 
Rather than work in a legal vacuum, legislators extended the validity of 
soviet laws while new laws were drafted (Norgaard and Pedersen 1994:107). 
The possibility of Lithuania leaping ahead of the West in terms of 
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environmental protection was noted by French (1990:40-1) who pointed to 
the years of experience, particularly in policy development and technology, 
which could be drawn upon in the process of reform. While, in some 
aspects Lithuania has been able to do this by preparing laws and a pollution 
control infrastructure, the administrative system has been limited in its 
capacity to deal with the sheer deluge of legislation requiring to be formed or 
changed. In addition, it has not been designed to cope with its new tasks as 
outlined in the legislation. For example, one of the failings of the permits 
and charges system is the difficulty of implementation and enforcement (see 
6.3.1.2). 
While decentralisation may have removed some influence of traditional 
soviet vested interests, other forces, such as heavy industry, new business, 
and foreign investors, are also mobilised by the process of democratisation. 
Such interests are usually well organised and have substantial financial 
resources at their disposal. This influence may counteract input from new 
political parties and non-government organisations. The political system, 
then, may still be restrictive to participation of NGOs which are typically less 
powerful (see 7.4.1.3). 
7.4.1 Environmental Legislation in Lithuania 
Environmental law has not, as yet developed into a separate branch, however 
the adoption of the Law on Environmental Protection of the Republic- of 
Lithuania 1992 (LEP) and its related laws ° formed the foundation for the 
national environmental policy which has culminated in the development 
of the National Environment Strategy in 1995. The more recent drafting of 
other environmental laws discussed below contribute to the first stage of 
environmental law reform in Lithuania (Zilgalvis et al. 1993:14-15). The 
formation of the LEP and the various pollution taxation laws that accompany 
it, might suggest some measure of priority by the government. A national 
strategy might also indicate that environmental protection is a priority. 
However, implementation is the key to understanding the true priority given 
to such a policies. For example, the Law might not receive adequate funding 
or infrastructure support for its implementation. Chapter 6 highlighted the 
economic priorities of the Government and international donors which has 
left the environment sector relatively underfunded. Where finance has 
been provided, it has generally been directed toward waste water treatment, 
7 See Supreme Council of Lithuania 1991a, 1991b, 1991c, 1992b. 
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effectively ignoring other issues. Another example of establishing 
commitment or priority to environmental problems is in the case of 
conflicting policies - forestry verses conservation of natural areas, for example 
- where priority might be given to the former. Although the economic 
situation is a limitation to successful implementation, there are a number of 
measures which could be taken at relatively low cost, and determination to 
fulfil the policy would uncover such measures. 
The LEP is essentially a framework law, determining the structure of 
environmental management, rights and duties of citizens, natural resource 
management, regulation of economic activities including permitting, 
monitoring, and enforcement of standards and application of penalties 
(Vainius 1995:91). Aside from general statements about the rights of citizens 
to a healthy environment and the connection between society and nature, 
the LEP relies heavily on pollution control measures. It also calls for the 
harmonising of standards with those of the EU (Stec 1995:104). Chapter 8 of 
the LEP deals with international cooperation and includes very broad 
statements concerning international agreements and global obligations in 
environmental protection (Supreme Council 1992b:17). There are also broad 
provisions for public participation but, as noted by Stec (1995:87), such broad 
statements are impractical when it comes to participation on the ground 
level. 
The generality of the law may be attributed to the fact that it was prepared 
hurriedly at a time of significant upheaval. At the time, a law on environment 
was a priority of reform. Legal reform in all areas has since slowed in pace 
as analysis and debates take place over their contents. As the new, and more 
specific, laws are enacted, a more stable base for environmental protection 
becomes possible. A commitment to ensuring environmental rehabilitation 
and protection would see such laws ratified more quickly. The ETA legislation, 
for example, involved several years of drafting before being completed in 
Autumn 1996. The articles of LEP relating to the regulation of economic 
activity set out in Chapter 4 of the LEP, stipulate that developers must prepare 
an ETA and present it to the Department of Environmental Protection (now 
Ministry) for evaluation and for a 'motivated conclusion' (see 7.4.1.3). 
Despite its problems, the LEP is sill the most important environment law 
for public participation and scrutiny of environmental decision-making 
because it provides for all interested parties. In fact, Vainius (1995:89), points 
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out that the generality of the rights expressed in the law can actually be 
useful. Environmental NGOs in Lithuania use the LEP and refer to it when 
writing letters, comments, statements, or complaints, thus reminding 
Government and the public of their obligations to protect the environment 
under law (Vainius 1995:91). 
7.4.1.1 Nature Protection 
Most of the general principles relating to the protection of flora and fauna 
and their habitats are found in the Constitution and the LEP. There are 
more specific regulations regarding the management and protection of fauna 
in the Law on Fauna Protection and Use 1987. The use and protection of 
flora is not covered by a single Act but by ordinances such as the Forest Code 
of 1979, the Law on Protected Areas 1993 and the Regulations on the Red 
Data Book 1990. All wild fauna is considered to be the property of the state 
but flora can be the property of the state or of private individuals. The status 
of some species of flora and fauna is critical. Around five hundred species 
(210 plant species, 210 animal species, and 81 species of mushrooms) are 
considered vulnerable. A further 120 species are endangered while 34 species 
are already extinct (Zilgalvis et al. 1993:29). All activities which threaten the 
extinction of rare or endangered animals and plants or that have a negative 
impact on their habitat are prohibited. This is a difficult regulation to uphold, 
given the difficulty faced by officers with poaching in reserved areas while 
many threatened species are not well represented by the reserve system. 
Earth disturbance from mushroom gathering has been particularly destructive 
to local forests. 
7.4.1.2 Protected Areas Network 
The system of protected areas had its beginnings in the Krushchev period in 
the 1950s and 1960s and was later reworked by prominent geographer, Paulius 
Kavaliauskas in 1992. The management of protected areas is now covered 
by the Law on Protected Areas 1993. The system, or framework, represents 
an interrelated system of zones aimed at protecting ecological processes and 
the neutralising the effects of human impact on the natural environment 
(Kavaliauskas 1995:102). It establishes five categories of protection (see Figure 
7.1). There are four Strict Nature Reserves (IUCN category I) in which most 
human activity is prohibited. It is forbidden to hunt, fish, utilise natural 
resources, change the hydrological regime of the land, pollute the water, use 
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activity, fishing or hunting (excepting hoofed animals). Within National 
Parks, a number of zones have been developed such as; conservation, 
protection, recreational, and industrial zones where particular land-use 
conditions apply. Any economic activity carried out in the afforested areas 
of National parks is conducted according to the Forest Management 
Regulations for Protected Areas and is approved by the Ministry of Forestry 
in conjunction with the MEP. There are 30 Regional Parks, including one 
Historic Regional Park which have a protection level equivalent to IUCN 
category V. Nature Conservation Reserves form another category which are 
established for the protection of areas significant to natural and cultural 
heritage by regulation of economic and recreational activity (IUCN category 
IV) (Zilgalvis et al. 1993:37, Kavaliauskas 1995:105). There are approximately 
350 Conservation Reserves of varying types. Common to all protected areas 
is a prohibition on urban and industrial development (Kavaliauskas 1995:105). 
The protected areas account for 11.2 per cent of Lithuania's territory thus 
providing a significant contribution to environmental protection in the 
country. The main criticism of the framework is that it has been devised on 
a geographical basis, ignoring the importance of natural diversity and leading 
to the protection of certain areas whilst arguably more important areas remain 
unreserved. The parks are also underfunded and understaffed which is 
evidenced by the fact that poaching continues to be the major problem faced 
by Park officials despite the fact that it is prohibited or restricted in many 
protected areas. Rangers have lamented that it is nearly impossible to control 
poaching without appropriate resources (pers. comm., July 1996). Contributing 
to the problem is the lobbying power of the hunting fraternity of which 
previous Environmental Ministers have been a part. 
7.4.1.3 Environmental Impact Assessment (ETA) Legislation 
Despite the significant environmental problems in Lithuania, there is still 
much that remains to be protected. As Duncan Fisher has argued (referring 
to the CEE and Baltics region); 'if environmental resources can be valued in 
an appropriate manner - ...ultimately a function of politics - EIA may become 
a valuable tool for the integration of environmental protection into economic 
development' (Fisher for EBRD 1994:xi). 
While the ETA law was being finalised (it had been in preparation for around 
4 years), details of ETA procedures could be found scattered throughout various 
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normative and regulative acts. The main source were Articles 15-18 of the 
LEP which stipulates that those applying for a permit to engage in economic 
activity must, at their own expense, prepare and submit documentation 
about the probable impact of their proposal to the appropriate regional office 
of MEP or to the Ministry itself for major industrial projects. (Zilgalvis et al. 
1993:26-28). The new ETA legislation was approved by Parliament in Autumn, 
1996 (Linas Vainius pers. comm., February 1997). 
For EIA legislation to be successful in Lithuania the general resistance to 
planning and controls must be overcome (Fisher for EBRD 1994:xii). As 
mentioned in Chapter 4, national sentiment is at times a hindrance to 
successful implementation of environmental policy. The antagonism toward 
policies of regulation on the new path to the free market could also affect 
the successful working of legislation designed to control economic activity. 
There is, on the other hand, a growing acceptance of ETA in the West as an 
important feature of planning for establishing potential impacts of projects 
both individually and collectively (Fisher for EBRD 1994:xii). However, this 
understanding of the value of ETA is not matched by successful 
implementation in the West. While ETA is designed to anticipate problems 
of construction and/or operation of a proposed facility in order to prevent or 
reduce potential environmental impacts, the process often begins late in EU 
countries making it unclear how the EIA is integrated into the project plan. 
Other problems include inconsistent quality (including unclear 
methodologies and the exclusion of certain alternatives), and inadequate 
facilitation of public participation (Fisher for EBRD 1994:xiv). According to 
Fisher, there is no evidence that similar problems will not also appear in the 
CEE and Baltic region. 
At a conference held by the Stockholm Environment Institute Tallinn branch 
(SET-Tallinn) it was alleged that recent constructions of oil terminals on the 
Baltic Sea coast were a serious threat to marine life due to inadequate 
technology, poor ETA procedures, and a lack of co-ordinated policies of the 
Russian Federation, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The construction of 
several of these terminals has not conformed with the recommendations of 
the Helsinki Convention to which all those countries are signatories 
(Trummel 1994). In 1994, construction on two oil terminals in Estonia was 
halted by the Ministry of Environmental Protection because obligatory 
environmental assessments and permits had not been obtained (011 1994:2). 
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The construction of the oil terminal near the coastal town of Butinge, close 
to the Latvian border will be a test that all procedures are followed correctly. 
The struggling economy is a hindrance on compliance of such procedures, 
as is the lack of tradition in ETA preparation, analysis, and enforcement. (8) 
The recent intensive construction of terminals on the Baltic coast stems 
from a general panic following the "blockades" on Russian supplies of oil 
and gas, leaving the countries determined to obtain access to other sources 
(see also 2.3). 
A well defined ETA procedure which includes public participation and legal 
recourse is, therefore, an important facet of a code of environmental 
protection. Fisher (1994) argues that the administration needs to be flexible 
with public consultation being a key factor. Unfortunately, 
the lack of experience on the part of both the public and the administration 
in mutual consultation, and the inherited perception of the planning process 
as a technical analysis rather than a process of negotiation, will make the 
task of ensuring effective public participation exceptionally difficult. In 
addition, the lack of a scoping process often results in argument about the 
scope of the EIA when it is too late to introduce new issues into the EIA 
process (Fisher for EBRD 1994:xv) (Further limitations to implementation of 
environmental policy in general are discussed below in section 7.4.4.1). 
There is no formal mechanism for public participation in the ETA process in 
Lithuania aside from the general right of the public to access information 
before the conclusion of the ETA (EBRD 1994:133) (unless it is considered a 
state secret). There is no public access to the details of issued permits and no 
legal requirement for public comment on either draft or final permits. There 
is also no system of public appeal but a proponent may appeal against decisions 
made regarding whether a proposed activity requires an ETA (Article 3(f)). In 
practice, individuals or groups can only consider the conclusions of an EIA 
(Vainius 1995:91, Zilgalvis et al. 1993:28, and Bissett 1994). However, the LEP 
states that it is possible to demand the ETA or other information relating to a 
proposed activity (Zilgalvis et al. 1993:28). As discussed in 7.2.2.3, such 
participation is not only a crucial part of democratic society but also integral 
to environmental sustainability. Public participation in the ETA process 
helps ensure some measure of accountability on the part of developers and 
the government who have a financial interest in promoting development. 
8 The apparent disregard of the EU directive on EIA as referred to by Wright & Shorey 1994, 
is also of concern, however, the EU does have a well developed procedure and understanding 
of EIA. The enforcement of such directives obviously remains a problem but there is no reason 
for the new members to ignore the procedures in place. 
Chapter Seven 	 355 
According to the LEP, information on environmental impacts should be 
provided by the MEP with public participation possible after the Ministry 
has given an opinion on the EIA followed by consultations with the developer 
regarding views of the Ministry and the public. It is the Ministry of Economy 
or the city government which then issues a decision on the project (EBRD 
1994:133). 
7.4.1.4 Agricultural Policy and Land Reform 
Agriculture has, historically, been a major component of Lithuanian society. 
In 1920, 79 per cent of the population were engaged in agriculture (Lieven 
1993:62). After land reform in 1920, Lithuania developed potential for 
successful wheat, dairy, and cattle farming of the Scandinavian type and 
capitalist smallholdings became very successful in the 1930s (Hope 1994:44-6). 
Yet, agriculture has also been a significant contributor to environmental 
degradation in Lithuania, particularly to water pollution. The Soviet rule 
transformed Lithuanian agriculture into a mass of collective farms centrally 
controlled and funded. Again, production targets dominated farming practices 
as they did in industrial production. As a result, large quantities of fertilisers 
and pesticides were distributed for use among farmers, ignoring the financial 
and environmental burden of such practices. 
The agricultural sector has been hard hit by the transition and associated 
land reform. Agricultural production has declined significantly (up to 60%) 
and this has been complicated by the land ownership changes. In particular, 
restitution of land owned prior to Soviet rule and the breaking up of collective 
farms have led to tensions in the rural community, especially through 
increased unemployment. In addition, the land reform process has consumed 
most of the institutional capacity at the local level, thereby severely limiting 
the capacity of municipal environmental agencies to engage in other 
environmental protection tasks to be assigned in the process of 
decentralisation (Eckerberg and Pedersen 1997 and Applegren 1994:1-2). 
As at January 1994, over 118 thousand claims for restoration of agricultural 
land had been processed with a further 300 thousand still to be reviewed 
(Budvytiene et at. 1995:82). By October 1996, the number of processed claims 
had increased to 268 thousand constituting 1.4 million hectares of land with 
a further 400 thousand claims registered with the authorities (ELTA October 
24, 1996). The main impact of the intensive land reform has been the 
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distribution of land tenure. The number of private family farms is increasing 
rapidly and these, together with the small private plots, are providing growing 
competition for the remaining larger state farms. An increase in livestock 
and crop concentration in these smaller farms (particularly those with poor 
quality soil) creates additional problems relating to waste management, 
chemical storage and use, water management (quantity and quality), and 
ground water contamination (Budvytiene et al. 1995:72-82 and Applegren 
1994:1, 18). 
It is foreseeable that, if the increase in smaller farms continues, a corresponding 
increase in the use of chemicals will emerge in response to a growing need 
to improve production and increase soil productivity (Budvytiene et al. 
1995:72). Yet, as in the industrial sector where economic decline meant less 
pollution, economic adversity has decreased the impact of agricultural 
chemicals on the environment. For example, the use of fertilisers decreased 
from around 700 thousand tons in 1988 to 600 thousand in 1991 and 145 
thousand in 1992. In the same period, pesticide use decreased by approximately 
90 per cent. This has been primarily due to price reform which has - led to 
dramatic increases in input costs (Budvytiene et al. 1995:83-5). Therefore, 
agricultural policy needs to be prepared for the likely increase. 
The economic decline, and subsequent decrease in the use of mineral 
fertilisers, provided Lithuania with a unique opportunity to allow the livers 
and ground water to recover somewhat. This provided time for 
environmental legislation to be enacted. However, secondary pollution 
problems have meant that the quality has not improved greatly (MEP 1995a:37) 
and for any benefits to remain, agricultural pollution needs to be strictly 
monitored. Maintaining the benefits of reduced pesticide use is complicated 
by the fact that the licensing of pesticide use and the quality control of pesticides 
are carried out by the same agency (Applegren 1994:19). Pesticide use had 
already begun to increase again in 1993. 
Ecologically sustainable agriculture is an essential facet of an overall 
ecologically sustainable pattern of development since it would have 
implications for both the economy and the environment in Lithuania. 
However, the political situation may not be conducive to an environmentally 
sensitive agricultural policy. Agriculture remains fundamental to the 
Lithuanian economy (25 per cent of GDP in 1993) and production will again 
be important as Lithuania aims for inclusion in the EU. Budvytiene et al. 
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(1995:70) point to the need for environmental education among the rural 
community since they often do not perceive the environmental consequences 
of their farming practices. Although, once again, such strategies require 
commitment and funding from government agencies. Applegren (1994:18) 
suggests that state subsidies to farmers be replaced with effective management 
mechanisms which would assist in efficient use of resources. 
In all land use laws, such as the Law on Land Reform, there are environmental 
protection requirements. They also provide the best avenues for public 
participation and could, theoretically be used by concerned citizens or NGOs 
to protest about changes which have a direct or indirect impact on the 
environment. However, it is quite difficult in practice, since land reform (or 
more specifically, the return of land to pre-Soviet owners) is a sensitive 
processes of economic reform in Lithuania. These laws and regulations are 
often altered by the authorities which further complicates any process of 
participation since even professional lawyers are uncertain of current rules 
(Vainius 1995:92). 
EU membership would also have implications for agricultural policy. The 
EU's common policy on agriculture, while successful in the early stages, has 
now been plagued by over-production, falling prices, pollution of ground 
water, soil degradation, a dependency on fodder imports, and the spread of 
diseases such as Salmonella, Mad Cow disease, and the potato virus. The 
Norwegian Society for the Protection of Nature (1994:6) used such arguments 
in their opposition to membership, pointing out that they had been spared 
such problems because of their restrictions on the importation of food. 
7.4.1.5 Other Related Laws 
As an overarching legal framework, the constitution is the most supreme 
legal document stipulating rights and duties of citizens in Lithuania. These 
are, necessarily, stipulated in fairly broad terms and generally have the 
function of a baseline for other laws and regulations put before the parliament. 
The constitution does not acknowledge a "right to a healthy environment", 
however, citizens and government are obliged to concern themselves with 
environmental protection (9) . The Law on Environmental Protection 1992 is 
9 There are very few constitutions which do acknowledge such a right, although there is a 
trend emerging in human rights law toward establishing a human right to a healthy 
environment (see Banks and Sainsbury 1997). 
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based on the right to a healthy environment. Many of the other basic human 
rights set out in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights which are 
important for participation in environmental decision-making are also found 
in the Lithuanian Constitution such as the rights to information, free 
assembly, association, and petition. In possible conflict with these are property 
rights and personal freedoms. The Constitution also provides for the 
sovereignty of the people and establishes parliamentary controllers 
(ombudspersons) for independent examination of complaints regarding the 
abuse of official powers. Article 54 of the Constitution also states that the 
'pollution of waters and air, the production of radioactive impact, as well as 
the impoverishment of fauna and flora, shall be prohibited by law' (Supreme 
Council of Lithuania 1992b). Although the permits and charges system 
described in Chapter 6 is evidence of an attempt to enforce such a statement, 
clearly, in practice, such impacts are not prohibited as such since by applying 
the "polluter pays" principle, a permit can be bought to undertake activities 
which pollute air and water. Further, it could be argued that the Ignalina 
Nuclear Power Plant is unconstitutional since there is a radioactive impact 
associated with its operation. However, the Constitution is not likely to be 
used in protest against environmentally destructive activities. 
The LEP includes a general statement that violators of the law may be subject 
to criminal liability. Conversely, the Criminal Code allows for criminal 
liability in cases of intentional or grossly negligent conduct resulting in 
environmental harm, however no criminal cases have, as yet, been brought 
against such activities (Stec 1995:112). The Civil Code also includes provisions 
relating to compensation for damages in cases of environmental harm. The 
LEP is somewhat more specific (in Articles 32 to 34) stating that a violator is 
legally required to compensate all losses and, if possible, restore the 
environment to its previous state. Those who have been affected have the 
right to make a claim for damages (Stec 1995:113). 
Other protective laws in the process of drafting include forests, waste 
management, biodiversity, soil protection, coastal areas and the continental 
shelf, water, air, and special measures to control pollution of the Baltic Sea. 
Applegren (1994:23) recommends that a water management policy should 
include a balance between state controlled management and economic 
incentives such as water use and pollution taxes, penalties, and charges. It 
could include positive incentive such as grants for improvements or tax 
exemptions. Ongoing monitoring would also be important in order to register 
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changes and trends. He also recommends the construction of small scale 
treatment plants for rural communities and private enterprises. In order to 
coordinate such measures and to improve effectiveness, Applegren (1994:24) 
suggests that an inter-ministerial committee be established including the 
Environmental Protection, Agriculture, Health, Urban Planning, and Industry 
ministries. 
7.4.1.6 Environmental Guidelines for Investors 
Environmental guidelines were developed for potential investors in 
Lithuania in 1993 with funding from the EBRD and the Development and 
the Commission of the European Communities. They provide an overview 
of the administrative structure, government bodies, environmental 
legislation, environmental audits, EIA, land use planning, water, air, and 
noise pollution standards, and waste management regulations. The 
guidelines focus 'specifically on those compliance, operational and liability 
issues which arise from environmental protection measures and affect 
investments' (Environmental Resources Limited (ERL) 1993:1). 
The development of such guidelines suggests a measure of responsibility on 
the part of the government in promoting good environmental practice for 
investors. However, the EIA process, problems with enforcement of penalties 
and charges relating to emissions, and an overall desire to promote large 
foreign investment possibly counteract any benefits to be achieved by such a 
document. 
7.4.2 National Environment Strategy (NES)  
By developing priority Action Programmes, the NES aims 
to strengthen Lithuania's institutional capacity to address its existing 
environmental concerns and problems effectively, and to ensure that the 
concept of environmentally sustainable development underpins Lithuania's 
transition to a free market economy (MEP 1995b: Ch. 1:2-3). 
The strategy was funded by the PHARE programme and prepared by a 
consortium of consultants from Ireland (International Development Ireland 
and DEVCO Ireland) and England (Environmental Resources Management). 
The final report was published in October 1995 and ratified by Parliament 
one year later (MEP 1995b:i and EL TA, September 25 1996). The delay in 
parliamentary approval of the strategy was considered by those working in 
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the environmental sector (government and NGOs alike) to be indicative of 
the low priority of environmental issues across the political spectrum. In 
the opinion of those working in the field of environmental protection, the 
report has little practical relevance (Vainius, L. and Greimas, E., pers. comm. 
July, 1996). The acceptance came just one month before the national elections 
and is one among many LDDP initiatives to be hurriedly concluded before 
the election. It may be that the Government considered it would attract 
votes and, in such a way, represents one of the few attempts to include 
environmental issues on the election agenda. On the other hand, it may 
have been a political stunt to accrue achievements and make changes more 
difficult for the possible new government. 
Several important benefits could be achieved through the adoption and 
implementation of the NES. It offers a comprehensive overview of short 
and medium term priorities for the optimal use of financial resources, thereby 
'providing a basis for the implementation of consistent national 
environmental policy' (MEP 1995b, Section 1:4). The strategy also aims to 
provide closer integration of environmental concerns and major economic 
activity in the country. Such a strategy will be useful for environmental 
agencies, particularly in directing donor investments into priority areas. Its 
success, however, rests with adequate funding and infrastructure for its 
implementation 
7.4.2.1 Positive and Negative Factors Affecting NES Implementation 
The NES acknowledges several 'negative factors and obstacles which may 
impact adversely on the implementation of the medium and short-term 
action programme' (MEP 1995b, Section 6:47). These include: a lack of legal 
and territorial planning documents; frequent breaches of the laws and 
regulations which are in place; a non-rational approach to land reform which 
is not balanced from either a management or ecological perspective; a generally 
short-sighted economic, technocratic, exploitative, and predatory approach 
to nature and the decisions regarding it; a lack of qualified specialists; a 
current national culture which gives a low priority to nature protection; and 
insufficient concern and funding for the protection of biodiversity (MEP 
1995b, Section 6:48). Many of these problems have been addressed in this 
thesis as obstacles not only to implementation of environmental policy but 
to the development of environmentally sustainable society. 
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7.4.3 Implementing Environmental Policies and Legislation 
A prerequisite for successful implementation of policy is that rules are clearly 
formulated. Compliance is less likely if the rules are vague. If they are 
vague, it could be a reflection of the priority of environmental protection as 
compared with other issues or the low cost for violationsw (Adreasson-Gren 
et a/., 1992:6). 
'It can not be assumed that policies will work; decisions run into unanticipated 
problems during implementation. Further, there are problems conducting an 
'objective' assessment of a policy once it is operating (Davis et al., 1988:126). 
Crucial to any attempts at successful implementation and its assessment is 
the policing of the rules and regulations. For example, the Soviet system 
had some of the toughest emission standards in the world, on a par with the 
US Clean Air Act, but did not enforce them effectively (Bogert 1990:17 & 
Adamkus in Drunga 1989:28). Lithuania now has new environmental 
legislation but, as identified in Chapter 6, still has difficulties with 
implementation and enforcement. The major problems with 
implementation are a lack of finance and organisational structures while 
enforcement is limited by the standard of records, measuring instruments, 
and avoidance of penalties. According to the recommendations of the World 
Bank, there needs to be a transition from, 
a system in which environmental laws represent a statement of goals to a 
system in which those laws provide operative requirements for the control 
of potential sources of environmental risk (World Bank, 1993:280). 
Implementation is even more difficult at an international level, especially 
when it concerns common property. One hindrance is countries' 
unwillingness to admit responsibility for pollution. Binding agreements 
between countries are the major legal source for environmental improvement 
and protection. These international conventions, including those applicable 
to the Baltic Sea, need to be implemented at the national level to be successful. 
For example, the Lithuanian Fund for Nature (1995:3) note that despite 
becoming a signatory to agreements such as the Bern, Ramsar, and Helsinki 
Conventions (all of which relate to the preservation of wetlands as wildlife 
habitat), official Lithuanian Government programmes do not follow the 
10 'The expected cost is the probability of detection multiplied by the size of the fine.... 
When the probability of detection is very low, the expected cost of violation is low even if 
the fine is high.' (Andreasson-Gren et al. 1992:6). 
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principles outlined whilst they have continued to pursue exploitation of 
wetland resources (see also 3.1). 
7.4.3.1 Limitations the Environmental Policy Process 
It has been demonstrated in previous chapters that poor economic conditions 
and national sentiment are major limitations to the priority given to 
environmental concerns because they influence the formation of 
environmental policy, obstruct balanced argument in the case of conflicting 
interests, and hinder implementation of environmental guidelines. Malgosia 
Fitzmaurice (1992:59) notes the obstacle of nationalism in regard to legal 
implementation and argues that, in the main, the control of pollution on 
common property (such as the Baltic Sea) is legally more complicated, 
especially regarding land-based sources which are more difficult to pin-point. 
Political instability in the region usually leads to short term programmes 
and investment since opportunities are perceived as precarious (Fisher 1992). 
This has implications for environmental investment since much of it requires 
long term support. The existing administrative structures are unable' to 
cope with the sheer deluge of new legislation as well as its expectations and 
requirements. For example, the system is not equipped to deal with practical 
requirements such as monitoring and the collection of fines as well as 
developing the avenues for participation provided for in the legislation 
(Fisher 1992), part of which is the issue of inadequate human resources. The 
inherited administrative and legal structures tend to operate on a sector-
orientated basis with laws specific to relevant agencies and which generally 
have the purpose of providing legal authority to existing activities (Applegren 
1994:3). The inter-ministerial approach (mentioned in 7.4.1.5) would go 
some way toward coordinating and consolidating the activities of different 
ministries and agencies in environmental management. 
Aside from the oft-stated problems of economic transition, there are 'barriers 
of the mind' which represent a greater hurdle for industry and Government 
to overcome. Arbaciauskas (1997) refers to several such barriers which he 
considers need to be addressed before the more minor economic issues. 
These include; a lack of knowledge and information, an uncertainty about 
the future, inefficient working patterns, a lack of motivation, a lack of 
environmental commitment, and a conservative attitude toward the changes. 
He also stresses the structural and organisational barriers which add to the 
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problem of implementing environmental policies in general and within 
companies in particular (Arbaciauskas 1997). 
7.5 Conclusion 
The previous sections have highlighted the complexity of the transition 
from a planned economy to a market democracy, particularly in relation to 
political culture. The capacity of interest groups to effect change is, therefore, 
limited. However, it should be reiterated that democracy, and the package of 
rights that entails, is an essential component of an environmentally aware 
society in which environmental issues are given high priority. But it does 
not guarantee such perceptions. While the political change was essential 
and fundamental to environmental policy, the transition to democracy is 
only one aspect of ensuring an ecologically sustainable society. Likewise the 
development of various environmental laws is an important facet of 
environmentally sustainable society. There are some positive aspects to the 
legal reform in Lithuania which, if fostered, could provide more strength to 
legal norms in the future. However, without a commitment to their 
implementation via adequate funding and monitoring personnel, the 
legislation will have little practical relevance especially if ongoing problems 
of corruption and economically and politically motivated "short-cuts" for 
economic developers continue. 
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Chapter 8: Environmentally Sustainable Society in 
Lithuania? 
The environmental perspective of this thesis is part of a multidisciplinary 
approach which highlights the interrelationships in Lithuanian society, in 
particular the links between politics, economic, and the environment and 
their implications for social justice. 
The thesis covers social, political, and economic theory, also it provides case 
studies, analysis of fiscal measures of environmental protection, a discussion 
of historical and recent events, and an overview of legal reform and obstacles 
to its implementation. Given that a thesis could have been dedicated to any 
one of the areas, it does not claim to be an exhaustive account of theory and 
practice in each area. In particular, analyses of social movement theory and 
economic policy in Lithuania are rather cursory. It does however, provide a 
holistic picture - a snapshot - of Lithuania at a time of extreme political, 
economic, and social upheaval and the way in which these changes have 
affected the environment. Because of the dramatic changes being undertaken 
in the country, these interrelationships are more apparent. The connection 
between environment and economy is reflected in the fluctuating pollution 
levels associated with economic decline and the beginnings of economic 
recovery. The former, for example, led to a decrease in industrial pollution 
and in the use of chemicals for agriculture, while economic recovery has 
already begun to reverse this trend. The decline in Green membership and 
support also had a more noticeable effect in Lithuania than in other countries 
experiencing a similar trend. In Australia, for example, declining membership 
in Green organisations has not had an obvious impact on environmental 
awareness or government priorities. In Lithuania, where the environmental 
movement secured mass support across political, religious, and ideological 
(and to some extent cultural or ethnic) divides, the decline in its support 
and in the public visibility of its activities had a greater impact on the 
development of environmental policy than in Australia. 
Analysis of the most recent events in Lithuania are generally tentative and 
most certainly risky, given the rapid changes taking place. The thesis' analysis 
of such events might, in time, prove to be incorrect. The emphasis is on 
change and the positive and negative impacts of change on Lithuanian society. 
There have indeed been many changes in Lithuania; even during the 
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preparation of this thesis. For example, there have been two national elections 
in which control has been exchanged from the Sajudis-led camp to the LDDP 
(or post-communist camp) with a return to the post-Sajudis camp (Homeland 
Union) in 1996. The movement toward a free market economy led to 
extremely high inflation which has since been reduced (from 1160 per cent 
to around 37 per cent). The free market economy has resulted in the 
establishment of electronic supermarkets on many street corners while two 
MacDonalds have been opened in Vilnius. Many petrol companies have 
become well established, new cars, mobile telephones, and brief cases are 
part of the city scene. Abundancy replaces the long queues of 1991/2 and 
shops with near-empty shelves. Cigarette companies, Levis, Coca-cola, 
Heinekin, Beneton, and Snickers have rapidly become household names. 
All of this seems to have signalled Lithuania's enlistment into the family of 
Europe. The problem with such developments is, primarily, that so much 
of the population is still unable to buy the imported products on offer, and 
that much could be produced in Lithuania. Further, there is little 
infrastructure in place to cope with the dramatic increase of solid waste 
levels caused by the influx of Western products. 
The thesis seeks to uncover whether expectations for the creation of an 
environmentally progressive society in Lithuania were misplaced. These 
expectations stemmed from the mass support for environmental issues in 
the 1988-1991 period. In addition, the changes necessary to establish such a 
society were thought possible due to the fact that the country was already 
experiencing major upheavals in all spheres of society. There was also an 
opening for the environmental knowledge, technology, and understanding 
of the West's 30 years experience. 
An environmentally sustainable society is not merely one in which the 
environment is protected. It involves acknowledging the links between 
various problems in society and integrating economic, environmental, and 
social policies for their resolution. It encompasses an open, pluralistic society 
in which the environment is not degraded for the economic gain of a few, 
and with particular regard for future generations. Banks (1991) and Kritkausky 
(1995) both discussed the possibility of integrating economic development 
and environmental protection issues. This thesis has shown that such a 
society did not emerge from the demise of communism and the subsequent 
restoration of Lithuanian independence. This is due to economic adversity 
and the associated aspirations to improve the economy and join the EU, 
limited administrative and legal structures which have been overloaded by 
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the deluge of reforms, strong national identity, a lack of a political culture 
and general political apathy, as well as the already apparent decline of 
environmental concern and activism. 
The prediction that Lithuania would lead the way toward an environmentally 
sustainable society has not been realised after six years of independence. 
When consideration is given to the difficulties in the West to achieve such 
an aim weighed against Lithuania's additional problems of corruption, 
maladministration, economic depression, high pollution levels, unsafe 
nuclear reactors, and other discussed problems, it seems unlikely that the 
aim can be achieved in the future. However, the situation was, and still is, 
complex. With the many interrelated issues that this thesis portrays, mono-
causal links and straightforward arguments are not suitable to the situation. 
For example, strong national identity has some positive implications for 
environmental protection because of the affinity it engenders with the territory 
and a desire to protect it from outside influence. Yet national sentiment can 
also have a negative impact by engendering insular, uncooperative behaviour 
as in the case of the oil terminal. Thus, it can be an obstacle to regional 
cooperation which could have both economic and environmental benefits, 
especially in the energy sector. However, regional cooperation is not the 
same as large regional blocs, such as the EU, which, as Lang and Hines (1993) 
point out are unable to adequately consider issues of environment and social 
justice. The distance between people and power tends to be widened under 
such unions of states, as many decisions are made geographically and 
linguistically apart from those they affect. Regional cooperation on a smaller 
scale holds greater possibilities for sustainability. 
Economic development can have positive effects by creating an economic 
base for funding protection programmes but the development of the economy 
without consideration of the environment can lead to both environmental 
and economic problems in the long term. Economic reform was also important 
in that it broke away from the economic inefficiency of the Soviet model in 
which no consideration was given to the cost of resources in the push to 
meet production targets. The free market, capitalist system that has replaced 
it does not have a good record of including environmental impacts in 
economic equations, yet some moves toward costing (at least as an externality) 
have begun. The transition itself, has had some positive effects for the 
environment but this has had more to do with the decline in economic 
activity than with a redirection of priorities by the new governments. But 
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the transition, involving the pursuit of economic goals and the relative 
negligence of environmental issues, has also led to environmental impacts 
such as those associated with the oil terminal at Butinge, along with 
deforestation and wetlands drainage for economic development. 
International assistance has been an important feature of environmental 
rehabilitation and protection in Lithuania but there are problems with both 
the motives of donors and the impacts created by projects. Most assistance 
has been directed at fostering economic development, causing further 
problems for the local environment. Thus, while international cooperation 
is an essential part of environmental protection, particularly in areas affected 
by transboundary pollution, pressure from the international community 
can be an obstacle to aspirations for the development of an environmentally 
sustainable society. The "watchdog" role of countries which are signatories 
to the same environmental conventions and treaties can also be positive in 
terms of the environment, however the pressures of free trade and other 
economic agreements largely preclude any attempts by individual countries 
to give priority to environmental concerns. In the main, international 
pressure, economic growth and free trade are a greater hindrance to 
environmentally progressive measures than they are a prerequisite for their 
implementation (see Chapters 5-7).. The power and influence of the EU are 
especially obstructive to the notion of an environmentally sustainable society 
in Lithuania. As Lieven (1993:332) points out: 
Aid and political support from the EC are highly useful, but its trade barriers, 
and particularly the Common Agricultural Policy, are a curse for the Baits 
as for the rest of Europe. 
There are also advantages of adopting EU standards, at least as a beginning. 
The harmonisation of laws and the commitment to free trade does, however, 
restrict member states from progressing above the norms of protection. 
There is evidence that democratic values existed in Lithuania at the time 
independence was restored, providing some hope for the future of democratic 
processes in which the public could be involved in environmental decision-
making. However, it has been shown that there are obstacles to the 
development of a democratic political culture such as the general population's 
lack of understanding of rights and obligations, a low tolerance for opposing 
political values, a continuing legacy of secrecy and corruption, and limited 
legal facilitation of avenues for participation. Further, the rights and duties 
bestowed on citizens can be in conflict with environmental protection or, 
indeed, a right to a healthy environment as set out in the Law on 
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Environmental Protection. Property rights, for example, enable citizens to 
not only own property but to act as they will in relation to it (within the 
bounds of legal obligations). In addition, while there have been some positive 
steps toward environmental law reform, these remain limited and are not 
provided with the necessary resources for their implementation. 
In general, however, the limitations expressed in this thesis suggest that 
environmental issues are likely to remain on the periphery of the political 
agenda. The analysis presented demonstrates that there has not been a 
commitment to environmental protection on the part of those who have 
governed since 1990, nor is there such a commitment amongst the general 
populace. Many of the issues discussed explain, to some extent, why this is 
the case. 
The example given of economic hardship is definitely an obstacle to the 
support for post-materialist or "soft" political concerns such as the 
environment. However, it has also been shown that while the poor state of 
the economy is influential in de-motivating those who have barely enough 
money to live, this is not adequate reasoning for environmentally destructive 
decisions on the part of governments. Economic hardship certainly has had 
a convincing role in decision-making but economic concerns need not have 
such primacy, even in a country which is faced with such dramatic reform. 
The Lithuanian government has rejected, on economic grounds, many small, 
inexpensive environmental protection proposals while, at the same time 
injecting large investments into the proposed oil terminal. There are 
relatively inexpensive ways of reducing emissions and efficiency measures 
which save money while simultaneously reducing pollution and which 
could be promoted in Lithuania. As Chapter 5 demonstrates, the links between 
economy and the environment are such that the government cannot continue 
to claim that the environment must wait for the economy to improve. 
Without the commitment to environmental protection discussed above, an 
improved economy is of no benefit to the environment and is, in fact, likely 
to create more degradation. Meanwhile ignoring environmental issues on 
the path to economic reform (establishing economic independence) only 
increases the problems to be resolved which may then require even more 
resources (financial, technical, and human). 
There are, then, factors other than the economy which have influenced both 
the governments' lack of commitment to environmental rehabilitation and 
protection and the declining interest and enthusiasm for such issues on the 
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part of Lithuanian society. In terms of the latter, the decline in activism and 
participation in elections together with the relatively low levels of 
membership (as compared with Western democracies) in political parties or 
NG0s, must also be attributed to the broader political developments which 
has led to disillusionment and apathy. The lack of formal avenues for 
participation, even at the level of expressing concern over particular issues, 
the unresponsiveness of government when concerns are expressed, the 
ongoing corruption which has contributed to the lack of trust in and respect 
for, politicians and the democratic process have all contributed to a declining 
interest in political life. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the Greens, in particular, have struggled to maintain 
respect and support due to the actions of those in the political arena, not 
least of which has been bitter feuding and factioning within the Party. This 
has had implications for the reputation of the Greens in general, even though 
the Green Movement remains independent from the Green Party. Prominent 
members of the Green Movement at the time of secession have since moved 
into other areas, often within the bureaucracy, adding to the sense of 
abandonment and disillusionment as well as reducing the attraction of the 
Green Movement. So, as noted by Reisinger et al. (1994:206), the decline in 
political activism and membership of NGOs since the restoration of 
independence could have more to do with the public's perception of parties, 
institutions, or the candidates and their actions than with economic adversity 
or a lack of support for democratic values. 
The decline in public support for environmental issues and willingness to 
act on improving the environmental situation has had definite consequences 
for the state of the environment and especially for the likelihood of creating 
an environmentally sustainable society. The less public support for 
environmental issues, the less likely there will be government action. There 
were a number of successful environment demonstrations at the height of 
dissent in the 1988-1991 period and, while there have still been successes 
such as influencing the location of the Butinge oil terminal, and stopping 
the construction of an airport in Neringa National Park, these have not 
been on the scale of those earlier actions, nor have they had the level of 
public backing. Meanwhile, several projects which were abandoned on 
environmental grounds after public pressure in Gorbachev's glasnost era, 
were restarted under the "Lithuania's economic independence" banner. This 
compounded the sense of disillusionment amongst those who had worked 
to protect the environment. The apparent betrayal of the once Greens leader, 
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Vaisvila, with the decision to restart the Kruonis Hydro-accumulation station, 
was a particularly sore point amongst environmentalists and the public. 
Another aspect of the decline in Green support is the argument that 
environmental concerns never held a position of philosophical attachment 
within the people. Although it appeared that Sajudis and the Green 
movement were fighting for change in the same way that environmentalists 
were in the West, the environment became a seemingly apolitical but useful 
tool for the realisation of the nationalist agenda to restore independence. 
Thus, while environmental problems still existed under new independent 
Lithuanian governments, public opposition to environmental degradation 
dwindled. That is not to say that many were not deeply concerned about 
and committed to resolving environmental degradation under Soviet rule. 
However, attacking the newly elected Lithuanian Government was more 
difficult than blaming the central Soviet Government (who are still held 
responsible for environmental problems in Lithuania). Opposition to 
environmental degradation under independent governments in Lithuania 
has not attracted the level of support generated in opposing the Soviet 
authorities on similar issues. This problem was compounded " by the 
dissolution of Sajudis and the Greens whereby a central focus was lost. 
While the primacy of economic development has certainly been the driving 
force of government decisions (regardless of their political leanings) there 
are other reasons for a lack of commitment to environmental protection. 
The decline in an public environmental voice is one, yet the government 
has had a role in such a decline. There are no causal explanations, only 
interrelated or circular arguments. Corruption and a legacy of "soviet 
thinking" have also had a role in the development of glasnost, or openness, 
which is an important aspect of an environmentally sustainable society. 
The attitude of secrecy, of government versus the people, and of promoting 
big business have all contributed to the failure to develop an environmentally 
progressive political agenda. 
Environmental law reform has also had a relatively low priority and, in the 
face of a deluge of legislative reform, lawyers are unwilling or unable to take 
on cases involving environmental crime. Public participation, while stated 
in broad terms in several new laws relating to the environment, is not 
provided with the mechanisms for its functioning in practice. Environmental 
protection in Lithuania is reliant not only on the legal commitments of 
governments, companies, and individuals but it also heavily reliant on fiscal 
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measures to fund environmental programmes. These measures form part 
of the law. This ensures some allocation of funds for the environment 
sector but it tends to take responsibility away from the government to co mmit 
regular financial contributions to the environment sector. Funding has 
been provided for waste water treatment, for example, but it is not substantial 
when compared with allocations for the economics and industry sectors and 
the environmental allocation has, moreover, been substantially decreased as 
such projects approach completion. 
The above mentioned obstacles to the creation of an environmentally 
sustainable society also explain why many environmental problems remain. 
Water pollution is being addressed by the construction of treatment plants 
but other problems, particularly those without direct human impacts, still 
exist. While treatment plants were a necessary step (especially in Kaunas on 
the Nemunas river), they are end-point, technical solutions. If environmental 
integrity is to be protected, there also needs to be some focus on preventative 
measures. The continued use of nuclear power is not a technical but a 
political decision which is not compatible with an environmentally 
sustainable society. Of course, one must consider the environmental impacts 
of alternatives such as air pollution associated with electricity produced from 
coal, or oil but there are technical solutions to reduce such impacts. Claims 
of economic reasoning make little sense when the economic cost of continuing 
nuclear power (including the cost of uranium, replacing channels, waste 
storage facilities, safety upgrades, and funds directed toward the Kruonis 
Hydro-accumulation plant) is very high, not to mention the social and 
environmental costs. Further, there seems to be a contradiction in claiming 
that Lithuania can not afford to lose Ignalina when so much money has 
been directed toward the construction of the economically inefficient oil 
terminal which has not, so far, been completed. The reason is that such 
decisions are made based on political motives, influenced by national concerns, 
by those who have something to gain by their implementation. 
There are many interrelated issues involved in the transition from 
communism to a free market capitalist state. The paradox is that while 
political, economic, and social reforms are a necessary facet of Lithuanian 
environmental rehabilitation and protection, they do not guarantee the 
development of an environmentally sustainable society; even if one considers 
the environmentally sensitive aspects of Lithuanian history and the mass 
support for environmental issues in the 1988-1991 period. Further, there are 
aspects of the changes which have created new environmental problems, 
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particularly in the area of waste management. So there are no straightforward 
answers, everything must be qualified. However, it is certain that Lithuania 
will not develop into an environmentally progressive country outside of 
what is possible within the specific temporal and spatial characteristics of the 
region. There remains a possibility that, with the passage of time, intense 
and vocal opposition to environmental degradation might resurface, with 
environmental issues regaining a position of priority on the political agenda. 
However, considering most of the limitations discussed in the thesis are 
likely to remain, it seems unlikely. 
A philosophical commitment to environmental protection may be too much 
to hope for in most modern governments but the worldwide development 
of legal instruments enshrining environmental principles, well developed 
infrastructures for public participation in the decision-making process, 
expanding international pressure to accept scientific warnings of 
environmental degradation, and a growing understanding of the relationship 
between ecology and economics are features which help facilitate ecologically 
sustainable development. In this respect, Lithuania has begun to turn the 
situation around. Should they be expected to do more than the other nations 
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Appendix la 
Questionnaire / Anketa 
Name of Organisation 
Organizacijos pavadinimas: 
1) AGE • under 18 0 AMZIUS 	• iki 18 0 
• 18-25 0 • 18-25 0 
• 26-35 0 • 26-35 0 
• 36-50 0 • 36-50 0  
• 50+ 0 • 50+ 0 
2) SEX • F/M LYTIS • Vyr/Mot 
3) Nationality 
Tautybe 
4) Where in Lithuania have you lived most? 
Kurioje Lietuvos vietoveje gyvenote ilgiausiai? 
5) EDUCATION: 0 ISSILAVINIMAS: 0 
• Secondary (12 Yrs) o • Vidurinis ri 
• Tertiary (B.A. + M.A. 5Yrs) 0 • Aukstasis 0 
• Doctorate (PhD) D • Aspirantura IT 
6) OCCUPATION: 	 UZIMTUMAS: 
• Service Sector 0 	• Aptarnavimo sfera 	0 
• Industry: 	 0 	• Pramone: 	 0 
a) Supervisory 0 	a) Vadovavimo sfera 	0 
b) Technical 	 0 	b) Inzinierius 	0 
c) Manual 0 	c) Darbininkas 0 
Please specify the type of industry 
Prasome ivardinti konkrecia sfera 
• Private Business 
• Professional /Specialist 
    
    
CI 	• Privatus verslas 
• Specialistas su 	0 
Please specify Profession 	 Prasome ivardinti konkrecia sriti 
• Student 	 0 	• Studentas/e 	0 
• Other, please specify 	 • Kila sfera: prasome ivardinti 
7) Have you taken part in an environmental protest rally? 	yin 
Ar esate dalyvaves (-usi) ekologineje protesto demonstacijoje? taip/ne 
8) Did you take part in any independence rallies? 	yin 
Ar esate dalyvaves (-usi) Lietuvos Nepriklausomybes demonstracijose? 
taip/ne 
401 
9) Are you a registered member of this Green group? 	y/n 
Ar esate uregustryitas suis zakuyhus gryoes barts? 	taip/ne 
10) To what extent do you take part in the group's activities? 
Kolciu mastu dalyvaujate sios grupes veikloje? 
• very active 	 fl 	• labai aktyviai 
	
0 
• active 	 • aktyviai 
	
El 
• occasional participation 	• retkarciais 0 
• non-participatory 	 • nedalyvauju 	El 
11) How would you rate the state of the environment in Lithuania? 






0 	• labai gerai 	Li 
0 	• gerai 	 0 
0 	• patenkinamai 	0 
0 	• blogai 	 0 
0 	• labai blogai 	0 
12) What are the major environmental problems (if any) in Lithuania: List 3. 





13) Why do you think these problems exist? 
Kodel Jus manote, jog sios problemos egzistuoja 
14) What do you see as the major problems for the Global environment? List 3 





15) Do you have contact with any Green groups from other countries? y/n 
Which countries? 
Ar palaikote rysius su uzsienio saliu zaliuju grupemis? 	taip/ne 
Su kuriomis salimis? 
16) Would you vote for a Lithuanian Greens Candidate? 	y/n/u 
Ar balsuotumete uz Lietuvos zaliuju kandidata? taip/ne/nezinau 
17) Do you expect the environmental situation to change now that Lithuania is 
an independent country? 	y/n/u Explain. 
Ar manote, kad ekologine padetis pasikeis, Lietuvai tapus Nepriklausoma 
valstybe? 	 taip/ne/nezinau. Pateikite savo argumentus. 
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• under 18 	0 	AMZIUS 	• iki 18 
• 18-25 El • 18-25 
• 26-35 • 26-35 0 
• 36-50 	0 	 • 36-50 
• 50+ 0 • 50+ 
• F/M 	LYTIS 	• Vyr/Mot 
   
4) Where in Lithuania have you lived most? 
Kurioje Lietuvos vietoveje gyvenote ilgiausiai? 
5) EDUCATION: 	 0 	ISSILAVINIMAS: 	0 
• Secondary (12 Yrs) 0 • Vidurinis 	 0 
• Tertiary (BA + MA 5Yrs) 	0 	• Aukstasis  
• Doctorate (PhD) 	 0 	• Aspirantura 	n L___ 
6a)Where did you come from to study in Vilnius/Kaunas? 
Is kur esate atvykes/-usi mokytis i Vilniu/Kauna? 
6b)Faculty: 
Fakultetas: 
7) How would you rate the state of the environment in Lithuania? 






0 	• labai gerai 	0 
0 	• gerai 	 0 
0 • patenkinamai 	0 
0 	• blogai 	 0 
0 	• labai blogai 	0 
8) What are the major environmental problems (if any) in Lithuania: List 3. 






9) Why do you think these problems exist? 
Kodel Jus manote, jog sios problemos egzistuoja? 
10)What do you see as the major problems for the Global environment? List 3. 
Kokios, Jusu nuomone, yra pagrindines pasaulio ekolgines problemos? 
Isvardinkite 3. 
1) 
   
    
2) 
3) 
   
    
11)Are you a registered member of a Green group? yin 
Ar esate iregistruotas zaliuju gupes narys? 	taip/ne 
12)To what extent do you take part in the group's activities? 
Kokiu mastu dalyvaujate sios grupes veikloje? 
• very active LI • labai aktyviai LI 
• active a • aktyviai LI 
• occasional participation a • retkarciais LI 
• non-participatory a • nedalyvauju o 
13)Have you taken part in an environmental protest rally? 	yin 
Ar esate dalyvaves (-usi) ekologineje protesto demonstacijoje? taip/ne 
14)Did you take part in any independence rallies? yin 
Ar esate dalyvaves 	Lietuvos Nepriklausomybes demonstracijose? 
taip/ne 
15)Would you vote for a Lithuanian Greens Candidate? 	y/n/u 
Ar balsuotumete uz Lietuvos zaliuju kandidata? 	taip/ne/nezinau 
16)Do you expect the environmental situation to change now that Lithuania is 
an independent country? 	y/n/u Explain 
Ar manote, kad ekologine padetis pasikeis, Lietuvai tapus Nepriklausoma 
valstybe? 	taip/ne/nezinau Pateikite savo argumentus. 
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